Narrating Hegemony:

Cultural Diplomacy, International Information and the Language of Power in US Foreign Policy, 1936-1953.

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A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy

of the Australian National University

This work contains no material which has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma in any university or other tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and belief, contains no material previously published or written by another person, except where due reference has been made in the text.



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ABSTRACT

This thesis examines how American cultural and informational diplomacy policy was formulated during the 1936-53 period. The central line of enquiry is to determine how the language in which policy initiatives were debated and implemented determined the kinds of cultural and informational strategies that Washington adopted, and how these linguistic practices in turn shaped Washington's posture of global hegemony after the Second World War. I interpret the emergence of the Cold War propaganda struggle in US grand strategy as an outcome of the ways in which US officials had represented America as the dominant cultural and informational actor within the post-war global order. In the course of developing this overarching argument, my study emphasises the key role played by the concepts of liberalism and American exceptionalism in constituting Washington's foreign relations during the period under review. I draw on constructivist theories of International Relations to interrogate the enabling and constitutive functions of discourse in foreign policy-making. There are three case studies, which are structured provide a cross sectional view of Washington's cultural and informational programs: American bilateral cultural diplomacy; the informational diplomacy of the Voice of America radio station; and US diplomacy within the multilateral United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation. Through an analysis of archival records from each of the programs I compare how US foreign policy was articulated within the context of these three aspects of US cultural and informational diplomacy.

INTRODUCTION

> Never before in the history of the United States, or of the Revolution which produced it, has the basic idea of that Revolution, the creative idea of that history, dominated the world as it does today...the people [are] on the march throughout the world...the idea of the people- the idea of the liberty and value of the people... on the march throughout the world...the idea of the people will be the final victor when this war is done.[1]
>
> *Annuit Coeptis.*[2]

With the American entry into the Second World War on December 8, 1941, United States foreign policy was set on a course that brought about foundational changes to the practices and principles of international politics. For at least four decades the US had possessed the world's largest economy and had pursued steadily deepening foreign policy ties with the Western Hemisphere, Asia, and Europe. Despite this, before 1941 Washington's vast capacity for influence within world politics had not been fully realised. This changed with the extensive national effort that the Second World War drew from the US government, as it mobilised an extensive military campaign on two continents, underwrote the rebuilding of economically devastated regions after the war, and sponsored the formalisation of the war's settlement within a range of multilateral global institutions.

Underlying Washington's effort to reconstitute the international order at the end of the Second World War was a relatively new and still-crystallising acceptance of the idea that to ensure America's future stability and prosperity, alongside that of other nations, US power must remain firmly embedded within the international system. The process of embedding US power globally differed from simply projecting influence because it naturalised a posture of international engagement within US foreign policy, and because US power was deployed to underpin new institutions, regimes, and behavioural norms within the international system. The cultivation of this kind of engagement in world politics rested in turn upon the idea that America's political purposes and spiritual promise had global resonance, and that

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[1] Archibald MacLeish, "The American Certainty," *Department of State Bulletin* 2269, (February 18, 1945), p. 239.

[2] Reverse of the Great Seal of the United States, translation: *Providence has favoured our undertakings.*

the terms upon which Washington would assume a posture of hegemonic engagement with world politics could be cognisant with the spirit of American politics and culture. As H. W. Brands has reflected, and as the quotations above suggest, the singularity US foreign policy during the Second World War period is that it was founded on the idea of global 'vindicationism.' Seeking vindication of the self through global engagement, according to Brands, stemmed from an "abiding belief that the United States has an obligation to improve the world." The turn to vindicationism rested upon on a sensibility, not exclusive to the United States but nonetheless one to which its political culture is particularly conducive, that cast America's global position in exceptional terms: as a political order that was at once singular and universal, whose foreign policy in this moment of upheaval was not guided by parochial self-interest, but rather by an ability to bring about the regeneration and betterment of other societies. "[I]n seeing the welfare of the world and the welfare of the United States as being of a piece," America's post-war foreign policy was thus to be envisaged, and indeed lauded, as a "forward defence of democracy" and a "beacon of virtue."[3]

This study examines the ways in which the shift in 1936-53 toward a posture of American hegemony and vindicationism was enabled by a process of internal debate that altered the shared ideas about America's role in world politics. I survey the terms of this identity shift through the lens of the State Department's cultural and informational diplomacy programs. I shall argue that these areas of foreign policy, which are, by definition, bound up with the pursuit of ideological influence and legitimacy within global public opinion were highly conducive to dialogue about the sources of America's influence and the nature of its singularity as a world power during the 1936-53 transition. As my analysis of foreign policy-making within these programs will show, the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy were a key site at which American history and political culture, its intellectual resources and cultural transitions, were fashioned into constitutive principles for a post-war global order underwritten by American power.

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[3] H. W. Brands, "Exemplary America versus Interventionist America," in *At the End of the American Century: America's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Robert L. Hutchings, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 30-1. See also, Anatol Lieven, *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, (Harper Perennial: London, 2005).

In adopting cultural and informational diplomacy as a vantage point from which to survey the connections between conceptions of American identity and US foreign policy, my study takes a rather different view of the practices of international persuasion than the prevailing contemporary approaches. I differ in my conceptual framework from studies of 'soft power' and 'public diplomacy' in that I treat the diplomacy of public persuasion not simply as a tool of state influence, but also as a policy practice through which a state's position and interests as an international agent are articulated, fixed, and at times contested and altered.[4] This study draws instead on a major theoretical movement within International Relations that explains state behaviour in terms of how collectively shared perceptions of 'self' shape the determination of national interests, and sees ongoing interactions between states as a source of inter-subjective understandings that structure international behaviour. This 'constructivist' theoretical perspective is underpinned by the proposition that a key feature of power in world politics inheres within the "social relations [between international agents, that] define who the actors are and what capacities and practices they are socially empowered to undertake."[5] Foreign policy, in this view, is a practice that is bound up with the social construction of international relations, since in the process of articulating policy imperatives state officials "populate...[the international realm] with objects and subjects, endow those subjects with interests, and define the relations between those objects and subjects."[6] The constructivist conception of power, as partly deriving from how agents are endowed with capacities by virtue of their social position, is central to my argument about the changing self-perceptions that account for America's changing posture toward international politics during 1936-53. In so doing, I shall attempt to demonstrate that cultural and informational diplomacy represents a particularly appropriate site at which to study the social aspects of power in international relations that constructivists engage with.[7]

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[4] I survey these approaches and how I differ from them in the discussion below, and in chapter one. See, e.g. Joseph Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004); on 'public diplomacy' as a tool of international influence see Jan Melissen, "The New Public Diplomacy: Between Theory and Practice," in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[5] Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, (no. 1, Winter 2005), p. 46.

[6] Jutta Weldes, et. al., "Introduction: Constructing Insecurity," in Jutta Weldes, et. al. eds. *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 14.

[7] The account of the forms of power in international relations that I draw on in this argument is: Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics." On identity see also: Alexander Wendt,

In assessing the implications of these dialogues about America's identity and how Washington should relate to the international during the formulation of the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs, my study sits alongside a broad range of other studies covering the 1936-53 period, most of which have examined Washington's deployment of other forms of power such as military influence, economic power, and structural dominance via international institutions.[8] This study's account of how Washington set about courting international public opinion, and how new ideas about America's rightful role and prerogatives as a world power were articulated in the process, can illuminate an aspect of US power that can complement existing studies of the deployment of more material forms of international influence by Washington during this period.[9] As such, I do not attempt to supplant existing historiographies of the military, economic, and institutional aspects of US foreign policy during the broader Second World War period. Rather, my aim here is to show that American policy in the arenas of cultural and informational diplomacy can illustrate how more diffuse identity conceptions that were cultivated, both internationally and endogenously, helped to enable Washington's changing material position in global politics during 1936-53.

"Collective Identity Formation and the International State," *American Political Science Review* 88, (no. 2: June, 1994).

[8] On the projection of American military influence see: John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972); John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982). On the projection of American economic power see, e.g. Louis W. Pauley, *Who Elected the Bankers? Surveillance and Control in the World Economy*, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1997); William Appleman Williams, *The Tragedy of American Diplomacy*, new ed., (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1972). On institutions see: Susan Strange, *States and Markets*, 2nd ed., (London: Pinter, 1994); G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001); John Gerard Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). An important study that examines both elements of structural influence and the projection of ideological or 'soft' power in relation to Washington's global hegemonic role is Robinson's study of the democratising project within US foreign policy: William I. Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy: Globalization, US Intervention, and Hegemony*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

[9] Key examples that also deal with this aspect of America's hegemonic moment will be discussed below. See, e.g. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, rev. ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of North-South Relations*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006).

The policies of international persuasion that the US adopted during 1936-53 had two broad dimensions: cultural diplomacy programs consisting of cultural and educational exchanges, cultural exhibits and the provision of cultural institutions; and international informational diplomacy, the cornerstone of which was international radio broadcasting. The cultural program was initially confined to an inter-American context after its establishment in 1936, while US informational diplomacy, which began with operations in Europe, the Americas and Asia, was founded in 1941. Both programs were extended geographically according to the requirements of the war and its settlement, yet they remained relatively modest in cost and scale, compared to the programs of other great powers, throughout the 1936-53 period. The American cultural diplomacy program expanded to include US involvement in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (Unesco) from 1944, which is scrutinised here as a case study in its own right because it illustrates how American cultural diplomacy was practised within a multilateral context.

That cultural and informational diplomacy provides such an important aperture onto the changing propositions about American identity as a world power is partly attributable to the fact that during the Second World War period these were new and somewhat controversial policies in Washington. Although propaganda was a routine and widely accepted feature of European statecraft by 1939, for almost two decades after the First World War official persuasion was deemed in many spheres of American popular and academic opinion an undemocratic practice at both the domestic and international levels. This position was generally staked upon American public criticism of the perceived excesses of Woodrow Wilson's domestic propaganda policy during the war.[10] With the success of Axis international propaganda in the mid-1930s, the idea of an American policy of international public advocacy began to gain a measure of qualified public and political acceptance. Nonetheless, with this background of public and academic critique of propaganda, the founding of an official cultural and informational diplomacy programs was bound up with lingering questions in the minds of US officials as to how they might effectively address the moral and political quandaries that were bound up with the practice of international public persuasion.

[10] I survey these inter-war debates in chapter two. In it I shall draw on J. Michael Sproule's exhaustive study of US academic perspectives on propaganda and mass communications. J. Michael Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

Furthermore, Washington's engagement with US cultural and informational diplomacy provides insight into the endogenous constitution of American hegemony by virtue of the idealistic and long-term scope of international persuasion activities. In other words, despite the seemingly peripheral role of international persuasion practices in relation to matters of high politics, it was precisely these areas of foreign policy in which a long-term vision for the global order and moral justifications for American power could be articulated freely. Numerous bureaucratic reorganisations and a general hostility toward international persuasion policies on the part of Congress did not dampen the tendency among cultural and informational diplomats to represent American cultural and informational practices as central to the fulfilment of America's international moral and political obligations. The archival record of US cultural and informational diplomacy is replete with instances in which US policies were rendered in the most evocative and far-reaching of terms, such as Assistant Secretary of State William Benton's assertion that:

> The United States is the only country which combines the qualities of moral leadership with the resources necessary to carry out a program of international information and cultural affairs based on principles international in their validity, free from narrow bias and from special pleading. Our leadership can be vital at a time when the world is in the midst of...a 'riot of propaganda.'[11]

Similar sentiments were expressed by Secretary of State Dean Acheson, when he claimed that America's culture and ideas served to highlight "the essential bond of common beliefs, and common interests that underlie differences in national customs and circumstances."[12] The stated repudiation of 'propaganda' as a description of US policies served to highlight America's special propensity for the cultural and informational enlightenment of others. The first director of the US's cultural diplomacy programs, Ben M. Cherrington, had thus charged that US policies could not be considered "propaganda in the popular sense of the term which carries with it implications of penetration, imposition and unilateralism," but rather as a program "definitely educational in character which emphasises the essential reciprocity in

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[11] William Benton (1947) quoted in James R. Vaughn, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57: Unconquerable Minds*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 238-9.

[12] Dean Acheson, "Support for an Expanded Information and Education Program," *Department of State Bulletin* 3913, (July 17, 1950), pp. 100-1.

cultural relations."[13] As Adolf Berle, a prominent figure in the Franklin Roosevelt State Department, put it in 1939: "we have looked at conventional propaganda and regard it as unworthy of respect. In its place we have discovered the enrichment that comes from the sharing of our intellectual inheritances."[14] US Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen similarly contended that the US was a singular agent in the field of international persuasion in that it would not suffer from portraying itself truthfully: Americans were "not obliged to present ourselves to the world as models of perfection...the United States has so many virtues to overcome the shortcomings that we need not fear the effect of our being thoroughly known abroad."[15] The shared premise here was that the "American concept of democracy is rooted in the very nature of the people themselves,"[16] and thus:

> Our strongest asset continues to be truth- truth about our world-wide motives and objectives, truth concerning these facts and events which have a bearing on our policy and which are denied to others, truth concerning the consequences of systems of government and policies based on other than democratic and peaceful principles.[17]

Such rhetorical commonplaces in US cultural and informational policy debate indicate that cultural and informational diplomacy was highly conducive to far-reaching debate on the nature of America and its significance within the global order. This study is structured as an analysis of the impacts and implications of these debates.

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[13] Ben M. Cherrington quoted in J. Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy 1936-1948*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 140.

[14] Adolf Berle, "Cooperative Peace in the Western Hemisphere: Address by Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle Delivered at George Washington University Winter Conference on Inter-American Affairs, Washington DC, December 5, 1939," *Department of State Bulletin* 1413, (December 9, 1939), p. 662.

[15] George V. Allen, quoted in Lloyd Leheras, "Information Please, International," *The American Foreign Service Journal* 25, (no. 9, 1948), p. 10.

[16] Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, "Operational Guidance on OWI Documentary Films. Nov 24, 1944," p. 3; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

[17] "US Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda," (no author), Dec 1, 1947, p. 2; Records of the International Information Activities 1938-1953; [Box 122]; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

The Research Program and Objectives of this Study

My study seeks to show how, in the course of formulating strategies for cultural and informational diplomacy, American foreign policy-makers discursively represented America and its changing global role during 1936-53. The basic insight underpinning my focus on language and foreign policy-making is that the kinds of discursive frameworks within which US policy-makers operated shaped the kinds of cultural and informational policies could be contemplated and adopted within the programs. Moreover, in undertaking to show how American cultural and informational practices were constituted by the language in which policy was articulated, my analysis can be extended rather further to suggest how this process of articulating America's approach to cultural and informational diplomacy was implicated in the transformation of Washington's foreign policy posture at a more general level. I develop this argument through an investigation of the following two research questions:

1. What were the key developments in American cultural and informational diplomacy during the 1936-53 period?

2. How did the articulation of US cultural and informational policy enable the cultivation of international influence by Washington during 1936-53?

In answering these questions, I show how Washington's post-war posture of engagement with the international system was constituted, and how it was to an extent *made possible*, by shared self-perceptions that were fixed and reproduced in the course of cultural and informational diplomacy debates and announcements. Policy debates within the areas of US cultural and informational diplomacy at the founding of the programs drew on existing principles of American political culture. These principles in turn nourished the kinds of self-perceptions that were needed for Washington to step into a hegemonic global role as the end of the Second World War drew close. In the immediate aftermath of the Second World War, the kinds of self-perceptions that cultural and informational diplomats articulated during the early phases of their work found a particularly strong resonance in the context of US plans to restructure the international order according to liberal principles. It is significant,

too, that the language in which US cultural and informational policies were formulated during the Second World War and its aftermath were subsequently generative of the Manichaean terms of the ideological rivalry that developed between the US and the USSR during the 1940s.

In drawing on the traditions of American political culture to structure Washington's cultural and informational diplomacy, two themes were particularly resonant: liberalism; and the idea that America's historical and political experience was exceptional. In drawing on these pre-existing traditions of American thought as a prism through which contemporary foreign policy challenges were understood, US cultural and informational officials fashioned symbolic tools and constituted a conception of the American 'self' that had profound implications for the way in which America's cultural and informational diplomacy programs were constituted. Liberalism and exceptionalism were mobilised in the course of US cultural and informational policy-making within several general types of discursive practice, all of which functioned in different ways to constitute subjects and organise experience pertaining to foreign policy. In the chapters to follow I will thus show how liberalism, exceptionalism and several related propositions were situated within patterns of discursive representation. These include the location of subjects in the context of their historical narratives; the 'framing' of issues and policies according to shared premises or particular interpretations; the positioning and classification of subjects in relation to each other; and the production of conceptions of 'self' in relation to its 'other.'

Investigating Cultural and Informational Discourse: Theoretical Context of this Study

In undertaking to make this kind of argument about the themes and forms of linguistic self-representation that served to enable US cultural and informational diplomacy, my study draws upon broader debates about the constitution of agents, the sources of state interests, and the nature of power itself within International Relations (IR) theory.[18] As noted above, the construction of US hegemony involved the

[18] I capitalise 'International Relations' when referring to the academic discipline, and use 'international relations' to refer to the realm of international interaction in general. Similarly, 'Diplomatic History' refers to the discrete sub-field of history that engages with the development and implementation of

deployment of several forms of power by Washington, such as military capabilities, economic power, and the establishment of institutional frameworks of international interaction that enshrined American global dominance. An important part of the story of the founding American hegemony was also Europe's extensive wartime devastation and the subsequent willingness on the part of European leaders to accept US economic influence and an ongoing American military foothold within the European continent.[19] But while acknowledging that these factors were key central to the construction of Washington's post-war global hegemony, my study charts an additional dynamic that shaped the form US hegemony ultimately took, namely the acquisition of what Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall refer to as socially 'productive' power. This understanding of power is based on the capacities agents are endowed with via the constitution of inter-subjective meanings and the assumption of mutually understood roles within a social system.[20] The wish to see fulfilment of the political and moral creeds of the 'self' through the communication of these principles abroad- the posture of vindicationism- was an important source of productive power. It was through this new sense of self that Washington conceived of and pursued a hegemonic posture of engagement with the international order during 1936-53.

Stefano Guzzini has summarised this view of power, which is strongly identified with the constructivist theoretical perspective in IR scholarship, as a shift away from traditional conceptions in IR about 'what power means,' to an interest in determining 'what power *does*' in terms of enabling agents to conceive of action and legitimately act in the international system.[21] In articulating this position, constructivist theories of IR seek to problematise the prevailing rational-actor assumptions and materialist conceptions of the ontology of world politics. Rationalist

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foreign policy, whereas 'diplomatic history' refers to the development and implementation of particular foreign policy initiatives over time.

[19] Gier Lundestad's well-known thesis on America's 'empire by invitation' is not entirely discounted by my study. His analysis is an important corrective to the historiography of the post-war settlement which has tended to focus solely on US agency in this phase of world politics. How does my study sit with his argument? The 'invitation' that was made to extend US economic assistance in the post-war years was received as positive feedback to the hegemonic posture that was resonant within cultural and informational policy debates from 1936. Washington's responsibility to supply Europe with ongoing security and economic assistance confirmed the vindicationist premise that had been articulated within the discourses of US cultural and informational diplomacy. Gier Lundestad, "'Empire By Invitation' in the American Century," in *The Ambiguous Legacy: US Foreign Relations in the 'American Century,'* ed. Michael J. Hogan, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

[20] Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics."

[21] Stefano Guzzini, "A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 6, (no. 2, 2000), p. 171.

approaches are seen in this light as united by the presumption that national interests can be exogenously determined because states are self-interested actors that engage strategically with the international realm. When states act within the system of international 'anarchy,' rationalists expect that strategic, utility-maximising calculation will determine the content of national interests. Hence, predictions about state behaviour can be made with reference to a state's position within the international system- for example, a position within a balance of power, or a situation of inter-dependence with other states through institutional, security or economic ties.[22]

The social constructivist perspective in International Relations is a diverse theoretical approach united by a commitment to the critical point that, in practice, state interests cannot be explained entirely on the basis of utility-maximising calculations, as rationalists expect. Rather, for constructivists, state behaviour derives from shared knowledge and norms that give meaning to action. Endogenous processes of self-representation and the inter-subjective meanings that develop in the course of ongoing international interaction lead to the development of state 'identities,' which shape the content of their national interests.[23] As Alexander Wendt's often-quoted critique of rationalism charged; "anarchy is what states make of it," because states

> act toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the meanings that the objects have for them. States act differently toward enemies than they do toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are not. It is collective meanings that constitute the structures which organise our actions... Actors acquire identities- relatively stable, role-specific

[22] A good summary of the constructivist critique of the two main rationalist theoretical perspectives in International Relations: neorealism and neoliberalism, can be found in Christian Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," in *Theories of International Relations*, ed. Scott Burchill et. al., 3rd edition, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996); see also, on the neo-utilitarian orthodoxy in IR scholarship: John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, (no. 4: Autumn 1998). On the inferred character of national interests in rationalist theory see also Peter J. Katzenstein, "Introduction: Alternative Perspectives on National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Jennifer Milliken's account of the discursive practices approach also provides a useful critique of the notions of scientism within rationalist approaches. Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, (no. 2, 1999). A brief history of the national interest as an analytical concept in International Relation scholarship is supplied in James N. Rosenau, *The Scientific Study of Foreign Policy*, (New York: The Free Press, 1971), Ch. 8.

[23] Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," pp. 216-7.

> understandings and expectations about self- by participating in such collective meanings.[24]

The collective meanings that constitute state identities arise from ongoing patterns of international cooperation and interaction, which socialise states into adopting particular interests, as well as from the ways in which national leaders and officials conceptualise their place in the international order through the policy debates, declarations and rituals that accompany the practices of foreign policy and diplomacy.

This broadens our understanding of what kind of process foreign policy-making actually is. A constructivist account of foreign policy does not simply seek to explain how particular foreign policy decisions are made, but also how the various possibilities that are contemplated in the context of foreign policy decision-making are mediated by state identities. Shared meanings and representations determine what policy-makers view as the possible options from which policy decisions can be made by orienting the practice of decision-making within a set of collectively shared propositions about the national subject on whose behalf they are acting and the international 'realities' they face.[25] The key implication of this move is that foreign policy is viewed not simply as a site of utility-maximising behaviour driven by the material interests of states, but rather as a practice through which subjects within world politics are themselves:

> produced, reproduced and transformed through the discursive practices of [policy] actors. More specifically, interests *emerge* out of the representations that define for actors the situations and events they face...Meanings are produced in representations made possible by particular discourses- that is, intersubjective structures of meaning-in-use- that provide categories through which we represent and understand the world.[26]

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[24] Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organisation* 24, (no. 2, Spring 1992), pp. 396-7. Elsewhere, Wendt identifies three core propositions of constructivism, which my study and other accounts that focus specifically on discourse, largely concur with. "(1) States are the principal units of analysis for international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjectives, rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system of by human nature or domestic politics." Wendt, "Collective Identity Formation," p. 385. See also Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit, "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism," *European Journal of International Relations* 4, (no. 3, 1998), pp. 266-7.

[25] Jamie Gaskarth, "Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, (vol. 4, 1006), p. 326. On 'how possible' explanations in social science see also Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, 'Introduction;' Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, Ch. 2.

[26] Jutta Weldes, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, (no. 2, November 1998), p. 218.

Discursive representation is important within foreign policy-making because "the possibility of practices presupposes the ability of an agent to imagine certain courses of action. Certain background meanings, kinds of social actors and relationships, must already be in place," and the language in which agents operate is indicative of these meanings.[27] As Roxanne Doty contends, linguistic "representation is an inherent and important aspect of global political life...[i]nternational relations are inextricably bound up with discursive practices that put into circulation representations that are taken as 'truth.'"[28] The discursive representations studied here thus illustrate how new truisms about the content of American national interests gained traction within the cultural and informational diplomacy programs and also permeated beyond them, based on how the language of foreign policy reflected the emergence of new "systems of knowledge through which meaning [was] produced, fixed, lived, experienced, and transformed." [29] Of particular importance in the generation of meanings is the extent to which international agents understand and articulate their identities in *relation to* others, and this is one of the key processes that the discursive practices approach seeks to engage with.[30] As I shall illustrate in the forthcoming chapter, the existing constructivist literature that has explored the connections between discursive representation and the formulation of foreign policy provides some general analytical tools to engage in a structured way with empirical cases. I use four key tools for the purposes of this study: the location of 'self' in relation to its 'other'; the situating of subjects in the context of historical relationships and developments; the framing of policies and issues according to figurative premises; and the positioning of subjects and objects in relation to each other. A

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[27] Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, (no. 3, 1993), pp. 168, 298-9. Mattern's analysis of the connections between identity and causal explanation also fleshes out how this 'how-possible' mode of explanation is constructed. See Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force*, (New York: Routledge Book, 2005), Ch 1.

[28] Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, p. 5.

[29] Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," p. 55.

[30] In emphasising the relational conception of identity, Lene Hansen's account of discursive practices and foreign policy diverges from Wendt's rendition of constructivism. It is thus significant to note that while I have located the discursive practices approach within a broader constructivist framework, work such as Hansen's also problematises the idea that states can bring 'pre-social' identities to international interaction. There are thus some points of ongoing debate between within the constructivist approach. See, Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, (London: Routledge, 2006), Ch. 2.

more detailed examination of this conceptual framework and how I intend to implement it shall be discussed in the next chapter.

One of the most important implications of the account of power and the connections between discourse and foreign policy-making that has been developed by these constructivist scholars is that a broader understanding of the nature of America's global hegemony can be developed.[31] This is because the kind of subjectivity- that is, the shared conceptions of what America was and what it stood for in the context of global politics- that informed how Washington constructed its hegemonic position in global politics after 1945 can be elucidated within the terms of a constructivist theoretical framework. A constructivist approach can illumate the way in which US cultural and informational diplomacy practices rested upon particular beliefs about international social subject positions, and how Washington set about constructing its authority within the hearts and minds of foreign publics accordingly. Most importantly, in terms of this study, adopting a constructivist approach can show how US hegemony was enabled by an endogenous "self-referential or self-justifying" process that legitimated the projection of America's

[31] In emphasising the inter-subjective aspect of hegemony, my work differs from the (largely economic) conception of American hegemony mobilised within the 'hegemonic stability thesis' that was influential in debates on US power and the international system during the 1980s. I emphasise the social and discursive foundations of hegemony, while the hegemonic stability thesis instead focuses on how the material fact of hegemony shapes the rational incentive structures of states in favour of cooperation. In emphasising the social and discursive foundations of hegemony, I share many of the interests of the 'neo-Gramscian' conception of hegemony (drawing on the conception of the 'historic bloc' or 'hegemonic bloc' articulated in the 1920s by the Italian Marxist scholar Antonio Gramsci), but do not accompany these scholars in their Marxian argument that the ideological and discursive elements of hegemony are wholly function of economic domination. On hegemonic stability see: Paul Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict From 1500 to 2000*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1987); David P. Calleo and Benjamin M. Rowland, *America and the World Political Economy: Atlantic Dreams and National Realities*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973); Joseph S. Nye, Jr. and Robert O. Keohane, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics and Transition*, (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1977); Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984). An important critique of the hegemonic stability thesis is: Bruce Russet, "The Mysterious Case of Vanishing Hegemony; or, Is Mark Twain Really Dead?," *International Organization* 39, (no. 2, Spring 1985). A rationalist account of hegemonic stability and US power that sought to take into account 'socialisation' is: G. John Ikenberry, and Charles A. Kupchan, "Socialization and Hegemonic Power," *International Organization* 44, (no. 3, Summer 1990). Among neo-Gramscian studies of hegemony, two of the best accounts that pertain to US hegemony are: Robinson, *Promoting Polyarchy*; Mark Rupert, *Producing Hegemony: The Politics of Mass Production and American Global Power*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). See also Antonio Gramsci, *Selected Writings 1916-1935*, ed. David Forgacs, (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1988).

influence globally.[32] In the forthcoming chapters I shall thus reflect extensively on the nature of American hegemony and how it was constructed in 1936-53, especially in terms of how the endogenous, self-justifying, and socially productive functions of foreign policy discourse helped to found the hegemonic structure of post-war authority and dominance upon which post-war US foreign relations were based. In the next section I will indicate how I structure this study in terms of its case studies, methodology, terminology, and the layout of the argument in the chapters to follow.

Design of this Study: Methodology and Case Studies

Case Studies

This study is structured as a cross-sectional comparison of three case studies from within the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs from 1936-53: the State Department's Division of Cultural Relations; the Voice of America radio station; and the US's diplomatic mission to Unesco.[33] Considered together, these policy divisions reflect the spectrum of the State Department's approaches to the diplomacy of international persuasion in the period studied here. The rationale behind structuring the case studies in this way is that synchronic, cross-sectional analysis can generate a detailed account of the patterns of discursive continuity and change at a particular historical moment. The ways in which policy-makers in each program comprehended and responded to international challenges can be charted and compared across the cases, and in this context I can compare how discursive representations within each of the programs were shaped by the same international issues, such as: the Second World War; the construction of a post-war settlement and the founding of the United Nations Organisation; the rise of fears about Soviet dominance within Europe in 1947-48; and Washington's assumption of the role of Cold War protagonist after 1948. The year 1953 is selected as the end of the period

[32] Here I draw on work in International Relations that is influenced by Max Weber's insight that actors who wish to act through authority perform rituals to legitimate their power. See: Rodney Barker, *Legitimating Identities: The Self-Presentations of Rulers and Subjects*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 13. Although critical of aspects of this Weberian account of legitimacy, another summation of the legitimation activities of powerful agents is noted in: David Beetham, *The Legitimation of Power*, (Atlantic Highlands NJ: Humanities Press International, 1991), pp. 28-31; Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*.

[33] So as not to disrupt the flow of the text, and in keeping with the usage of the term in official Unesco documents of the time, this acronym is not capitalised in my study.

under review due to the extensiveness of President Dwight Eisenhower's administrative reforms to the information programs, and the fact that these symbolised how cultural and informational diplomacy issues had migrated to the centre of US grand strategy concerns during the Cold War.

Several caveats with regard to those areas of policy that are not covered in my study are warranted. First, during 1936-53 the State Department also established a separate program of educational diplomacy after 1946: a consequence largely of Senator J. William Fulbright's vision for bringing about deeper bonds of international understanding after the ravages of the Second World War. Although Fulbright's eponymous educational diplomacy program has come to be regarded as one of the US's most worthwhile policies of international persuasion, for reasons of scope it has not been possible to adopt it as a separate case study in this dissertation. However, my study is not wholly blind to the State Department's engagement with international educational exchange practices: educational exchange activities were overseen by the Division of Cultural Relations for much of the 1936-53 period, and Unesco's ideals and program, which are studied here, were also heavily concerned with international educational interchange on a multilateral scale.[34]

Secondly, it is common to encounter studies that apply the moniker 'cultural diplomacy' to the covert and subversive operations that the superpowers engaged in during the Cold War. I focus, for reasons of scope, on the 'civilian' programs that Washington implemented, although as Frances Stonor Saunders' detailed study of the US Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Cold War activities indicates, the covert cultural programs were replete with similar generative representations in the context of the Cold War to those studied here.[35] The US radio operations Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty are well known to scholars of the Cold War, but as they were

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[34] Neither are the State Department's censorship operations adopted here as a case study. Censorship was an important adjunct to the cultural and informational programs during the Second World War, but they were largely a domestic operation.

[35] In the period covered here, several US agencies conducted cultural activities as a form of psychological warfare, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation's espionage and psychological operations in Latin America prior to the Second World War. The US's wartime intelligence office, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) included a small operational section (the Special Operations Branch), and presided over fairly extensive research into psychological warfare techniques (the Research and Analysis Branch). OSS was disbanded in 1945 and reformed as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in 1947. The CIA undertook extensive cultural and intellectual activities from the late 1940s, outlined with great clarity and detail in: Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, (New York: The New Press, 1999).

initially covert initiatives, and they thus operated under very different assumptions from the 'civilian' State Department programs that are adopted as case studies here. For the same reason, covertly sponsored multilateral cultural and intellectual initiatives such as the Congress for Cultural Freedom fall beyond the scope of my study.[36]

Methodology

As will be clear from the foregoing discussion, I draw extensively within the historical chapters on foreign policy archives and other primary sources in order to show how the articulation of US foreign policy initiatives evolved between 1936 and 1953. In developing this basic historical narrative I draw on the available reports, memoranda and correspondence from the archives of US foreign relations, as well as published memoirs, oral histories and other sources that chart the formation US cultural diplomacy and international information policy. The methodology adopted in these chapters utilises historical description and interpretation to establish an accurate account of the broad outlines of cultural and informational policy initiatives as well as to gather evidence of how US officials represented their work in their own words. In order to answer the theoretical questions within this study, I combine this historical mode of enquiry with an analysis of how particular general forms of linguistic representation that are identified within contemporary studies of discursive practices in foreign policy featured within the discursive representation of US cultural and informational policy in this period.

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[36] On the CIA-sponsored short-wave radio stations Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty see: George R. Urban, *Radio Free Europe and the Pursuit of Democracy: My War Within the Cold War*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). Good accounts of the CIA's relationship with youth and student organisations are supplied in the following: Joël Kotek, "Youth Organisations as a Battlefield in the Cold War," in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945*-1960, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam. (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Karen Paget, "From Stockholm to Leiden: The CIA's Role in the Formation of the International Student Conference," in *The Cultural Cold War in Western Europe 1945*-1960, eds. Giles Scott-Smith and Hans Krabbendam. (London: Frank Cass, 2003); Giles Scott Smith, *The Politics of Apolitical Culture: The Congress for Cultural Freedom, the CIA and Postwar American Hegemony*, (London: Routledge, 2002). On philanthropic activities, particularly the Ford Foundation, and the cultural Cold War, see: Volker R. Berghahn, *America and the Intellectual Cold Wars in Europe: Shepard Stone Between Philanthropy, Academy and Diplomacy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001); Volker R. Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 'American Century," *Diplomatic History* 23, (no 3, Summer 1999).

Terminology

In light of the empirical parameters of this study just outlined, I shall almost always use the phrase 'cultural and information diplomacy' to refer collectively to the three policy programs I have identified as case studies. 'Public diplomacy' and 'political communication' are terms generally applied to international persuasion policies in contemporary IR debates, however neither term was in routine use during 1936-53 and so they are rarely used here. I frequently use the terms 'rhetoric,' 'discourse,' and 'narrative' as each corresponds to a slightly different kind of linguistic function in the context of policy-making. 'Rhetoric' is a process of persuasive argument or 'representational force,' used when agents seek to persuade others to adopt particular renditions policy intentions or approaches over others.[37] 'Discourse' and 'discursive practice' refer here to the propagation of shared representations that capture the premises of foreign policy-making. Following Doty's usage, I deem discourse to be productive in its functions (as opposed to rhetoric, which is persuasive), consisting of interlocking representations which "underlie the production of knowledge and identities and...make various courses of action possible."[38] 'Framing' practices sit within discourses as premises, figurative assumptions or background knowledge through which particular policies or issues were articulated. Finally, 'narratives' pertain to discourses that establish overarching 'stories' of foreign policy by plotting subjects within chronological trajectories and historical relationships.[39]

Establishing a clear definition of 'culture' as it is used in this study is particularly important, given the diverse and contested connotations of the term in social science usage.[40] I use the term here in a way that owes much to the

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[37] In this I follow Mattern's work in particular. Mattern, *Ordering International Politics.*

[38] Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, p. 5

[39] Campbell, *Writing Security*; Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

[40] For many constructivists, culture is used as a term for the dispositional environments within which state interests are defined and agency takes place- a 'decision-making culture.' I do not adopt the constructivist definition here. On the constructivist view of decision-making or 'strategic' culture see, e.g.: Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity and Culture in National Security," in *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997); Reus-Smit, "Constructivism," pp. 210-1. In this sense, constructivists adopt a sociological view of culture, not an anthropological one, and have been inspired

anthropological definition of culture as a cluster of national aesthetic dispositions.[41] To adopt this definition is not to settle the extensive social scientific debates about the nature of culture- an 'essentially contested concept' as Clifford Geertz puts it- but rather to chart the aesthetic and political judgements that policy-makers made about American culture in the course of framing cultural diplomacy strategies.[42] 'Culture' in my usage is an artefact of foreign policy discourse: specific assessments about what was most emblematic of 'America' were made from a wide spectrum of cultural artefacts or propositions available to policy-makers for their international purposes.

'Political culture' is a term that will be used frequently in this study. Although the study of political culture within comparative politics has been subject to some significant critiques since the 1960s, the term is useful for the purposes of this analysis. In the course of framing definitions of 'America' to export, policy-makers made judgements about the 'character of mind' in which Americans engage in political life, and reflected on how these ideas and practices might be mobilised within world politics.[43] 'Political culture' has in some work been cast as an alternative term to 'ideology,' since the latter refers to a set of beliefs a subject actively subscribes to, as opposed to the 'political culture' populations are socialised *into*. But since this dissertation is concerned with the definitional process of how political dispositions were *represented* in the context of policy-making, drawing this type of distinction between political culture and ideology creates needless

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by work such as that of Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, (no. 2, 1986).

[41] On the anthropological view of culture see: Julie Reeves, *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists*, (Abington: Routledge, 2004).

[42] Following Lapid's suggestion that culture be considered an 'emergent' concept, and Clifford Geertz's warning of the perils of seeking closure for an 'essentially contested concept,' however, I acknowledge the limitations of this anthropological definition beyond the confines of this account. Yosef Lapid, "Culture's Ship: Returns and Departures in International Relations Theory," in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Clifford Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays by Clifford Geertz*, (London: Huchinson, 1975).

[43] One of the most influential definitions of political culture (as 'civic culture') see: Gabriel A. Almond, "The Intellectual History of the Civic Culture Concept," in *The Civic Culture Revisited*, eds. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba. (London: Sage, 1989). The foundation for studies of US political culture as the American 'character of mind' see: Alexis De Tocqueville, *Democracy in America and Two Essays on America*, trans. Gerald E. Bevan, Penguin Edition (London: Penguin, 2003). On the development of the concept in comparative politics and its failure to achieve a workable operational definition see: Ruth Lane, "Political Culture: Residual Category of General Theory?," *Comparative Political Studies* 25, (no. 3, October 1992). A recent collection of essays draws on national collective memory, and as such usefully engages with the implications of political culture and national identity in foreign policy. See: Duncan Bell, "Introduction: Memory, Trauma and World Politics," in *Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship Between Past and Present*, ed. Duncan Bell, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan).

complexity. I use both terms to refer to the storehouse of US political principles and practices that US cultural and informational officials drew on to *represent* America to other populations and as self-perceptions. The term 'political culture' differs from 'mass culture' or 'popular culture' in the vocabulary of this study. American mass/popular culture was often projected alongside the communication of precepts of US political culture, or framed in official practices as an illustration of US political culture. But mass/popular culture are terms used here for the artistic and entertainment products produced and consumed by American society, some of which may convey elements of US political norms, but not by necessity.

Finally, 'propaganda' is understood for the purposes of my analysis as a straw figure of US foreign policy discourse, rather than as a practice with essential or inherent characteristics to distinguish it from cultural diplomacy or international information. The history of propaganda and the tradition of American propaganda critiques will be surveyed in some depth in chapter two, and I defer giving a detailed account of the origins of the term and practices until then. It shall suffice to note here that in seeking to understand how the constitution of American identity took place through the representation of American policy, the construction of 'propaganda' as a category of action, distinct in particular ways from Washington's innovative and singular 'cultural diplomacy' or 'informational diplomacy,' is an objective of this study. Hence, propaganda is not defined as an inherently manipulative practice or in practical terms as essentially different from cultural and informational diplomacy within in my discussion.[44] A basic general definition of propaganda as international political advocacy through informational or cultural mechanisms will suffice.

The Layout of This Study

In chapter one I elucidate the threads of my study's argument and the nature of its contribution to IR, illustrating in more depth the overarching thesis developed in my work concerning the constitutive significance of cultural and informational diplomacy discourse in relation to Washington's wider role as an international agent.

[44] The term 'propaganda' had religious origins as a non-pejorative term for propagating ideas or truth. However, during the 1930s the term had acquired its pejorative definition in America and Britain. In chapter two I engage with the intellectual history of the US 'anti-propaganda' debates, and the discursive process through which US policy-makers overcame this prevailing sentiment is charted in the case study chapters.

I elaborate on the role that discourses of liberalism and American exceptionalism played in terms of how new ideas about America's global role were articulated, drawing on the insights of constructivist theories of foreign policy. My conceptual framework, drawn from the discursive practices literature within constructivism, will be illustrated. I shall show how the discourses of US cultural and informational diplomacy fall into various categories of discursive practice, such as: the articulation of self/other, or 'alterity;' narratives; the framing of policies and issues; and the positioning of subjects through grammatical 'predication.' In the forthcoming chapter I also specify the relationship between my work to other contemporary accounts of cultural and informational diplomacy within the disciplines of International Relations and Diplomatic History.

Chapter two constitutes the beginning of this study's historical component. I chart the rise of propaganda as an instrument of international politics and the political debates in the US and Europe that accompanied these new foreign policy practices. The discussion also surveys the use of cultural and educational interchange in Europe, China and Latin America by American philanthropic organisations and other non-government institutions, since these practices served as a basis for the official programs. My discussion also traces the extension and deepening of US foreign relations in general during the inter-war years, questioning in the process the 'isolationist' moniker that is often applied to US foreign relations during this period. This sets the stage for the case studies to follow, in which I survey the establishment of the American bilateral cultural diplomacy, international information, and Unesco programs.

My first case study is surveyed in chapter three, in which I examine the founding and expansion of bilateral cultural diplomacy administered by the State Department's Division of Cultural Relations.[45] The Division was initially founded to implement five educational and cultural exchange treaties signed at the 1936 Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires. Prevailing discourses of American cultural diplomacy in this early phase emphasised the long-term diplomatic impacts of the search for inter-American cultural understanding. The extension of the cultural diplomacy program to a global scale was prompted by US involvement in the Second World War. Cultural operations were extended first to China, then to the Middle

[45] The Division was subject to several name changes throughout the period surveyed here.

East, South Asia and Western Europe, and in the immediate post-war period to the defeated and Allied-occupied Axis regions as part of a wider policy of ideological reorientation. I argue that representations of American culture as embodying universal, liberal democratic principles were implicated in the construction of Washington's new role as a globally dominant power within the post-war order. I will also show how representations of American cultural diplomacy practices as singularly democratic and a symbol of historical progress in this post-war phase were implicated in the kind of cultural struggle that developed between Washington and Moscow in the early phases of the Cold War.

The functions of the Voice of America (VOA) radio station from 1941 to 1953 are examined in chapter four. VOA was founded as a direct result of the US entry into the Second World War, and was intended to foster allied morale and counter the propaganda and psychological warfare policies of the Axis powers. Policy debates within VOA throughout the war and its aftermath were fraught with quandaries over how the manipulative practices of 'propaganda' could be avoided, given the station's role as an apparatus of international persuasion on behalf of the US government. In this context I chart how VOA's staff sought to characterise their work as 'journalism' rather than outright persuasion, particularly in response to frequent policy directives from Washington that VOA should be primarily attentive to its diplomatic functions during the war. US informational officials resolved this tension between the 'informative' and 'diplomatic' functions of VOA by emphasising America's singular ability, as a symbol of historical progress, to simultaneously persuade and enlighten foreign audiences. Similar dynamics to those observed within the cultural diplomacy programs are evident in the context of informational diplomacy during the early Cold War. Prevailing ideas about Washington's approach to international information as a vehicle of free speech and democracy, and conversely of the distortion of international information by the Soviet Union, are shown to have helped generate a posture of global ideological antagonism within US foreign policy.

The final case study within this dissertation is the US's diplomatic mission to Unesco, examined in chapter five. This case contributes some distinctive insights in the context of the study as a whole. Unesco's multilateral structure forced the US delegates to engage with the perceptions and intentions of its co-members of Unesco in a more direct way than the bilateral cultural policies or the unidirectional radio

practices necessitated. The period covered within this chapter encompasses the formulation of Washington's interest in multilateral cultural cooperation prior to Unesco's establishment in 1944-45, as well as the early phase of Unesco's operation after 1946. Significant discursive practices in this case include US efforts to promote freedom of international information through Unesco and the emergence of the US's self-perception as a Cold War protagonist after 1948. Both highlight the extent to which the representations that informed US cultural policy endogenously largely failed translate into an effective co-optive discourse in a multilateral context. This suggests that while the 'universalism' of America's cultural and informational programs was a claim that had clear resonance for US policy-makers themselves, it did not necessarily translate into a policy consensus and compromise at the multilateral level.

The conclusion of my study will review the key insights and reflect on the implications of the discursive processes charted in the proceeding chapters. In it I will summarise and account for key similarities and differences in the articulation of America's global role across the three case studies by considering how US cultural and informational diplomacy was articulated in relation to the Third World, the USSR and Europe. The wider impacts of the discursive representation of cultural and informational diplomacy in relation to US hegemony and Cold War grand strategy will also be considered. In this context I identify how cultural and informational discourse provided an arena in which the tensions and contradictions associated with the transformation of US foreign policy toward hegemony during 1936-53 were articulated and resolved.

With such complex factors at work, the constitutive and enabling functions of cultural and informational discourse on US hegemony must be understood as part of a much more diffuse process of historical change. But this study finds that there are, nonetheless, grounds for suggesting that the production of a new collective identity did inform Washington's embrace of hegemony and vindicationism in the period under review here.[46] Given the foundational role played by cultural and ideological antagonisms in the early Cold War, the way in which America was represented by cultural and informational diplomats can be seen to have had a

[46] On this Cold War literature see especially: Nigel Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, (no. 2, April 2003); Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union*, (New York: New York University Press, 1999).

palpable wider significance. Even as Washington sought to stridently denounce Communist absolutism during the late 1940s, the themes of liberal evangelism and American exceptionalism that were mobilised within the programs can be seen to have led Washington down a similarly absolutist path. Having constructed a morally privileged global role for America since the early days of cultural and informational diplomacy, the representation of America in the context of these programs served, despite the lofty intentions of the individual officials involved, to deepen the ideological antagonism.[47]

In the final section of the conclusion I shall highlight the contributions made by my study in calling for the development of a broader, theoretically-informed research agenda into cultural and informational diplomacy. I show how discursive practices analysis and the broader constructivist theoretical project should take note of cultural and informational diplomacy as sites in which the constitution of states, internationally and self-reflexively, as subjects of international relations takes place. This discussion shows how new space has been opened for considering the self-constitutive functions of cultural and informational diplomacy as practised by other states, and in particular how American exceptionalism has been, and remains, an important concept in understanding of identity of America as a hegemonic subject.

[47] Readers familiar with Reinhold Niebuhr's work will note that my argument moves toward that developed in *The Irony of American History*. Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952).

CHAPTER ONE

ARTICULATING US CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY: LIBERALISM, EXCEPTIONALISM AND THE DISCURSIVE PRACTICES OF US FOREIGN POLICY

This study develops an account of the formulation of US cultural and informational diplomacy strategies during 1936-53 and assesses the broader significance of these practices in the context of US foreign relations. In it I draw broadly on a constructivist theoretical approach to IR that asks how states acquire identities as agents in world politics, and I aim specifically to show how the functions of discourse in formulation of US cultural and informational diplomacy policy can be explained within the terms of a constructivist approach. Constructivist theory, as I indicated in the foregoing chapter, takes the inter-subjective construction of state interests and the impact of shared ideas and norms on state behaviour as its key object of analysis. Foreign policy, in this view, is not only a process in which particular courses of action are weighed up in terms of their costs and benefits, but also a site at which the identity propositions and interests that are implicit within policy decision-making are inter-subjectively constituted.[1] Moving beyond approaches to foreign policy analysis that see bargaining between rational bureaucratic actors with pre-given preferences as the substance of foreign policy-making, the approach utilised here sets out to

[1] This view of interests as dynamic and inter-subjectively constituted is often presented by constructivist scholars as stemming from an initial critical turn away from the neo-utilitarian view of state interests as fixed as immutable. A useful summary of the constructivist challenge to it is developed in John Gerard Ruggie's article: "What Makes the World Hang Together?." Ruggie's underlying critique of neo-utilitarianism is ontological. It contends that within this orthodoxy "ideational factors, when they are examined at all, are rendered in strictly instrumental terms, useful or not to self-regarding individuals (units) in the pursuit of typically material interests, including efficacy concerns." Constructivists, on the other hand, proceed to develop a richer ontology of world politics in that they argue that 'social facts' shape international outcomes. John Gerard Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-Utilitarianism and the Social Constructivist Challenge," *International Organization* 52, (no. 4, Autumn 1998), pp. 855-6. Jutta Weldes situates the critical turn that constructivists embarked upon in viewing national interests as constructed not in terms of ontology but the explanation of foreign policy decisions: "As many critics have noted, the deductive determination of national interests...has led to a conception of those interests which is 'too broad, too general, too vague, too all-inclusive' to explain state action." Weldes also notes that policy-makers and officials at the state level should comprise the main focus in an analysis of state interest-formation, as is undertaken in my study. Jutta Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," *European Journal of International Relations* 2, (no. 3, 1996), p. 278.

determine how shared ideas about the content of state interests are "produced, reproduced and transformed" in the course of policy debate and implementation.[2]

Within the context of this constructivist theorisation of foreign policy, I draw on a strand of existing research that applies discourse analysis to the study of foreign policy as the conceptual framework for my analysis. Discursive practices analysis adopts the premise that language comprises a key mechanism through which the shared identities, interests, and role conceptions that inform foreign policy are (re)constituted, and in turn shape state behaviour. As Roxanne Doty summarises, a discursive practices approach to foreign policy analysis is attentive to the fact that:

> Policy makers...function within a discursive space that imposes meanings on their world and thus *creates* reality...An approach that focuses on discursive practices as a unit of reality can get at *how* this 'reality' is produced and maintained and *how* it makes various practices possible.[3]

Language has further significance within this approach in that it furnishes agents with symbolic tools or rhetorical capacities that enable actions in a social context such as policy-making.[4]

The historical analysis of US foreign policy that will be presented in the forthcoming chapters is structured around these premises, as I seek to emphasise how the practices of American cultural and informational diplomacy practices were constituted and enabled by the language in which policy initiatives were articulated, debated and implemented. As I suggested in the preceding chapter, the available archival sources charting the formation of US cultural and informational diplomacy

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[2] Jutta Weldes, "Bureaucratic Politics: A Critical Constructivist Assessment," *Mershon International Studies Review* 42, (no. 2, November 1998), p. 218. Good summaries of the kind of approach to foreign policy analysis entailed by a discursive practices approach are also supplied in the following: Jamie Gaskarth, "Discourses and Ethics: The Social Construction of British Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 2, (vol. 4, 2006); Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy: German Reconstruction and the Invention of the West*, (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2006). On the development of the rational choice approach to Foreign Policy Analysis as actor-specific theory and the limits of rational choice analysis within this approach, see: Valerie M Hudson, with Christopher S. Vore, "Foreign Policy Analysis Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow," *Mershon International Studies Review* 39, (no. 2, October, 1995). In other work Hudson has defended the key tenets of the rational choice approach, but nonetheless acknowledges the contribution of constructivist insights to some empirical problems within the study of foreign policy-making: Valerie M. Hudson, "Foreign Policy Analysis: Actor-Specific Theory and the Ground of International Relations," *Foreign Policy Analysis* 1, (no. 1, 2005), pp. 3-4.

[3] Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, (no. 3, 1993), p. 303.

[4] Weldes, "Bureaucratic Politics," pp. 217-9.

policy during 1936-53 indicate that policy debates within these programs were replete with patterns of self-reflection and discussion about the sources of moral and historical progress on an epochal scale. The argument made here is that these discourses had significant implications for the kinds of policies that were actually pursued within the cultural and informational programs as well as, more diffusely, shaping the hegemonic global posture that Washington pursued at a more general level during and after the Second World War and into the Cold War. I shall show how cultural and informational officials set about cultivating and propagating new ideas about the nature of America and how it should behave as a hegemonic world power, and suggest how these shared propositions fitted into the transformation of Washington's posture of foreign relations during the Second World War. My analysis of the origins of American hegemony thus draws on a conception of power as partially determined by the social identities that agents acquire in the course of ongoing international interactions. In this sense, this study scrutinises the way in which Washington claimed a new identity in world politics and was thus able to draw on a set of concomitant international social capacities that went with it.

There are several strands of the existing literature within International Relations and Diplomatic History that my work draws upon and has implications for. Although my work has some bearing on the concerns adopted by contemporary public diplomacy studies and also draws heavily on the recent research into cultural and informational diplomacy in the field of Diplomatic History, the theoretical interests and purposes that I adopt largely differ from the existing perspectives within these fields. In taking up a conceptual framework that emphasises the constitutive functions of discourse and a conception of power in world politics as deriving from state identities and the social capacities they entail, my study is shaped by the theoretical interests and substantive concerns of the discursive practices research agenda within constructivist International Relations scholarship.[5] In the kinds of conclusions that I draw concerning what kinds of shared ideas structured US foreign relations, this work also joins a burgeoning contemporary research agenda among scholars of US foreign policy that analyses the particular cultural, political and

[5] I take the term 'discursive practices approach' from the work of Roxanne Doty. A summary of this approach is provided at a later stage in my discussion, so I will defer listing key examples at this point. See, e.g. Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of North-South Relations*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).

historical determinants of American foreign relations.[6] This recent literature has sought to revisit the history of American foreign relations with an analytical interest in the singularity of US foreign policy doctrines in mind, and amounts to a renewed interest, in the parlance of John Gerard Ruggie, in the extent to which the fact of "*American* hegemony was every bit as important as American *hegemony* in shaping the...[post-1945 world] order."[7] In doing so, this contemporary engagement with the issue of whether there is a distinctive American style of foreign policy joins a more longstanding tradition of academic reflection on the nature and significance of America's ideological traditions, of which the work of Louis Hartz and Reinhold Niebuhr is particularly illustrative. As Hartz memorably framed his assessment of American foreign relations, and in terms that point toward the fundamental argument of this study:

> When one's ultimate values are accepted wherever one turns, the absolute language of self-evidence comes easily enough. This then is the mood of America's absolutism: the sober faith that its norms are self-evident. It is one of the most powerful absolutisms in the world...It was so sure of itself that it hardly needed to become articulate, so secure that it could actually support a pragmatism which seemed on the surface to belie it. American pragmatism has always been deceptive because, glacierlike, it has rested on miles of submerged conviction.[8]

In this chapter I shall elaborate on the theoretical and historical argument that will be made within my study, and specify the conceptual framework that I adopt in more detail than was possible in the foregoing chapter. My argument turns on what I find to be the most significant constitutive and enabling functions of the discursive representations mobilised during the formulation of US cultural and

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[6] I supply a more detailed survey of the key contributions to this debate as this chapter proceeds.

[7] Ruggie, "What Makes the World Hang Together?," p. 863.

[8] Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955), pp. 58-9. See also: Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952). For a survey of American literature that reflects on the distinctiveness of America's history and culture, see: Sacvan Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*, (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1978). Some of the writing of Hans Morgenthau also reflects on the peculiar and distinctive strength of moral imperatives in US foreign policy thinking, see: Hans J. Morgenthau, "The Mainsprings of American Foreign Policy: The National Interest vs. Moral Abstractions," *The American Political Science Review* 44, no. 4 (December, 1950).

informational diplomacy. I thus aim to determine what particular kinds of linguistic representations opened and maintained possibilities for Washington to make ongoing use of the cultural and informational instruments of international persuasion during 1936-53. I also suggest how emerging ideas about the nature of America as a global cultural and informational subject helped to facilitate Washington's embrace of a posture of embedded global hegemony during this period. The formulation of US cultural and informational policy was not always a straightforward process, however, and one of key findings of my analysis is that US cultural and informational diplomacy were sites at which several contending ways of constituting 'America' and its national interests were debated by foreign policy-makers. In the paragraphs to follow I shall also explore the parameters of the conceptual framework adopted for this study, which I draw from the existing constructivist literature that applies a discursive practices approach to the analysis of foreign policy. Lastly, in this chapter I shall situate my work in relation to other approaches within International Relations and Diplomatic History that have engaged with the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy, highlighting in the course of my discussion how my work differs both theoretically and methodologically from these existing accounts. In this final section I will also specify how my work extends the explanatory range of discursive practices approach.

The Functions of Discourse in US Cultural and Informational Diplomacy: The Argument of this Study

As I outlined in my introductory chapter, I adopt two research questions to guide my investigation of the discursive basis of US cultural and informational diplomacy and my assessment of the wider implications of cultural and informational discourse for US foreign relations. In order to establish an overarching historical account of the development of American cultural and informational policies I initially ask: what were the key developments within US cultural and informational diplomacy during 1936-53, the period during which the tools of international persuasion were first taken up on an ongoing basis by Washington? The second research question animating this study draws on the concepts of discursive power articulated within constructivist theorisation of foreign policy making, and calls for an enquiry into the functions of language in the context of US cultural and informational diplomacy.

Specifically, I ask to what extent did the articulation of cultural and informational initiatives by US policy-makers function to encourage and enable the projection and embedding of American power within international system?

My study answers the latter question in two ways. First, I chart and analyse the key features of foreign policy discourse within the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs, and aim to show how the practice of discursive representation enabled certain kinds of policy strategies to be contemplated and rendered others less desirable, or indeed unthinkable, within the context of Washington's cultural and informational diplomacy programs. In this way I shall be able to chart what kinds of moral, cultural and political representations constituted Washington's posture of cultural and informational diplomacy. The 1936-53 period was a time of extensive changes to the international system, and my study illustrates how the shared ideas that informed US cultural and informational diplomacy evolved alongside the global transformation that the Second World War brought about.[9]

Secondly, and in addition to my primary goal of assessing representations of America and its national interests within the context of cultural and informational practices, I shall extend my analysis to suggest some connections between the discursive representations mobilised in the course of cultural and informational diplomacy and the transition toward embedded global hegemony as the overarching posture of US foreign relations. The discursive representation of US cultural and informational diplomacy is taken here as a condition of possibility that shaped the *kind* of hegemonic role and global ideological posture that Washington adopted after 1945. Hence the unfolding representations of cultural and informational diplomacy surveyed here are taken as evidence of "new beliefs [that created] new policy choices, even policy imperatives" at the level of US grand strategy.[10]

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[9] As I noted in the foregoing introductory chapter, the assumption of a posture of global hegemony by Washington has been surveyed extensively within IR scholarship in relation to other aspects of American power such as the extension of US military capabilities; the achievement of US economic hegemony and the establishment of institutions to bind other states to US power over the long term. While a number of excellent studies of how the extension of US cultural and ideological power was contemplated during this transition already exist (notably Frank Ninkovich's *Diplomacy of Ideas*) the cultural and informational foundations of American hegemony lamentably remain an under-explored feature of the post-war moment in *International Relations* scholarship. Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

[10] Martha Finnemore, *The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs About the Use of Force*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 14-5. I use the term 'grand strategy' here in a general way, to denote the general posture of engagement that Washington took up, rather than in a strict military/strategic sense. I agree somewhat with Robert J. Art's broader use of the term to encompass

Seeking to assess the wider impacts of the discursive representations mobilised by US cultural and informational diplomats- in terms of their generating or enabling functions for the projection of American global hegemony- brings with it some important caveats. There is a danger of placing undue emphasis on cultural and informational discourse as a direct, causal factor in changes to US grand strategy, during what was a phase of immense global upheaval and extensive domestic debate on foreign policy issues within the United States, and in which significant material factors were also crucial to how Washington contemplated its post-war role. The material base of America's post-war hegemony is not denied within the terms of my analysis. What I instead ask is how shared propositions concerning the *purposes* behind the projection America's material power evolved. Furthermore, most accounts of how discursive practices shape global politics emphasise that linguistic representations constitute international subjects in a diffuse fashion; in terms of enabling certain possibilities to be contemplated rather than operating as specific causal instances.[11] Since my argument identifies how foreign policy possibilities were constituted rather than how changes to US policy were 'caused,' I seek to show in the pages to follow that the policy debates examined here were one part of a much more diffuse and complex tapestry of changing ideas about America and its global role that developed in the political and public spheres during 1936-53.[12] My study

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non-military ends, but expand my conception of grand strategy to also encompass the *non-military means* of US foreign relations. Although the term brings with it some association with strategic studies, it is also a very useful short-hand term for the kinds of broad postures in US foreign policy that I am interrogating within this study. See Robert J. Art, "A Defensible Defence: America's Grand Strategy After the Cold War," *International Security* 15, (no. 4, Spring 1991), pp. 6-7.

[11] Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, (no. 1, Winter 2005); Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction." Weldes describes the kind of causality captured by this approach as how identities constituted certain forms of action as 'warranted' rather than directly causing outcomes: Weldes, "Constituting National Interests," p. 282. On 'how possible' arguments, see Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction," pp. 298-9. The specific causal implications of ideas are not discounted within my approach, however. Studies of rhetoric and of ideas as 'symbolic technologies' within the discursive practices approach chart how in certain relational contexts language attains a high degree of causal specificity. See Mattern on representational force: Janice Bially Mattern, "Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft: Representational Force and the Sociolinguistic Construction of Attraction in World Politics," *Millennium* 33, (no. 3, 2005); on symbolic tools see: Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, "Beyond Belief: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations," *European Journal of International Relations* 3, (no. 2, 1997).

[12] For example, this was an era of extensive and influential media debates on US grand strategy and foreign policy, of which Henry Luce's 1941 *Life Magazine* editorial lauding the twentieth century as the 'American century' is emblematic. A good historical work that assesses the impacts of Luce's claim is Donald White, *The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996). In focusing on the kinds of debates on America's cultural and informational role primarily conducted among policy-makers, but also incorporating media and academic comment, this study complements these existing accounts about the transformation of US foreign policy.

illuminates how, with these significant material shifts and broader domestic policy debates also at work, conceptions of US cultural and informational diplomacy were nonetheless significant in constituting the posture of embedded global hegemony that Washington cultivated towards the end of the Second World War and its aftermath.

The 1936-53 phase of American diplomatic history constitutes a phase of fundamental transformation in terms of how deeply the connection between American security/prosperity and that of the world order was envisaged. My study illustrates how cultural and informational discourses naturalised the idea that American power must be embedded within the world order in the closing stages of the Second World War. This was a period during which American foreign policy-makers began to articulate plans for a peace settlement that involved a far-reaching set of reforms to the global order, precisely the kinds of progressive ideals that cultural and informational diplomats were routinely situated as an integral foundation for a durable post-war settlement in an interdependent and ideologised world. The representation of US cultural and informational diplomacy thus helped to define terms according to which Washington envisaged and pursued the reordering of the global order after 1945. Furthermore, part of what was distinctive about US foreign policy during the post-1945 settlement was that it was at the end of the Second World War that Washington began to see the need to systematically pursue an ongoing engagement with the international order by means of authority and legitimacy, rather than outright domination or imperialism. The articulation of US cultural and informational diplomacy in this founding of the post-1945 world order provides an interesting view onto how Washington sought to construct a position of world authority and claimed a legitimate right to global influence during 1936-45.

The emergence of the Cold War as an ideological struggle during the 1940s provides an important indication that the prevailing conceptions of 'America' articulated within the cultural and informational programs had a constitutive influence on US foreign policy and grand strategy. To restate this central point: the kinds of moral, cultural and historical questions that had preoccupied US cultural and informational officials in the early phases of the programs are observed as having moved into the centre of US grand strategy thinking as a response to American antagonisms with the USSR. My study takes this as testament to the kinds of generative and enabling functions that US cultural and informational practices performed in terms of how Washington was constituting its position and interests in

world politics. Washington's emergence as a protagonist in the Cold War propaganda struggle highlights how self-understandings of American cultural and political identity had become central to Washington's sense of itself as a global hegemon.

As the chapters to follow will show, however, policy debates within the US cultural and informational programs indicate that the assumption of a Cold War posture of ideological conflict was not straightforward or uncontested: there were officials in all three case studies adopted here who felt that Washington should not partake of ideological antagonisms in an instrumental or overly strident manner. At a basic level, however, the fact that cultural and informational programs themselves had come to be regarded by these Cold War dissenters as symbols of America that must not be pressed into the service of propaganda warfare reinforces my central line of argument. These controversies indicate that cultural and informational diplomacy were practices that both sides of the debate on America's Cold War strategy sought to definitively interpret, and thus they had some value as constitutive principles of American power and purposes in the global order.

The argument developed here complements a set of existing historical explanations of the sources of Cold War antagonisms. As the work of Nigel Gould-Davies, Scott Lucas, Robert L. Ivie, and especially David Campbell have all in various ways contended, from the first stages of the Cold War the ideological implications of Soviet expansionism were seen in Washington as an inherent threat to both US national security and the integrity of the post-war order.[13] As Washington

[13] Nigel Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, (no. 2, April 2003); Scott Lucas, *Freedom's War: The American Crusade Against the Soviet Union*, (New York: New York University Press, 1999); Robert L. Ivie, "Fire, Flood and Red Fever: Motivating Metaphors of Global Emergency in the Truman Doctrine Speech." *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, (no. 3, September 1999); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, rev. ed., (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998). A further illustration of my overall point has been made by Reinhold Wagonlietiner, who has argued: "The wartime bureaucratisation and formalisation of the cultural programs of the Department of State, after a short crisis immediately after World War II, allowed the complete integration of cultural diplomacy into the wider objectives of America...In the cultural Cold War consensus, liberal ideas could acquire an apologetic function for political conservative." Reinhold Wagonleitner, "Propagating the American Dream: Cultural Policies as a Means of Integration." *American Studies Internationalism* 24, (no. 1, April 1986), p. 78. On the emergence and central role of ideological struggle in US foreign policy thinking see also, David Ryan, "Mapping Containment: The Cultural Construction of the Cold War," in *American Cold War Culture*, ed. Douglas Field (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005); James R. Vaughn, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda in the Arab Middle East, 1945-57: Unconquerable Minds*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), 'Introduction;' Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*; Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts*

and Moscow faced the successive geopolitical quandaries that emerged out of the post-1945 European settlement with deepening mutual animus, the Soviet intention to establish a sphere of ideological influence within Europe was increasingly regarded by US policy-makers as inherently untenable on moral and ideological grounds. The March 1947 declaration of the 'Truman Doctrine' to forestall the extension of the USSR's European geopolitical influence constituted an especially clear signal that ideology had come to be regarded as the currency according to which the post-war balance of geopolitical influence would be measured. As Truman's address to Congress charged:

> We shall not realise our objectives...unless we are willing to help free peoples to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes. This is no more than a frank recognition that totalitarian regimes imposed on free peoples, by direct or indirect aggression, undermine the foundations of international peace and hence the security of the United States.[14]

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and Letters, (New York: The New Press, 1999). On official national security thinking on propaganda see: United States National Security Council, "Newly Declassified Annexes of A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Secretary of United States Objectives and Programs for National Security: April 14, 1950," with Comments by James H. McCall, *SAIS Review* 29, (no. 1, Winter/Spring 1999). John Lewis Gaddis foreshadows this kind of reading, particularly Ivie's account of the Truman Doctrine, within his touchstone history of the Containment doctrine in US grand strategy. He emphasises the important point that the concept of ideological struggle was partly intended to convince the American public to support US foreign policy initiatives to halt the extension of Soviet power. John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War 1941-1947*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 348-51. On US public opinion and the administration's rationale and strategy for gaining public support for the Cold War, see also: Steven Casey, "Selling NSC-68: The Truman Administration, Public Opinion, and the Politics of Mobilisation, 1950-1," *Diplomatic History* 19, (no. 4, September, 2005).

[14] Harry Truman, "Address: Truman Doctrine," in *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History*, eds. Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, (New York: Harper & Row, [1947] 1966). As Robert Irvie has argued, the Truman Doctrine address has come to be seen as one of the most important foundations for America's 'rhetorical vision' of the Cold War, as the site in which the basic configuration of Washington's Cold War motives was set out. He traces the use of metaphors of disease, fire and flood within Dean Acheson's early drafts of the speech and their fruition in Truman's eventual announcement to Congress, noting how the 'terminology of motives' that the disease metaphor implied staked out the Cold War as an exceptional kind of international emergency in which global containment represented the only feasible course of action. Within this totalising, exceptional kind of crisis scripted within this foundational Cold War discourse, communist ideology *was* the underlying contagion that the United States was charged with containing. Depictions in US anti-Communist rhetoric of the shadowy, subversive apparatus that the USSR had transmitted to the Western democracies also fits with this image. Ivie, "Fire, Flood and Red Fever." The emergence of Cold War rhetoric and sensibilities within the US has thus been characterised as 'prophetic dualism,' which "divides the world into two camps...One side acts in accord with all that is good, decent, and at one with God's will. The other acts in direct opposition. Conflict between them is resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other." See: Phillip Wander, "The Rhetoric of American Foreign Policy," in *Cold War Rhetoric: Strategy, Metaphor, Ideology*, eds. Martin J. Medhurst et. al., (New York: Greenwood Press, 1990), p. 157.

The fact that Communist ideology was cast by these prevailing representations as a threat *in itself* to American interests indicates that the questions that had deeply preoccupied US cultural and informational diplomats- such as, which moral and political values Washington stood for, and how it should extend these within world politics- had by the late 1940s become one of main lenses through which Washington understood its strengths and challenges in relation to Cold War geopolitics.

The historical period surveyed within my study concludes just before the Eisenhower presidential campaign. Eisenhower's foreign policy rhetoric during this campaign was interesting because international information and psychological warfare policies were stated to be a key national security issue for America.[15] As a result of several high-level reviews of US informational diplomacy called immediately after Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, an Executive Agency, the United States Information Agency (USIA), was founded and remained in operation until the 1990s.[16] The situating of the Cold War propaganda struggle as an election issue and the founding of USIA constitute a logical end-point to my analysis. Eisenhower's national security posture signals that the articulation of America as an international cultural and informational agent had well and truly become a central feature of US grand strategy and geopolitics, and that the cultural and informational diplomacy programs had also largely settled on a paradigm of Cold War ideological warfare as the format of their operations. The phase of transformation that went before 1953 is thus interesting because it encompassed such significant elements of promise, frustration and contradiction within the global order. Periods of transition

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[15] The most comprehensive account of the role of propaganda in Eisenhower's foreign policy thinking and first presidential campaign is Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, (Westport CT: Praeger, 2002). John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 154-61; Holly Cowan Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 50-1.

[16] Leo Bogart, *Cool Worlds, Cold War: A New Look at USIA's Premises for Propaganda*, revised ed., (Washington DC: American University Press, 1995); Kenneth A. Osgood, "Form Before Substance: Eisenhower's Commitment to Psychological Warfare and Negotiations with the Enemy," *Diplomatic History* 24, (no. 3, Summer 2000); Wilson P. Dizard, *Inventing Public Diplomacy: The Story of the US Information Agency*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2004); R. E. Elder, *The Information Machine: The United States Information Agency and American Foreign Policy*, (Syracuse NY: Syracuse University Press, 1968); John W. Henderson, *The United States Information Agency*, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1969); Walter Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997); Lois Roth, "Public Diplomacy and the Past: The Search for an American Style of Propaganda (1952-1977)," *Fletcher Forum* 8, (no. 2, 1984); Hans N. Tuch, *Communicating With The World: US Public Diplomacy Overseas*, (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990).

throw the functions of discourse into clear relief, as we shall see in successive stages of the US cultural and informational programs when policy-makers sought to fashion out of existing representations new ways of comprehending and responding to the rapidly changing global conditions of 1936-53.

Let us review the foregoing points. The overarching argument within this study is that the discursive representation of US cultural and informational diplomacy helped to generate and generalise the kinds of identity principles that were necessary for Washington to adopt the posture of embedded, vindicationist hegemony that as cultivated in the post-war period. That cultural and informational diplomacy were adopted during the course of the Second World War at all was a significant departure within US foreign policy, and the discursive practices scrutinised here show how these new policies were symbolically enabled and naturalised as legitimate features of US foreign policy through discursive representation. The justifications that were articulated for continuing the US cultural and informational programs into peacetime also illustrate the transition from Washington's *ad hoc* approach internationalism during the inter-war years to a posture of embedded hegemony after 1945.[17] The initially modest but, after the US entered the war, steadily growing acceptance within Washington that an ongoing cultural and informational diplomacy program was necessary for American foreign policy accompanied and, I argue, played a role in enabling this much broader shift in US foreign relations toward the cultivation of a posture of hegemony. Furthermore, I argue that conceptions of America's cultural and informational influence had profound implications for the emergence of the Cold War as the overarching rationale of US grand strategy.

Two themes stand out as having particular constitutive and symbolic resonance within the articulation of US cultural and informational diplomacy practices during 1936-53: liberalism and exceptionalism.[18] In the chapters to follow I shall trace how these two themes were drawn on in relation to specific policy initiatives within US cultural and informational diplomacy, and also highlight how

[17] I shall survey US foreign policy in the inter-war period in the forthcoming chapter, and in this discussion I depart from the conventional image of inter-war 'isolationism' in emphasising the extension of US influence, especially in Asia and Latin America.

[18] As it happens, recent work by Vibeke Pedersen characterises liberalism and exceptionalism as the two cardinal, and fundamentally oppositional, traditions in US foreign policy thinking. Vibeke Schou Pedersen, "In Search of Monsters to Destroy? The Liberal American Security Paradox and a Republican Way Out," *International Relations* 17, (no. 2, 2003).

they were conveyed within different *kinds* of discursive practice in the context of policy-making. I shall summarise my argument concerning the significance of these two themes in the sections below.

The Substance of American Self-Representation: Liberalism and Exceptionalism in the Discursive Representation of US Cultural and Informational Diplomacy

Cultural and Informational Practices as Liberalism

As the material presented in the chapters to follow will illustrate, liberalism, and in particular the conception of 'freedom' entailed by liberal discourse, was an important symbolic resource for cultural and informational policy-makers as they articulated and debated policy initiatives and challenges.[19] As a key strand within US cultural and informational discourse, shared representations of America's liberal political culture and its implications for how Washington should behave as a liberal power served to enable the extension of American power within the global order after the war. The lexicon of liberalism, as applied to American cultural and informational practices, scripted limits for the exercise of US power and signified Washington's reluctance to pursue self-aggrandisement through formal imperialism or naked global domination. Just as the domestic powers of the government of the United States had been purposely fragmented to guarantee the American people their political freedom, so too were the liberal scripts mobilised by US cultural and informational officials intended to convey Washington's intention to establish a consultative post-war order in which US influence would be bounded by regulating institutions.[20] The articulation of American liberalism in this way was not solely intended to cast America's intentions in a favourable light to global public audiences, however. The liberal scripts of US cultural and informational diplomacy will be shown to have also been directed internally, during between policy-makers, to address lingering

[19] In the argument to follow I draw on the work of Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes, and also on the path-breaking work of Anne Swidler, to argue that ideas can endow agents with particular capacities in the context of social action. Ideas are thus 'inextricably embedded' in the kinds of material practices and relations of power that agents function within. Laffey and Weldes, "Beyond Belief," pp. 209-10; Ann Swidler, "Culture in Action: Symbols and Strategies," *American Sociological Review* 51, (no. 2, 1986).
[20] Tony Smith, *America's Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democracy in the Twentieth Century*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). See also: G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order After Major Wars*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001).

questions as to how US political culture would be expressed within the increasingly extensive post-war global role that was being contemplated in Washington during the Second World War.

The mobilisation of liberalism as a constitutive principle of US cultural and informational diplomacy was particularly evident as US policy-makers and diplomats sought to repudiate the term 'propaganda' as a description of their own cultural and informational activities. Instead, US officials represented American practices in singular terms, as a manifestation of truthful, progressive and apolitical intentions rather than self-aggrandisement or manipulation. In this way, US officials explicitly contrasted their actions with the deceptive practices of other states, particularly (but not solely) the Axis and the USSR. As the head of the US Office of War Information Elmer Davis had reflected in relation to US informational activities:

> It may be said that [State Department programs] must be propaganda in intention, otherwise why should the State Department conduct it?... the intention is to see that foreign countries get a complete picture of what is going on in America...[I]n the long run that the total picture will create a good impression of the United States.[21]

Within the cultural diplomacy programs, this commitment to presenting an open, truthful face to the world by instituting reciprocal cultural interchange was one basis upon which US officials sought to naturalise cultural programs within US foreign relations by connecting them to the liberal traditions of US political culture. Liberal principles were called upon in a similar way by policy-makers within the US informational diplomacy program. By adopting a truthful, journalistic paradigm the programs could thus "take into account the nature of the hostile propaganda, its effectiveness, and take specific measures to offset it without feeling that we are betraying our principles by so doing."[22] The nature of American culture itself, as a 'civic' ethos constituted around liberal principles rather than an exclusive ethnic identity, was also a significant manifestation of the liberal script that had been attached to cultural diplomacy programs. In many cases, the cultural openness and pluralism that America's liberal creed had nurtured was represented as the source of

[21] Elmer Davis, "Address of Elmer Davis to the Chicago Rotary Club, 26 February, 1940," p. 9; Box 4; Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.
[22] W. R. Tyler, to William T. Stone, "Notes on the OIC Program," 22 April, 1947, p. 3; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

Washington's potential to regenerate world politics after the destructive nationalist hatreds that had ignited the Second World War.[23]

As a symbolic technology utilised in the context of policy-making, the explicit repudiation of 'propaganda' and the assertion that America's culture itself was civic rather than ethnic rendered acceptable the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy acceptable according to the established creeds of US political culture. What is especially interesting in this regard is that categorising 'propaganda' in pejorative terms within US policy debate functioned as a discursive strategy that actually situated America's tools of international persuasion *within* the liberal critique of propaganda, and thus *superior to* the narrow, manipulative policies of other states. In articulating US cultural and informational diplomacy in this way, a sense of moral and political license was symbolically claimed for the cultural and informational programs by their staff. The analysis that I develop in the following chapters also shows how this sense of superiority constrained informational and cultural policy choices. By fixing a vocabulary of US cultural and informational diplomacy that signalled America's liberalism in such an overt way, there was by the late 1940s only limited scope for self-criticism and dissenting voices to be incorporated within to the terms of US cultural and informational diplomacy debates. Even as American cultural and informational practices edged closer to a selective and manipulative 'propaganda' posture during the Cold War, many American cultural and informational officials continued to laud the openness, the reticence, and the tolerance of debate that had led Americans to have a 'traditional' aversion to propaganda.[24] I contend here that in this respect the Manichaean tone of the Cold War ideological struggle was encouraged rather than diffused within the terms of America's 'liberal' cultural and informational practices. This was because the representation of America

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[23] See Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*. Sacvan Bercovitch effectively summarises the expansive implications of this doctrine of America's civic culture within the American political tradition: "Of all symbols of identity, only *America* has united nationality and universality, civic and spiritual selfhood, secular and redemptive history, the country's past and paradise to be, in a single synthetic ideal." Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*, p. 176.

[24] The work of Roxanne Doty and Patrick Jackson on discursive 'fixity' and 'rhetorical commonplaces' resonates in the context of this argument. Doty suggests that the most reified, accepted terms within policy discourse are often the most contentious, politicised and hegemonic representations to sustain. The prevalence of the idea that America 'inherently' rejected the practices of propaganda indicates that the effects of this discursive practice was far-reaching, and that the anti-propaganda discourse was laden with some important judgements about the nature of America as a hegemonic subject. It tied into the notion of American exceptionalism, and had important implications for the way the Cold War developed in the late 1940s. In the chapters to follow this idea is further illustrated and developed. See, Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, 'Introduction;' Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, 'Ch 1.'

in such singular terms seemed to suggest an antithesis: and the USSR thus came to be understood as an illiberal, immoral and inherently obstructive subject.

Washington's involvement in Unesco's founding and post-war development was also constituted around a lexicon of American liberalism. In the forthcoming chapter on US diplomacy within Unesco I shall emphasise how the principles of multilateralism; the free distribution of international information; and non-governmentalism were themes that drew on liberal principles and became integral to the way in which Washington's interests in relation to cultural multilateralism were articulated. By emphasising Unesco's liberal functions as a clearing house for international cultural interchange, multilateral cultural cooperation could be justified by Unesco's supporters as an essential component of the liberal orders that were being fostered in other spheres of international cooperation. As Elmer Davis once again asserted, Washington's posture toward the Organisation should serve as testament to America's historical commitment to liberal freedoms:

> What we have got to be everlastingly vigilant about is the safeguarding of our moral and still more our intellectual base, for that- with our economic and military power behind it- is the real citadel of the free world...I doubt if we could win a world war if we were not fighting for freedom- above all the freedom of the mind; there would be little temptation for others to be on our side if we were no better or little better than the opposition.[25]

However, the liberal script that was thus applied to Unesco also functioned as symbolic license to the pursuit of American diplomatic and ideological dominance within the Organisation. Once again, the sense of superiority and entitlement that was bound up with celebrations of liberalism within foreign policy discourse appears to have inhibited the scope for self-correction in relation to the domineering way in which the US delegation was seeking to turn Unesco into an instrument of the Cold War struggle. As I shall show, established representations of America as a liberal global subject enabled US officials to unreflectively regard themselves as tolerant of open debate, political freedom and multilateral compromise, even as the US delegation worked in practice toward severely restricting opportunity for debate on Cold War non-alignment and social democracy within Unesco.

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[25] Elmer Davis, "Address Delivered to a Meeting of the United States National Commission to Unesco, 26 January 1952," pp. 5-6; Box 4; Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.

In the process of unpacking the functions of liberal self-representations within the discourses of US cultural and informational diplomacy, my argument highlights the permeability between America's domestic political culture and the formulation of foreign policy. The work of John Gerard Ruggie develops a similar point: the post-1945 world order instituted by Franklin Roosevelt was, in Ruggie's account, enabled by the "congruence between the vision of world order invoked...and the principles of domestic order at play in America's understanding of its own founding, of its own sense of political community."[26] My own argument concerning the symbolic power of American liberal creeds in relation to US cultural and informational diplomacy reinforces Ruggie's thesis. I show how the mobilisation of a liberal vocabulary enabled the initial adoption of cultural and informational diplomacy by situating these new diplomatic practices *within* the terms of existing liberal debates condemning 'propaganda' according to the tenets of US political culture itself. Liberalism also featured strongly in the representation of US cultural and informational objectives during implementation of the post-1945 peace settlement. The depictions of American cultural openness and universalism that were mobilised within the programs provided a warranting argument in favour of the projection and emedding of American political influence within the global order after 1945. The idea of 'freedom' entailed by liberalism was a symbolic tool, articulated not in terms of "a series of liberal freedoms individuals (or even nations) possess, but [rather the] ... *deployment* of freedom as a power to do, make and act."[27] This illustrates one of the paradoxes of American foreign policy that my study probes: within the practices of US cultural and informational diplomacy liberalism became a claim to influence and a symbolic license to act as much as it was a self-imposed structure against the exercise of outright domination. Hence, the cases analysed in forthcoming chapters draw attention to the way in which the symbolic license entailed by liberal discourses of US foreign policy served as an inducement to the Cold War ideological conflict. The irony that liberalism could be fashioned into a justification for the projection of power was noted by Reinhold Niebuhr in the early 1950s. That Washington emerged as a protagonist in the Cold War conflict by mobilising its commitment to liberalism was for Niebuhr an irony of the most profound kind:

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[26] John Gerard Ruggie, "Past as Prologue? Interests, Identity, and American Foreign Policy," *International Security* 21, (no. 4, Spring 1997), p. 93.

[27] Anthony Burke, "Freedom's Freedom: American Enlightenment and Permanent War," *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture* 11, (no. 4, July 2005), p. 327.

> Our modern liberal culture, of which American civilization is such an unalloyed exemplar, is involved in many ironic refutations of its original pretensions of virtue, wisdom and power...we are involved in the double irony of confronting evils which were distilled from illusions, not generically different from our own.[28]

Exceptionalism and the Construction of Cultural and Informational Diplomacy.

Closely tied to mobilisation of liberal discourse during the articulation of US cultural and informational diplomacy was a tendency to situate America in the context of world history as a singular moral and political subject that at the same time had universal resonance as a beacon to other states. These exceptionalist sentiments sprang from a longstanding tendency within US literary and political traditions to ascribe spiritual meaning to America's historical and political break from Europe.[29] Niebuhr's sense of irony that Washington's efforts to wage ideological warfare during the Cold War were undertaken in liberalism's name is more comprehensible when it is considered as a manifestation of this underlying conundrum of exceptionality within US political culture. The effort to actually turn American critiques of the illiberal impacts of propaganda into a lexicon of cultural and informational diplomacy that actually licensed Washington to use similar practices constituted a solipsism that was anchored within the logic of American exceptionalism.

In keeping with the terms of my theoretical framework, I define American exceptionalism in this study as a representational commonplace; a reflection of the shared meanings through which US officials comprehended and debated American foreign policy. As such, I depart from some of the existing work on American exceptionalism that has set out to defend the proposition that, due to its revolutionary birth, American democracy, economic policy, intellectual traditions, religious observance and party politics are qualitatively different from those of other states. This approach, associated with the work of Seymour Martin Lipset on America as the 'outlier case' in particular, has already been subject to an insightful and convincing

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[28] Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, p. viiii.

[29] Perry Miller, *Errand Into The Wilderness* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956); Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad.*

historiographical critique by Ian Tyrell, the terms of which shall not detain us here.[30] Instead, and to place my account of exceptionalism on firmer empirical ground, the work of Louis Hartz and Reinhold Neibuhr, and more recently that of H. W. Brands, Sacvan Bercovitch and John Gerard Ruggie, informs the account of American exceptionalism presented here.[31] Brands's term 'vindicationism' neatly captures my view of exceptionalism in the sense that it describes the solipsistic way in which US intentions were constituted in the aftermath of the Second World War, rather than articulating a substantive hypothesis about comparative US foreign policy behaviour.[32]

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[30] See especially: Seymor Martin Lipset, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective*, (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1963); Seymor Martin Lipset, *American Exceptionalism: A Double Edged Sword*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1996). To be sure, much of Hartz's work can be read as part of this tradition: Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America*. On the 'insuperable logical difficulty' of this hypothesis see: Ian Tyrrell, "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History," *The American Historical Review* 96, (no. 4, October 1996), especially p. 1034; Michael Kammen, "The Problem of American Exceptionalism: A Reconsideration," *American Quarterly* 45, (no. 1, March 1993). A survey of three works that explores how exceptional US foreign policy has been that finds some merit in the idea of 'exceptionalist rhetoric' as a feature of American foreign relations is: Akira Iriye, "Exceptionalism Revisited," *Reviews in American History* 16, (no. 2, June 1988). A rather provocative thesis on the nature of American exceptionalism, but which falls into some of the solipsisms of Lipset's work, in relation to foreign policy was Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy: Cultural Politics and Foreign Affairs*. (New York: Mentor, 1983).

[31] Hartz *The Liberal Tradition in America*; Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*; H. W. Brands, "Exemplary America versus Interventionist America," in *At the End of the American Century: America's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Robert L. Hutchings, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1988); Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*; Ruggie, "Past as Prologue?"; John Gerard Ruggie, *Winning the Peace: America and World Order in the New Era*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). See also: Margaret Mead, *And Keep Your Powder Dry: An Anthropologist Looks at America*, expanded edition, (New York: William Morrow & Co, 1965); Stanley Hoffman, "American Exceptionalism: The New Version," in *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, ed. Michael Ignatieff, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); Jonathan Monten, "The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democracy Promotion in US Strategy" *International Security* 29, (no. 4, 2005).

[32] Brands, "Exemplary America versus Interventionist America." In other research that probes the domestic antecedents to US foreign policy, John Gerard Ruggie adopts a similar view of exceptionalism, as a process of habitually seeking American moral and political self-fulfilment through foreign policy, in relation to the planning stages of the United Nations Organisation. Ruggie highlights the symbolic inducement that the lexicon of America's singular commitment to democracy and progress supplied to US foreign policy in the post-1945 phase, noting the tendency among US officials in this period to conceptualise international issues according to a presupposed continuum between domestic American political culture and the future trajectory of international progress. "Old-World balance of power reasoning...had little allure for the American people...So Roosevelt framed his plans for winning the peace in a broader vision that tapped into America's sense of its self as a nation...For Roosevelt's successors countering the Soviet threat reinforced the mission...American exceptionalism-pursuing an international order that resonated with values the American people saw as their own-became the basis for a global transformational agenda whose effects are unfolding still." John Gerard Ruggie, "American Exceptionalism, Exemptionalism, and Global Governance," in *American Exceptionalism and Human Rights*, ed. Michael Ignatieff, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 304.

My argument concerning the role of vincidationism/exceptionalism in the context of my three case studies is that there was a persistent 'submerged conviction,' as Hartz described it, that America's singularity and historical advancement conferred moral distinction on the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs that was not shared by the policy programs of other international agents. US cultural and informational diplomacy policy was informed by a shared premise that American practices of international persuasion had the singular distinction of delivering modernity and moral enlightenment to its international audiences. A posture of self-vindication through foreign policy premised claims about 'America's certainty' of its right to exercise global leadership after 1945 by Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLiesh.[33] Vindicationism also underpinned public statements such as Stanley Hornbeck's concerning America's special ability to represent the international general interest in its proposals for the post-war settlement:

> It is not our American concept that there should be a static world or a frozen *status quo*. As a nation we have always had in mind the evolution of society, of political institutions, or economic instruments and devices accomplished through cooperation and conciliation, through the pacific settlement of controversies and through the general improvement of all conditions, national and international, by peaceful methods and processes.[34]

The idea that there was a progressive, vindicationist basis for the exercise of US influence emerges as a key premise of US cultural and informational discourse in relation to Third World/modernising states in a particularly clear way. US information practices were, for instance, represented in planning documents as attempting to show the people of China how to "realise the principles of individual human dignity and equality, liberty and thought and expression...which are bases of the democratic way of life."[35] So too did depictions of America, as opposed to

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[33] A detailed survey of MacLeish's rhetoric is provided in the ensuing chapters, particularly chapter three. See, e.g.: Archibald MacLeish, "The American Certainty," *Department of State Bulletin* 2269, (February 18, 1945).

[34] Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Why We are Fighting and For What." *Department of State Bulletin* 1745, (May 23, 1942), p. 462; Henry S. Villard, "The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2256, (January 28, 1945).

[35] Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, "Guidance for OWI Informational Work in Unoccupied China, Oct 24, 1944," pp. 1-2; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. Strengthening the democratic consciousness, as well as appealing to the aspirations

Europe, as the cultural and political apogee of the 'West' draw on a premise that America had an exceptional role, conferred by historical forces, to play in reconstituting global politics after the war, as the case studies to follow illustrate.

I shall also argue in the chapters to follow that the idea of self-vindication through foreign policy became a potent symbolic tool within US cultural and informational policy-making discourse precisely because of the contradictions it entailed.[36] On the one hand, America was seen as singular, unique as the pinnacle of historical progress and political fulfilment. On the other, the US constituted a global symbol: it was the apex of political, economic and cultural modernity and, in the post-1945 context, the guarantor of these values of behalf of all people.[37] This dialectic between singularity and universalism within the discourses of US cultural and informational diplomacy constituted, to draw on Vibeke Pedersen's terms, an 'inducing rhetorical structure,' which represented America as a political 'culture on an errand.'[38] This is not to suggest that the United States has been the only state to understand its foreign policy in vindicationist terms: Anatol Lieven, for instance, detects similarities between American exceptionalism and nationalist foreign policy discourses in Israel.[39] My study does, nonetheless, develop the line of argument that there was a depth and potence to the dialectic of American exceptionalism in this period that unlocked America's energies for the pursuit both of cultural and informational influence and global hegemony on a wider scale. The representation of

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and emotions, of the Chinese people was also alluded to in an undated report by Gerald F Winfield, an OWI field officer in Chunking: Gerald F. Winfield, "OWI Program in China: A Report and Tentative Suggestions;" Records Relating to the China, Burma and India Theatre 1942-5, Records of the Historian; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD. See also: "Objectives and Principles of the International Information and Cultural Program," (no author), (July 11, 1946), pp. 2-3; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

[36] The palpable impacts of this contradiction are also emphasised in the work of Bercovitch and Pedersen: Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad*; Pedersen, "In Search of Monsters to Destroy?"

[37] This contradiction is also reflected on in Pedersen, "In Search of Monsters to Destroy?," pp. 215, 221-3.

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 214-5, 220-1.

[39] Anatol Lieven, *America Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, (London: Harper Perennial, 2003), pp. 17-8. Michael Barnett's work highlights how the Israel's Zionist identity has informed exceptionalist rhetoric in the context of Israeli foreign policy: Michael N. Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change: Israel's Road to Oslo," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, (no. 1, 1999). The antagonism between the American and Iranian exceptionalisms is also explored in William O. Beeman, *The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs:" How the United States and Iran Demonize Each Other*, (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2005). French exceptionalism is explored in Tzvetan Todorov, *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*, trans. Catherine Porter, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). There seems to be some continuity across these studies, and with the American case, in that they all deal with nations that see themselves as born by revolutions.

US cultural and informational diplomacy in exceptional terms shaped the transformation of US foreign policy during 1936-53, serving as an inducement to embed and vindicate American politics and culture on a global scale.

In sum, the three threads of my argument about the significance of cultural and informational discourse run as follows. First, I argue that shared ideas about the nature of 'America' as an international subject that were mobilised by cultural and informational diplomats during the early stages of the programs moved toward the centre of US grand strategy during the post-1945 period. This took place in conjunction with the embedding of American military, economic and institutional influence, and helped to justify the projection of these forms of material power by reformulating American political culture as principles for American hegemony on a global scale. Second, the lexicon of liberalism had strong symbolic currency in the context of the cultural and informational programs. Liberal scripts, which had enabled the cultural and informational diplomacy programs to be established in the first place, were crucial in shaping how cultural and informational diplomacy were seen to support the reorientation of US foreign policy toward an embedded posture of global hegemony after 1945. Finally, the grammar of exceptionalism/vindicationism- a dialectical and solipsistic way of characterising American foreign relations- will be shown to have informed the kind of cultural, informational and broadly hegemonic agent Washington became during the period surveyed in this study.

Representing Foreign Policy: The Discursive Practices Approach as Foreign Policy Analysis

Having illustrated the three arguments I develop within this study, it is necessary at this point to clarify the conceptual framework and mode of enquiry upon which my empirical research in forthcoming chapters rests, and ground my use of this framework within the context of existing approaches. The basic constructivist theoretical claim informing my study is that there are extensive connections between inter-subjective meanings, language and foreign policy decision-making. The process that this conceptual framework illuminates is how foreign policy-makers "use role and identity conceptions...to form an idea of their state as a unit." Hence "we cannot understand state identity without learning something about the political,

philosophical, and legal discourses that give it meaning."[40] Within the discursive practices approach, from which I establish a conceptual framework for this study, the agents and objects that comprise "[t]he international system [are taken to] represent... not innocent sets of objects attracting orderly speech practices; they are parts of a system that has been conjured up in *policy-related speech practices.*"[41] Explanations of foreign policy that adopt this approach aim to specify how linguistic representations give rise to the range of possibilities- and the criteria for evaluating these possibilities according to the inter-subjectively understood 'identity' of the national subject they pertain to- contemplated by officials in the course of foreign-policy making.

There is a basic ontological premise underpinning the discursive practices approach, which is that discourses reflect the shared 'structures of meaning' that function to 'organise social relations.' Discourses organise social relations in two ways: as a shared underlying representational system that configures meanings across the spectrum of policy texts, and as rhetorical commonplaces that have strong symbolic or persuasive force in the context of particular actions.[42] As a consequence of this ontological move, one of the central concepts of International Relations scholarship, power, is recast within this conceptual framework. As I foreshadowed in my introduction, in addition to the material transactions (such as coercion, compensation or institutional structures) that are generally understood by IR scholars as comprising relations of power, power is also a property of specific social relations between international agents. This kind of situated social power arises from 'diffuse social processes' that determine what kinds of inter-subjective meanings and forms of knowledge are 'taken for granted' at a particular time, and thereby enable certain kinds of action to be contemplated and preclude others.[43] My study mobilises these

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[40] Mlada Bukovansky, "American Identity and Neutral Rights from Independence to the War of 1812." *International Organization* 51, (no. 2, Spring 1997), p. 210.

[41] Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 95. My own emphasis added. A good summary of the ontology of this approach is to be found in: Lene Hansen, *Security as Practice: Discourse Analysis and the Bosnian War*, (London: Routledge, 2006).

[42] Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction." To flip this distinction between the configuration of meanings and persuasive force, John Kenneth Galbraith defines these kinds of social relations from the perspective of its objects as 'conditioned power,' which "is the product of a continuum from objective, visible persuasion to what the individual in the social context has been brought to believe is inherently correct." John Kenneth Galbraith, *The Anatomy of Power*, (London: Corgi Books, 1983), p. 43.

[43] Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," pp. 55-6. A helpful discussion of productive power is also: Jennifer Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of Research and Methods," *European Journal of International Relations* 5, (no. 2, 1999), p. 231. Laffey

theoretical points for the purposes of my analysis of policy-making within the US cultural and informational programs. Diffuse social processes, reflected in the kinds of discourses policy-makers utilised, led to the embedding of new understandings of the scope and nature of US foreign relations among policy-makers. I explore this process, and show how the understandings they reflect in turn made it possible for Washington to define and claim the posture of post-war vindicationist hegemony that it did after 1945.[44]

As an account of foreign policy-making, the discursive practices approach surveys these productive or constitutive processes, and thus promises "to broaden our understanding of what foreign policy making *is*," envisaging policy-making as "a practice that produces a social order as well as one through which individual and collective subjects themselves are produced and reproduced." As such, discursive practices analysis has significant implications for the parameters of IR scholarship in that it supplies a critique of rational-actor approaches that "take as unproblematic the *possibility* that a particular decision or course of action could happen." Rather, what is to be explained here "is not *why* a particular outcome obtained, but rather how the subjects, objects, and interpretive dispositions were constructed such that certain practices were made possible."[45] To put this another way, Patrick Jackson has summarised discourse analysis as an effort to understand how language is implicated in:

> the production and reproduction of *boundaries of action*. The central issue is how the limits of acceptability are drawn; a legitimation process constructs spheres within which certain actions can be performed, and it cordons off others as falling beyond the pale...One distinguishing characteristic of these boundaries is that by *limiting* action, they *produce* an actor, demarcating a sphere in which that actor can legitimately act.[46]

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and Weldes highlight the productive capacity of discourse by pointing that discourses provide actors with 'symbolic technologies' in the context of social action: Laffey and Weldes, "Beyond Belief," p. 209.

[44] Here I draw on the insights of Rodney Barker in his study of political authority as a kind of claim or performative act, rather than an attribute of government. As observed in the foregoing chapter, the account of US hegemony developed here applies the following insight at the level of the American state: "The claim of rulers to special status or qualities, and the actions they take in cultivating this claim, are the central part of endogenous legitimation, of the self-justification of rulers by the cultivation of an identity distinguished from that of ordinary men and women." Rodney Barker, *Legitimating Identities: The Self-Preservation of Rulers and Subjects*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), p. 3.

[45] Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction," p. 298.

[46] Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, pp. 24-5.

Drawing on this conceptual framework, my argument concerning the constitutive role of liberalism and exceptionalism/vindicationism within American cultural and informational diplomacy suggests that discursive representations made possible the broadening scope of US foreign policy during 1936-53. In adopting a conceptual framework that asks how foreign policy practices were *made possible* by inter-subjective dispositions and discursive practices, my study joins this existing research agenda within constructivist IR scholarship.

Although the functions of discourse in constituting states as knowing subjects of international relations are seen to be diffuse (i.e. enabling or warranting) rather than specific in their 'casual' impacts, discourse analysis provides at the same time a conceptual framework that is attentive to the role of individuals as discursive agents within foreign policy-making. By assuming that "the world does not issue a summons to speak in a particular way but rather ways of speaking are implicated in world making," the discursive practices framework emphasises the ongoing enabling and productive functions that individuals perform when they uphold or diverge from the prevailing representational order.[47] Patrick Jackson has recently taken this emphasis on the representational practices undertaken by individuals within the context of foreign policy-making one step further, emphasising the representational *transactions* that individuals participate in during the course of foreign policy-making. Jackson calls attention not only to how options were opened up as policy possibilities through processes of representation, but also how struggles over the *acceptability* and *legitimacy* of particular avenues under consideration played out in the rhetorical exchanges that punctuate foreign policy-making.[48] As Roxanne Doty has also emphasised, "any meaningful discussion of [individual] agency must perforce be a discussion of representation."[49] In the case studies to follow I shall draw heavily on primary archival sources and the secondary literature within the discipline of Diplomatic History in order to expose the kinds of representational practices that individual agents within the US foreign policy process engaged in.

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[47] Michael Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation*, p. 123. In fact, to the considerable degree that post-structuralist philosophy has informed the discursive practices approach, the ongoing production of meaning is necessary and enforced by the fact that language is 'inherently unstable;' it never achieves complete fixity over reality. Consequently, ongoing individual action is crucial to sustaining particular meanings and practices. See Hansen, *Security as Practice*, pp. 20-1.

[48] Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*, pp. 15-6, Ch. 2.

[49] Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, p. 164.

What kinds of analytical tools does the discursive practices approach offer to understand the constitutive and enabling functions of discourse in US foreign policy-making? In this section I shall extract a 'toolkit' of analytical insights from the existing literature within the discursive practices approach that will allow me, in the forthcoming chapters, to assess how particular representational practices functioned to constitute subjects and symbolically enable action within the cultural and informational programs. These analytical tools within the discursive practices approach include: relational identity propositions or 'logics of alterity;' processes of narration and rhetorical framing; and the situating of actors within grammatical relationships of predication, which lead to the classification or hierarchical positioning of subjects.

Self/Other: Alterity and the Making of Foreign Policy

One of the most significant analytical concepts that has been advanced within the discursive practices approach is that policy-makers and other international agents habitually engage with other international actors in terms of endogenous relational identity propositions about the 'self' and its 'other.' One of the most influential texts to apply self/other relations to the international sphere was Tzvetan Todorov's *Conquest of America*, which set out a conceptual framework that has since been taken up by IR scholars such as Iver Neumann and Jacinta O'Hagan.[50] Published in 1982, Todorov's study considered how propositions about identity shaped the behaviour of 'civilized' Europeans during their encounter with the 'uncivilized' indigenous Americans after the conquest of 1492. Todorov demonstrates how the conquering encounter was embedded, for the Europeans, within a series of interlocking and relational logics of opposition (or alterity) pertaining to the Spanish and indigenous civilizations. In this encounter, the kind of claims about the 'self' that Europeans made encompassed a set of related presuppositions that

[50] Iver B. Neumann, *The Uses of the Other: 'The East' in European Identity Formation*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Iver B. Neumann, "Deep Structure, Free-Floating Signifier, or Something in Between? Europe's Alterity in Putin's Russia," in *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jacinta O'Hagan, "'The Power and the Passion': Civilizational Identity and Alterity in the Wake of September 11," in *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

denigrated and estranged the indigenous 'other' and thereby legitimated the violent subordination of the peoples of indigenous America. The conquest has broader significance for Todorov as an exemplar of the logic of alterity at work in the context of international relations:

> the discovery of America, or of the Americans, is certainly the most astonishing encounter of our history. We do not have the same sense of radical difference in the 'discovery' of other continents of other peoples...the discovery of America is essential for us today not only because it is an extreme, and exemplary, encounter.[51]

In asserting the discursively constructed and contingent nature of otherness as a category in international politics, Todorov identifies three processes of judgement that compose relations of alterity: international subjects are positioned along axiological, praxaeological and epistemic axes.[52] In this context, axiological logics determine how the other is considered in terms of value judgements such as good/bad or equal/inferior. Second, praxaeological alterity specifies the degree of closeness between the 'self' and 'other,' thereby determining the intensity or significance self/other relations. And third, epistemic alterity is framed according to the level of ignorance or knowledge of the 'other' that the 'self' possesses in the context of any given encounter or relationship.[53]

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[51] Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans. Richard Howard, (New York: Harper & Row, 1982), pp. 4-5.

[52] In addition to *The Conquest of America*, see also: Todorov, *On Human Diversity*, Ch. 4.

[53] Todorov, *The Conquest of America*, p. 185. Several other scholars have drawn on the concept of alterity in world politics to effectively engage with a broader repertoire of case studies. Most notably, Iver Neumann has developed the concept of alterity in relation to European encounters with the 'other,' through which notions of the European civilisational 'self' were constituted. In *The Uses of the Other*, Neumann shows how Europe's encounters with its proximate neighbours: the Turkish and Russian 'others,' have been represented in the context of foreign policy discourses. He emphasises the political purposes in which these representations are embedded- the European idea of Russia, for instance, is varied, dynamic and encompasses numerous contradictions, with Russia constituted simultaneously as anomalous to *and* placed within the taxonomy of 'Europe.' Neumann emphasises the primacy of the identification of 'self' within the logic of self/other representations: thus he draws the rather counter-intuitive conclusion that since the end of the Cold War the estrangement of the Russian 'other' from the European 'self' has become more pronounced because "the temptation remains...to play up the alterity of Russia *in order* to increase the integration of the European self." The multifaceted analysis that the tripartite axes that compose relations of alterity is crucial, as Neumann's work demonstrates, for comprehending complex, varied and long process of historical interaction such as the European/Russian one. Neumann, *The Uses of the Other*, pp. 107-12. In recent work William O. Beeman has adopted the general insights of Todorov and Neumann to analyse the generation of 'self/other' representations in US/Iran relations as a function of 'master myths' in foreign policy. These myths comprise a 'repertoire of cultural dynamics' within which the representation of the 'self' for the purposes of consolidating the domestic 'imagined community' has primacy. Beeman, *The "Great Satan" vs. the "Mad Mullahs,"* Ch. 2.

How might the representational practices that attended the formation of American cultural and informational policy be interpreted in terms of the construction of alterity? In the chapters to follow I shall contend, for instance, that the rise of the Soviet Union as America's ideological antagonist was increasingly constituted through logics of alterity mobilised within US cultural and informational discourse. As Roxanne Doty has also observed, during the Cold War the USSR was regarded as axiologically opposed to the United States within US foreign policy texts, and was increasingly cast as an immoral, uncivilised, and aggressive world power. Simultaneously, the magnitude of the Soviet threat was perceived as great because the USSR was situated as close to the US on the praxeological and epistemic axes: the USSR had a similar capacity for global influence to that of the US, and was also closely studied and scrutinised to the extent that its intentions were thought to be well known in Washington.[54] In this reading, the multifaceted nature of American Cold War discourse can be unpacked into its constituent axes of judgement, and thus the origins of the globally-encompassing and Manichaean tone of the conflict can be engaged with greater precision.

What makes the self/other connection significant is that it opens space for considering the constitutive processes that occur when foreign policy-makers reflect upon the interests, values and character of the national subject in whose name they speak and act, and assess the implications of this self-representation for foreign policy relationships. In the context of American cultural and informational discourse, which, as I have already noted, drew heavily on existing doctrines of American liberalism and exceptionalism/vindicationism, the construction of the American self as the liberal democratic Cold War protagonist through its alterity with the USSR can be surveyed. Drawing on the concept of alterity, I shall also suggest in the forthcoming chapters that the construction of a Third World/modernising 'other,' by refashioning prior representations of the modern, advanced American self, also shaped the tone of US cultural and informational diplomacy in these regions. The alterity of the modernising other in relation to America- China, in particular- as backward and hence highly prone to subversion by Axis and Communist propaganda functioned in such a way as to encourage the embedding of American material and

[54] Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction."

ideological influence within these regions during and after the Second World War.[55]

Narrating Identities: Situating the Self In Time

The functions of discourse in the self-constitution of subjects in world politics have also been emphasised in the context of narrative practices in foreign policy discourse, as emphasised by David Campbell, Vibeke Pedersen, Michael Barnett, Christina Klein and others.[56] The exegesis of the concept of narrative in the work of Campbell, Klein and Pedersen is instructive here since these writers also undertake to enquire into US foreign policy, thereby suggesting not only how the concept of narrative can be operationalised as an explanation of foreign policy at the general level, but also that narrative practices have been resonant in the case of the United States. For Campbell, American 'foreign policy' is constituted by what is articulated as a 'threat' to the American 'self,' with both conceptualised as a racial and religious categories. Hence, Campbell's work seeks to expose and analyse how the narration of US foreign policy has shaped the prevailing terms of American national identity, and how these in turn have determined where US policy-makers

[55] The interventionist impulse in relation to small states that the United States acquired in the context of the Cold War can also be understood as a product of representational practices. As Michael Shapiro contends, military coercion was so frequently resorted to by the US in its relations with Central America during the 1970s and 1980s because discourses of international 'anarchy' entrenched concepts of instability, difference and "relations of [US] superiority and [Latin American] inferiority" within US foreign policy thinking. Shapiro also detects in US foreign policy planning texts a pervasive "bureaucratic/managerial imagery which has lent the [US's] foreign-policy discourse the identity of the conflict manager." This discourse self-reflexively constituted the US as a morally and rationally 'privileged' actor within the international system, contributing to the ways in which US national interests were rendered in globally expansive and deeply ideological terms during the Cold War. The 'bureaucratic managerial' and 'interventionist' impulses in US foreign policy in relation to the Western Hemisphere were derived from "a narrative built around the myth that America is a nation created out of a search for 'freedom' (as opposed to more favourable tax status, better land, etc.). This notion fuels an interventionist, state-centric foreign policy by casting America as a defender of freedom, an actor committed to helping others achieve a similar destiny." Although my study surveys a phase of the Cold War in which intervention in small states was still developing as a mode of Cold War engagement, to a significant degree the 'managerial' element within US policy toward the Third World is evident in the material on China and other non-Western states that will be presented in the forthcoming chapters. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation*, pp. 101-2 & 115-7.

[56] Campbell, *Writing Security*; Pedersen, "In Search of Monsters To Destroy?"; Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change"; Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). Kevin C. Dunn, "Narrating Identity: Constructing the Congo During the 1960 Crisis," in *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Robert W. Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s*, (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997); Laura A. Belmonte, "A Family Affair? Gender, the US Information Agency, and Cold War Ideology, 1945-1960" in *Culture and International History*, eds. Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003).

identify threats to US 'national' security within the international realm.[57] Campbell's premise is that US foreign policy initiatives are always articulated in such a way as "to discipline the state." [58] States themselves are artificial or 'imagined' communities: states "do not possess pre-discursive, stable identities," and this "renders states in permanent need of reproduction: with no ontological status apart from the many and varied practices that constitute their reality, states are (and have to be) always in a process of becoming."[59]

Michael Barnett, whose work centres on Middle Eastern regional politics, has also provided a lucid account of the self-constitutive functions of narrative in foreign policy discourse. He defines narrative as "a story that is joined by a plot," which shapes the state's subjective identity as "lived history...[that] continues a storyline from the past through the present and some imagined future."[60] Accounts of narrative in political contexts have also emphasised their metaphorical or figurative meaning (the concept of 'plotting' in Barnett's definition). As David B. Edwards has also noted, the metaphorical functions of narrative have a 'controlling' effect by situating actors within prescribed roles according to the 'organising logic' of a political system.[61] In the chapters to follow I shall show how narratives that depicted

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[57] Cambpell. *Writing Security*, p. 4.

[58] *Ibid.*, p. 51.

[59] *Ibid.*, p. 12. The 'inherently unstable and contingent' basis of national identity is taken as a key premise in Doty's work on British immigration discourses: Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Immigration and National Identity: Constructing the Nation," *Review of International Studies* 22, (no. 3, 1996), pp. 238-240.

[60] Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change," p. 12. Tzvetan Todorov and Hayden White have both, like Barnett, emphasised the storytelling form of narratives, while White also notes that the primacy of the self's subjectivity is a feature that characterises narrative as a particular kind of discourse. Todorov emphasises how the narrative form encompasses chronology and description, and situates the relationship between the protagonists as one of interaction and transformation. Tzvetan Todorov, "The 2 Principles of Narrative," *Diacritics* 1, (no. 1, Autumn 1971), pp. 38-9. In his discussion of subjectivity, Hayden White has noted that narrative is nonetheless a transcultural medium: "far from being a code among many that a culture may utilise for endowing experience with meaning, narrative is a metacode, a human universal on the basis of which transcultural messages about the nature of a shared reality can be transmitted." White's work on 'genre' and 'narrative' also reflects on the significance of both frameworks in the study of history, and thus provides some corroboration for the methodological approach taken here. Hayden White, "The Value of Narrativity in the Representation of Reality," *Critical Inquiry* 7, (no. 1, Autumn 1980), pp. 6-7. Kevin C. Dunn has emphasised the identity-forming function of narrative: "Identities are formed by the gradual layering on and connection of events and meanings, usually through three steps: the selection of events themselves, the linking of these events to each other in causal and associated ways (plotting), and interpreting what the events and plots signify." Dunn, "Narrating Identity," p. 124. On the 'narrative turn' in International Relations scholarship and the properties of narrative, see also: Geoffrey Roberts, "History, Theory and the Narrative Turn in IR," *Review of International Studies* 32, (no. 4, October 2006).

[61] Edwards argues that metaphor is particularly significant because of the frequency with which metaphors emerge in 'polemical' contexts. As such the use of metaphor is connected to contexts of

Washington's unfolding historical relationships with other nations and geographical regions supplied organising logics for the cultural and informational diplomacy programs, and for US hegemony at a broader level.

The constitutive functions of narrative are examined in some detail within Campbell's *Writing Security*, which develops a historical analysis of US national security policy that is attentive to:

> the roles danger and difference play in constituting the identity of the United States [which] involves a deconstruction of conventional discourse and its self-preservation...the argument proposes that United States foreign policy be understood as a political practice central to the constitution, production, and maintenance of [domestic] political identity.[62]

Singled out for particular emphasis in Campbell's account is the narrative structure of the political sermon, or 'jeremiad.' Articulating US national security policy within the format of the jeremiad provided a strong inducement to Americans to partake of the Cold War as an ideological crusade, combining "searing critiques with appeals for spiritual renewal... preaching the omnipresence of sin so as to instil the desire for order."[63] Hence, in key Cold War national security texts such as National Security Council Report 68, issued in April 1950:

> while one might have expected few if any references to national values or purposes in confidential documents prepared for the inner sanctum of national security policy (after all, don't they know who they are or what they represent?), the texts of foreign policy are replete with statements about the fulfilment of the republic, the fundamental purpose of the nation, God-given rights, moral codes,

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acute struggle or historical transformation and the kinds of radical agency pursued at these moments. David B. Edwards, "Mad Mullahs and Englishmen: Discourse in the Colonial Encounter," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 31, (no. 4, October 1989), p. 651. Jennifer Milliken's discussion of the possibility of metaphor analysis in the discourse practices approach also approaches these figurative/metaphorical issues in the language of foreign policy. Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations," p. 235.

[62] Campbell, *Writing Security*, p. 8.

[63] *Ibid.*, p. 32. On the Eisenhower administration's use of this narrative, see *ibid.*, p. 149. America's frontier myth is also highlighted in the context of Campbell's discussion as a theme of narratives that connected America's past expansionism to contemporary 'progressive' trajectories. The frontier constituted a key figurative element of the US's Cold War identity: "At the core of the Myth is the belief that economic, moral, and spiritual progress are achieved by the heroic foray of civilized society into the virgin wilderness." This allowed the Soviet Union and subversive elements inside the US during the Cold War to be cast in resonant ways as a barbarian element, a threat that "only understands force and cannot be reasoned with." Richard Slotkin cited in *ibid.*, p. 146.

> the principles of European civilization, the fear of cultural and spiritual loss, and the responsibilities and duties thrust upon the gleaming example of America. In this sense, the texts that guided national security policy did more than simply offer strategic analyses of the 'reality' they confronted: they actively concerned themselves with the scripting of a particular American identity.[64]

A similarly central role for narrative practices in foreign policy discourse is suggested in recent work by Vibeke Pedersen. In work that once again deals with American security strategy, Perdersen characterises American foreign policy thinking as a "restless mode of imagination," shaped to a large degree by the jeremiad's "distinctively inducing communicative tradition," which served to encourage the pursuit of international interventions in post-1945 US foreign policy. Pedersen notes one significant implication of the narrative tradition in US foreign policy discourse: it has located US foreign relations as a way to cultivate the global *telos*. American foreign policy texts often reproduce this exceptionalist narrative of self-fulfilment, serving "to constitute America as a special entity, stressing its otherness in terms of *time*- America is different because it is advanced, ahead, avant-garde."[65] In her account Pedersen argues that this extant self-conception has guided Washington into an ongoing search for international 'threats' within the post-Cold War world order, since the script of crusade and redemption remains the prevailing mode through which US foreign policy has been represented and understood.

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[64] *Ibid.*, pp. 31-2. In other work, Campbell likens these constitutive practices to drawing of an American moral cartography for the Cold War, in which "the responsibility for evil was located in the other and the responsibility for combating it was the burden of the self...One of the effects of this moral cartography was the currency attached to the idea that no international action was possible without US leadership." David Campbell, "Violent Performances: Identity, Sovereignty, Responsibility," in *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory*, eds. Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996), p. 163. In this particular contribution to debates about culture, discourse and identity in international politics Campbell traces the legacy of the Cold War moral cartography on post-Cold War debates on military intervention, particularly in relation to the Balkans Wars during the 1990s. As in earlier periods, American statehood still lacked 'ontological being' and required a 'geography of evil' to consolidate its subjectivity. In the post-Cold War era the process of sketching threats and dangers was undertaken through debates about the 'national interest' and a "casting around for the form that new dangers and recalcitrant threats might take." Campbell, "Violent Performances," p. 167-8.

[65] Pedersen, "In Search of Monsters to Destroy?," pp. 215-7. One of Pedersen's most important points is the sense of virtue the jeremiad established. It bears acknowledging that much of Pedersen's discussion is inspired by Bercovitch, *The American Jeremiad.* An emphasis has been placed on the redemptive element in puritan jeremiad formats in the work of Perry Miller: "The demand made upon benighted human nature in the covenant of grace is not exorbitant, and demonstrates ... how solicitous God appears as He is pictured by this school. It is indeed a little surprising to the modern student to find how large a part of Puritan sermons was devoted to proving to people that they need not be weighed down with *too great a sense of sin.*" My own emphasis added. Miller, *Errand Into the Wilderness*, p. 83.

Whereas Campbell and Pedersen have emphasised how narratives danger, opposition and interventionism are present in US national security discourse, in *Cold War Orientalism* Christina Klein notes how narratives were mobilised in the context of US foreign policy discourse to enable the pursuit of an interdependent international order after 1945. In this work Klein exposes the logics of *integration* and *pluralism* that were mobilised within US foreign policy thinking and, subsequently, US popular culture to garner public acceptance for the US's post-war grand strategy within the Asia Pacific. In an account that regards popular culture as a rich source of 'foreign policy texts' and thereby attests to the 'diffuseness' of socially constitutive practices in international relations, Klein contends that:

> [t]he exercise of political, economic, and military power always depends upon the mechanisms of 'culture,' in the form of the creative use of language and the deployment of shared stories...[F]ar from being wholly separate from the realm of politics, [culture] offers a privileged space in which politically salient meanings can be constructed and questioned, where social categories can be defined and delimited, where shared values can be affirmed and contested.[66]

The images of Asians regularly presented in US popular entertainment during the early Cold War are taken in Klein's analysis as symptomatic of a broader representational shift in US public discourse that "helped to construct a national identity for the United States as a global power." A crucial part of the 'work' that popular entertainment performed was to harmonise two 'complicated' aspects of America's post-war role for the US domestic audience: the transition to global hegemony in the face of residual domestic sentiments of isolationism, and the self-image that Americans had cherished as an anti-imperialist, democratic nation.[67]

Klein identifies three key narratives within this post-war American representation of Asia that functioned to resolve this contradiction, including, firstly, the situating of Asia cartographically as contested space of geopolitical struggle between the great powers in need of ordering and securing, and secondly the

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[66] Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, pp. 6-7. I would clarify here that Klein's survey of 'popular culture' is not explicitly framed as an engagement with the ways in which US foreign policy officials pursued 'cultural diplomacy.' Rather, Klein's objective here is to show how the highly diffuse perceptions of Asians within US popular culture in general represented a worldview that informed Washington's general posture of foreign policy. In other words, her work surveys the broad sphere of popular public perceptions, whereas my work surveys the very specific stock of perceptions that informed a narrow segment of US policy-makers.

[67] *Ibid.*, p. 9.

propagation of stories of Americans benignly encountering Asia with progressive, modernising intentions. The third narrative told a story about America's liberal democratic exceptionality, plotting how:

> Washington defended democracy during the [Second World] war as a universal political philosophy applicable to all peoples regardless of race, and by doing so it helped move into the mainstream the idea of America as a harmonious nation made up of people from diverse ethnic, racial, national, and religious backgrounds... The United States thus became the only Western nation that sought to legitimate its world-ordering ambitions by championing the idea (if not always the practice) of racial equality.[68]

In this way the US's engagement with Asia came to be politically and publicly understood as an historically progressive, pluralist encounter, summarised in that Klein terms as a 'narrative of American anti-conquest.'[69]

The development of Klein's argument about the function of integrative/pluralist narratives within post-war American foreign relations is a line of enquiry that warrants some emphasis here. The narrative representation of US cultural and informational diplomacy often adopted the kind of integrative tone that Klein detects. My work follows Klein's path of enquiry in that I do not presuppose that the articulation of foreign policy narratives *necessitates* the estrangement, denigration or persecution of the international other.[70] Although the representation of

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[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 10-11. I shall show in forthcoming chapters how the principle of Third World self determination was mobilised in this way by cultural and informational diplomats. Klein develops a provocative and interesting point in her account that I have chosen (for reasons of scope) not to take up in the context of my study. She draws attention to emotion as a salient feature in political discourse. Sentimentalism played a key role in the narration of US-Asian interactions as an emotional core for the 'narratives of anti-conquest,' which celebrated the forging of bonds across divides of racial, national and religious difference, and the development of "human connections...characterised by reciprocity and exchange, often of a personal, intellectual or material nature." Klein also connects these representations to geopolitical functionality: "[t]he power of sympathy could be a double-edged one, however: in forging emotionally satisfying bonds across the divides of difference and in providing access to another's subjectivity, the sentimental could serve as an instrument for exercising power." Logics of integration/pluralism and sentimentalism thus also served as narratives that legitimated the binding of other societies to American power. The study of emotion in international relations is an important and innovative research agenda, however incorporating a theory of emotional with the discursive practices approach adopted here simply raises too many additional issues and would complicate what is already an eclectic theoretical framework. *Ibid.*, pp. 13-15. On racial equality and foreign policy, see also Thomas Borstelmann, "Jim Crow's Coming Out: Race Relations and American Foreign Policy in the Truman Years," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 29, (no. 3, September 1999).

[69] Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, pp. 13-15.

[70] This argument regarding the multiple definitions of the other has also been illustrated in recent work by Lene Hansen. In a recent critique of the substantive concerns of the discursive practices approach, particularly Campbell's *Writing Security*, Hansen draws attention to the tendency among scholars to

America as the locus of international integration and inter-dependence undoubtedly belied the underlying structures of American domination within the Third World, the *ideals* of international integration and pluralism will be shown to have exerted a very powerful influence over what kinds of cultural and informational strategies were adopted within the programs studied here and over the kind of hegemon that Washington perceived itself to be after the war.[71] What unites Campbell, Petersen and Klein's accounts, however, is their shared emphasis on the narrative form itself as an influential feature of foreign policy discourse, and the extent to which all three bring out the solipsistic nature of the foreign policy perceptions that have been constituted through the narrative representation of America as a world power.

Framing Imperatives: Premises and Policy-Making

Returning to the work of Michael Barnett, it is instructive to note how the concept of discursive 'framing' has been utilised by Barnett to engage with the persuasive functions of discourse in the context foreign policy-making. Barnett's use of the term draws on broader work within the context of discourse analysis that defines the function of frames in social action as "specific metaphors, symbolic representations, and cognitive cases used to render or cast behaviour and events in an evaluative mode."[72] Barnett's analysis of Israeli defence policy, for example, suggests that political actors tend to discursively frame particular international issues

identify the other in foreign policy discourse as a 'radical other' only. She notes that the other can be seen as "constituted through multiple links" and as such "even when security discourses articulate a radical Other, it is one potentially constituted through links to more ambiguous less-than-Radical Others...the antagonistic Other is not the only Other constituted through security discourse. States also articulate and rely upon 'constitutive Others' who might be formal or 'identity' allies ('Allied Others') or the benefactors of humanitarian policies ('Assisted Others'). Constitutive Others are not constituted as threatening 'instrumental' objects, but as subjects whose recognition – in the form of assistance and similarity from 'Allied Others' or gratitude from 'Assisted Others' – confirm crucial elements of the Self." Given the interest taken here in how Washington constructed its foreign policy in integrationist, pluralist and benign terms, Hansen's argument is significant as a call to extend the substantive parameters of the discursive practices approach. Lene Hansen, "The Clash of Cartoons? The Clash of Civilizations? Visual Securitization and the Danish 2006 Cartoon Crisis," Paper presented at the 48th Annual International Studies Association Convention, Chicago, USA, February 28 - March 3 2007, p. 5.

[71] Indeed, there is some overlap here with the kinds of representations that Roxanne Doty and Michael Shaprio examine in relation to US stewardship and management of backward or 'childlike' Third World Nations. See Doty, *Imperial Encounters*; Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation*.

[72] Zald quoted in Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change," pp. 15, 25. In his work on Arab regionalism, Barnett has contended that frames were modes of 'organising events' deployed strategically by Arab governments as they sought to fix prevailing purposes and norms of regional order. See, Michael N. Barnett, *Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), Ch. 1.

as a deliberate, strategic move. In discursively framing an issue or subject, agents seek to 'fashion shared understandings,' 'fix meanings' and 'organise experience.' Frames are specifically tied to agency in the sense that they are deployed as premises that enable certain courses of action over others, or cast the implications of certain courses of action in favourable ways, according to established discourses and beliefs.[73]

The concept of discursive framing is utilised quite broadly in my study, to describe not only the deployment of symbols in a strategic way, but also the more general way in which US policy documents built on shared symbolic, figurative and evaluative premises that served to bound the scope of their discussion. For instance, we shall see in the case studies to follow Washington's repudiation of 'propaganda' and the range of ideas about the American subject this implied was a common discursive frame through which cultural and informational policy initiatives were represented. In this context, my use of the concept of framing draws on Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes' recent discussion of ideas as 'symbolic technologies' whereby shared ideas are seen to be fashioned into tools that enable social action, and on conceptions of rhetoric and policy-making developed in the recent work of both Patrick Jackson and Janice Bially Mattern.[74]

Predication: Situating the Self in Hierarchies and Categories

In addition to the scripting of self/other relations and the narration and framing of policy initiatives, one of the key functions of discourse in US cultural and informational diplomacy was the positioning of international subjects according to Washington's developing vision of post-war ideological and political reform. Examining these positioning functions illustrates in a particularly clear way the proposition that discourse structures relationships of power in world politics. One of the key contributions within the discursive practices literature that develops this insight is Roxanne Doty's *Imperial Encounters*, in which Doty determines how the

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[73] Barnett, "Culture, Strategy and Foreign Policy Change," p. 15.

[74] Jackson, *Civilizing the Enemy*; Patrick Thaddeus Jackson, "*Whose* Identity? Rhetorical Commonplaces in 'American' Wartime Foreign Policy," in *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Mattern, "Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft"; Janice Bially Mattern, *Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force*, (New York: Routledge, 2005); Laffey and Weldes, "Beyond Belief."

subordination of the 'Third World' has been affected through its subordinate representation as a category of prevailing Western foreign policy discourses. Within this account, British colonialism and post-war US foreign policy in relation to the 'Third World' are both understood as structures that were contingent upon the asymmetric constitution of the dominant Western subject and its subordinate, Third World other.[75] In this context the 'hegemonic' purposes that the US and imperial Britain pursued in the Third World were enabled by denying 'Third World' societies the attributes of rationality, democratic sensibility, modernity and civilization within political discourse, and thereby inviting the exercise of Western power by rendering these societies inherently incapable of shaping their own destinies.

The conceptual approach adopted by Doty inquires into the ways in which international subjects acquire identities and social capabilities by virtue of how they are routinely positioned in relation to each other within the grammatical structures of language.[76] *Imperial Encounters* breaks down these positioning grammars into three 'capacities.' Generative capacity exists within foreign policy discourse, according to Doty, when the prevailing representations cast particular identities or ideas as 'natural.' In this context, discourse reinforces or "creates background knowledge that is taken to be true...[and] entails an implicit theorisation of how the world works and also an elaboration of the nature of its inhabitants." Associated with this process of presupposition is a second generative function: classification, which places agents or "human beings into the categories in which they 'naturally' belong. Hierarchies are often established based upon the presumed character of various kinds of human beings."[77] Finally, discourses of foreign policy-making also generate meanings about the international 'realities' within which actors operate by positioning subjects and

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[75] In hinging her study on the analysis of representations mobilised by dominant states during moments of colonial insurgency, Doty's approach mirrors Todorov's insight that moments of conflict are particularly significant for advancing the study of discourse and identity in world politics. See: Doty, *Imperial Encounters*; Todorov, *The Conquest of America.*

[76] Doty's emphasis on how discourses constitute a form of power owes much to the pioneering work of Edward Said. *Imperial Encounters* presents many similar insights to Said's highly influential *Orientalism*, particularly the centrality of a positional reading of power in social contexts, and the ways in which vested interests coalesce around the dominant intellectual and discursive frameworks, and constitute enduring structures of 'hegemony,' defined in neo-Gramscian terms. Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, pp. 5-7. See also Antonio Gramsci, *Selected Writings 1916-1935,* ed. David Forgacs, (Lawrence & Wishart: London, 1988); Edward Said, *Orientalism*, (New York: Vintage Books, 1979).

[77] Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, p. 10. Doty also identifies two additional discursive processes that are particularly relevant to the ways in which knowledge shapes the North-South relations that she examines: surveillance and negation. From her discussion of these points (p. 11), it is unclear how these processes could be thought to relate to the formation of policy for US cultural and informational diplomacy and so I do not import them into my framework of analysis.

objects relationally: "[w]hat defines a particular kind of subject is, in large part, the relationships [a] subject is positioned in relative to other kinds of subjects...[s]ome of the important kinds of relationships that position subjects are those of opposition, identity, similarity, and complementarity."[78]

Jennifer Milliken's survey of the discursive practices approach further clarifies this view of discourse as a mechanism for (re)constituting the positional relationships between international subjects during the course of foreign policy-making. The grammatical analysis typified by Doty's work is termed 'predicate analysis' in Milliken's survey, since this framework seeks to determine how "[p]redications of a noun construct the thing(s) name as a particular sort of thing, with particular features and capacities." Foreign policy texts are scrutinised in relation to their 'object space,' encompassing the "predications attaching to the subjects the text constructs" and the basis from which "subjects are distinguished from and related to one another."[79] There is some overlap between predicate analysis and the kinds of relational subject positioning that alterity brings about; as illustrated, for instance, in the triangular relationship between the US, Soviet, and Third World subjectivities that I noted above.[80] I draw on both concepts in the case study analysis to follow, distinguishing between alterity as a foundational and relatively fixed self/other categorisation, and taking the process of predication as a more fluid and dynamic process of textual positioning. I thus use the term 'predication' in a general sense to refer to the generation of subjects and their relational positions (which differs from 'representation' in the general sense since predication has an explicitly positional logic), as well as noting how international subjects were 'classified' or 'characterised' within the discursive construction of cultural and informational diplomacy.

One of the most prevalent presuppositions that is traced in Doty's work is the way in which American anti-imperialism was articulated in the context of post-1945 US foreign policy, which cast the global extension of US power in such a way as to affirm America's tradition of opposition to imperialism even as Washington sought to extend influence over the Third World.[81] The classification of the United

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[78] *Ibid.*, p. 11.

[79] Milliken, "The Study of Discourse in International Relations," p. 232.

[80] I also drew on Doty's work in making note of this subject positioning in the discussion above. See: Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction."

[81] Hence, and to extend this point a bit further, the concept of 'American Empire' is controversial because it contravenes the anti-imperial discourse of US foreign relations. See: Michael Cox, "The Empire's Back in Town: or America's Imperial Temptation Again," *Millennium* 32, (no. 1, 2003).

States as anti-imperialist and the Third World as backward and powerless is thereby shown to have created possibilities for Washington to craft a managerial global identity as an alternative to formal global imperialism. Washington constituted its subsequent interventions in Third World politics within a lexicon of foreign policy that constructed the American subject as "an exemplary world citizen [and the] living model of sovereign identity, stability, freedom, democracy, and material progress."[82] The extension of American power to the Third World could be contemplated and accepted on the grounds that post-colonial nations were presupposed to be "'emerging peoples'...[n]ot yet fully developed, unreconciled, they are always subject to the dangers stemming from their own immaturity."[83] Doty's account is particularly illustrative of the enabling functions of discourse by showing how the classification and positioning of subjects within US foreign policy discourse opened the possibility for particular interventions Third World politics that might otherwise not be contemplated.

Rather than selecting one analytical concept from this existing discursive practices literature, in the foregoing discussion I have shown that it is possible to draw several analytical tools from existing discursive practices analysis into an overarching conceptual framework. Within each of my case studies I examine the constitution of US cultural and informational diplomacy by drawing upon the concepts of alterity, narrative, frames, and predication surveyed in the foregoing discussion.[84] In my account of the development of the Division of Cultural Relations and its successor agencies presented in chapter three I utilise these four concepts as a basis to determine what the prevailing modes of representation mobilised in the context of US cultural diplomacy were, and to enquire into the broader implications of these practices in the context of US foreign relations. The narration of deepening inter-American ties will be shown to be implicated in the establishment of a cultural diplomacy program 1936 and in the deployment of cultural relations in a wider global

[82] Doty, *Imperial Encounters*, p. 83. As I shall discuss shortly, Christina Klein's work has also explored the US's 'narratives of anti-conquest' in the post-war period.
[83] *Ibid.*, p. 134.
[84] It bears noting that Jutta Weldes' survey of explanatory approaches to the constitution of national interests also emphasises the different kinds of discursive practices that can be simultaneously in play at a particular historical moment, and thus provides some support for my strategy of interrogating several formats of discursive practice within each case study. Weldes, "Constructing National Interests," pp. 281-2.

context during the Second World War and its aftermath. Concepts of diplomatic reciprocity and non-governmentalism were frames that situated the extension of Washington's cultural influence into the Western Hemisphere in this early phase as mutually agreeable (and anti-imperialist, in keeping with prevailing conceptions of liberalism in US political culture), and subsequently predicated the extension of US cultural diplomacy to other modernising regions such as East Asia. The concept of American anti-propagandism was a frame mobilised in 1936-38 that legitimated the expansion of the cultural diplomacy programs during the Second World War and its aftermath. The construction of logics of alterity within cultural diplomacy policy texts was implicated in maintaining claims to American exceptionality that this subjectivity implied: the US alone had developed a liberal format for cultural diplomacy, while 'others' such as the European colonial powers and the totalitarian states invariably perpetrated distorted, subversive cultural messages.

In the context of informational diplomacy, as undertaken by the Voice of America (VOA) radio station surveyed in chapter four, the significance of framing and predication within informational policy texts provides an effective illustration of the enabling functions of discursive representation in foreign policy. Situating VOA's work in relation to the prior debates criticising propaganda in the US was an acute quandary for VOA officials, particularly since they were determined to convey the principles American political culture as well as fulfilling a foreign policy purpose. As the forthcoming chapter will show, notions of journalistic practice and Washington's commitment to the establishment of a liberal international informational order were, from the founding of the Voice and throughout the 1940s, frames that enabled information to be projected for the purpose of securing international influence *even though* prior political debates had repudiated the similar practices associated with 'propaganda.' Generally it was in the name of the American people and the journalistic practices upheld by the private American media that informational diplomacy policy was articulated by VOA officials. Hence, the functions of US informational diplomacy were framed in progressive and non-aggrandising terms. Finally, chapter four highlights how narratives of global historical progress situating the US as the vanguard of the transition toward an economically and politically liberal global order also featured in the representation of US informational diplomacy. This narrative practice served as a basis to locate

American foreign policy in general as an effort to install, and subsequently defend, the interests of all nations at the level of global order after 1945.

The course of Washington's diplomacy within Unesco highlights how the representation of American identity and interests played out in a multilateral context. In my discussion of the Unesco case in chapter five the classification of other agents emerges as a prevalent tendency within the articulation US policy. In the mid-1940s, supporters of Washington's involvement in the founding of the institution mobilised more long-standing narratives situating America as the locus of post-war global renewal and historical progress toward a liberal world order. The value of apolitical cultural interchange, the significance of non-governmental representation, and the democratic connotations of multilateralism were recalled within these narrative representations, and ultimately served to situate the United States as a vanguard of global progress and integration. As Cold War antagonisms deepened during the late 1940s, Unesco was increasingly situated as an arena through which to pursue the vindication of America's liberal political culture, and the politically and morally subversive intentions of the Communist and social democratic 'other' were increasingly prevalent within US diplomatic papers and policy proposals. Although the USSR was not a member of Unesco during this phase, the logic of alterity through which the propaganda struggle with the USSR had been represented in Washington licensed the increasingly overbearing way in which Washington engaged with Unesco on issues that had ideological bearing.

Reconceptualising Cultural and Informational Diplomacy: Theoretical Contribution of This Study

In the course of adopting a conceptual framework informed by discursive practices analysis to engage with the practices of US cultural and informational diplomacy in the way illustrated in the foregoing section, my study speaks to the empirical and theoretical concerns of several existing strands of academic literature. Firstly, my study has implications for contemporary writing on American soft power and the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy- now generally referred to as 'public diplomacy'- within the field of foreign policy studies. My study extends this literature by identifying the constitutive functions of cultural and informational diplomacy discourse during 1936-53. Generally, these diplomatic practices have

been considered within studies of IR solely in terms of their ability to deliver to influence over foreign public opinion to governments. Furthermore, in setting out to elucidate the constitutive aspects of cultural and informational policy, my study also proffers a political and historical critique of the prevailing theoretical terms, notably the concept of 'soft power,' in which public diplomacy is currently conceptualised. I shall contend in the discussion below that the notion of soft power itself can be understood as being implicated in a self-reflexive discourse, and argue that soft power itself is less significant as a description of how to attain global influence than it is a reflection of ongoing patterns of American self-constitution and an emblem of the kinds of self-perceptions that historically nourished Washington's engagement in Cold War antagonisms.

Secondly, I shall review the emergence of a contemporary research agenda within the field of Diplomatic History that surveys the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy. This research agenda has paid particular attention to the development of these diplomatic practices by the US and the USSR, articulating in the process a new historiography of the Cold War. Several important empirical research programs and lines of theoretical enquiry in relation to international cultural and intellectual practices have been opened during these debates. I also indicate how adopting a theoretical perspective informed by IR constructivism/discourse analysis helps to clarify some of the conceptual questions that this historical research agenda has identified, thereby opening the possibility for cross-fertilisation between the Diplomatic History and International Relations research agendas into culture, ideas and foreign policy. In the final part of this section, I shall return to the discursive practices approach to specify how extending discourse analysis to cultural and informational diplomacy can extend the substantive parameters of this IR literature.

Soft Power and the Contemporary Public Diplomacy Debates

The value of effective public diplomacy and other instruments of international persuasion has emerged as a key theme within US foreign policy debates in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks against the United States. These events brought into stark relief the issue of how Washington might more effectively manage global public perceptions of America through cultural diplomacy, educational exchange, international information and public relations- practices

collectively termed 'public diplomacy' within this contemporary literature. Joseph Nye's early writing on soft power predated the 2001 attacks on the US, however Nye's work has subsequently become central to the contemporary lexicon in which the impact of public perceptions on world politics is debated. This recent public diplomacy/soft power literature warrants consideration here firstly because my study's empirical concerns overlap with the kinds of practices that are surveyed within this prominent current literature. Secondly, my study's theoretical approach provides a way of critically reflecting on the underlying ontological and political assumptions of this current debate.[85]

Beginning with 1990's book *Bound to Lead*, Nye's writings on soft power presented a thesis on the key role that political and cultural attraction played in Washington's 'triumph' over the Communism system, and should serve as a basis of Washington's ongoing position of global leadership in a post-Cold War context. In this early work on soft power, Nye contended that, having represented the embodiment of democratic principles and successfully pursued their global vindication during the Cold War, the US possessed an ability to get other states "to *want* what it wants- [which] might be called co-optive or soft power in contrast with the hard or command power of *ordering* others to do what it wants." This constitutes a form of international influence "associated with intangible power resources such as culture, ideology, and institutions," through which "a state may achieve the outcomes it prefers in world politics because other states want to follow it or have agreed to a situation that produced such effects."[86] However, despite having articulated the geopolitical effects of soft power upon US foreign relations, this early work emphasised the *non-governmental* sources of American political attractiveness and cultural prestige: its media, entertainment industries and educational institutions, and the universalism of US ideals such as liberty and prosperity enshrined within America's domestic political culture.

It was not until the more systematic unpacking of the force of persuasion and attraction in foreign policy undertaken within 2004's *Soft Power* that Nye addressed the practices of international persuasion by governments in detail. Framed as an assessment of the implications of Washington's "fraught international relations"

[85] Significantly, few scholars within the constructivist or critical theory approaches to International Relations (with the exception of Janice Bially Mattern) have critically engaged with Nye's conception of soft power. Mattern, "Why 'Soft Power' Isn't So Soft."
[86] Joseph Nye, "Soft Power," *Foreign Policy*, 80 (Fall, 1990), pp. 166-7.

in the wake of the 2003 US invasion of Iraq, *Soft Power* asks how foreign policy itself can shape the relationships of cultural attraction and political emulation that structure the international system. In this context, Nye observes that governments can accrue soft power both by adopting the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy themselves, and by taking a broadly multilateral approach in their foreign policy. In a survey of the history of the Cold War, Nye notes how government-sponsored educational exchanges; scientific congresses; high cultural events such as theatre and musical tours; as well as the export of popular entertainment and even sporting competitions effectively won admiration for American values among a global public audience.[87] He also observes that although the US was a relative 'latecomer' in utilising official cultural and informational diplomacy in the 1930s, America's universalist culture and the creeds of liberty and prosperity that America's political culture celebrates had placed Washington in prime position to undertake public diplomacy on behalf of Western civilization during the Cold War.[88] During the post-Cold War period, however, Nye finds that bureaucratic upheavals and inadequate funding have hampered Washington's ability to mobilise its soft power. In the contemporary context, a more coherent, well-funded, attentive and culturally-sensitive US approach to international persuasion is advocated, so that the US can continue to draw on the influence that comes from global "attraction to [America's] shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to those values."[89]

As the foregoing points suggest, Nye's survey of the adoption of cultural and informational diplomacy within US foreign policy is part of a broader argument about the basis of America's Cold War 'triumph' and the subsequent recommendation that US public diplomacy be extended to undermine global anti-Americanism and terrorism. The historical survey of US cultural and informational diplomacy that Nye develops for this purpose is thus not sufficiently detailed to engage with the ways in which US policy-makers tended to represent the practices of international public persuasion, and were thereby implicated in the diffuse internal changes that led to the transformation of Washington's foreign policy posture in 1936-53.[90] Furthermore, the premise behind the soft power concept is that a natural

[87] Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), pp. 45-7.
[88] *Ibid.*, pp. 100-2.
[89] *Ibid.*, pp. 123-4.
[90] *Ibid.*, pp. 99-107.

congruence exists between what the US's domestic political culture symbolises and the political and cultural aspirations of significant numbers of non-Americans. Within this posited continuum between global aspirations and US politics and culture, American 'attractiveness' appears to be understood as a fact rather than as a political claim. By simply communicating America's values more strenuously and consistently, this logic seems to suggest, the US can tap into a reserve of global public attraction that comes from America's embodiment of 'universal' human aspirations.[91]

In developing his argument about the US's inherent attributes for cultural and political leadership, Nye overlooks the point that when Washington began to pursue cultural and informational diplomacy on an ongoing basis from 1936 there were deep ambiguities within academic and policy opinion as to whether US political culture even permitted Washington to use cultural and informational diplomacy. As I noted in my introduction to this study, the embrace of global posture of hegemony and vindicationism by Washington during the Second World War period was undertaken by articulating precisely this kind of continuum between America's domestic creeds and the nature of cultural and political aspirations abroad. Asserting this continuum became a source of self-legitimation for US cultural and informational diplomacy. Might Nye's work be thought of in similar terms? One of the implications of adopting a discursive practices framework for my analysis is that it shows how America's universal cultural and political 'attractiveness' has been a historically contingent and endogenous claim, and that Nye's conception of US soft power appears to fall into a similar pattern.[92] In fact, the concept of soft power

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[91] A related point is that Nye adopts the vocabulary of cultural and political universalism as a *description* of America's global position, rather than a *political claim*, presupposing in the process that the aspirations of the world's people are uniformly focused on emulating the US's form of political, cultural and economic life. This claim, as the coming chapters will show, was also habitually made in the context of US foreign policy-making within the cultural and informational programs, and this study suggests that the underlying purposes and self-images that such claims advance must be subject to deeper reflection. Thus, in addition to presuming that public diplomacy is a basis for the 'fulfilment' of America's domestic creeds, Nye's assumes that America *is* a culturally and ideologically universal beacon. In my work, these are treated as political claims of the kind that Rodney Barker emphasises that are implicated in the construction of power relations, rather that as objective political 'facts.' See Barker, *Legitimating Identities*.

[92] As such, the soft power thesis also denies the objects of American attraction, the global public, the ability to think beyond the United States's example in articulating their cultural and political aspirations. In making this point I have drawn on Cox's distinction between problem-solving and critical international theory. Robert W. Cox, "Social Forces, States, and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory," in *Approaches to World Order*, ed. Robert W. Cox with Timothy J. Sinclair, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

achieves traction within US foreign policy commentary precisely because it is couched within the shared assumptions and lexicon through which Washington has cultivated a sense of itself as a hegemonic actor in world politics. However, to effectively analyse the representational practices that have constituted Washington as a cultural and informational agent in world politics necessitates that alternatives terms of theoretical engagement from the concept of soft power be found.

Similar political premises are evident in many other recent discussions of US public diplomacy, much of it written by former government officials. In 2002 Christopher Ross, then serving as a special coordinator for public diplomacy within the Department of State, urged the 'rebuilding' of the US's capacity to conduct public diplomacy and revive America's cultural and political influence among populations that might otherwise be swayed by anti-Americanism.[93] US informational diplomacy has been presented in these recent policy debates as a vital short- and medium-term tool for American counter-terrorism. Hence, former VOA director Sanford J. Ungar claimed in 2005 that radio broadcasting- "the country's best instrument of public diplomacy-" could be of great significance in confronting current US foreign policy challenges.[94] David Hoffman, head of the journalism advocacy organisation Internews, emphasised in 2002 that in addition to its own informational diplomacy, the US should also work towards the liberalisation and improvement of journalistic practices globally:

> freedom of speech and exchange of information are not just luxuries, they are the currency on which global commerce, politics, and culture increasingly depend...that, more than any number of advertisements about American values, is what will bring light to

[93] Ross emphasises how "great numbers of people reject terror and hope for themselves, their families, and their societies that for which the United States is known: democratic governance, tolerance and freedom to prosper...the United States [must] engage them." Christopher Ross, "Public Diplomacy Comes of Age," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, (no. 2, 2002), p. 83. The same year, US diplomat Helena K. Finn charged that the US's resources for cultural diplomacy were "utterly inadequate," and that international persuasion ("one of the most potent weapons in the United States' armoury") had been neglected by Washington for too long. In this piece Finn was presenting her personal views. Helena K. Finn, "The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences," *Foreign Affairs* 82, (no. 6, 1993), pp. 17, 20.

[94] Sanford J. Ungar, "Pitch Imperfect: The Trouble at the Voice of America," *Foreign Affairs* 84, (no. 3, May/June 2005), pp. 7, 13. See also the various replies to Ungar's essay: David S. Jackson, Kenneth Y. Tomlinson, Richard Richter and Philomena Jurey, "His Master's Voice? Is the Voice of America a Source of Responsible Journalism?," *Foreign Affairs* 84, (no. 4, July/August, 2005);

the darkness from which terrorism has come.[95]

Hoffmann's recommendations are especially interesting since the doctrine of freedom of information has been a long-standing feature of US informational diplomacy discourse, in the context of Washington efforts to promote international liberalism more broadly, as my forthcoming chapters will highlight.

Although they are part of a significant debate in the context of contemporary US foreign policy thinking, the work of Joseph Nye and the other current public diplomacy commentators as noted above are steeped in the prevailing political interests and assumptions of the US foreign policy.[96] This is because none of these contemporary foreign policy pieces engage with the question of how the ideological foundations of America's 'public diplomacy' have been endogenously constituted, and the implications of these representational practices for the kind of presumptions to universalism that premise their policy recommendations.[97] As John M. Hobson contends, adopting an historicist methodology as this study does constitutes a

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[95] David Hoffmann, "Beyond Public Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 81, (no. 2, March/April 2002), p. 95. A call for more high-level interest in public diplomacy was made by Anthony J. Blinken, a former US National Security Council member, who emphasised the universalism of America's ideology when he noted that the international "critics of the United States have useful corrections but no alterative system of values and practices that offer as much progress and possibility as the US system does." Anthony J. Blinken, "Winning the War of Ideas," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, (no. 2, 2002), pp. 111-13. Published extracts from the Council on Foreign Relations' Independent Task Force on Public Diplomacy in 2002 similarly suggested that international persuasion was particularly central as a tool with which to undermine anti-American terrorism: Peter G. Peterson, "Public Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism," *Foreign Affairs* 81, (no. 5, September/October 2002). The failure of the US's international persuasion has also been noted by Chris Patten, "Soft Power and the Rule of Law," *The Sydney Morning Herald*, (April 17, 2003); Max Walsh, "Unilateral Damage," *The Bulletin*, (October 5, 2005). Other contributions, including Rosaleen Smyth's 2001 survey of the global mass media environment and the ongoing relevance of informational diplomacy, have explored how the US's informational diplomacy might be enhanced by new technologies and digital communications. Rosaleen Smyth, "Mapping US Public Diplomacy in the 21st Century," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 55, (no. 3, 2001).

[96] And having sketched the limitations of Nye's concept in the context of my own research problem, his views are certainly a resonant and influential part of this contemporary debate calling for a reversal of the unilateralist tendencies of the current US administration.

[97] A recent edited volume by Jan Melissen has added a theoretical dimension to the contemporary debate on public diplomacy. Brian Hocking's contribution to this volume is particularly important in clarifying the kinds of inter-governmental relationships and complex policy networks in which contemporary public diplomacy is conducted. However, these accounts also fail to consider the existentially productive dimension of public diplomacy discourse. Brian Hocking, "Rethinking the 'New' Public Diplomacy," in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005). Another angle on this problem has been illuminated by Julia Sweig, who has recently contended that by celebrating too boisterously and unreflectively America's claim to cultural and political leadership within international politics in the context of the Cold War, US foreign policy-makers have actively undermined the US's international credibility and appeal as a hegemonic power into the post-Cold War era. Julia Sweig, *Friendly Fire: Losing Friends and Making Enemies in the Anti-American Century*, New York: Public Affairs Press, 2006), Ch. 16.

'critical' theoretical project, in that historical studies expose the origins of prevailing relations of dominance and subordination within the global order. Writing history provides "a means to *rethink* theories and *problematise* the...present," revealing how contemporary global relationships have "emerged not in accordance with 'natural' human impulses but rather through processes of power, identity/social exclusion, and norms."[98] In uncovering the constitutive functions that have been performed by the discursive representation of American cultural and informational diplomacy, my study 'de-naturalises' the discursive and ideological foundations of US public diplomacy.[99]

In contrast to these contemporary public diplomacy commentaries, recent scholarship examining the diplomatic history of cultural and informational diplomacy, particularly in relation to the Cold War, offers more detail and conceptual depth into the constitutive functions and the kinds of identity-claims that policy-makers articulate in the context of cultural and informational policy-making. The key objectives and contributions of this Diplomatic History research agenda are surveyed in the next section. My study takes several cues from this so-called 'cultural turn' within Diplomatic History research, and I follow a similar historical methodological, although in the section to follow I shall also indicate how the questions that guide my study differ from the kinds of questions that have been asked by this historical literature.

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[98] John M. Hobson, "What's At Stake in 'Bringing Historical Sociology *Back* into International Relations? Transcending 'Chronofetishism' and 'Tempocentrism' in International Relations," in eds. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson, *Historical Sociology of International Relations*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 5-10.

[99] This critical theoretical approach also informs the discursive practices approach, particular insofar as Raymond Duvall and Michael N. Barnett have surveyed it in their 2005 study of the typology of power in international relations. In this article the authors call for an extension of the discursive practices approach specifically within the context of US foreign policy studies, so that IR scholars might better understand the sources of discursive or 'productive' power that have attended the material structures of US hegemony/empire. "It is possible and desirable...to see the American empire as constituted by global social relations. Making this move requires that willingness to see the United States at the imperial centre, structurally constituted and discursively produced through a complex of imperial relations that are not themselves fully under the control of the US state as actor. To fully appreciate how power is embedded in empire, though, requires a willingness to see not only the different forms of power but also how they combine in different ways to create structured and enduring hierarchies of control and advantage." Barnett and Duvall, "Power in International Politics," p. 66.

Culture in Diplomatic History: The Propagation of Ideology as Foreign Policy

Since the late 1970s an expanding research agenda within the study of foreign policy history has set out to examine the cultural, ideological and discursive determinants of diplomacy and foreign policy. One of the key features of this agenda has been its ability to situate these inter-subjective factors within the historiography of the Cold War. In the process of emphasising the diplomatic impacts of culture, ideology and information, this historical work, like the constructivist critique of neo-utilitarianism that emerged during the 1990s in IR, has effectively moved beyond depictions of international politics as a domain populated by purely rational agents in pursuit of their material interests.[100] In this observation the nature of states as agents within world politics was effectively recast during the early stages of this debate: as Akira Iriye has contended, states are in one way or another "held together both by public authority organising and enforcing law and order, and by significant symbols that impose meaning on experience."[101] The key point of critical insight here was that governments pursue diplomacy through the prism of the prevailing cultural and ideological terms of their domestic authority.[102] Iriye's *Across the Pacific* developed this premise by charting the cultural determinants of Washington's diplomatic relationship with East Asia. In this context he traced how US foreign policy in the first decades of the twentieth century was driven by a posture of "moral mission," through which Washington saw itself as a "symbol of progress...impart[ing] its blessings to others."[103] These cultural prisms through which American foreign policy was conceived were especially powerful in the case of US foreign policy toward China, which was built upon "moral concern with the destiny of China...America was pictured as having built up good will in China; Free China, a phrase that began to be used in official documents, looked to the United States for support and

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[100] I hasten to add that this move has been much less controversial and largely driven by empirical concerns rather than by a turn to ontological critique, in the case of constructivism in IR. See Akira Iriye, "Culture and Power: International Relations as Intercultural Relations." *Diplomatic History* 3, (no. 2, 1979), p. 100. A more recent statement of this approach is made in Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), pp. 1-2.

[101] Iriye, "Culture and Power," pp. 116-7.

[102] Much of this work was developed in relation to Great Power politics in the Asia Pacific. See, e.g.: Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967).

[103] Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, pp. 205, 221. On Theodore Roosevelt's 'civilizing mission' and the distinctive characteristics of US imperialist in the first decades of the twentieth century see Frank Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism*, (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2001).

cooperation," although this image proved ultimately "hollow, a product of the liberal American imagination."[104] In later work Iriye extended his assessment of the significance of international cultural interaction to diplomatic relationships, contending in 1997's *Cultural Internationalism and World Order* that just as political interactions take place through the prism of cultural and ideological perceptions, so too do international cultural interactions serve as a conduit for the pursuit of international political interests, rivalries or, conversely, international *rapprochement*.[105]

Much subsequent research on cultural diplomacy and international information within the discipline of Diplomatic History was sparked by these pioneering reflections on the cultural and inter-subjective determinants of foreign policy. Frank Ninkovich's history of the US State Department's cultural diplomacy programs constituted a key early contribution to this research agenda. In 1981's *Diplomacy of Ideas*, Ninkovich surveyed the evolving scope and tone of US cultural diplomacy practices. He shows how the sentiment of 'liberal ecumenism' that had dominated the State Department's programs in the 1930s and early 1940s gave way to cultural power politics and ideological confrontation by the late 1940s: a reflection of the broader shift toward a Cold War posture within US grand strategy.[106] His account also implicitly recognises the legitimising function that references to America's historical development within policy texts performed, as US policy-makers grappled with the implications of Washington's involvement in global ideological antagonisms during the early stages of the Cold War.

> As the rhetoric of the Cold War grew progressively more abstract- with frequent allusions to the conflict of systems, the antithesis between totalitarianism and democracy, and the struggle between slavery and freedom- contradictions evaporated...The world was changing rapidly and making new and difficult demands on the United States, [and] Americans could keep pace only by using the traditions available to them. It was inevitable as well as ironic that a cultural diplomacy that prided itself on its ecumenism and its rationality was prevented by the very expansiveness of its vision from becoming conscious of its parochial limitations. What passed

[104] Iriye, *Across the Pacific*, p. 221.
[105] Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, 'Conclusion.' The overarching nature of culture as a prism through which international politics takes place is also emphasised in Ninkovich's work, see Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas.*
[106] Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, 'Conclusion.'

> for universalism was only a projection of America's self-image, and a distorted one at that.[107]

The constitutive and enabling functions of foreign policy discourse were also explored by Ninkovich in a 1977 article exploring the internal controversy sparked by a touring exhibition of *avant-garde* painting supported by the State Department's visual art exchange program in 1947. In an illustration of how cultural and political issues came to be deeply entwined during the Cold War, Ninkovich traces how the Department of State's art program prompted fierce debates about the 'intellectual and structural underpinnings' of post-war American grand strategy. The controversy over the modernist artworks provided an outlet for the expression of a nativist American aesthetic, which actually presaged the consolidation of the US's Cold War ideological posture among domestic and official opinion:

> The emphasis on universalism, the fear of radical subversion combined with a self-righteous insistence upon the pristine vitality of American cultural forms, and the view of art as an instrument of national power- all the themes which tended to clash in the art fiasco would begin to mature into a comprehensive cold war consensus that would eventually allow for the release of immense American energies throughout the world.[108]

In engaging with a range of empirical issues that reflect on US's cultural and political perceptions of world politics,[109] Ninkovich's work represented an important addition to the first wave of scholarship into the connections between foreign policy and culture, media and ideology within the field of Diplomatic History. [110]

The second wave of research into culture and foreign policy within Diplomatic History has been encompassed considerable theoretical diversity and casts

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[107] *Ibid.*, pp. 150, 183.

[108] Frank Ninkovich, "The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State Department 1938-1947," *Diplomatic History* 1, (no. 3, Summer 1977), p. 236.

[109] In addition to these studies of the State Department's cultural programs, the cultural, spiritual and 'civilizational' elements of US foreign relations have also been traced in Ninkovich's work on American philanthropic institutions and the modernisation of China through educational programs during the early twentieth century. Frank Ninkovich, "The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change," *The Journal of American History* 70, (no. 4, March 1984).

[110] In addition to the work of Akira Iriye, standout works from this phase include: Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982); Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Domination: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe*, 1919-1933, (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1984); Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

a wider empirical net in terms of its subject matter. The historical insights presented by this second-wave literature have exposed some of the key issues that my study examines. These insights include how Washington's post-war cultural diplomacy programs were responded to by European populations; how the Cold War developed within the realm of international cultural and intellectual interchange; and how discursive practices have informed the ways in which different states utilised the cultural and informational instruments of diplomacy. As Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht notes in an introduction to a recent collection that is emblematic of the diversity of the second 'cultural turn' in Diplomatic History, the focus of this literature is "the sharing and transmitting of consciousness within and across national boundaries...[and] the creation and communication of memory, ideology, emotions, life styles, scholarly and artistic works, and other symbols."[111] Issues examined within this agenda include: the history of multilateral cultural cooperation, especially the connection between the inter-war cosmopolitan political movements and cultural internationalism; Soviet and British cultural diplomacy; non-government international philanthropic and educational interactions; and the projection of concepts of gender through official and non-government cultural diplomacy.[112] The constitutive influence of popular culture has been a strong theme cutting across the various geographical and temporal preoccupations of this recent research,[113] as has the

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[111] Jennifer C. E. Geinow-Hecht, "Introduction: On the Division of Knowledge and the Community of Thought: Culture and International History," in *Culture and International History*, eds. Jessica C. E. Geinow-Hecht and Frank Schumacher, (New York: Berghahn Books, 2003), p. 6.

[112] Thomas Allen Schwartz has written a book review that usefully surveys the 'cultural turn' in Diplomatic History: Thomas Allen Schwartz, "Explaining the Cultural Turn- or Detour?," *Diplomatic History* 31, no. 1 (January 2007). Another interesting reflection on this turn is supplied in Ninkovich's evocatively titled review: Frank Ninkovich, "Where Have All the Realists Gone?," *Diplomatic History* 26, (no. 1, Winter 2002). My discussion in chapter two also surveys much of the secondary literature on the history of cultural and informational diplomacy. On multilateral cultural diplomacy see: Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*. In addition to Gould-Davies's work on Soviet cultural diplomacy, the writings of former US diplomat Frederick C. Barghoorn during the 1950s and 1960s provide some interesting reflections on the 'symbolic' significance that cultural relations were understood to have by Soviet leaders. See, e.g.: Gould-Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy;" Frederick C. Bargoorn, "Soviet Cultural Diplomacy since Stalin," *Russian Review* 17, (no. 1, January 1958). On gender see, e.g.: Emily S. Rosenberg, "Consuming Women: Images of Americanisation in the 'American Century,'" *Diplomatic History* 23, (no. 3, Summer 1999); Belmonte, "A family Affair?" On philanthropy see, e.g.: Volker R. Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 'American Century," *Diplomatic History* 23, (no. 3, Summer, 1999). The role of symbolic diplomacy such as honours, summits and other rituals has also been explored in contemporary Diplomatic History writing, and represents a tangential approach to the study of diplomatic history as a cultural practice. See: Chan Lau Kit-ching, "Symbolism as Diplomacy: The United States and Britain's China Policy During the First Year of the Pacific War," *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 16, (no. 1, March 2005).

[113] Film, art, music, popular literature and fashion have been regarded as "significant texts for diplomatic historians." Helen Laville, "'Our Country Endangered by Underwear:' Fashion, Femininity, and the Seduction Narrative in *Ninotchka* and *Silk Stockings*," *Diplomatic History* 30, (no.

examination of discursive practices in relation to the diplomacy of culture and information.[114] Consequently, my work speaks to many of the theoretical and empirical concerns of this historical debate.

The centrality of cultural meanings and cultural diplomacy practices in generating Cold War rivalries has been developed in the work of Nigel Gould-Davies, Scott Lucas, Frances Stonor Saunders and James Vaughn. As I reflected above the insight into the constitutive role that cultural antagonism played in the context of the struggle presented in their work supplies ballast to the reading of the Cold War I develop here. Gould-Davies, for example, has summarised this underlying account of the Cold War as an ideological struggle in the following terms: "the Cold War was essentially a clash of belief systems in the absence of direct military hostilities, the transmission of ideas and values was a key method of conflict. The 'low politics' of cultural relations were, in fact, high politics."[115] This conclusion is shared by Scott Lucas in his survey of the various informational and psychological warfare agencies through which the US waged its international crusade in the name of the overarching cause of 'freedom.'[116] In a detailed study of US Central Intelligence Agency's activities during the early Cold War struggle, Stonor Saunders proffers a similar argument in suggesting that the early struggle between Washington and Moscow was founded on the shared premise that there were deep connections between cultural and intellectual vitality and geopolitical competition.[117] James Vaughn has recently illustrated the benefits of a comparative perspective in the study of propaganda, charting the failure of British and US Cold War informational practices in the Arab Middle East during 1945-57. Vaughn's work is of some interest in that he notes how

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4, Summer 2006), p. 625. See also Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*; Rosenberg "Consuming Women." A review of this gender literature is: David Healy, "Haiti, Marines, and Culture," *Diplomatic History* 27, (no. 5, November 2003). On Art, in addition to Ninkovich, "The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy;" see: Jessica C. E. Geinow Hecht, "Art Is Democracy and Democracy Is Art: Culture, Propaganda and the *Neue Zeitung* in Germany, 1944-1947," *Diplomatic History* 23, (no. 1, Winter 1999).

[114] Rosenberg, "Consuming Women;" Laville, "Our Country Endangered by Underwear;" Klein, *Cold War Orientalism.* Belmonte develops the argument that there were potent narratives within US informational diplomacy in relation to gender: "While the information programs were an integral element of early Cold War diplomacy, they also represented a concerted effort to define American national identity. Through radio shows, films, and publications, US policymakers propagated a carefully constructed narrative of progress, freedom, and happiness. They not only 'imagined' an American 'community' but they also presented their vision to the world in hopes of persuading foreign peoples to reject communism and adopt democratic capitalism." Laura A. Belmonte "A Family Affair?," p. 80. Also see: Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty.*

[115] Gould Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," p. 212.

[116] Lucas, *Freedom's War.*

[117] Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War*, Ch. 2.

the ideological and cultural identities of both Britain and the US were perceived during the Cold War as highly valuable objects over which the conflict itself had, to some extent, been staked.[118] In coming to these conclusions, the historiography of the cultural Cold War complements the argument made by this study, namely that cultural and informational diplomacy was a highly significant constitutive practice in the emergence of superpower rivalry.

I differ from this cultural historiography of the Cold War in my adoption of a conceptual framework drawing on constructivist IR, as such this work encompasses a theoretical dimension pertaining to the parameters of foreign policy analysis that is not explicitly addressed within the study of Diplomatic History. In the next section of this discussion I therefore revisit the discursive practices approach to show how my work extends the substantive insights and theoretical parameters of this existing work.

The Functions of Cultural and Informational Diplomacy and the Extension of Discursive Practices Analysis

A discussion of the conceptual and analytical frameworks of the discursive practices approach has been undertaken above, and so at this stage I shall briefly review how my work extends the discursive practices approach through its engagement US cultural and informational diplomacy. As I suggested above, much of the work within this approach examines processes of international estrangement and the production of (in)security. The work of Todorov, Shapiro, Doty and Campbell, as well as other scholars within the discursive practices approach such as Jutta Weldes and the early work of Lene Hansen, has collectively illuminated the discursive constitution of danger and insecurity in world politics with strong critical insight.[119] While this aspect of discursive practices in foreign policy is surveyed in

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[118] Vaughn, *The Failure of American and British Propaganda*, pp. 4-5.

[119] Todorov, *The Conquest of America*; Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation*; Doty, *Imperial Encounters*; Cambpell, *Writing Security*. The underlying theoretical claim within this literature can be summarised as follows: "identities (both of self and others) and insecurities, rather than being given, emerge out of a process of representation through which individuals- whether state officials, leaders or members of nationalist movements, journal editors, or users of the Internet, for example- describe to themselves the world in which they live." Jutta Weldes, *et. al.* "Introduction: Constructing Insecurity." in Jutta Weldes, et. al. eds., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999), p. 14; Jutta Weldes, "The Cultural Production of Crises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba," in eds. Jutta Weldes, et. al., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Jennifer Milliken, "Intervention and Identity: Reconstructing the West in

this study- especially in relation to the way in which cultural and informational officials represented Axis and Soviet propaganda in terms of a threat to American security- much of what was attempted through US foreign policy in this period was also constructive, integrative and sought to affect deeper international interdependence. Washington's vision of the post-war order as a source of cultural rehabilitation and political *rapprochement*- a vision in which Unesco was particularly emblematic- was also constituted by the policy discourses that I examine in this study. As such, the work of Christina Klein and a recent critique articulated by Lene Hansen, alongside that of historians who have connected US policy discourse to the process of post-war economic integration, is significant as a call to extend the discursive practices approach beyond security policy toward examining how representations enabled American to construct the post-war global order.[120] This is not to suggest that the study of discourse and danger/crisis is not a productive line of enquiry, but to claim that it is possible to extend the substantive interests of the discursive practices approach beyond studying foreign policy as the articulation of international threats and disorder.

One of the most significant implications of the argument I develop in the chapters to follow is that I problematise David Campbell's claim that America's Cold War foreign policy was essentially bound up with the articulation of difference and denigration in relation to an internal 'other.' My study shares Campbell's interest in uncovering the transformation of US interests and identity as enabled by US foreign policy discourse during the 1936-53 period. However, cultural and informational diplomacy give a slightly more nuanced view of how the concept of ideological warfare was regarded and eventually accepted as the guiding rationale of US foreign policy during the late 1940s.[121] Although the Cold War symbolises the importance of

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Korea," in eds. Jutta Weldes, et. al., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999); Pedersen, "In Search of Monsters to Destroy?;"H ansen, *Security as Practice*; Shared themes on the cultural contexts of security 'threats,' with less explicit focus on discourse as a methodology, are developed by Ole Wæver and Morten Kelstrup, "Europe and its Nations: Political and Cultural Security," in eds. Ole Wæver and Morten Kelstrup, *Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe*, (London: Pinter, 1993).

[120] Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*; Hansen, "Clash of Cartoons?"; Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty*; Rosenberg, "Consuming Women."

[121] I share this interest in how moral, ideological and narrative elements shaped the transformation of the United States as an international agent during the Second World War and early Cold War without necessarily sharing the implication of Campbell's view of the primacy of the domestic threat in the discursive constitution of the Cold War. There is sufficient scope within the purposes of my discussion to delve into the causal implications of Campbell's work on the Cold War. My own conclusions on how discourses about the Communist and Soviet threats shaped the US's agency as a

the constitutive functions that cultural and informational discourse played in the transition to a hegemonic posture in US foreign relations, the ways in which cultural and informational diplomats regarded Cold War ideological antagonisms is not revealed as a straightforward process within this study. Rather, I also show how the Cold War propaganda struggle was subject to several different interpretations by US policy-makers in the late 1940s. Liberal sentiments were often voiced to counteract moves toward a posture of ideological warfare within the cultural and informational programs themselves, while at the same time supporters of a more strident approach couched their arguments in terms of the defence of the liberal democratic system. In other words, both Cold Warriors and those who sought a less antagonistic basis for engagement with the Soviet Union co-opted the same rhetoric of liberalism and American singularity to articulate their views. As such, my case study chapters will cast Washington's assumption of the role of Cold War protagonist in a more nuanced, complex and contested way than Campbell's implication that the Cold War was an ontological inevitability suggests.[122]

Conclusion

In the foregoing discussion I illustrated how, in response to my key research questions, my overarching argument develops along three lines. First, my overarching argument contends that from their earliest stages the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs hosted debates about the nature of US political culture and the parameters of American interests as a world power, and that these had a broad resonance in helping to enable the transition toward a hegemonic posture in US foreign relations. My study further argues that the mobilisation of discourses of liberalism and exceptionalism were two key ideas that structured the cultural and informational programs and shaped the kind of hegemonic global role Washington

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cultural and informational diplomat will be made clear in the chapters to follow. Campbell, *Writing Security*.

[122] Campbell is not alone in his implication that the Cold War was somehow 'inevitable' at the conclusion of the Second World War. In an ironic convergence of conclusions, structural realist explanations of the Cold War similarly locate the nature of the struggle as taking place through internal balancing due to the bipolar structure, and thus adopt a similar functionalism concerning the origins of the Cold War struggle as a historical phenomenon that Campbell's account, arguably, also regresses into from its very different starting point. For a survey of structural realist accounts of bipolarity see: Patrick James, "Structural Realism and the Causes of War," *Mershon International Studies Review* 39, (no. 2, October 1995). On bipolarity see Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979), Ch. 7.

began to construct for itself during 1936-53. Finally, I noted above that in making this argument my work has implications for how IR scholars conceptualise power, agency, and the nature of foreign policy-making as a constitutive practice. After summarising the three key threads of my argument and the implications of this work, my discussion moved into a discussion of the conceptual framework and mode of enquiry that I draw from the discursive practices approach within constructivist IR. I reviewed discourse analysis in light of the analytical tools it supplies to engage with the linguistic processes that feature within foreign policy-making: including logics of alterity; narratives; frames; and the classificatory/positioning device of grammatical predication, indicating how I employ these tools within my three case studies. Finally, this chapter has indicated how my work differs from other current approaches to cultural and informational diplomacy in International Relations and Diplomatic History.

The historical component of my study begins in the forthcoming chapter, in which I survey the European inter-war historical context in which the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy and propaganda developed. I shall chart the development of these practices as diplomatic tools, and explore the intellectual and popular responses to cultural and informational diplomacy within Europe and the US during the inter-war period. In the next chapter I also examine the political context in which international persuasion was adopted by Washington as a diplomatic tool in 1936, noting how the proliferation of American philanthropic activities and the extension of US foreign policy constituted the backdrop to the founding of a US cultural diplomacy program.

CHAPTER TWO

PROPAGANDA CRITIQUE AND POST-LEAGUE INTERNATIONALISM: AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN THE INTER-WAR PERIOD

In 1927's *Propaganda and the World War*, American political scientist Harold Lasswell observed that the advent of 'total war' in 1914-18 heralded a profound change in the way that political power would subsequently be exercised. For Lasswell, the widespread use of psychological warfare during the conflict had signalled that propaganda's emergence as one of the "most powerful instrumentalities of the modern world," having "arisen to its present eminence in response to a complex of changed circumstances which have altered the nature of society."[1] Lasswell's emergence during the 1920s as America's most prominent theorist of mass communications, politics and modernity, particularly given the significance accorded to the question of propaganda's relationship to democracy in Lasswell's work, is emblematic of broader shifts within American and European politics that occurred during the inter-war period.[2] Communications, culture and public opinion had become one of the most pervasive and controversial topics of debate among academics, diplomats and government officials and within the popular media on both sides of the Atlantic. What generally underscored these debates were Laswell's two key concerns: namely that the instruments of political power had undergone a key shift due to the advent of rapid mass communications technologies, and that in the wake of the First World War

[1] Quote taken from the British edition under a different title: Harold D. Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*, (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co, 1938), p. 220. On Lasswell see also: Garth S. Jowett and Victoria O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion* (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1986), p. 99.

[2] Lasswell does not seem to have been a wholehearted critic of propaganda. For example, in *Propaganda Technique in the World War* he is less critical of Woodrow Wilson's Committee on Public Information than many other US propaganda critics of the period. In other writings Lasswell emphasised the centrality of symbolism and representation, and sought to contribute to the developing study of political psychology. See, e.g.: Lasswell, *Propaganda Technique in the World War*; Harold D. Lasswell, "The Study and Practice of Propaganda," in *Propaganda and Promotional Activities*, eds. Harold D. Lasswell, Ralph D. Casey and Bruce Lannes Smith, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1935); Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930).

governments had increasing incentive to use them in the context of the rise of populist ideological movements.

In this context, a particularly significant topic of debate in the inter-war period concerned propaganda's impact upon the conditions of peace, war and effective diplomacy. In one of the most enduring contributions to these debates E. H. Carr had observed how "it did not take long for the belligerents of 1914-18 to realise that...it was a condition of success on the military and economic fronts that the 'morale' of one's own side should be maintained, and that of the other side sapped and destroyed."[3] Carr went on to articulate a conception of strategic influence in the international system that encompassed 'power over opinion,' as well as the more traditional military and economic resources that states could bring to bear in the pursuit of their national interests.

While many scholars of the inter-war period such as Carr had suggested that the most significant implication of propaganda was its function in international conflict, an increasing number also detected the potential for international progress and political integration through the use of mass communications as an instrument for fostering international understanding. This inter-war 'cosmopolitan' movement advocated enhanced government and non-government efforts to deepen understanding and solidarity between nations, and thereby establish a foundation for international peace. Within this movement a 'cultural internationalist' sphere of international cooperation emerged, which drew on nineteenth century precedents to international cultural diplomacy and encompassed a "variety of activities...to link countries and peoples through the exchange of ideas and persons, through scholarly cooperation, or through efforts at facilitating cross-national understanding."[4] Specific criticisms of this movement also emerged, such as Oswald Spengler's denunciation of cosmopolitanism as a quest for pan European 'cultural fulfilment' that symbolised the demagogical and poisonous tendencies of a civilisation in decline. Other critics of cultural internationalism, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, sought to demonstrate that the historical

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[3] Edward Hallet Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis 1919-1939*, 2nd edition, (New York: Harper & Row, 1946), p. 136.

[4] Akira Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism and World Order*, (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), p. 3.

record did not support the proposition that cultural understanding would restrain the aggrandising tendencies of states.[5]

What is also significant about these propaganda debates of the inter-war period was the epochal character of the changes that the rise of propaganda and total war were thought to signify. As Akira Iriye has observed, "just as the coming of the [First World War] unleashed nationalistic emotions and submerged internationalist forces, its prolongation had the effect of once again forcing people to question the system of interstate relations founded on national sovereignties, identities, and interests."[6] These foundational institutions of world politics were questioned in light of the view that the balance of power had failed as a regulatory mechanism within international politics and the notion that technological innovations in communication and transport had caused spatial and temporal integration in international relations. The Russian Revolution and the enshrining of principles such as democracy and self-determination within the Versailles settlement were also taken as evidence of profound changes to the international system, as both seemed to herald a new historical era in which mass politics dominated both the domestic and international agendas of states. Bestselling books in Europe of the inter-war period reflect the imagery of epochal shifts, with titles including the 'Decline of the West,' a 'Twenty Years' Crisis,' and 'Great Illusions.' Other titles interrogated 'Power,' 'International Government,' the rise of an 'International Mind' and the 'Prospects for Democracy.'[7] In the United States, with the arguable exception of Reinhold Niebuhr's work, propaganda and the advent of total war were regarded somewhat differently, through a self-reflexive and moral prism through which America's exceptionalism and morality as a world power

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[5] See Jacinta O'Hagan, *Conceptualizing the West in International Relations: From Spengler to Said*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 59-71; Niebuhr, *Moral Man*, Ch. 4.

[6] Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, pp. 54-5.

[7] See e.g.: Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West: Form and Actuality*, trans. Charles Francis Atkinson, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1926); Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis*; Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion*, 2nd edition, (London: Heinemann, 1933)- the book's first edition was issued in 1908, to be reprinted multiple times in the two decades after; Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis*, 2nd edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960); Leonard Woolf, *International Government*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1916); 'International Mind' is a chapter title from John A. Hobson, *Towards International Government*, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1915); Alfred Zimmern, *The Prospects of Democracy and Other Essays*, (London: Chatto and Windus, 1929).

should be embodied by Washington's refusal to use propaganda.[8] Uniting the divergent trans-Atlantic perspectives on the moral implications of propaganda, however, was a basic consensus that the war had opened up foundational changes for the conduct of statecraft. New instruments of political power had emerged, and factors such as culture, social structure, nationalism, and public opinion had become part of the fabric of the international system.[9]

Three strands from the history of the inter-war period will be analysed in this chapter. The first is the emergence of propaganda and cultural diplomacy as tools of international statecraft. Washington's adoption of cultural diplomacy and international information as instruments of foreign policy from 1936 occurred after a twenty-year period during which the deployment and refinement of these diplomatic techniques had been taking place in the crucible of European diplomacy. I shall outline some key elements of the history of propaganda and cultural diplomacy prior to 1918, and then turn to a more detailed account of the techniques and policies that were adopted in Europe in the wake of the First World War and the Russian Revolution. As I observed above, a key preoccupation within intellectual and popular debates in this period was the question of whether the diplomatic deployment of information and culture would turn out to be a source of deeper chaos or future stability in the international system. Consequently, the second strand of inter-war history that will be examined in this

[8] It is fair to say that Niebuhr has a more 'European' than 'American' outlook within his work on international politics during this period. I thank Vibeke Tjalve for some useful discussions on the 'European origins' of Niebuhr's thought. Reinhold Niebuhr, *Moral Man and Immoral Society: A Study in Ethics and Politics*, (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 1932). See also Harold Lasswell, *Power and Persuasion*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co, 1948). Sproule's study of US reactions to propaganda is perhaps the most comprehensive available and will be drawn on extensively in this chapter. J Michael Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

[9] Although many textbooks emphasise that the first 'Great Debate' of International Relations scholarship took place in the inter-war period, these accounts have tended to overlook the role of public opinion as an axis of debate between scholars in this period. Instead, the stories that International Relations tells about its 'first debate' focus on how the prospects for inter-state cooperation were rendered in political debates of this time. However, it is clear that the questions posed by new technologies, new ideologies and the rise of propaganda as an instrument of political power were one of the core theoretical questions for international commentators in this period. It is a shame that the accounts of this debate presented to students of International Relations overlook this aspect. This is one of several problematic implications of the image of a 'First Debate' between discrete 'idealist' and 'realist' positions. Other implications of this debate are surveyed in: Joel Quirk and Darshan Vigneswaran, "The Construction of an Edifice: The Story of a First Great Debate," *Review of International Studies* 31, (no. 1, 2005).

chapter is the intellectual history of propaganda studies. In this context, some of the key differences that emerged between the European and US responses to propaganda will be analysed. The development of an American public and international discourse on propaganda is a particularly important story to be addressed in this section, because it was in this public and academic context that the first renditions of the US's objectives and approaches to official cultural and informational diplomacy were articulated.

The third strand of this chapter's historical survey is an examination of US foreign relations during the inter-war period. American philanthropic and educational activities in the realm of international cultural and informational interchange will be examined within this discussion as an area in which internationalist and humanist activities flourished prior to Washington's official involvement in cultural and informational activities, furnishing the government programs with expertise and channels of operation after 1936. I shall also examine the broader steps toward international engagement that were pursued through US foreign policy during the inter-war period. Contrary to the retrospective image of an 'isolationist' Washington that the historiography of US foreign relations has perpetrated, I shall highlight in this section that there were some important forms of international engagement pursued by US foreign policy in the decades between the Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Delano Roosevelt presidencies. In this context I adopt the term 'post-League internationalism' to refer to Washington's approach to foreign policy during the inter-war period. This term suggests a more nuanced account of America's international role after the Senate's rejection of the League of Nations Charter than the conventional isolationist image.[10] This is not to suggest that there were not significant instances of US disengagement from the international system during the inter-war period. Charles P. Kindleberger's account of the spiralling economic chaos of the 1930s, for example, highlights several instances of inaction on the part of the US that deepened the crisis, and the US Senate's

[10] This term is taken from Tomoko Akami. *Internationalizing the Pacific: The United States, Japan and the Institute of Pacific Relations in War and Peace, 1919-1945*, (London: Routledge, 2002). Akira Iriye also uncovers the elements of internationalism that underscored US foreign relations during the inter-war period in reflecting on the 'globalising' of America after 1913. See: Akira Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Policy, Volume Three: The Globalizing of America 1913-1945*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

failure to ratify the League of Nations Charter is also well known.[11] However, it is not acknowledged often enough that Washington also participated in a number of League initiatives, spearheaded multilateral arms control initiatives, and extended its diplomatic and economic reach deep into the Western Hemisphere and the Asia Pacific during this period. Most significantly, uncovering these strands of internationalism that were developing within US foreign policy between the world wars brings into focus the circumstances of Washington's adoption of cultural and informational diplomacy practices.

In the discussion below I use key terms in the manner outlined in my introductory chapter. Here 'propaganda' refers to advocacy of a political doctrine through informational and symbolic means, while 'informational diplomacy' will refer to international persuasion through print, radio and film media. I shall trace how the terms 'cultural diplomacy' and 'cultural internationalism' were articulated in this period to describe cultural and educational interchange during the inter-war period, largely as a way to escape the pejorative connotations that 'propaganda' had acquired during the First World War. These terms were favoured in a diplomatic context by Britain in particular during this period, as a way to convey its ideological critique of the Axis and Communist practices. However, as I noted in my introduction, I am interested in the construction of pejorative terms such as 'propaganda' and liberal ones such as 'cultural/informational diplomacy' that were mobilised during the inter-war period, and as such do not assume a natural distinction between them exists.

[11] Kindleberger's work is significant here as a history of failure of economic cooperation in the 1930s here, however I do not take up his explanation of this failure as a function of a multi-polar international structure. Charles Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929-1939*, Penguin edition, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1986), Ch. 14. In the context of the League of Nations Charter ratification fiasco, it is often wrongly assumed that Senate Republicans were comprehensively and irretrievably hostile to the League project from the beginning. This was not the case, isolationist elements were scattered across both the Republican and Democrat parties and did not make up the majority of Lodge's supporters in passing the Charter with reservations. The Lodge Reservations to the Charter were intended to coordinate US participation in the League with the provisions of the US Constitution, and as such actually reflected the Senate majority's enthusiasm for a more active basis for US engagement in post-war international relations. Woodrow Wilson himself, the League's most ardent supporter, should be seen to share responsibility for the disagreement that precluded US involvement in the League for his refusal to negotiate with the constitutionalist (not isolationist) position of Congress.

The Emergence of Cultural and Informational Instruments in Diplomacy.

Although the inter-war period represented a crucial phase in the development of culture, information and education as tools of foreign policy,[12] these practices have considerably older origins. The leaders of Hellenic Athens, for instance, had extended Greek cultural achievements across the Athenian empire as a complement to its military and economic dominion. In one of the most frequently quoted passages of Thucydides's *History of the Peloponnesian Wars* the Athenian General Pericles thus declared that as an example of politics, law and aesthetics his city was "an education to Greece."[13] Thucydides's epic goes on to document Athens' decline from this position of *hegemonia*- the possession of power that is broad, legitimate, containing a cultural component and embodying common interests- into one of *arkhe*, meaning 'control' or outright coercive domination. Thucydides's work is emblematic of a broader tradition of classical political thought concerned with the exercise of international attraction, which distinguished the pursuit in politics of "enlightened from narrow self-interest, strategies of influence associated with each and their implications."[14] Within this style of political thought, as Thucydides's account reflects, the ability to sustain cultural and educational prestige was inextricably linked to the maintenance of domestic and international political legitimacy.

Cultural prestige and imperial power were also deeply connected in the context of the classical Roman Empire. As with Athens, Roman culture, education and ideals were promulgated in the context of Roman imperial ties, though they also

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[12] Although the focus of this study is not educational diplomacy, the development of educational diplomacy parallels the emergence of cultural and informational practices, and I see no reason to exclude it from the broader survey of international persuasion that I develop in this section.

[13] Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. R. Warner, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1954), pp. 145-7. As with the overlooked propaganda element in the conventional image of the 'Great Debate' that IR scholars have crafted for a pedagogical purposes, I would note that the resources of legitimacy and culture that the Athenian empire drew on and squandered during Thucydides's epic are also overlooked in disciplinary accounts of the IR 'Realism' of Thucydides.

[14] Richard Ned Lebow, "Power, Persuasion and Justice," *Millennium* 33, (no. 3, 2005), p. 551. The presence of these themes within Thucydides's account provide an interesting illustration of two broader concerns within this dissertation: namely the nature of hegemonic power and the way that culture and ideas have accompanied the exercise of hegemony, and the ways in which policy-makers (or in the case of Pericles, military leaders) *narrated* the exercise of Greek cultural influence abroad.

percolated far beyond, and outlasted, the formal empire. The Ceaser dynasty was particularly innovative as cultural diplomats, as Jowett and O'Donnell argue:

> [t]he Roman Empire was able to offer more than military protection- they provided both a moral philosophy and a cultural aesthetic that was adopted by the local peoples. In this way the art and architecture of Rome was as much a symbol of imperial power as were the garrisons of armoured legions; and the cultural legacy remained much longer.[15]

As a consequence, some contemporary commentators have regarded the Roman empire as the exemplar of cultural hegemony as an international phenomenon, and thus the most appropriate benchmark against which to assess the extensiveness of US cultural dominance in the twenty-first century.[16]

The term 'propaganda' does not derive from classical political discourse, however, but rather is associated with Pope Gregory XV's *Sacra Congreatio de Propaganda Fide* of 1622, a program of Catholic renewal and mass publicity launched in the context of the counter-reformation at the beginning of the Thirty Years War. What followed the Pope's declaration was the earliest systematic and strategic use of mass propaganda in the context of war: the number of printed subversive leaflets that were distributed to troops by various parties to the conflict during the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) numbered in the thousands.[17] Despite the connection that was established in the seventeenth century between propaganda and warfare, the term still referred in a neutral way to advocacy of truth or of a particular doctrine: it was not pejorative in

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[15] Jowett and O'Donnell, *Propaganda and Persuasion*, pp. 40-1.

[16] Joseph Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?" *The National Interest* 64, (Summer, 2001), p. 43. The comparison has been taken to its conclusion within Peter van Ham's study of public diplomacy and *pax Americana*, where he illustrates the mixture of attraction and rebellion that US power garners by citing the scene from the Monty Python film *Life of Brian* where the Israelite revolutionaries ask 'what have the Romans ever done for us?' The answer is, ironically, such things as aqueducts, sanitation, medicine, education, and wine. Peter van Ham, "Power, Public Diplomacy, and the *Pax Americana*," in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 53-55.

[17] Significantly, the peace agreements that ended the conflict, signed in the city of Westphalia, dealt with foundational principles of the European international order. The possible links between the kinds of issues that were settled during this foundational peace settlement, with its extensive impacts international law and politics, and the extensive use of propaganda by both sides remain little understood, however.

connotation at this stage.[18] Propaganda acquired an association with manipulation and deception during the early twentieth century, largely as a consequence of the ways in which barrages of false and emotive information were deployed as propaganda by all sides during the First World War. In this post-1918 period 'cultural diplomacy' and 'cultural internationalism' emerged as liberal categories of persuasive practice in an international context, while 'propaganda' was informational (and, for many commentators, nefarious) in character.

Precursors to Cultural Diplomacy, Propaganda in the Post-1648 Order

As far back as the seventeenth century cultural and educational propaganda techniques had been developed in a European context, but not as an official diplomatic activity. In 1689 a French-speaking college, one of the earliest examples of an international cultural institution, was founded in Prussia by exiled French Protestants. Several similar French institutions were founded shortly thereafter in Britain. In the decades that followed, the exiled French Huguenot communities in Holland and England also established French-language periodicals that came to be widely distributed across Western Europe, and contributed to the emergence of a trans-national, French-speaking pan European 'republic of letters.'[19] In the course of the eighteenth century propaganda's form, function and content were refined with its use as a diplomatic tool of the French monarchy. During the War of Spanish Succession (1701-1714) French diplomats distributed jurisprudential pamphlets which cited passages from eminent legal authorities such as Hugo Grotius that implicitly advanced French claims. Interestingly, French diplomats avoided putting these forward as their King's personal claims, anticipating that the pamphlets "consisting as they do entirely

[18] The roots of the term are Latin, *propagare*: to extend, enlarge or spread.

[19] Joseph Klaits, *Printed Propaganda Under Louis XIV: Absolute Monarchy and Public Opinion*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), pp. 20-1. On the expulsion of roughly 200,000 French Hugenots after the Edict of Fountainbleu of 1685. See: Heather Rae, *State Identities and the Homogenisation of Peoples*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), pp. 117-9. On French cultural expansion in the seventeenth century see: Walter R. Roberts and Terry L. Deibel, *Culture and Information: Two Foreign Policy Functions*, (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1976), p. 17. See also Anthony Haigh, *Cultural Diplomacy in Europe*, (Strasborg: Council of Europe, 1974), pp. 28-30.

of passages from disinterested authors, cannot be attacked without directly attacking authors...who carry weight in the public's judgement."[20] Joseph Klaits situates this innovation in the broader context of Louis IV's 'communications revolution,' in which the use of symbols and information became integral components of the Sun King's domestic and international statecraft.[21]

Increased rates of literacy in Europe had established the eighteenth century as an era saturated with mass political debate, much of it prompted by the work of cartoonists, pamphleteers including William Hogarth, James Gillary, and the French economic satirist Frederick Bastiat. As Mlada Bukovansky has argued, it is in this period that the "origins of the notion of public opinion as a political force" on an international scale can be observed.[22] Bukovansky argues that the spread of discourses of political authority and legitimacy originating in post-Revolutionary France and America affected a profound transition in the practice of diplomacy:

> underpinning the changes in the conduct of war and international politics that followed in the wake of the [French] Revolution was a new template of political legitimacy. Widespread emulation of the revolutionary French did not immediately ensue...but the template generated in the Revolution proved durable and compelling.

The liberal revolutions of the eighteenth century thus fundamentally altered "shared understandings of what was possible in politics," ultimately contributing to the downfall of absolute monarchy as the source domestic political authority, and of dynastic marriage as the format of international alliances.[23] Political revolution was

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[20] French ministerial consultant Ulrich Obrecht is quoted here. Klaits, *Printed Propaganda Under Louis XIV*, pp. 96-7.

[21] "In the artwork of the absolutist state, French society was to be much more than a passive audience. Louis XIV's government intended that the King's subjects should participate in the ceremony of monarchy....Intendants, provincial governors, and other officials throughout France were mobilised to accomplish this purpose." *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12. A brief history of French cultural diplomacy as a national 'brand' from Louis XIV onward is also supplied by Wally Olins, "Making a National Brand," in *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*, ed. Jan Melissen, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[22] Mlada Bukovansky, *Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), p. 102. The earliest instance of propaganda on behalf of the United States occurred in this period, as reflected in Benjamin Franklin's efforts from 1777 to appeal to sympathetic sectors of French and English public opinion.

[23] *Ibid.*, pp. 165, 186

deeply implicated in the refinement of techniques for the coordinated use of propaganda, particularly in the case of the French revolutionary government's effort to court sympathetic intellectuals across Europe. As with Louis IV's legal advocacy, post-revolutionary French propaganda had a covert element: during the Napoleonic Wars it was revealed that a purportedly English newspaper called *The Argus of London* had actually been written by French government agents.[24]

During the nineteenth century, propaganda and cultural diplomacy techniques were extended and refined as a consequence of their deployment in the context of European colonial expansion. France was, once again, at the forefront of these innovations. Among the European powers it was France that placed most emphasis on cultural diplomacy, based on a vision of its colonial possessions as an extension of the French nation. The *Alliance Française* was founded in 1883, partly with the rationale of consolidating colonial ties, and partly to stand self-reflexively as an official symbol of French cultural universalism and political prestige. As Tzvetan Todorov has reflected, French national identity had been articulated in increasingly universalist terms following the revolutionary period. Writing on French nationhood in 1844, Jules Michelet had thus observed: "What is holy in France, whatever it may be, is holy to all nations: it is adopted, blessed and mourned by the human race. For any man...his first country is his own, and his second is France."[25] By 1900 France had established a government office to monitor and support non-government international cultural initiatives, including the *Alliance Française*.[26] French educational diplomacy, in the Middle East in particular, had become particularly extensive by the end of the nineteenth century, arising in part from the Catholic missionary tradition and in part from the government's cultural format for colonial dominance.[27] The trajectory of

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[24] Jowett and O'Donnell *Propaganda and Persuasion*, pp. 59-60.

[25] Such discourses of universalism and exceptionality, as I shall demonstrate in the forthcoming chapters, have strong parallels within the discursive practices of US foreign policy-making during the period examined within this study. Many strikingly similar statements were made by US foreign policy-makers during the Second World War. Jules Michelet (1844) quoted in Tzvetan Todorov, *On Human Diversity: Nationalism, Racism, and Exoticism in French Thought*, trans. Catherine Porter, Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1993, p. 211.

[26] Roberts and Deibel, *Culture and Information*, p. 18.

[27] The author also notes that these initiatives were largely tolerated within the pluralist Islamic societies in which they operated. John P. Spagnolo, "The Definition of a Style of Imperialism: The Internal

German cultural expansion followed a similar path to French practices, and proliferated widely during the latter part of the nineteenth century.[28]

The rise of a pan European intellectual discourse on propaganda and mass politics in the twentieth century had also been foreshadowed by the very end of the nineteenth century. Several influential academic treatises had appeared considering the emergence of public opinion as a key force in European political life. A bestselling work by the French scholar Gustave Le Bon captured prevailing European intellectual sentiment at the turn of the century when it remarked that "[t]he entry of the popular classes into political life- that is to say, in reality, their progressive transformation into governing classes- is one of the most striking characteristics of our epoch of transition."[29]

Twentieth Century Cultural and Informational Diplomacy

Geopolitical events during the first two decades of the twentieth century gave significant impetus to the development of new techniques and technologies for propaganda which comprise the backdrop to Washington's adoption of cultural diplomacy in 1936 and international information in 1941. These European developments are worth surveying because European inter-war diplomacy constituted the framework in which cultural and informational diplomacy developed as foreign policy practices, and because European practices served as the context for public debates on the nature of propaganda in the US. Although France remained Europe's key sponsor of international cultural relations after 1918, some of the most significant innovations in the mass distribution of international information occurred to the east: in Germany and Russia. In 1915, Germany used international broadcasting for mass persuasion purposes for the first time, using cable communications to transmit political

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Politics of the French Educational Investment in Ottoman Beirut," *French Historical Studies* 8, (no. 4, Autumn 1974).

[28] Thirty-eight German-speaking international schools had been established between 1830 and 1870, and were, like the first French examples, a product of private initiative rather than government policy.

[29] Gustave Le Bon, *The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind*, (London: Ernest Benn, 1896), pp. 15-16. On Le Bon's popularity in Europe during the early twentieth century see Volker Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy in the 'American Century,'" *Diplomatic History* 23, (no. 3, Summer 1999), pp. 395-6. See also: Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, p. 30.

messages into enemy areas. However as Philo Wasburn points out, Lenin and other Bolshevik leaders had been discussing radio's significance as possible tool of Communist revolution as early as 1910, since "Russia had need of a centralised, far-reaching system of mass communication. It was a nation of enormous proportions...made up overwhelmingly of illiterate peasants."[30] Consequently, "[o]n November 7, 1917, the first day of the Russian Revolution, the cruiser *Aurora*, in the harbour of St. Petersburg, broadcast messages to the 'Citizens of Russia' containing decrees written by Lenin."[31] Morse code cable communications were also extensively used in Russia during the immediate post-Revolutionary period, and by February 1918 Lenin himself had addressed the Russian people via short-wave radio transmission. The Bolshevik government proceeded to sponsor research to improve radio broadcasting techniques in the aftermath of the revolution. By 1922 the *Nizhni Novorod* station was broadcasting within a radius of 2,000 miles due to innovations in signal capacity.[32]

As the French revolutionary government had a century earlier, the USSR possessed a comprehensive and consistent ideology to propagate, which gave it a consistent and systematic message and a clear intended audience. One former US diplomat to the USSR highlights how this early Bolshevik propaganda was viewed in the West, noting how, from 1917, the Communists:

> claimed leadership of the 'national liberation' movements in the non-European world and of the struggle of the Western proletariat...Soviet Russia has offered to the world, or even demanded that the world adopt, its version of mass culture.[33]

The Bolshevik government articulated a policy of systematic international propaganda in 1927, and founded its first permanent international short- and medium-wave

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[30] Philo C. Wasburn, *Broadcasting Propaganda: International Radio Broadcasting and the Construction of Political Reality*, (Westport: Praeger, 1992), p. 2. On the pre-revolutionary propaganda experience gained by the Bolsheviks, see Peter Kenez, *The Birth of the Propaganda State: Soviet methods of Mass Mobilization 1917-1929*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 5-8.

[31] Wasburn, *Broadcasting Propaganda,* p. 2.

[32] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.

[33] Frederick C. Barghoorn, *The Soviet Cultural Offensive: The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), p. 28. E. H. Carr also made point that the messianic approach of Soviet propaganda was the key to its success. See Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis*.

international broadcasting station, Radio Moscow, in 1929. The station initially undertook ongoing broadcasting in German, French and English.[34] The Bolsheviks were also innovative in the use of radio propaganda in a targeted way, pioneering the deployment of propaganda in crisis diplomacy by broadcasting on behalf of Soviet demands in 1926 for the return of territory from Romania, and then later conveying the USSR's solidarity (in English) with striking coal miners in Britain.[35] These broadcasts thus attracted some of the earliest attempts at radio signal jamming by the European powers. This was a tactic later used by the US during the Cold War.

The Soviet All-Union Society for Cultural Ties (VOKS) was created in 1925. Though it claimed to be independent from the Soviet government, the Society was funded by the state to manage the Soviet Union's official cultural and educational exchanges. Building on existing Marxist sympathies in Western Europe, VOKS made considerable progress in promoting Bolshevik views among European intellectuals during the inter-war period. VOKS's approach to cultural and educational exchange in this period was highly selective and politicised, however. For instance, the Society's vice-president instructed the Czech Soviet Friendship society in 1931 that "[o]ur foreign societies would...be entirely wrong in limiting their work to disseminating neutral information."[36] Many intellectuals visited the USSR under its auspices during the inter-war period at Stalin's personal invitation, including John Dewey, H. G. Wells and Bertrand Russell. Intourist, the official Soviet tourist agency established in 1929, oversaw these visits and developed strategies that would subsequently be used within Soviet cultural exchanges to control the impressions of official visitors, including surrounding them with cadres of 'interpreters' and confining them to group tours.[37]

A relatively significant number of visits and cultural activities between the USSR and the West took place prior to the Second World War. In his detailed study of

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[34] Gary D. Rawnsley, *Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956-64*, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996), p. 7; Michael Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens: The Battles of Western Broadcasting in the Cold War*, (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1997), p. 3.

[35] For a more detailed than can be provided here, see: Rawnsley, *Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda*, p. 7, Ch. 1. See also: Wasburn, *Broadcasting Propaganda,* Ch. 1.

[36] Lous Nemzer, "The Soviet Friendship Societies," *The Public Opinion Quarterly*, 13, (no. 2, Summer 1949), p. 274 .

[37] *Ibid.*, p. 43.

Soviet cultural diplomacy Frederick Barghoorn does not supply figures, but notes that in the 1930s Western visitors to the USSR numbered in 'the thousands' and were 'unusually purposeful' because they consisted largely of international 'opinion leaders.'[38] Many of the cultural and intellectual visits from the US to the USSR were sponsored by American philanthropic organisations, since no formal diplomatic ties existed between the two countries. Thus, despite Bolshevik concerns that Western contacts might introduce 'alien' ideas or hearten the 'remnants of capitalism' that remained in the USSR,[39] when compared with the insular cultural policies of the early Cold War period, the 1920s and 1930s have been described as a time of 'extensive' Soviet openness to cultural diplomacy. In contrast to this estimate that 'thousands' of sponsored visitors went to the USSR during the 1930s, one study suggests that only 140 delegations from *all* non-Communist states were invited to the USSR between 1945 and 1952.[40]

The Crucible of Europe: Inter-War Cultural and Informational Practices

The use of information and cultural interchange as instruments of foreign policy also expanded widely outside the USSR during the 1920s. As noted above, a formidable effort to extend French culture had been ongoing via private initiative, with government support, since the nineteenth century. There was significant enthusiasm in France, within both official and private spheres, for the large-scale emergency cultural interchange and information policies that had been put in place during the First World War to continue into peacetime. In 1920 one official in the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs had reflected that continuing the wartime information programs could provide a new foundation for France's influence in Europe, noting how: "Propaganda is nothing but intellectual and moral influence and yet it is the most immediate and most valuable means for seconding the efforts made by this country to establish and develop her

[38] *Ibid.*, pp. 32-5. Nigel Gould-Davies confirms this estimate, noting that 'several thousand' American tourists visited the USSR in the 1920s and early 1930s with a range of purposes in mind, some educational or culture and some, no doubt, purely for tourism. Nigel Gould Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, (no. 2, 2003), p. 186.
[39] Barghoorn, *Soviet Cultural Offensive*, p. 31.
[40] Frederick C. Barghoorn and Paul W. Freidrich, "Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics* 8, (no. 3, April 1956), p. 326.

material prosperity."[41] The emphasis on French cultural prestige was also strong throughout the inter-war period, reflected in the French government's leading role in sponsoring the League of Nations International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation and the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, both of which were headquartered in Paris. French spending on cultural diplomacy increased steadily during the inter-war years, between 1933 and 1936 alone French funding for cultural and informational projects doubled.[42] With France's economic and military capacities decimated after 1945, bilateral relationships were emphasised as the preferred format for French cultural diplomacy, and lauded in characteristic terms as a basis to reassert France's 'traditional' status as a world power and global cultural beacon.[43]

Building on nineteenth century private-sector initiatives, the first government programs for German cultural diplomacy were founded in 1900. Germany's most well-known initiative during this period was the Goethe Institute, founded in 1932. A recent study by Wolf Lepenies has illustrated the assumptions that underpinned the projection of German culture after the First World War, noting the tendency in Germany to sublimate political claims into a celebration of German cultural achievement. Aesthetics had been a key feature of post-unification German political culture, and received strong emphasis as a salve for the national humiliation of the Versailles settlement. Many German intellectuals had enthusiastically supported the First World War effort, having signed a 1914 manifesto entitled *An die Kulturwelt* ('To the Civilized World') which amounted to a 'moral declaration of war' on behalf of German culture. Consequently the post-war conditions imposed on Germany were condemned as a slight on German culture itself: "[w]hen political and military defeat came in 1918, German historians were well prepared, as at the war's outbreak four years earlier, to reject the claim that the Allies had fought a war against German militarism only...not against German culture."[44] The appeal of National Socialism in Germany is thus explained partly by the supplanting of democratic politics by aesthetic ritual, a process

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[41] M. Nobelmain (1920) quoted in Haigh, *Cultural Diplomacy,* pp. 28-30.
[42] Wilma Fairbank, *America's Cultural Experiment in China 1942-1949*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 4.
[43] William R. Pendergast, "Unesco and French Cultural Relations," *International Organization*, 30, (no. 3, 1976).
[44] Wolf Lepenies, *The Seduction of Culture in German History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), pp. 17, 22.

which appeared to reinstate Germany as '*Kulturnation*:' the cultural apex of the West. Furthermore, Washington seemed aware in this period of the political undertones of German cultural diplomacy, and the extension of Nazi cultural exchange programs into Latin America provided one of the most important catalysts for the US to take up cultural diplomacy practices in the late 1930s.

The connection between totalitarianism and cultural diplomacy was reflected in Japanese policies in the inter-war period, although these were largely conducted within an East Asian regional context. From 1919, calls were repeatedly made in the Japanese Diet for official cultural exchanges with China, which prompted the founding of a Japanese government bureau to supervise cultural diplomacy in Asia. The role of this bureau was expanded in 1927 to encompass a program of official cultural contacts with Europe and the Americas.[45] During the 1930s culture and information, or 'thought war' (*shisōsen*)- came to occupy a key place in the context of official visions of Japan's future empire in Asia.[46] As one Japanese commentator had put it in 1939, the extension of culture and information was seen as a way of communicating to Asians that they could "totally put an end to the long period of dependence on and copying after the West" and highlight Japan's 'innate' claim to a sphere of influence within Asia.[47]

As the 1920s gave way to the 1930s, short- and medium-wave radio became the most commonly utilised format for international information broadcasting. Short-wave had benefited during the 1920s through technological innovations in signal capacity, spearheaded by two states with large territories: the USSR (as mentioned) and the US. In the US, however, it was private enterprise rather than the state that had spearheaded technical innovations.[48] The authoritarian regimes in Germany and Italy used short-wave extensively for their international broadcasting during the early 1930s.

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[45] Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, p. 74. International persuasion initiatives outside Asia in this period included the opening of a pro-Japanese publicity bureau in New York City.

[46] Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda*, (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), p. 15.

[47] Ude Hisashi (1939), quoted in Akira Iriye, *Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War, 1941-1945*, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), p. 5.

[48] Short-wave's prominence also increased as receiver sets and adaptors became cheaper, particularly after 1932. Holly Cowan Shulman, *The Voice of Victory: The Development of American propaganda and the Voice of America, 1920-1942*, (PhD Dissertation: University of Maryland, 1984), p. 26.

As the pre-war chief of German international broadcasting Eugen Hadamowski had observed, radio was "the strongest weapon of the spirit- that opens hearts and does not stop at the borders of cities and does not turn back before closed doors...that is able to force peoples under the spell of one powerful spirit."[49] While German short-wave infrastructure had initially been established in 1929 for the purpose of communicating with colonial outposts, during the early 1930s much of the German radio infrastructure was redirected toward the German-speaking regions of Europe accompanied by the distribution of pre-tuned radio receiver sets.[50] It was reported in the US that by 1939 70% of German households owned a wireless set- the highest percentage in the world- while many offices, factories and restaurants had also been fitted with receivers.[51] The Nazi approach to international information to non-German speaking areas has been characterised as 'pragmatic' in tone, however, since it was connected the search for export markets and lacked the innovativeness and broader message of Soviet propaganda.[52] Yet the commercial purposes of German broadcasts to Latin America did have the effect, perhaps unintended, of sparking concerns about Axis economic expansion in the United States and leading Washington toward adopting official cultural diplomacy as a response.

Beyond Germany, the newly sovereign Vatican City adopted a short-wave international propaganda policy in February 1931. Italy commenced short-wave broadcasting from 1935, with a strong international component undertaken in the hope of undermining British interests in Africa and the Middle East.[53] Japan founded its official short-wave broadcasting program in the mid-1930s. In September 1935 the Ethiopian emperor Haile Selassie beamed appeals (that were not heeded) for American military support against the Italian invasion using a one-kilowatt transmitter.[54] Both

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[49] Eugen Hadamowski quoted in Nelson, *War of the Black Heavens*, p. 4. A comprehensive study of how Nazi Germany's propaganda infrastructure was built with a comparison with British policies is: Michael Balfour, *Propaganda in War: 1939-1945*, (London: Routledge, 1979). See also: Aristotle A. Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

[50] "Radio as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," (no author, undated); Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD, p. 3.

[51] *Ibid.*, p. 14.

[52] Wasburn, *Broadcasting Propaganda*, pp. 15-6.

[53] Rawnsley, *Radio Diplomacy*, p. 7.

[54] Shulman, *Voice of Victory*, p. 29.

sides in the Spanish Civil War also made use of radio broadcasting in the hope of courting international public opinion.[55] The need to communicate with expatriates in colonial outposts led to the development of government short-wave infrastructure in Western Europe: the Dutch commenced routine broadcasting to its colonies in 1927; the French and Belgians followed suit in 1931; while the British Broadcasting Corporation's (BBC) Empire Service was founded in 1932.

'Traditional Self-Effacement?' The Development of Cultural and Informational Diplomacy in Britain

As we shall shortly see was the case in the United States there was a certain British reticence among the public towards the idea of official propaganda in the 1930s, which makes it an interesting case within the historical context of US cultural and informational diplomacy. British international information:

> developed...in a rather haphazard manner without any central plan for the creation of a comprehensive British propaganda organisation. There [had] been very little systematic consideration of the nature of this instrument in the ways it might best be utilized to advance British foreign policy objectives.[56]

As far back as the 1920s, during which time Whitehall had maintained only a skeleton international information program, British policy-makers had declared some reluctance to publicise government aims as an official policy. As one Foreign Office official had reflected in 1922, "the word 'propaganda' is a misnomer and the aim which has been put before us is rather that of correcting misapprehensions...as a result of the aggressive propaganda of other nations."[57] A second memorandum of 1930 had similarly observed the problem posed for Britain was that despite the efforts of the European cultural internationalists to craft new, non-coercive forms of international

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[55] *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
[56] John B. Black, *Organising the Propaganda Instrument: The British Experience*, (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975), p. xi.
[57] P. A. Koppell (1922) quoted in Phillip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy*, (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999), p. 72.

public persuasion, the fact remained that the "boundary between cultural and tendentious propaganda is, in practice, very indefinite" and this left British policy-makers with a moral and political dilemma.[58]

The 1932 founding of the BBC Empire Service constituted an addition to the BBC domestic services (established by Royal Charter in 1927). It was established along the lines of the domestic Charter of the BBC, and was thus a government-funded but editorially independent corporation for distributing news and features to British subjects in British colonies. In 1938 the BBC Empire Service's range was extended beyond the Empire to Middle Eastern and Mediterranean regions that were being subject to Fascist Italian propaganda, and it was with this crucial decision that the British reticence toward the projection of British culture and information as a tool of foreign policy began to diminish.[59] Plans were subsequently drawn up for the establishment of a Ministry of Information in case Britain should require psychological warfare services in the event of a future European conflict. Phillip M. Taylor thus notes that, as reflected in the unanimous support by the House of Commons for a resolution in favour of the dissemination of British information abroad,

> the depth of prejudice and suspicion about propaganda was decidedly less deep-rooted in the late 1930s than it had been at the end of the First World War...This was largely because the evidence and the kind of arguments that had prompted the creation of the British Council in 1934 continued to gather force and wide currency during the remaining five years of peace...The issue was kept alive not only by the intensification of anti-British propaganda, and the steps taken by the government to counter it, but also by questions and debates in the House of Commons, regular debate in the Press, numerous articles published in learned journals, and the appearance of several influential books.[60]

Given this sense of reticence, the Empire Service broadcasts remained distinct in style from the Axis broadcasts; the BBC sought to be 'peaceful,' it declined to take a

[58] BBC memo of 1930 quoted in Shulman, *Voice of Victory*, p. 27.
[59] J. M. Lee, "British Cultural Diplomacy and the Cold War: 1946-61," *Diplomacy & Statecraft* 9, (no. 1, March 1998), p. 117.
[60] Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p. 81.

stridently ideological line on international issues and broadcast exclusively in English until 1938. American policy-makers drew heavily on these sentiments in articulating their vision of the tone and rationale for US international short-wave broadcasting.

However, there was a sense of pragmatism alongside the British efforts to maintain a 'peaceful' approach to propaganda; as Philo Wasburn notes, of all the Great Powers it was the declining imperial power Britain that had most to benefit from propaganda. In Wasburn's view, the Empire Service was intended:

> to do more than contradict the claims of adversaries...They were attempting to perpetuate the appearance of power in the eyes of foreign observers at a time when radio transmissions from hostile states were beginning to expose, by a variety of means, the harsh realities of British decline.[61]

Furthermore, and as Nicholas Cull has extensively charted, as the British propaganda services were extended during the late 1930s, one of their principal efforts was a campaign against America's position of neutrality in the European struggle against the Axis before 1941.[62]

Cultural diplomacy was also adopted by Whitehall as a tool to consolidate British ties with the colonies. It developed rather slowly, however, which the diplomat and commentator Harold Nicholson attributed to traditional British sense of self-effacement: "if foreigners failed to appreciate, or even to notice, our gifts of invention and or our splendid adaptability, then there was nothing that we could do to mitigate their obtuseness."[63] The cultural diplomacy advocate Rex Leeper similarly quipped: "as for taking positive steps to explain our aims and achievements, that we regard as undignified and unnecessary."[64] The British Council for Relations with Other Peoples was established in 1934 as a consequence of recommendations from the British

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[61] Wasburn, *Broadcasting Propaganda*, p. 11. On the issue of British decline and the failure to use cultural and informational diplomacy see also Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p. 65.

[62] Nicholas Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American 'Neutrality' in World War II*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

[63] Harold Nicholson quoted in Frances Donaldson, *The British Council: The First Fifty Years*, (London: Johnathan Cape, 1984), p. 11.

[64] Rex Leeper quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 11-2. See also: John M. Mackenzie, *Propaganda and Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion 1880-1960*, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1986), p. 10. See also: Lee, "British Cultural Diplomacy."

Overseas Trade Committee that cultural diplomacy could support the UK's economic interests and a vigorous lobbying effort led by Leeper. The Council was partly to serve as a semi-official institution to attract international visitors to the UK, improve the image of British firms in Latin America and Europe, and supervise educational and cultural activities.[65] Its first director, Lord William Tyrrell, summarised the Council's role in the following terms:

> We have much to learn from others, but we have also much to teach them. If we do not do the teaching ourselves, we shall be misunderstood and misinterpreted. If you will regard us as a body able and willing to do this educational work abroad, may I ask you also to regard us as a people who are assisting practically in our national defence. Modern defence consists not only in arms but in removing misunderstanding.[66]

The foregoing survey of the development of propaganda and cultural diplomacy has highlighted the importance of technology in the development of international persuasion as a diplomatic practice. From the emergence and distribution of the printing press across Europe to the achievement of better short-wave signals in Russia, and even as reflected in the use of aircraft by German and French forces for the distribution of pamphlets during the First World War, there has been a close relationship between the evolving means of communication and use mass advocacy as a diplomatic tool. Two external factors also spurred the development of propaganda and cultural diplomacy in Europe: ideological expansionism and colonial conquest. The relative absence of these two factors, and the strength of the private sector in American media and cultural life, appears to have largely distanced the US from the pressures of a propaganda-saturated European context during the inter-war period and fostered public debates condemning European diplomatic practices as undemocratic and war-mongering.

[65] Lee, "British Cultural Diplomacy," p. 117.
[66] Lord William Tyrrell (1936) quoted in Taylor, *British Propaganda*, p. 77.

Closely paralleling the technological and political developments outlined in the foregoing discussion were academic and popular debates that sought to determine how the adoption of informational and cultural propaganda had altered the nature of the global order and the exercise of domestic political authority. In fact, cultural diplomacy emerged during the inter-war period as a distinct category of practice that was seized upon within official US policy-making after 1936 as a consequence of these intellectual debates, as European cosmopolitans sought to theorise and put into practice less manipulative and unilateral approaches to the projection of national ideas and influence. In the next section I shall examine in more detail the intellectual developments that were stimulated by the rise of propaganda and cultural diplomacy, including the emergence of academic International Relations in Europe as a discrete discipline of study and the beginnings of behavioralism in US political science.

Propaganda and Inter-war Intellectual Debates

Cosmopolitanism and Cultural Internationalism

How was the evolution of cultural and informational diplomacy as a means of exercising international influence comprehended during intellectual debates of the inter-war period? As Jo-Anne Pemberton has recently observed, by the end of the First World War European scholars saw their time as an era of 'historic discontinuity,' as reflected in 'crisis literature' such as Oswald Spengler's bestselling *Decline of the West* of 1918. Interestingly, images of crisis and discontinuity also framed the so-called 'idealist' or 'cosmopolitan' internationalist movement, which advocated global renewal and the construction of a new world order based on international communications and cross-cultural understanding as a response to the crisis of total war in 1914-18.[67] As I foreshadowed above, both sides of the European decline/renewal debate in inter-war scholarship shared the premise that the First World War's unprecedented destructiveness and the rapid pace of technological change were a portent of imminent,

[67] Jo-Anne Pemberton, "New Worlds for Old: The League of Nations in the Age of Electricity," *Review of International Studies*, 28 (no. 2, 2002), pp. 311-2. On Spengler, particularly his concept of the dwindling spiritual resources of the West, see: O'Hagan, *Conceptualizing the West*, pp. 71-6.

epochal change.[68] Very few contributions to intellectual debates of this period sought to claim that the First World War had little historical significance or signified continuity with the historical dynamics of the past.

As Pemberton suggests, cosmopolitan visions of world order constituted an attempt "to generate excitement about possible tomorrows" and to quell widespread public anxieties about the communications technologies that had been deployed for propaganda purposes during the war. In this context the cosmopolitans sought to demonstrate that it was possible to "deliberately produce a harmony of interests" by advocating the "rearranging intellectual and political priorities."[69] The technological and political forces that had been unleashed by the war were depicted as "amenable to telic control given the application of the correct knowledge as well as rational appreciation of the need for concerted action."[70] In articulating this conception of political progress, many of the inter-war cosmopolitan writers suggested that international communications could foster an 'international community,' a concept drawn from nineteenth century legal debates (especially during the Hague Conferences) and the application of evolutionary philosophy to international affairs. L. T. Hobhouse's *Democracy and Reaction*, written in 1904, was one of the most important precursors to inter-war British cosmopolitanism in his account of the evolution of a liberal international community.[71] Hobhouse had inspired cosmopolitan scholars in their effort to problematise the "arbitrary divide between national and international politics" by suggesting how a civilised human conscience could serve as a safeguard against the narrow interests of sovereign states.[72] Communications technology came into play here, envisaged as a practical mechanism for achieving this type of international progress.

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[68] Pemberton, "New Worlds for Old."
[69] *Ibid.*, pp. 312, 335.
[70] *Ibid.*, p. 317. See also, Peter Wilson, "Introduction", in eds. David Long and Peter Wilson, *Thinkers of the Twenty Years Crisis: Inter War Idealism Reassessed*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 4.
[71] L. T. Hobhouse, *Democracy and Reaction*, (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1904), see esp. Ch. 5-6. See also Casper Sylvest, "Continuity and change in British liberal internationalism, *c.* 1900-1930," *Review of International Studies* 31, (no. 2, 2005).
[72] Sylvest, "Continuity and Change," pp. 270-3. On the internationalist movement in the US at the turn of the twentieth century see William T. R. Fox, "Interwar International Relations Research: The American Experience," *World Politics* 2, (no. 1, October 1949).

The political significance mass persuasion and the idea of an *international* public sphere of opinion and cultural understanding was built into the lexicon of inter-war International Relations as a consequence of the collectivist philosophy underpinning of the League of Nations. The League of Nations International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation and the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation, established in 1922 and 1926 respectively, sought to foster an alternative basis for international diplomacy than power politics for precisely this reason. Participants in these initiatives had insisted that Europe had been united by the suffering of war, while:

> the submergence of internationalism, in particular the cultural internationalism that had seemed to have emerged so promising before the war, under excessive nationalism had been the most deplorable aspect of the conflict. Educated elites themselves had been guilty of this development, as they had embraced power politics and called on the masses to reject the cultural influences of enemy nations. Deeply embarrassed and ashamed of their wartime behaviour, many erstwhile internationalists, as well as new converts, now vowed to dedicate themselves to resuscitating and expanding that movement as the only hope for a sane world order.[73]

The aspirations embodied by the cosmopolitan internationalist movement were humanist and progressive, yet also "unquestionably elitist" in subscribing to the view that "intellectuals of all nations had a responsibility to teach the masses how not to be caught up in a chauvinistic frenzy but instead to become even more aware of their shared destiny."[74] We shall see in the coming chapters that the articulation of US cultural diplomacy after 1945 played up the democratic elements of its own cultural forms, drawing contrast with these elitist elements of the inter-war basis of cultural internationalism that had ultimately failed to prevent a second European war.

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[73] Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, p. 56.

[74] Akira Iriye, *The Cambridge History of American Foreign Policy, Volume Three: The Globalizing of America 1913-1945*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 107-8. US Comment on the League Institute during the period that the US government was carving out its own programs for cultural and informational exchange also picked up on this issue of 'elitism.' See: "US Now Planning to Educate Europe, Official Reveals," *New York Times*, April 8, 1943.

Despite this elite focus, the cultural internationalists of the inter-war period emphasised the revolutionary potential of their activities. Mary Parker Follett characterised cosmopolitanism in *The New State* as an epochal shift in world politics: whereas "the old fashioned hero went out to conquer his enemy; the modern hero goes out to disarm his enemy through...mutual understanding." Hence, the pacification of international relations would be anchored within a:

> group culture which shall be broader than the culture of one nation alone. There must be a world-ideal...in which the ideals and civilization of every nation can find a place...I am told that this is mysticism. It is the most practical idea I have found.[75]

Similarly rousing language was adopted by Frank Heath, secretary of the British delegation to the League Committee, who suggested that to affect progress in world politics "the realm to be conquered is the Kingdom of Knowledge and Ideas."[76] Sir Alfred Zimmern, often referred to as the 'unofficial spokesman' of inter-war British cultural diplomacy, contended in 1928 that with the rise of radio communications technologies the pace at which political ideas could be transmitted and adopted had increased rapidly. "Political ideas no longer grow in stillness: they burst in upon us from near or far," such that policymakers "have not even yet understood that the life of the world has entered upon a new phase in which the older...modes of calculation are of no avail."[77] Zimmern was quite specific about how international communications and cultural diplomacy would remake international relations, remarking in 1929 that world politics was being subject to a process "of knitting together intellectual relations, not emotional relations, of developing acquaintanceship and mutual knowledge." Elsewhere he noted the need to 'obliterate difference' between nations, emphasising the

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[75] Mary Parker Follett, *The New State: Group Organization the Solution of Popular Government,* (New York: Longmans, Green & Co, 1920), pp. 345-6. See also Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, pp. 58-60.
[76] Frank Heath (1929) quoted in Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, p. 61.
[77] Alfred Zimmern, *Learning and Leadership: A Study of the Needs and Possibilities of International Intellectual Cooperation*, (London: Oxford University Press, 1928), pp. 24, 323-5, 333. See also Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, p. 64. I do not wish to suggest that Zimmern sits wholly within the 'idealist' or 'cosmopolitan' camp, in fact he reflects the diversity of supporters of the League Committee. Zimmern disagreed with his contemporaries on some key points, colonialism in particular. A nuanced account of Zimmern's thought on world politics is provided by Jeanne Morefield, *Covenants Without Swords: Idealist Liberalism and the Spirit of the Empire*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

psychological closeness that flows from travel, trade and communication in forging 'organic' trans-national connections and thus rendering war unthinkable.[78] Zimmern's fellow British delegate to the League of Nations Committee Gilbert Murray similarly observed that:

> The world has not yet sounded or measured the immense power of mere publicity...I mean the knowledge that your actions are to be known and discussed, and particularly that you will have to answer questions about them face to face with your questioner. Publicity is the only new weapon which the League possesses, but if properly used it may well prove to be about the most powerful weapon that exists in human affairs.[79]

The inter-war advocates of international cultural and informational interchange stressed the links between improved international communication and the refinement of human rationality. Normal Angell, perhaps the most famous cosmopolitan thinker of the period, had argued in *The Foundations of International Polity* (1914) that although economic interdependence would constitute the key mechanism for lasting peace, an integral part of this process involved exposing the essentially artificial nature of national differences via trans-national communication and interaction. Angell observed that "all those factors of improved communication which have intensified our material interdependence have to a still greater degree intensified our moral and intellectual interdependence," and thus contained within them the promise of a more peaceful international system.[80] In response to his 'defeatist' interlocutors, Angell charged that "the guarantee of the moral values of a free society...have been systematically belittled by certain modern writers who have laboriously used reason to prove that reason cannot be trusted; and have maintained campaigns against liberty and liberalism."[81] A similar charge was levelled by Leonard Woolf against the critics of the League of Nations. He argued in *The War For Peace*

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[78] Alfred Zimmern, quoted in Julie Reeves, *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists*. (Abington: Routledge, 2004), pp. 45-6.
[79] Gilbert Murray (1922) quoted in Robert W. McElroy, *Morality in International Relations: The Role of Ethics in International Affairs*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), p. 11.
[80] Norman Angell, *Foundations of International Polity*, (London: Heinemann, 1914), pp. xxii-vii & 33.
[81] Norman Angell's *Why Freedom Matters*, quoted in Peter Wilson, "Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to *The Twenty Years Crisis*, 1939-46," in *EH Carr: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. Michael Cox. (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000), p. 167.

that "one must hesitate to accept sweeping statements about interests, conflicts of interests, and power being such immutable social or political 'realities' that they inevitably determine the structure of society."[82] As Robert McElroy has subsequently reflected, in lauding international communication and cultural engagement as a basis to pacify world politics, the inter-war liberal internationalists including Angell and Woolf:

> advanced a view of human nature that stressed rationality and community, rather than conflict and the drive for power...World War I and the democratisation of the West had created a radically new situation for international relations in which morally based precepts of state action could be effectively enforced by international public opinion and the community of nations. The politics of nations was for the internationalists a malleable thing that was capable of being patterned, albeit imperfectly, according to an effective moral order.[83]

For these cosmopolitan scholars "normative analysis...did not imply 'bleeding heart' idealism, but rather practical policy relevance. Academic specialists in international relations and law addressed the world of states as it was with a view to changing things for the better." Many of the conferences on fostering international progress that were held under the auspices of the International Institute of Intellectual Cooperation thus applied their beliefs to pressing policy questions such as international economic governance.[84]

As intellectual and policy discourse, therefore, the inter-war cosmopolitan vision for world politics mobilised some powerful ideals and descriptions of the international system. Their imagery pitted efforts toward post-war renewal against the suffering of total war that was the inherent risk in adopting the balance of power as the regulative principle of world order. The cosmopolitans contrasted the 'humanistic' intellectual bonds sought by cultural internationalism against the forces of war and nationalism; and situated images of their own activism against the passive, repetitive and morally irresponsible balance of power system.

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[82] Leonard Woolf quoted in *ibid.*, p. 177.
[83] McElroy, *Morality and American Foreign Policy*, pp. 12-3.
[84] David Long, "Conclusion: Inter-War Idealism, Liberal Internationalism, and Contemporary International Theory," in *Thinkers of the Twenty Years' Crisis: Inter-War Idealism Reassessed*, eds. David Long and Peter Wilson. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), pp. 306-7.

Power over Opinion and 'Realist' Critics

As the foregoing discussion has indicated, a vibrant discourse spelling out the connections between international communications, public opinion and political progress had developed within the cosmopolitan movement of the 1920s and early 1930s. We shall see in later chapters that the doctrine of cultural internationalism advocated by the cosmopolitans was deeply undermined but not completely extinguished by the Second World War. Cultural internationalism re-emerged as the rationale for enhanced bilateral cultural ties and in proposals that cultural multilateralism be undertaken under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation in the post-1945 period. US policy-makers drew extensively on the vocabulary of historical progress that these prior attempts at international cultural cooperation had mobilised. Nonetheless, looming concerns about another military crisis in European politics gave the international 'realists,' who had sought to refute the cosmopolitan image of imminent global renewal, an increasingly large audience as the 1930s progressed. Rather than celebrating the progressive possibilities that mass communications provided, these critics argued that mass communications and populism had further entrenched the practice of power politics. E. H. Carr's *Twenty Years' Crisis* remains one of the most widely read contributions to these debates, and it developed precisely this argument. In pointing out the shortcomings of the Versailles settlement and the League of Nations, Carr contended that the nascent 'international community' was an illusion. Carr thus included among his catalogue of Western Europe's diplomatic failures at the end of the First World War the false hope among policy-makers that international information (and implicitly cultural initiatives) would bring peace and stability.

As with the cosmopolitan doctrines of international reform that I surveyed above, Carr's account rests on the premise that new communications technologies were an important symbol of change in global politics. In this context Carr made two salient observations: the tendency toward capitalist monopolies in the areas of mass communications and media enterprise, and the frequent use of the mass media by

governments to actively enflame nationalist passions during the 1920s and 1930s. As a consequence of these two developments, Carr noted that governments were already "vitally dependent on the opinion of large masses of more or less politically conscious people," and how even private media enterprises follow the prevailing political interests, finding it "convenient to accept voluntary collaboration with the state as an alternative to formal control by it."[85] With such instruments of mass persuasion working on behalf of the state, "freedom of thought is being fundamentally modified by the development of...new and extremely powerful instruments of power over opinion," such that "the issue is no longer whether men shall be politically free to express their opinions, but whether freedom of opinion has, for large masses of people, any meaning but subjection to the influence of innumerable forms of propaganda directed by vested interests."[86]

Carr's account of modern types of power drew on Bertrand Russell's *Power* (1938), an extended analysis of the sociological and ideological underpinnings of political authority. Russell's account posed a conundrum between modernity/democracy and the accumulation of state power, reflecting on the significance of belief, opinion and communication as a source of authority for the modern state.

> Like energy, power has many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion. No one of these can be regarded as subordinate to any other, and there is no one form from which the others are derivative...the power of a community depends not only upon its numbers and its economic resources and its technological capacity, but also upon its beliefs. A...creed, held by all the members of a community, often greatly increases its power.[87]

Carr had a similar interest in disaggregating state power in its modern form, citing the military, economy, and favourable public opinion as key capabilities that states can deploy both domestic and international statecraft. This was evident in the cases of Italy, Germany and the USSR, with the USSR in particular having made use of its

[85] Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis*, pp. 134-5.
[86] *Ibid.*, pp. 134-5.
[87] Bertrand Russell, *Power: A New Social Analysis*, 2nd edition, (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1960), pp. 9, 99.

"universal gospel" to court favourable public opinion in international contexts.[88] But one of the most controversial of Carr's claims was that democratic governments manipulated mass communications in a similar way to these totalitarian regimes.[89] Here he charged that:

> [d]emocracies purport to follow mass opinion; totalitarian states set a standard and enforce conformity to it...In practice, the contrast is less clear cut...Democracies, or the groups which control them, are not altogether innocent of the arts of moulding and directing mass opinion.[90]

In positing this continuum of propaganda behaviour across both totalitarian and democratic regimes, Carr thus dismissed the cosmopolitan thesis that detected the promise of renewal in the harnessing of mass communication for diplomatic purposes.

Carr also contended that a key 'fallacy' of cosmopolitan writing was the fact, symbolised by the rise of Axis power, that the collective principles of the League of Nations "meant different, and indeed contradictory, things to different people...Opinion in favour of the League...was confined to those countries where the League was felt to be serving ends of national policy."[91] The League's decline:

> had far more than a local significance, and gives us a clue to the whole problem of the place of what are now known as 'ideologies'

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[88] Carr, *Twenty Years Crisis*, p. 138. See also Edward Hallett Carr, *Propaganda in International Politics*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 6; Russell, *Power*, Ch. 9-10.

[89] Carr, *Propaganda*.

[90] Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, pp. 133-4. Carr's tone here is one of moral ambivalence, and it has some similarities with the tone adopted by Russell when he observes that the main beneficiary of the rise of new forms of power in modern society was not a particular type of ideological regime or economic class, but rather the institution of the state itself. Russell, *Power*, pp. 135-6. Russell's account also developed a strident critique of the democracies: "Systematic propaganda, on a large scale, is at present, in democratic countries, divided between the Churches, business, advertisers, political parties, the plutocracy, and the State. In the main, all these forces work on the same side, with the exception of political parties in opposition, and even they, if they have any hope of office, are unlikely to oppose the fundamentals of State propaganda." Russell, *Power*, p. 97.

[91] Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 140. The 'illusory' nature of international consensus on universal principles, whether originating with the League of Nations or with the promulgation of ideologies such as Communism and Fascism, is complicated somewhat by Carr's insistence that there are internationally powerful ideas, on the basis which we can suggest that 'international morality' also exists. As Peter Wilson's discussion of Carr's critics indicates, these and other contradictions have been debated and Carr did not, perhaps, ever resolve them effectively. See Peter Wilson, "Carr and his Early Critics: Responses to *The Twenty Years Crisis*, 1939-46," in *EH Carr: A Critical Appraisal*, ed. Michael Cox, (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2000).

> ... For if it be true that power over opinion cannot be disassociated from other forms of power, then it appears to follow that, if power cannot be internationalised, there can be no such thing in politics as international opinion, and international propaganda is as much a contradiction in terms as an international army.[92]

It bears noting that Marxist scholars, particularly those of with the Frankfurt School in Germany and the work of Antonio Gramsci in Italy, had posed a similar a challenge to the cosmopolitans' reception of mass communications and culture as a liberating force in world politics.[93] Carr's critique also had certain parallels with American liberal/rationalist critiques of propaganda and its role in international conflicts in this period. Emerging perspectives about communications and political behaviour noted the concentration of power and the distortion of human rationality that propaganda induced. US historical scholars were also deeply sceptical of the veracity of the supposed links between international communications and lasting peace that the cosmopolitans had emphasised. As I shall elaborate in the next section, together these perspectives constituted a potent American anti-propaganda discourse during the inter-war period.

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[92] Carr, *Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 138.

[93] Inspired by the work of Lenin, who first explored the question of how to wage the battle of ideas against the false consciousness of the workers in *What Is To Be Done?*, Marxists in Germany and Italy reflected on the role of opinion in capitalist societies during the 1920s. Antonio Gramsci, writing in the 1920s as a prisoner of Mussolini, argued that ideologies be understood as "real historical facts" and should confronted as such in revolutionary struggles, because ideology had proved increasingly central to the modern state as the mechanism by which ruling elites intellectually subordinated the workers. Gramsci's account of the social formation of 'hegemony' constituted a detailed account of the connections between intellectuals, public opinion, and the structures of power in the capitalist state. German Marxists from the Frankfurt School identified their revolutionary struggle as a form of *ideologiekritik*, noting that "radical criticism of society and criticism of dominant ideology are inseparable." These accounts of power were detailed and complex in their analysis of the state and propaganda, and their depths are beyond the scope of my main discussion. Nonetheless, as a reflection of the European intellectual milieu of the inter-war period, Marxist research had, along with the cultural internationalist movement, taken on the interest in the power of ideas. What characterised Marxist accounts, including Carr and Russell's, was their scepticism of claims that 'democratic' societies differed from totalitarian ones in relation to the character of their propaganda. See: Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, *What Is To Be Done? Burning Questions on Our Movement*, (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1947), Ch. 5; Antonio Gramsci, *Selected Writings 1916-1935*, ed. David Forgacs, (Lawrence & Wishart: London, 1988), pp. 196-7; On *ideologiekritik* see: Raymond Guess, *The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas & The Frankfurt School*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 26. The Frankfurt School's engagement with mass culture as a 'culture industry' is associated with the work of Theodor Adorno, particularly during the late 1940s. For Adorno's summary of this work see: Theodor W. Adorno, "The Culture Industry Reconsidered," in *Critical Theory and Society: A Reader*, eds. Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay Kellna, (New York: Routledge, 1989).

Democracy and the American Propaganda Critics

What were the main elements of the US intellectual response to propaganda in the inter-war period? In addition to acknowledging the significance of 'total war' as a new phenomenon in world politics, there was a tendency within US studies of propaganda during the inter-war period to link criticism of their own government's use of public information to the question of propaganda's validity *per se*. Revelations that false information about the war that had been promulgated within the US had proved deeply unsettling to the American public after 1918. A key factor in this scandal was the British censorship of information about the war through its monopoly of the transatlantic cable and the knowing distribution of false information in the US by British diplomats. The activities of the Woodrow Wilson administration were a further source of concern. Public opinion had remained somewhat divided on US involvement in the war even in 1917. This led Wilson to broaden the functions of his newly established Committee on Public Information (CPI) from censorship (instituted prior to the US's entry into the war as a combatant), towards the proactive task of promoting the official view of the conflict to both domestic and international audiences. The Committee became known as the Creel Committee, named after George Creel, the high-profile journalist who had been engaged by Wilson to direct it.

As J. Michael Sproule reflects in his comprehensive study of US propaganda debates during this period:

> Under Creel's ministration, Wilson's war pervasively enveloped American citizens at every venue in their personal lives. For those travelling to work, there were trolley posters illustrating all manner of ways that the ordinary citizen could personally help win the war... Displayed in locales urban and rural, posters supplied some of the most evocative and best remembered propagandas of the war in accordance with the belief of Division-chief Dana Gibson...that wartime art needed to 'appeal to the heart.'[94]

[94] Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, p. 10.

The Committee's activities also included distributing information to public institutions and schools, including the *National School Service Bulletin* supplied to teachers for the purpose of 'citizenship' instruction. In universities across the US, courses on the causes of the war and the defects of German culture were offered, and the Committee drafted a number of well-known American scholars into promoting the war effort. These academic efforts were supervised by a National Board for Historical Service, under the leadership of the Columbia University social scientist James T. Shotwell.[95] Hollywood was drafted into the effort to make films to promote the war as a crusade for democracy that demanded America's wholehearted effort. Public speakers known as the 'Four Minute Men' were also sent to film screenings in order to use the intermission for short 'patriotic orations,' in a style "owing more to American 'boosterism' and its 'bandwagon syndrome' than to psychological enlightenment."[96] As Robert Endicott Osgood subsequently observed, the CPI-authored information tended to liken America's role in the European conflict to a 'holy war.'[97]

Internationally, the CPI's activities included the distribution of printed material in support of disruptive separatist movements in Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, agitating in Spain for its entry into the conflict on the side of the Allies, and garnering support for US war aims in Russia and Latin America.[98] Above all, the CPI sought to secure favourable international opinion on Wilson's post-war settlement plan. As one account of the Committee written during the 1940s suggested "the object [of the CPI's international campaign] was almost entirely political- to win the support, over the heads of the government if need be, for the Wilsonian program of peace and reconstruction." These international activities included lecture tours, photograph displays and the circulation of printed information and films. They were subsequently regarded as so successful that "by the time of the Armistice the name of Woodrow Wilson, and a general idea that he was a friend of peace, liberty and

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[95] *Ibid.*, p. 10.
[96] Alfred E. Cornebise, *War As Advertised: The Four Minute Men and America's Crusade, 1917-1918*, (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1984), pp. ix-x.
[97] Robert E. Osgood, *Ideals and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century*, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 277-8.
[98] J. R. Mock and C. Larson, *Words that Won the War: The Story of the Committee on Public Information 1917-1919*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1939), pp. 301, 321.

democracy, were nearly as familiar in some of the remote places of the earth as they were in New York, St. Louis or San Francisco."[99]

The CPI's activities incorporated a cultural element: the more than two hundred lectures delivered across Europe by prominent Americans, for example, were intended to emphasise America's moral 'greatness' and to offset 'Hollywood' images of American culture as a vacuous celebration of material abundance.[100] Although the term 'propaganda' was used freely in internal correspondence to describe Committee activities, public statements issued by the Committee had a tendency to represent the CPI as a celebration of democracy.[101] Hence the Committee's final report claimed:

> We dealt in the positive, and our emphasis was ever on expression, not suppression...We did not call it 'propaganda', for that word, in German hands, had come to be associated with lies and corruptions. Our work was educational and informative only, for we had such confidence in our case as to feel that only fair presentation of its facts was needed.[102]

The material examined in the next chapters reflects how similar terms were adopted by US policy-makers in casting the State Department's cultural and informational activities as 'positive' rather than self-serving, on the grounds that the US's 'authorship' established a distinction between acceptable 'information' programs and manipulative 'propaganda.' Yet in key respects the need to convincingly do so had been made more acute in light of the CPI's precedent.

In the two years following the CPI's dissolution in 1918 some particularly influential members of the American journalistic and scholarly professions began to voice concerns about the Creel Committee's final report and the practices of the Committee in general. Some members of the Committee's international section, including director of the Foreign Press Bureau Ernest Pool, had urged that the Committee's efforts, particularly its international advocacy, should continue into

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[99] *Ibid.*, pp. 235-7.
[100] United States Committee on Public Information, *The Creel Report: Complete Report of the Chairman of the Committee on Public Information 1917: 1918: 1919*, (New York: Da Capo Press, 1972), p. 170.
[101] Mock and Larson, *Words that Won the War*, p. 286.
[102] Committee on Public Information, *The Creel Report*, p. 1.

peacetime.[103] However, feelings of betrayal and suspicion among the US public had developed in the wake of emotional and fervent tone of the Committee's domestic activities, precluding the adoption of Pool's proposal. As Alan Winkler notes, these post-war sentiments hardened into a pervasive scepticism toward propaganda within the United States:

> Creel accomplished his task too well. As his agency sought to arouse America, it stirred up hatred of all things German...The CPI did spark support for the war, but it also helped stir up the hysteria that led unthinking Americans to rename sauerkraut 'liberty cabbage' and hamburger 'Salisbury steak'. At the same time, it generated unrealistic hopes for a better world. When Wilson's hopes for peace and reconciliation were eroded at the peace conference at Versailles and in the subsequent debate over ratification at home, Americans were left with the sharp contrast between unfulfilled dreams and the realities of world politics. And so in the following decades the Creel Committee was remembered in a bitter way...*propaganda itself was viewed as too boisterous, too exuberant for a world that had hardly been made safe for democracy.*[104]

The style of the Committee's work would later be approvingly cited, along with British propaganda, in Adolf Hitler's assessment in *Mein Kampf* that the democracies had found a "psychologically correct" method of public persuasion and had deployed it with "unheard-of-skill."[105]

The initial public condemnation of the Committee's work in the immediate aftermath of the war sparked an academic debate on propaganda and democratic politics during the 1920s. A key early contribution was Walter Lippmann's *Public Opinion* (1922), followed by Harold Lasswell's *Propaganda and the World War* (written as a PhD dissertation at the University of Chicago, and eventually published in 1927), both of which reflected on deleterious impacts of mass persuasion and official

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[103] Mock and Larson, *Words that Won the War*, p. 331.
[104] My own emphasis. Alan M. Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942-1945*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 3.
[105] Adolf Hitler quoted in Elmer Davis, "War Information," in Elmer Davis and Byron Price, *War Information and Censorship*, (Washington: American Council on Public Affairs, 1943), p. 12.

media controls within democracies.[106] As early as 1919 Lippmann had advocated the establishment of a centralised government bureau to monitor the accuracy of the US news media to ensure that public information could be kept free of the taint of propaganda. US journalist Will Irwin had warned his readers that same year that the war signified how the world had entered its 'Age of Lies.' One of the most common concerns expressed about the CPI's work in these contexts was its emotionalism: the propaganda critics of this period, deeply troubled by the blurring of information and psychological manipulation that the Committee had accomplished, seized on the concepts of journalistic and educational freedom as a way to insulate American democracy from subversion by propaganda.

A key factor in the popular interest in US debates on the rise of propaganda in international relations was the extent to which the advertising and public relations industries expanded within the United States during this period. Sproule characterises the inter-war period as America's era of 'Big Communication,' with the US public increasingly saturated with the products of the mass media. The number of radio receivers in use within the US had risen dramatically, from 60,000 in 1920 to 3 million in 1924.[107] American scholars, many of them at the Universities of Chicago, Yale and Columbia, consequently turned their analytical focus to the implications of mass media and the significance of strategically deployed language or symbolism in both political and commercial contexts. Lasswell's analytical methods were at the forefront of this developing research agenda assessing "infiltration of self-serving ideology into news...[which] diffused the idea of propaganda as democracy's enemy." As Sproule notes, 'propaganda analysis,' a term that referred to research seeking to demonstrate the illicit nature of propaganda, had become "a prominent strain in American social thought" by the 1920s. The impacts of the media were also examined in the 'social influence' studies of Raymond Dodge and the writings of Everett Dean Martin, both of whom singled out the 'emotional logic' of propaganda as the basis for its degenerative impact on democracy.[108]

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[106] Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, pp. 18-9.
[107] *Ibid.*, p. 33.
[108] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

Many of these early efforts within the US academy to understand propaganda were shaped by an emerging 'behaviouralist' approach for the scientific analysis of mass politics. By the 1930s, however, the tone of much American writing on propaganda had shifted in emphasis as a consequence of the darkening political situation in Europe. Across Europe academic and popular debates were reflecting a sense of despair about the connection between media, culture and political power. As Iriye notes:

> The decade was characterised by forces that were the precise opposite of cultural internationalism: exclusionary nationalism, racism, aggression...Moreover, culture, instead of moderating national military power, was frequently combined with it, thereby losing its autonomy and its international character.[109]

The quandary this provoked for US commentators was what an American intellectual and policy response to these troubling European developments should be, with many concluding that at the very least the scourge of propaganda that had spread to Western Europe could be prevented from taking root in the United States. What thus developed during this phase of American propaganda scholarship was a moral critique of propaganda and cultural diplomacy, framed in historical rather than behaviouralist terms, and exemplified by the writings of O. W. Reigel, Reinhold Niebuhr and Nicholas Spykman.

Reigel had contended in 1934 that the source of Europe's peril- aggressive nationalism- had arisen as a consequence of communications technologies of public 'enslavement' and the regimentation of the human mind. His title, *Mobilising for Chaos*, reflects the contention that propaganda as practised by both the fascist and democratic European powers was a particularly dangerous manifestation of modernity in world politics. Reigel's book thus concludes with the warning that although "the United States has so far resisted the tendencies which have...produced an intellectual medievalism in certain European countries," the survival of American democracy was

[109] Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism*, p. 91.

vitally dependent on freedom of opinion and information.[110] US author Frederick Lumley similarly warned of a 'propaganda menace' in a 1933 book of the same title, in which he examined a spectrum of communication processes and noted how vested interests were routinely conveyed through news, culture, religion and education. Walter Millis' bestselling *Road to War*, published in 1935, illustrated to Americans how propaganda had been the catalyst of the First World War, highlighting a litany of immoral tactics on the part of the British in their effort to secure American involvement in the conflict.[111]

A key figure in this phase of American debate on the moral and historical implications of propaganda and the possibility of international reform through international communications was Reinhold Niebuhr. In 1932's *Moral Man and International Society* Niebuhr articulated a critique of cultural internationalism with a similar premise to Carr's, questioning the cosmopolitan logic that a peaceful international community could be secured by the development of an international public sphere. As Niebuhr observed:

> While rapid means of communication have increased the breadth of knowledge about world affairs among citizens of various nations, and the general advance of education has ostensibly provided the capacity to think rationally and justly upon the inevitable conflicts of interest between nations, there is nevertheless little hope of arriving at a perceptible increase of international morality through the growth of intelligence and the perfection of the means of communication.[112]

In a commentary on cultural diplomacy written a decade later, Niebuhr cites the historical animosity of France and Germany, neighbouring societies with extensive knowledge of each other, as an illustration of this logic. While international interchange and understanding might bring about international community in the long term, Niebuhr noted that this could not occur without other extensive international reforms. In his post-1945 writing on cultural relations, Niebuhr shifted somewhat from

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[110] O. W. Reigel, *Mobilising for Chaos: The Story of the New Propaganda*, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1934), pp. 17, 211-4.
[111] Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, pp. 45-6, 50.
[112] Niebuhr, *Moral Man*, p. 85.

this position and conceded that there was some possibility that the international system could be reformed through cultural exchange. He nonetheless cautioned that the 'social tissue' required for world government would develop slowly and "immediate and direct relevance" for cultural diplomacy should not be claimed.[113] Cultural interchange could turn out to be especially hollow, according to Niebuhr (and here he was plainly addressing American cultural diplomacy advocates), when it was vulnerable to domination by a lone and potentially overbearing power.[114]

Yale University's Nicholas John Spykman was another prominent sceptic of the efficacy of cultural internationalism and international communication. As a theorist of power politics who argued that military power was the ultimate determinant of influence within the international system, Spykman acknowledged the increasing salience of psychological warfare as a tool of international statecraft, however. He took up these ideas after Washington had adopted cultural and informational techniques, suggesting in 1942 that war:

> cannot be won except with the whole-hearted cooperation of both soldiers and civilians...The state has become vulnerable to new weapons. Psychological and ideological warfare have been added to the technique of economic strangulation, political manoeuvre, and military assault. Propaganda and counter-propaganda have been added to the arms with which the will to fight is undermined or strengthened.[115]

In dismissing cultural internationalism as a 'fashion' and disparaging the 'missionary' enthusiasm with which government and private cultural relations initiatives were conducted in Latin America , Spykman argued that the:

> political results of [the US's]...cultural campaign have been nil... Fear and distrust of the United States have become considerably less in recent years, but the change is not due to a better understanding of our culture but to the basic shift in our attitude

[113] Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Theory and Practice of Unesco," *International Organization* 4, (no. 1, February 1950), pp. 6-10.
[114] Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Illusion of World Government," *Foreign Affairs* 27, (no. 1, 1948), p. 380.
[115] Nicholas John Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1942), p. 36.

toward Latin America symbolised by the Good Neighbour Policy.[116]

Like Niebuhr, Spykman condemned the logic of cultural internationalism due to its mistaken "assumption that people who are fundamentally different will necessarily begin to like each other as they become better acquainted its erroneous and disproved in everyday life." Despite the swarms of American travellers who have visited Europe, he notes that the American public remained convinced throughout the 1920s that disengagement was an appropriate diplomatic strategy toward Europe. On the other hand, Spykman observed that Americans had been "much more favourably disposed toward the Chinese, whose country almost no one had visited and whose civilization practically nobody understood."[117]

Julie Reeves' recent account of the history of cultural studies during this period highlights another intellectual shift that was taking place and had bearing on American perceptions of world politics. The development of anthropological studies within the US was taking place during the 1930s and 1940s, as reflected in the writings of Margaret Mead and Ruth Benedict, with the latter's *Patterns of Culture* published in 1934 constituted the "symbolic milestone" in this development. The previously dominant 'humanist' discourse had situated culture as:

> 'the best of everything' and the 'pursuit of perfection.' The aim now was to pursue that perfection on an international scale and to spread the benefits of 'sweetness and light' globally by exchanging the 'best of everything'...If people became more cultured, then they would change their habits and behaviour; this would mean that they would become more civilized, which would, if all went to plan, affect the nature of international relations. In the short run, it could prevent war, and in the long run, it could lead to a whole new world order.[118]

During the 1930s and 1940s, however, what supplanted this discourse of high cultural interchange was an 'anthropological' view, situating culture as an organic source of division between national communities. Hence by the late 1940s, the ideological

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[116] *Ibid.*, p. 236.
[117] *Ibid.*, p.255.
[118] Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, p. 41. See also: Warren I. Susman, *Culture as History: The Transformation of American Society in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2003), p. 153.

tensions between the US and USSR were reinforced by prevailing conceptions of culture as

> less something to be exchanged, least of all to foster mutual understanding, and more of a weapon in the battle to win hearts and minds. Moreover this battle was not entirely concerned with promoting a state's best side, the primary purpose was to win the competition between two, very different, 'ways of life.'[119]

Thus during the same decade as more instrumentalist informational techniques were gaining a measure of acceptance as diplomacy instruments within US political science, the dominant academic discourse on culture was correspondingly moving toward a divisive, anthropological framework.[120]

As support for US intervention in the Second World War after 1939 gathered momentum, many of the American progressive propaganda critics reoriented their work and began to consider how to enhance official information as a mechanism for civilian morale building. The rapid decline of the Institute for Propaganda Analysis, established in 1937, which had been intended to sponsor research on how to combat propaganda, symbolised this shift away from anti-propaganda studies.[121] In its place, a spate of new psychological and sociological studies emphasised the connection between public morale and national efficiency, and an academic Committee for National Morale was founded July 1940 to examine national mobilisation and public

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[119] Reeves, *Culture and International Relations*, p. 93.

[120] The emergence of the sub-discipline of area studies within US political science during the inter-war period no doubt formalised these emerging anthropological views of culture. As Mark T. Berger has highlighted, Latin American studies was "consolidated as an institutional force and as a series of professional discourses" during the 1930s and 1940s. The concept of 'Greater America' or an 'Epic of Greater America' was famously lauded by Berkeley historian Herbert Eugene Bolton in 1932, a claim that was taken up in academic discourse and (as I shall highlight in the next chapter) US foreign policy within the 'Pan American' sphere during the 1930s. Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas 1898-1990*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 47-8, 52-4.

[121] See: Clyde R. Miller, "For the Analysis of Propaganda," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 2, (no. 1, January 1938). See also Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*. This shift was also symbolised by the publication of Sidney Rogerson's *Propaganda in the Next War*, which set out to articulate a comprehensive propaganda strategy for Washington in the event that the US became embroiled in outright warfare with the European fascist powers. See Sidney Rogerson, *Propaganda in the Next War*, (London: G. Bles, 1938).

opinion in wartime.[122] As Sproule observes, although the propaganda critics had dominated US inter-war scholarly debates, the challenge of sustaining this refutation of propaganda in the context of world events had led, by the late 1930s, to a "wide-ranging, unsettled, and characteristically American colloquy on the meaning of propaganda for democracy."[123] This range of perspectives on culture, communications and world politics constituted a fertile basis from which US policy-makers articulated America's cultural and informational strategy in world politics, as the coming chapters will show. Furthermore, the impetus behind calls for an official program of cultural diplomacy drew on the fact that US philanthropic programs had proliferated in Latin America, China and to a lesser extent in Europe. Many of these initiatives were intended to foster democratic principles and economic development through education, cultural interchange and technical assistance, and thus they shaped the terms upon which supporters of an official cultural program articulated their positions. I shall discuss these discourses of American philanthropic influence shortly in the following section, which considers the third strand of inter-war history to be examined here. In the discussion below I shall thus summarise the American non-government sector's engagement with cultural diplomacy and philanthropy prior to 1936, and then highlight the broader aspects of internationalism in US foreign policy upon which the US's cultural and informational diplomacy programs were built.

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[122] Harold Lasswell was involved in this shift within the study of propaganda analysis away from the critique of propaganda's negative impacts on democracy to the study of the refinement of communication and persuasion techniques. Lasswell was provided with funding from the Rockefeller Foundation from 1940 to establish and head the Experimental Division for the Study of Wartime Communications under the direction of the Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish (who, after leaving the Library, joined the State Department). Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, pp. 180-2, 193-4. It is important to note that the ideas of the anti-propaganda movement did not completely disappear with the Second World War: the University of Chicago and *Life* editor Henry Luce jointly sponsored an investigation into freedom of the press, which published its findings in 1946, which argued that the press must avoid commercial subversion and remain subordinate to the interests of moral cohesion and communal interests. See: William Preston, *Hope and Folly: The United States and Unesco 1945-1985*, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1989).

[123] Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy*, pp. 52-3.

Inter-war America: Anti-Propagandism, Philanthropy, and Post-League Internationalism

Despite public and academic criticism of government propaganda, since the early twentieth century American philanthropic, evangelical and educational institutions had maintained a strong cultural and educational presence abroad, and these activities proliferated during the inter-war period. As the Division of Cultural Relations' Waldo Leland had observed in 1943, these non-government activities were crucial in the US public's eventual acceptance of an official cultural diplomacy policy, having established the idea that an American cultural presence must be maintained abroad in the public psyche for several decades.[124] American sponsored scientific exchanges were some of the earliest examples US philanthropic activity, having been a key policy of the Smithsonian Institution after 1848. In 1890 the American Association of University Women awarded its first scholarship to send an American to study overseas.[125] An important forerunner to the Fulbright Program emerged in this period, in the form of the Belgian Educational Foundation, established at the behest of President Herbert Hoover in 1920 to spend surplus currency from Washington's Belgian relief program during the First World War on a series of bilateral educational exchanges. The American Library Association had also sponsored English-language libraries overseas, many of them in Latin America, from the early 1920s. These libraries, along with the US cultural centres that had been established by US expatriates throughout Latin America, were later absorbed into the official cultural relations program and counted as one of its early areas of success.[126]

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[124] Waldo Leland, "International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems." (Denver: The Social Science Foundation at the University of Denver, 1943), pp. 7-8; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers), Special Collections Library; University of Arkansas, Fayetteville.

[125] J. Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy 1936-1948*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 38-43.

[126] As Gary Kraske notes, 'success' would have to be judged from the point of view of national policy rather than from the ideals of the public library- since many of the ALA's members were dismayed by the government's selective approach to stocking the libraries. Gary E. Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book: The American Library Profession and the Origins of United States Cultural Diplomacy*, (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1985), p. 138. Also, the integration of the libraries into the US government program

The number of American international philanthropic institutions had proliferated significantly from the first decade of the twentieth century: there were five US grant-making foundations at the turn of the century, 30 by 1914, and nearly 200 in 1930.[127] The key areas of focus for American philanthropic programs were Europe, Latin America and China, with emphasis shifting toward the latter two during the 1930s. The Institute of International Education (IIE), which subsequently worked closely with the US government educational exchange programs, played a key role in promoting Latin American educational exchanges during the 1930s. In addition to establishing summer schools for American college students in Rio de Janeiro (1929) and Lima (1932), the IIE presided over an expanding educational fellowships program that brought Latin Americans to the US, initially offering 148 positions to Latin Americans in 1926, expanding to 375 by 1938.[128] Liping Bu notes that while the recipients of IIE fellowships represented a small proportion of the overall foreign student population in the US,

> the significance of these fellowships should not be ignored. The fellowships were established for the purpose of enabling 'bright, capable, and typical students to study abroad who because of economic restriction would otherwise be unable to do so.' Fellowship students, upon returning to their homelands, were expected to become leaders in their communities and to influence public opinion in favour of international understanding. Candidates were instructed that fellowships were created as a valuable instrument for international understanding and only incidentally for the personal advantage of the fellows.[129]

The American Council of Learned Societies had been established in 1919, and also worked towards fostering international educational interchanges with Europe and Latin America.

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was not technically the first time this had been done: during the First World War the Creel Committee worked in cooperation with ALA libraries such as the Benjamin Franklin Library in Mexico City to distribute propaganda in Latin America.

[127] Morag Bell, "American Philanthropy as Cultural Power," in eds. David Salter and Peter J. Taylor., *The American Century: Consensus and Coercion in the Projection of American Power*, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999), p. 284.

[128] Liping Bu, *Making the World Like US: Education, Cultural Expansion, and the American Century*, (Westport: Praeger, 2003), p. 72.

[129] *Ibid.*, pp. 73-4.

As Frank Costigliola has observed, large numbers of American tourists, as well as artists, writers, and scholars visited Europe in the wake of the First World War, taking advantage of affordable travel and favourable currency exchange rates.[130] This interchange of persons also deepened the cultural and intellectual ties between Americans and Europeans, and comprised an additional basis for the American public's gradual acceptance during the 1930s that an official cultural diplomacy program was warranted. Given the extensive opportunities and resources that were thus available for international interchange in this period, Richard Arndt has recently described the 1930s as:

> a historical high in American private internationalism, despite the onrush of economic disaster and totalitarianism. As though to protest Congress's rejection of the League, the US intellectual world struck out on its own. Cultural internationalism had come to life, even if the news had not reached America's legislators.[131]

In China, the American Oriental Society played a prominent role in promoting commercial contacts and educational activities with the US, and the Rockefeller Foundation's China initiatives contributed significantly to medical, scientific and technical education there from early in the twentieth century. After 1920, the Foundation broadened into sponsorship of cultural exchange and social scientific education. Foundation reports from 1909 and 1914 stated that these elements of the program had been intended for "striking at the roots of superstition" to eliminate "radically false views of life;" to thus "develop the scientific spirit, high moral ideas" and provide "training in new conceptions of political and social organisation."[132] Rockefeller's Humanities Division, established in 1934, articulated "an explicit interest in promoting international understanding through cultural means." Its directors were:

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[130] Frank Costigliola, *Awkward Domination: American Political, Economic and Cultural Relations with Europe, 1919-1933*, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 173. See also Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*, (New York: Basic Books, 1997).

[131] Richard T. Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005), p. 45.

[132] Frank Ninkovich, "The Rockefeller Foundation, China, and Cultural Change," *The Journal of American History*, 70, (no. 4, March 1984), pp. 801-2.

> convinced that the humanities, like the sciences, were internationalist in thrust and that they could advance the same progressive cultural mission...[A]n interchange of cultural values, in addition to reducing international tensions caused by misunderstanding, would result in 'the discovery of common origins for differentiated national ideas.'[133]

Similar progressive visions of world history had also been taken up within the American pacifist movement, which consisted of various student, Trades Union, Church and women's groups, reaching its zenith with the formation of the National Peace Conference in 1933.[134]

Philanthropy and the Basis of Official Cultural Diplomacy

When the US government moved into the realm of international cultural and educational relations, it drew on experts with philanthropic experience, many of whom had long been advocates of a US government framework or clearing house to support private projects. For example, Dr Samuel Guy Inman, who was selected by Cordell Hull to negotiate several multilateral cultural exchange conventions at the Pan American Conference of 1936, had been a longstanding advocate and practitioner of educational relations with Latin America in the interests of more effective political relationships. Inman is recorded as suggesting that Washington take note of the extent to which French success in the geopolitical realm was as much a product of the 'power of cultural attraction' as it was of its high diplomacy.[135] Philanthropic support for research on international cooperation had also been an important function of philanthropic foundations that contributed significantly to the early US government programs. The Rockefeller Foundation, for instance, had sponsored a committee at Columbia University under James T. Shotwell, who later sat on the General Advisory

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[133] *Ibid.*, p. 814.
[134] Lawrence S. Wittner, *Rebels Against War: The American Peace Movement, 1933-1983*, (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1984), p. 179, Ch. 1.
[135] Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 24-5.

Committee for the Division of Cultural Relations, to study intellectual cooperation and its impact on world politics.[136]

The private and philanthropic origins of US cultural diplomacy had a significant impact on the discourses that were subsequently articulated in the context of the State Department's cultural programs. International philanthropic activities emanating from the US embodied the conviction, which Andrew Carnegie did much to publicise in his *Gospel of Wealth*, that the application of business methods to humanitarian programs and foreign policy would bring the most effective results.[137] In his historical study of US philanthropic foundations Edward Berman has suggested that the concepts of 'development' and 'governance' that arose from the corporate philosophy comprised an ideological template that shaped Washington's policies for international economic development in subsequent decades.[138] Frank Ninkovich has similarly identified a technocratic rationale within the philanthropic activities of this period consisting of

> an emerging pragmatist perspective that had as one of its central tenets... a belief that enquiry itself could stabilise and sustain a culture,... determines the mental attitude of people...and carries with it the shaping of a civilization.[139]

Ninkovich also notes that in addition to the technocratic notions of 'cultural modernisation,' a teleological liberal discourse had informed philanthropic ideals in the inter-war period. In his study of the Rockefeller's activities in China during the first

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[136] Iriye *Cultural Internationalism*, p. 65. Shotwell had also been the recipient of funding from the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace to study the impacts of the First World War, for which he produced a *152 volume* study of the economic and social history of the war. Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy," p. 398.

[137] Hugh Brogan, *The Penguin History of the USA*, 2nd edition, (Penguin: London, 1999), p. 445.

[138] This is a reasonably controversial argument- Berman suggests that the class consciousness of the philanthropic foundation directors meant that they were determined through their programs to extend the reach of American capital abroad. The significance of philanthropic foundations, in their educational and cultural programs, function within a hegemonic system similar to that described by Antonio Gramsci, in which the naturalisation of relations of production is affected through ideology and intellectual systems. Berman also emphasises the role of technical expertise and a 'technist' social ideology in the extension of American capital abroad. Edward H. Berman, *The Influence of the Carnegie, Ford, and Rockefeller Foundations on American Foreign Policy: The Ideology of Philanthropy*, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983), pp. 5-7, 29-32. The anti-Communist activities of US philanthropic foundations during the inter-war period are also examined in Berghahn, "Philanthropy and Diplomacy," pp. 398-9.

[139] Ninkovich, "The Rockefeller Foundation," p. 804.

decades he notes that the Foundation's programs reflected a "transparently historicist faith in the inevitably triumph of the liberal World Spirit."[140] As we shall observe in the next chapter, these notions deriving from philanthropic activities of technocracy, modernisation and American pragmatism, as well as elements of liberal teleology, were also incorporated into the lexicon through which official cultural diplomacy was represented by US officials after 1936. The official programs also co-opted philanthropic principles in emphasising that Washington's cultural diplomacy was politically disinterested: policy-makers seized on the idea that even with government funding, cultural diplomacy's "purposes can be served in some detachment from national political purposes."[141]

Post-League Internationalism: the Ideological Origins of Official Cultural Diplomacy and International Information

As I stated above, in addition to the adoption of cultural and educational diplomacy practices by philanthropic and private institutions, an important precondition to the adoption of official cultural diplomacy and international information programs were the deepening international ties Washington pursued through its foreign policy during the inter-war period. In this context, Tomoko Akami's recent account of the American Institute of Pacific Relations and inter-war US foreign policy research is particularly illuminating. Akami distinguishes between the templates of 'Wilsonian Internationalism' and Republican 'post-League Internationalism,' contending that after the decline of Wilsonism, internationalist sentiments did continue to shape US foreign policy. As Akami observes:

> If there was a distinguishing feature of Republican internationalism in the 1920s, it was its enthusiastic pursuit of an American order in certain regions. Isolationism meant isolation from European politics. The Monroe Doctrine defined and protected the US sphere of interest- the American continent, Asia and the Pacific- and the United States

[140] *Ibid.*, p. 818.
[141] Frances X. Sutton, *American Foundations and US Public Diplomacy*, (Ford Foundation: New York, 1968), p. 3.

was actively involved in these regions.

Within this US sphere of interest, as Henry Cabot Lodge had indicated in 1919, "Americanisation was the basis of world peace....The Pacific region, Asia included, was clearly the extended frontier where the United States could pursue its manifest destiny."[142]

In what has since been regarded as a manifesto of this inter-war Republican internationalism, Elihu Root claimed in a 1922 article in *Foreign Affairs* that despite its failure to join the League of Nations, the US nonetheless understood and intended to uphold its "rights and obligations incident[al] to the membership of the community of nations."[143] Within this legalist sensibility, the education of global public opinion on questions of international order and law would be indispensable in establishing a new 'popular diplomacy' between states. Root was also a prominent supporter of the philanthropic and educational programs emanating from the US at this time such as the Institute of International Education, and served as a trustee of the Carnegie Corporation and president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.[144] Many of the foreign policy initiatives undertaken by the inter-war administrations took up Root's rhetoric of international 'community,' the march of democracy and the rule of law. During the 1920s and 1930s activities that "complemented the League and became a significant part of the machinery of the post-League order," highlighting the fact that Republican politicians were attempting to link "the popular dream of world peace to a...partisan vision of an ongoing world of law and economic cooperation free from political precommitment."[145]

Akami characterises post-League Internationalism as a posture of independent engagement in international initiatives, while Frank Ninkovich offers a slightly

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[142] Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, pp. 34-5.

[143] Here, I am characterising the internationalism of the Republican party, not the 'neo-republican' theory of international order that recent scholarship in IR has propagated. Elihu Root, "A Requisite for the Success of Popular Diplomacy," *Foreign Affairs* 1, (no. 1, 1922), p. 8. On the neo-republican or 'neo-constitutionalist' account of international order see, e.g.: G. John Ikenberry, *After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).

[144] Bu, *Making the World Like US*, p. 53.

[145] Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, p. 33. See also Charles DeBenedetti (1978) quoted in Akami, *Internationalizing the Pacific*, p. 34.

different term: 'cooperative anti-imperialism,' to describe the kinds of international ties the US pursued during the inter-war era, particularly in the Asia Pacific. Ninkovich emphasises the heritage of the early twentieth century's progressive era within the Republican internationalism of the inter-war period, particularly in relation to notions of great power cooperation, international law and arbitration, and the pursuit of economic ties.[146] The Washington Disarmament Conference of 1921-22 and the Nine Power Treaty over China of 1922 were key examples of progressive foreign policy principles that were put into practice during the inter-war period. The Coolidge administration took up the progressive legacy with the co-sponsoring of one of the most far-reaching treaties of the period: The General Treaty for the Renunciation of War (Kellogg-Briand Pact, or Pact of Paris) of 1928. This treaty was significant also for its outlawing of propaganda containing 'incitements to war,' a principle later cited as a legal precedent with which to prosecute the Nazi leadership during the Nuremberg trials.[147] Dollar Diplomacy, Open Door economic policies, and the Monroe Doctrine (somewhat augmented into a rhetoric of Pan Americanism) were principles derived from the progressive era that were upheld under the terms of Republican post-League Internationalism. Douglas Little's analysis of antibolshevism as a 'fundamental tenet' of US foreign policy thinking in the inter-war period also finds a more internationalist posture in US foreign relations during this phase than retrospective concepts of US isolationism generally suggest. Little shows how Woodrow Wilson's policy of non-recognition toward the Soviet Union was carried on by successive Republican administrations as a key platform of US foreign policy, and as such from the late 1920s onward anti-Communism provided a rationale for Washington's military intervention in Nicaragua in 1926.[148]

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[146] Ninkovich, *The United States and Imperialism*, pp. 221-2.

[147] Preston, *Hope and Folly*, p. 26.

[148] The sending of American marines to Nicaragua was justified by Secretary of State Kellogg by the fact that "the Bolshevist leaders...set up as one of their fundamental tasks the destruction of what they term American imperialism." Secretary of State Henry Stimson later stated that the economic and political strife in the Caribbean as a consequence of the Great Depression was attributable to "Communists and the riff raff." US relations with Greece and Spain were also shaped by an interest in undermining the extension of Soviet influence. Douglas Little, "Antibolshevism and American Foreign Policy, 1919-1939: The Diplomacy of Self-Delusion," *American Quarterly* 35, (no. 4, Autumn 1983), pp. 380-2.

In the economic sphere, John Lewis Gaddis notes that in addition to the legal progressivism of the inter-war period, the extension of American economic power into Europe and elsewhere indicates that a more active form of foreign policy was pursued by the inter-war Republican presidents than the isolationist image in much American historiography suggests:

> The effects of American participation in World War I came to lie primarily in the emergence of the United States as Europe's chief creditor and source of investment capital...the critical role Americans played in the rehabilitation and stabilisation of Europe during the 1920s ...now seems comparable in importance to their better known activities there after 1945.[149]

Akira Iriye adds that internationalist principles shaped US foreign relations in the inter-war period. Though it was applied in a somewhat *ad hoc* fashion, a commitment to re-establishing 'order and stability' in US foreign policy discourse was matched by an extensive economic commitment to the Asia Pacific. Even with the Japanese occupation, US capital investments in China had hit a sum of $40 million by 1941.[150]

The Asia Pacific comprised geographical focal points for the progressive, integrationist imaginary of post-League Internationalism during the inter-war period. In the Pacific context, the Institute of Pacific Relations proposed an:

> American [led] regional order [that] was not a simple assertion of hegemony, but a multilateral framework of cooperation of the powers under the leadership of the United States...The Pacific Community carried all the excitement and anxiety of a dawning new era.[151]

Although Washington did not undertake many practical measures to halt the Japanese conquest of China after 1931, its moral condemnation of Japanese policy and appeal to the League of Nations to formulate a multilateral response highlight an internationalist

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[149] John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), pp. 6, 11.
[150] Iriye, *Power and Culture*, p. 17.
[151] Akami, *Internationalising the Pacific*, pp. 44-5.

sentiment- the paucity of action notwithstanding- in US foreign policy thinking during this period.[152]

A Pan American sensibility had also developed within Washington and among the US people during the 1920s and 1930s. President Herbert Hoover made the symbolic gesture of designating April 14 as Pan American Day in the US, and by 1930 more than 20 conventions and treaties for fostering closer ties between the American republics were proposed and ratified by Washington.[153] As I shall highlight in the next chapter, the administration of Franklin D. Roosevelt placed Western Hemispheric relations high on its foreign policy agenda, with the Good Neighbour Policy as the administration's first foreign affairs declaration.[154] It is also significant to note that despite the domestic upheavals of the period, the US public's enthusiasm for progressive internationalism was based on:

> the proposition that the best way to reaffirm American self-definition was not to eject alien elements or to eschew foreign contact, but to stand for a new vision of the world in which American values and ways of life would spread to other lands. American civilization would be reinforced through its dissemination to the rest of the world...not to remain comfortable with its own traditions but to try to universalise them.[155]

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[152] Akira Iriye, *Across the Pacific: An Inner History of American-East Asian Relations*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1967), pp. 178-80.

[153] Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings*, pp. 18-25. On Washington's innovative economic policy toward Latin America during the inter-war period and the extent to which this informed the post-war Bretton Woods institutions see: Eric Helleiner, "Reinterpreting Bretton Woods: International Development and the Neglected Origins of Embedded Liberalism," *Development and Change* 37, (no. 5, 2006).

[154] In fact, Roosevelt lauded the Good Neighbour Policy in his inaugural address. The interventionist basis of the Good Neighbour Policy is emphasised by Mark T. Berger: "Although Pan Americanism after 1933 was relatively benevolent in contrast to German and Japanese expansion in this period, or the situation in the British and French empires, the Pan American system served primarily as a means by which the US could maintain its hegemony in the western hemisphere. Despite the stated anti-interventionism of the Good Neighbour Policy, the US, operating within a structure of Pan American cooperation, was even more interventionist than previously. But US 'intervention' was carried out by ambassadors, foreign service officers, economic and military advisers backed up by economic assistance and private capital, instead of the Marines and gunboats of the past." Berger, *Under Northern Eyes*, p. 50.

[155] Iriye, *Cultural Internationalism,* pp. 81-2.

The foregoing points indicate that to characterise US official and public opinion as entirely isolationist in the inter-war period is misleading. As we shall see in the chapter to follow, despite public fears of propaganda, the officials of the first American cultural programs understood that there was some public support for apolitical forms of cultural and educational interchange between the US and other nations if a way of addressing concerns about the immoral implications of 'propaganda' could be found.

American visions for the development of orderly and prosperous communities of interest within the Asia Pacific and the Western Hemisphere during the inter-war period were especially significant because it was also to these regions that the bulk of US philanthropic cultural and educational projects had been directed. Hence it was to these regions, and not to Europe, that the official cultural diplomacy programs initially directed their efforts. These official cultural programs were consequently represented as a conduit between these pre-existing spheres of US interaction with Latin America and Asia.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have outlined the most significant historical developments associated with the rise of propaganda and cultural diplomacy after the First World War. The academic and popular responses to the emergence of propaganda in Europe and the US during the inter-war period have also been surveyed, as were the strands of internationalism within US foreign relations during the inter-war period. Inter-war era American conceptions of propaganda, cultural philanthropy and international progress encompassed a diverse set of propositions as to whether, and if so how, the US might construct official programs of cultural and informational diplomacy. This 'colloquy' of opinion concerning propaganda and international cultural relations in inter-war America provided a varied and flexible lexicon in which the framing of the US's official cultural diplomacy programs took place after 1936, as I shall illustrate in the coming chapters. By actually building on critiques of propaganda as an undemocratic practice, and simultaneously drawing on the philanthropic discourses that cast

international cultural initiative as a mechanism for the spread of democracy and order, US cultural diplomacy could be represented by policy-makers as a singular category cultural influence that simultaneously repudiated *and went beyond* 'propaganda.' Rather than grasping the nettle of propaganda as a necessary measure in times of war, as the British essentially did in this period, US policy-makers overwhelmingly tended in the early phases of the program to represent their work as an apolitical, universalist, but also persuasive cultural program that was not to be termed 'propaganda.'[156] It is this effort to frame American practice as distinctive, unique and embodying reciprocal interests that is the subject of the chapter to follow, in which I shall examine discourses of American identity and influence that were mobilised in the making of US cultural diplomacy policy after 1936.

[156] On British propaganda, see: Carr, *Propaganda.* See also: Ralph Block, "Propaganda and the Free Society," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, (no. 4, Winter 1948), p. 677.

CHAPTER THREE

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY: FROM GOOD NEIGHBOUR PRINCIPLES TO THE MORAL BASIS OF WORLD ORDER[1]

The State Department's Division of Cultural Relations was established in 1938 and, with several name changes, it remained Washington's main organ for cultural diplomacy during 1938-53. As such, it presided over programs for the exchange of persons, established American cultural institutions abroad including the United States Information Service centres (USIS), and circulated material on American society and culture. The program also encompassed educational activities, intellectual projects, and the distribution of publications and films. By surveying the policy directives, debates and public statements that accompanied the formulation of US cultural diplomacy, as I have contended in foregoing chapters, I will examine in this chapter how conceptions of American identity were articulated during the process of foreign policy-making. Identity was a feature of cultural foreign policy-making in two related senses: firstly, in the way in which cultural diplomats established symbols of 'America' to be projected to audiences abroad, and secondly, as a discourse that defined the range of available options that were envisaged by policy-makers. In the latter case, I am interested in the discursive frameworks through which policy-makers fixed shared ideas about the subjects, objects and issues that US cultural diplomacy pertained to. As such I shall address the key questions of this study, which ask how the discursive representation of US cultural diplomacy developed and how these representations were implicated in Washington's transition toward a posture of global hegemony. In particular, I trace how and why the promotion of US culture came to be understood as a necessary feature of American foreign relations, particularly in relation

[1] On the 'moral basis' for world order see B. Harvie Branscomb, Chair of the US Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange, (1948) quoted in Henry Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 7.

to the 'vindication' of America political ideals within a global context, at successive stages of US foreign relations during 1936-53.

What were the key components of US cultural diplomacy discourse during 1936-53, and how did they enable the adoption and ongoing use of cultural diplomacy by Washington? Furthermore, how were they implicated in Washington's transition toward seeing itself as a hegemonic power? As I shall highlight in the discussion below, American cultural diplomacy was initially framed as a reciprocal activity. By seeking to gradually mould the opinions of foreign educational and cultural elites through international interchange, the rationale that was stated at the founding of the cultural diplomacy programs was to foster *mutual* understanding between Americans and their neighbours. We shall see below how reciprocity was often articulated as the basic format of US cultural diplomacy in order to assuage ongoing concerns in Washington and publicly about propaganda's illegitimacy in the context of US political culture. Similarly, bilateralism was articulated as the basic format of the cultural program in this early phase, partly as a symbolic expression of the Division's (and by implication the American people's) aspiration for genuine, meaningful dialogue with other societies according to America's liberal principles.[2]

Within the discourses of US foreign policy-making, distinguishing 'cultural diplomacy' from 'propaganda' was not a matter simply of announcing a categorical distinction at the founding of the Division or in the announcement of new initiatives. Rather, what emerges from the archives of cultural policy-making is an ongoing representational process that situated Washington's style of cultural diplomacy in exceptional terms. This representational practice most often took the form of discursive 'framing' within US cultural policy directives and statements. 'Framing,' in my usage, is a process of articulating figurative premises and categories according to which narrower policy imperatives are to be conceptualised. These cultural policy 'frames' were thus treated as 'background' assumptions about the character of American identity and agency and were thus subject to agreement in a way that the particular cultural

[2] See Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005).

policy imperatives or initiatives themselves under discussion in policy-making contexts were not.[3] Upholding Washington's deep commitment to anti-propagandism was one of the most significant framing principles of US cultural diplomacy. In fact, as we shall see below, the repudiation of propaganda was a key condition of possibility for the US cultural diplomacy program. By affirming the exceptionality of America's cultural practices, the exceptionalist 'self' that American political discourse had traditionally articulated could be vindicated by the format of US foreign policy. The repudiation of propaganda in foreign policy discourse was a symbolic tool that assisted in marshalling broader governmental and public support for the programs of US international persuasion, rendering an American *cultural relations* program thinkable despite the fact that *propaganda* had been deemed 'un-American' by the inter-war propaganda critics. In this way, US cultural policy-making also implicitly upheld shared social understandings about the acquisitive character of European propaganda and the distinctiveness of the 'New World' style of diplomacy crafted by Washington.

We shall also see below how grammars of predication and alterity were also utilised to great effect within these discourses of US cultural diplomacy. Locating the State Department's cultural diplomacy practices as anti-propagandistic drew on the idea that the United States was a singular nation in its historical commitment to liberalism, and that this could find expression in the format of its foreign policy. The concept of 'authorship' was used frequently in US cultural diplomacy discourse to connect the bounded nature of power in US domestic political culture to its conduct of foreign policy. In this way, even if particular policies resembled 'propaganda' the US, by virtue of its domestic identity, repudiated propaganda itself as a practice. The cultural diplomacy program was presupposed by a set of ideas about the US 'self' that connected America's domestic virtues to the pursuit of global virtues and a moral world order.[4] Logics of integration and opposition, through which Washington's role as a hegemonic power was constructed *relationally*, also featured within the discursive practices of US cultural diplomacy. Implicit in notions of American authorship within

[3] I noted in chapter one that I differ slightly from other scholars, such as Michael Barnett, who have used the term 'framing' in the context of foreign policy analysis.

[4] An early statement of the cultural programs as part of a moral order was made in the following address: Sumner Welles, "Address by Sumner Welles at the Consultative Meeting of the American Republics, September 30, 1939," *Department of State Bulletin* 1382, (September 30, 1939), p. 302.

cultural policy debates was a set of presuppositions about how the American 'self' was situated in relation to international 'others.' In the case of US cultural diplomacy to Europe or the USSR, the other could be rendered in oppositional terms, as separate, threatening or otherwise antithetical to the US. However, US cultural diplomats often also articulated a pluralist identity for the US that approached the international other as a constituency for its ideas and influence: as subjects that needed to be bound more closely to America's vision of the global order. This was particularly the case within US cultural initiatives to Third World, as I discuss in this chapter with particular reference to China.[5]

My discussion in this chapter covers several stages of the US cultural diplomacy program. I begin with the inter-American origins of the US cultural diplomacy program, highlighting the representations of diplomatic interdependence, reciprocity and openness mobilised by US officials during its early phase. Washington first adopted an international legal framework for official cultural diplomacy and educational exchanges through multilateral Pan American treaty provisions that it had proposed in 1936, and ratified shortly after. Fears of Axis influence in the Western Hemisphere, particularly concerns that Germany was using purportedly 'apolitical' cultural activities as a vehicle for economic imperialism, served as a catalyst for Washington's 1936 proposal of a Pan American treaty for cultural interchange. As the Division of Cultural Relations' first director had reflected, the founding of US cultural diplomacy in 1938 was essentially a defensive response to "the misrepresentation of American life...[that] was going on in South America," rather than a fully-fledged effort to assert US power.[6] As a consequence of these regionalist origins, the

[5] For an extended discussion of predication: in my usage I follow Roxanne Doty and Jennifer Milliken, see chapter one. On logics of opposition/integration see chapter one also, particularly my discussion of Christina Klein, Iver Neumann, Lene Hansen and Tzvetan Todorov.

[6] Ben Cherrington quoted in Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 32. See also Ben Cherrington quoted in J. Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy 1936-1948*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 112-3.

development of US cultural diplomacy and its approach to inter-American relations were deeply entwined until the mid-1940s.[7]

As Cordell Hull phrased it, the origins of US cultural diplomacy rested with the realisation that political ties must be "bulwarked by an appreciation...of the spiritual and intellectual values in this country, as well as by an understanding by the American people of the cultural achievements of their southern neighbours."[8] In addition to the articulation of cultural diplomacy as a defensive measure in an inter-American context, the founding statements of the official US cultural diplomacy program contained within them seeds of a broader vision of US-sponsored international economic, military and social interdependence. As the international affairs scholar Harley Notter had observed in a 1939, Washington:

> recognised [the] interrelatedness of societal national factors and societal international factors...The ideas, the ideals, and the manners of the different nations have become better known to all nations. The commerce of ideas and ideologies along the ether waves and the skywaves of travel have become matters of as direct governmental concern as commerce in merchandise.[9]

US cultural diplomacy was extended beyond Latin America first to the Near East, then to China where there had been a strong tradition of US philanthropic activities, and shortly after that to Europe. In charting the extension of the cultural diplomacy program, I note how the anti-propaganda frame and discourses of alterity (both oppositional and integrative) established a new conception of self that US policy-makers were increasingly casting as Washington's preferred post-war global role. But

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[7] Key advocates of cultural diplomacy in the US at this time came from an inter-American context. These include Samuel Guy Inman (Latin Americanist and unofficial advisor to Cordell Hull on cultural issues); Sumner Welles (former ambassador to Cuba and Assistant Secretary of State); and Steven Duggan (of the Institute of International Education). The inter-American origins of US cultural diplomacy are plainly suggested by the title of Espinosa's, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy.*

[8] Cordell Hull quoted in Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, p. 111.

[9] Harley Notter, "Cultural Relations with the Other American Republics: Address before the American Political Science Association on December 29, 1939," p. 3.; Miscellaneous Subject Files, 1939-1950 (Subj. 1939-50); Records of Harley Notter (HN); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, College Park, MD (NARA, CP).

in the immediate post-war period Congress downscaled many of the State Department's wartime initiatives, and the cultural program's administrative arrangements were consequently unsettled in the years immediately after the war. Despite these bureaucratic pressures, I note how the cultural programs took on new functions in order to consolidate the Allied victory and enact their conception of America's global cultural and political vindication during 1944-45. The broadening of US cultural diplomacy functions in the immediate post-war period was made possible by some particularly evocative depictions of American culture and the possibilities for bringing about stability and progress promised by its export. In the 1944-45 period US cultural diplomacy was articulated according to a logic of inclusion/pluralism, which scripted US foreign policy as a basis to bind the international system to the multilateral institutions and liberal internationalist principles during the post-war settlement. Narrative practices also came to the fore within the representation of US cultural diplomacy during this phase, with policy-makers tending to situate the position of international dominance Washington occupied after the war as a way to fulfil America's longstanding adherence to democratic politics and a liberal culture.

There were ironies and ambiguities associated with the representation of American cultural diplomacy and hegemony in the post-war context, however. Cultural diplomacy practices were situated within a wide and complex set of ideas about US foreign policy and the global order, and such there were often several threads and even contradictory representations mobilised simultaneously.[10] As Washington's responsibilities as a victorious power expanded to include post-war reconstruction and reorientation in Axis areas during 1946, a more instrumental and unidirectional kind of cultural diplomacy had to be crafted by the Division. Maintaining the credibility of US policy through expressions of anti-propagandism and the repudiation of power politics was a particularly significant function of cultural diplomacy discourse in the late 1940s, and I show that much was at stake in this because the sentiment was increasingly belied by the policies adopted. Deepening mistrust between the US and USSR from 1946-47 onwards had shaped cultural diplomacy debates into defending Washington's

[10] On the diffuse causual impacts of discourse see, e.g.: Michael N. Barnett and Raymond Duvall, "Power in International Politics," *International Organization* 59, (no. 1, Winter 2005).

commitment to democratic openness while simultaneously and forcefully rebutting Soviet propaganda claims.

In 1948 the cultural programs were placed on a firmer legislative footing with the passage of Smith Mundt Bill, yet I will show below that this did not dampen debates within the Division on the implications of ideological warfare for America's longstanding political principles. In my survey of the post-1948 context I explore the struggle on the part of many cultural policy-makers to sustain their expressions of liberalism and the commitment to anti-propagandism against contending visions of cultural diplomacy as a Cold War instrument, particularly given the Cold War sentiments of Assistant Secretaries of State William Benton and George V. Allen. Another significant implication of the shift toward an increasingly instrumental understanding of cultural diplomacy in this period was a new discourse about what American culture itself signified in an international context. Whereas in the inter-American context, and during the war, US officials had emphasised America's 'popular' culture as the cultural expression of democratic principles, as antagonisms with the USSR developed US officials sought to project America's 'high' cultural and intellectual achievements to Europe and the USSR. The emergence of the Cold War, as a struggle that was in an overarching sense a 'cultural' contest, reveals in a particularly clear way how the articulation of America's cultural identity enabled American emergence as a protagonist in the Cold War.

Inter-American Origins of the Cultural Diplomacy Program

The founding of a US government program for cultural relations with the Latin American republics in 1936 was articulated as a response to two key developments. Over the short term, concerns that Axis information and cultural activities were undermining the US's reputation in the Western Hemisphere had catalysed high-level support for efforts to improve America's regional image. Over the longer term, deepening cultural, social and intellectual ties between North and South America, and the success of Franklin Roosevelt's integrationist Good Neighbour Policy toward the region, had rendered the idea of a formalised, official cultural program

increasingly acceptable in the policy and public spheres.[11] With episodic setbacks such as Bolivia and Paraguay's Chaco War of 1932-35, the two decades that had followed the First World War had witnessed deepening economic and political ties across the Western Hemisphere, and State Department officials took this as a testament to the relevance of cultural diplomacy as a diplomatic instrument.

Precedents for many of the cultural diplomacy activities taken up by the Department of State after 1936 had also been set during the First World War, within the Creel Committee's ambitious program to publicise Woodrow Wilson's war aims in the Western Hemisphere. The Committee's activities, which included the provision of free English language tuition, the establishment of public libraries and the distribution of printed materials and films, were countenanced in part because they had escaped some of the condemnation that Wilson's domestic propaganda had attracted after 1919.[12] These diplomatic forerunners to a permanent US international persuasion program were possible because these precedents had been considered 'educational' rather than 'propagandistic' in character.[13] As J. Manuel Espinosa notes in his definitive memoir of founding of the Division of Cultural Relations, the US public also increasingly perceived itself as part of a regional cultural convergence in the inter-war period.[14]

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[11] As Robert Dallek notes, it is important to recall the formative influences of two earlier presidents: cousin Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson- the latter appointing Roosevelt as Secretary of the Navy- on Franklin Roosevelt's internationalism. Robert Dallek, *Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979).

[12] One of the most significant components of the Committee on Public Information's international cultural diplomacy was the opening of the Benjamin Franklin library for US publications and English language study in Mexico City, which was administered by the government for seven and a half months and in that time received 106,000 visitors. With the CPI's dissolution at the end of the war, official support for the US libraries and other initiatives weakened, but the Benjamin Franklin Library was kept open through private funding, and was reintegrated into the government cultural diplomacy after 1938 like many other cultural centres and English language programs in Latin America. Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, p. 18.

[13] The Herbert Hoover presidency subsequently founded several political and educational initiatives to improve inter-American relations. Hoover declared his support for the study of Latin American languages within the United States, and strongly supported the exchange of films- because they represented a 'universal language' for cross-cultural understanding. Hoover was also a pioneer in establishing American educational exchange programs, proposing that currency from surplus war materials left in Belgium be used to send students and professors to the United States. This funding structure based on surplus currency was later adopted by J. William Fulbright in the 1946 Surplus Property Act which established his eponymous educational exchange program. *Ibid.*, pp. 18-22.

[14] On tourism and US public sentiment, see: *ibid.*, p. 47. See also: Waldo Leland, "International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems," University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville. Leland

Inter-American conferences for both official and non-government purposes proliferated markedly during the inter-war period. Notable among these was the (non-government) Inter-American Institute of Intellectual Cooperation, established in 1930 with the objective of advising the Pan American Union on regional cultural and intellectual relations. Private initiatives to foster inter-American cultural diplomacy and intellectual exchanges were relatively well developed by the late 1930s, and embodied the voluntarism and philanthropic spirit of American philanthropy.[15]

The establishment of an official program for cultural diplomacy in 1936 built on the political precedents set under Wilson and Hoover as well as public sentiment and existing networks established through philanthropic and private activities. This heritage was emphasised by the staff of the Division of Cultural Relations after 1938 as they sought to co-opt philanthropic expertise into the government activities.[16] In stating their connection to the philanthropic sphere, US officials often characterised the official cultural diplomacy program as a 'clearing house' for private initiatives to convey the open, reciprocal 'American' spirit that the US cultural diplomacy programs sought to embody. A key short-term political factor in the founding of the Division was reflected in Franklin D. Roosevelt's inaugural address of 1933, in which he articulated his administration's intention to be a 'good neighbour' within the Western Hemisphere. Some significant gestures in US-Latin American relations followed, including the abrogation of the US-authored Platt Amendment to Cuba's constitution, and the proposal of a multilateral military non-intervention pact at the 1933 Pan American

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notes the increasing involvement of the US public and intellectuals in international cultural and intellectual relations. These deepening connections were also symbolised by the proliferation of trade showcases within the US such as the *Pacifico Mercado*, and by fact that proposals for an inter-American highway were debated by Congress during the 1930s.

[15] On the ways in which increasing internationalist sentiments developed from the perspective of US diplomats, see Edward Trueblood, "Recent Developments in the Field of Inter-American Cultural Relations: Cooperation Between Government and Private Interests," *Foreign Service Journal* 18, (no. 1, January 1941), p. 6.

[16] Rosenberg notes that the scale of private and philanthropic actions declined in the 1930s as a consequence of the depression, and puts forward the argument that government involvement in cultural diplomacy was begun in order to fill this vacuum. Emily S. Rosenberg, *Spreading the American Dream: American Economic and Cultural Expansion 1890-1945*, (New York: Hill and Wang, 1982), pp. 202-3.

Conference.[17] There has been a fairly extensive historical debate on the lasting impacts the Good Neighbour Policy. However, during the 1930s the policy established a new conception of America's identity as a politically and economically dominant, but benign, regional power.[18] Washington's fears about the extension of Axis economic and political influence into the Western Hemisphere were, in part, understood as a transgression of this dominant regional position that the Roosevelt administration had articulated during the mid-1930s.

Among the eleven conventions for peace, solidarity, disarmament and trade signed at the Buenos Aires Pan American Conference of 1936 were five pertaining to cultural and educational relations. Their provisions were modest in themselves: only two students and one professor would travel under the Convention's auspices from the US to each of the Latin American republics, and vice versa, per year. However, the language of the convention was evocative and far-reaching, and it established the terms of the more generalised discourse of reciprocity, openness and liberalism that was articulated for the cultural diplomacy program beyond Latin America in the early 1940s.[19] The preamble to the agreements had stated:

> the purpose for which the Conference was called would be advanced by greater mutual knowledge and understanding of the people and

[17] The Platt amendment was a deeply resented principle arising from US colonial control of Cuba which had given the US the right to unilateral military intervention.

[18] Historiographies of the Good Neighbour Policy have disputed the rosy image that US historians have traditionally upheld. Many Latin American historians have characterised the policy somewhat differently, the *'dependency'* of analysis has situated the Good Neighbour Policy as an attempt to extend the penetration of American capital in South America. Max Paul Friedman has provided a different critique of the Good Neighbour Policy in Latin America, pointing out the covert counter-espionage policies that the US pursued in Latin America during the 1930s and 1940s. The persecution of innocent German and Italian civilians by the FBI in Latin America was a largely overlooked feature of US foreign policy during the inter-war period. However, accepting Friedman's judgment of the 'evanescence' of the Good Neighbour Policy does not prevent us examining the discursive practices engaged in by US policy-makers at the time. In fact, the discursive practices that cast the Good Neighbour Policy as an egalitarian and democratic basis for hemispheric relations can be thought of as even more significant as a self-reflexive practice if we accept that they obscured a hypocritical state of affairs in US-Latin American relations. Max Paul Friedman, "There Goes the Neighbourhood: Blacklisting Germans in Latin America and the Evanescence of the Good Neighbour Policy," *Diplomatic History* 27, (no. 4, September 2003).

[19] Miguel Espinosa's official memoir of the cultural program makes this point, noting the inter-American agreements of 1936 were deliberately expansive in their language, explicitly intended as a rhetorical basis that "made possible a broad interpretation of future inter-American people-to-people exchange and communication." Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, p. 1.

> institutions of the countries represented and a more consistent educational solidarity on the American continent, and that such results would be appreciably promoted by an exchange of professors, teachers and students among the American countries, as well as by the encouragement of a closer relationship between unofficial organisations which exert an influence on the formation of public opinion.[20]

In both American policy statements and internal documents from the Buenos Aires conference the notion of international public opinion as the basis of US regional leadership was a key frame. US initiatives would embody the "common denominator of public opinion," and gave "form to a unified public opinion" within the Hemisphere.[21] Assistant Secretary of State Sumner Welles emphasised how US leadership in the region would be "conducive to a healthy international trade...[of] the culture and civilization of other people."[22] Cordell Hull who, more than any other figure, came to symbolise the extension of America's New Deal era social and economic progress into US foreign policy, claimed that the American delegation had brought with it to Argentina:

> a strict political and moral doctrine for the nascent [inter-]American democracy... the basis of peace lies in the development of a public opinion- for which freedom is indispensable- that will totally repudiate the acts and utterances of statesmen propagating doctrines of militarism.[23]

Reflecting several years later on the nature of US foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere during this period, former Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle asserted that the United States' vision of regional order:

> differs materially from many theories of international organisation.

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[20] "Draft Inter-American Convention for the Promotion of Cultural Relations," (1936); Reel 33; Microfilm Personal Papers of Cordell Hull, Library of Congress Manuscript Division.
[21] Adolf Berle, "Speech of A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State. Foreign Policy Association-Boston, Massachusetts, January 21, 1939," p. 8; Speeches, Box 142; Papers of Adolf Berle; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.
[22] Sumner Welles (1935) quoted in Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas, 1898-1990*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), p. 51.
[23] "Highly Important Speech of Mr Cordell Hull," *Noticias Graficas* (Buenos Aires), 24 December, 1936; Reel 33, Papers of Cordell Hull; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.

> It contemplates the complete equality and sovereignty of every member of the community. It likewise assumes that each member of the community maintains its liberty of action. But it takes for granted that the bonds of understanding shall be so strong that on tasks of great common interest the group will act together. So, it was hoped, the Western world would achieve peace, a steady settlement of international problems by reason and justice instead of by force, and a continuous cooperation for defence against any powers outside the hemisphere.[24]

Although the treaties signed at Buenos Aires covered a range of issues, including disarmament, collective security and trade, the cultural and educational exchange agreements were held up as a symbol of the progressive and emancipatory possibilities promised by the extension of American power during the late 1930s.[25]

The vision of regional order that the US delegation articulated during the Buenos Aires Conference also reflects the emergence of liberalism and liberal internationalism as key categories within US political discourse. As Ronald Rotunda has observed, after 1932 Franklin Roosevelt co-opted in his electoral campaign a moniker that had hitherto been relatively obscure: 'liberal.' Rotunda notes that "[t]he symbol 'liberal' is especially important for the New Deal because, as it emerged, it seemed to represent something new" even as it repackaged long-standing principles of US political culture into a pro-New Deal partisan position.[26] The US delegation's program at the Buenos Aires Conference, particularly as symbolised by Cordell Hull's proposed agreements to 'liberalise' trade, made a similar rhetorical move to cast the Roosevelt administration as singular and innovative in its foreign policy.[27] In this

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[24] Berle, "Speech of A. A. Berle Jr.," pp. 2-3.

[25] Ninkovich notes the significance of reciprocity as one of the key approaches in the cultural diplomacy program during this early phase, see Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, Ch. 1.

[26] Here, Roosevelt was particularly keen to distance himself from the economically conservative traditions of his own Democratic party. Ronald Rotunda, *The Politics of Language: Liberalism as Word and Symbol*, Iowa City: University of Iowa Press, 1986), pp. 16, 57. An interesting piece that can be read in conjunction with Rotunda's book is Alonzo Hamby's analysis of how, in the years immediately after Franklin Roosevelt's death, symbols and myths were fashioned around the persona of Roosevelt himself to provide a rallying point for liberals (again, liberalism is meant here in a *domestic partisan sense*). Alonzo L. Hamby, "The Liberals, Truman and FDR as Symbol and Myth," *The Journal of American History* 56, (no. 4, March 1970).

[27] In the introductory chapter of his study, Robert Haddow has traces the (considerable) influence of ideas about enterprise and industry, through figures such as Henry Luce and Nelson Rockefeller, in relation to the foreign policies that Washington adopted during the 1940s. Robert Haddow, *Pavilions of Plenty: Exhibiting American Culture Abroad in the 1950s*, (Washington DC: Smithsonian Institution Press, 1997).

context it is significant that cultural diplomacy was adopted at a time in which new partisan categories were being articulated for domestic politics and foreign policy.

It was not until mid-1938 that permanent administrative arrangements to implement the Buenos Aires agreements were finalised. On July 27, 1938 the Division of Cultural Relations was established by State Department Order. The Division was to be headed by Ben Mark Cherrington, former director of the Foundation for the Advancement of Social Science at the University of Denver.[28] In his letter inviting Cherrington to fill the post, Secretary of State Cordell Hull located the Division's connection to US foreign relations in terms of "the importance of an understanding of the habits of thought and mode of life of other countries" which could facilitate "cordial and fruitful international relations."[29] In founding the Division, Hull sought to distance the Roosevelt administration from the aspersions of 'propaganda,' claiming that 'cultural diplomacy' was a more appropriate term to apply to the policies of a progressive democracy such as America. Hull could therefore assert: "we are clear about one matter: we do not wish to follow the examples of the totalitarian States. Whatever we do must conform to the procedures and standards long established in our American democracy."[30]

Cherrington later reflected that US cultural diplomacy had come about "when Hitler and Mussolini's exploitation of education and culture as an instrument of national power policies was at its height," and consequently the Division was determined to be "an organisation that would be a true representation of our American

[28] An interesting indication of the prevailing sentiments of surrounding the cultural diplomacy program was the selection of a director. Samuel Guy Inman, who had attended the Pan American Conference in Buenos Aires as a negotiator for the US and was one of the most prominent Latin Americanists in the US at the time, was led to believe he would head the Division when the proposals were first discussed. Despite his friendship with Secretary of State Cordell Hull, Inman was judged by other State Department officials to be unsuitable for the job in light of his background in Christian missionary activities. Cherrington, who had run the Foundation for the Advancement of the Social Sciences at the University of Denver, and had supervised several studies of international education, proved an acceptable 'secular' and more social scientific alternative, although he only served in the post of Director for two years. On Inman's activities see Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, Ch 1.

[29] Cordell Hull quoted in Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, p. 329.

[30] Hull quoted in Arndt, *First Resort of Kings*, p. 67.

tradition of intellectual freedom and educational integrity."[31] Waldo Leland, as head of the American Council of Learned Societies and an advisor to the Division since its inception, similarly defined the program's approach in this early period as concerned with the "advancement of the cultural (and intellectual) life of the participating peoples by the sharing of knowledge and experience,...the promotion of understanding and spiritual solidarity among peoples and the improvement of the conditions life."[32] This point was also made by George Messersmith, who succeeded Hull as Secretary of State. He observed that with the Division's activities "we are not trying to make...counter-propaganda. We are interested in the broad basic problem of developing the really friendly relations between this country and our neighbours."[33]

The repudiation of propaganda in US cultural diplomacy discourse was complemented by the mobilisation of logics of international integration and cultural pluralism within cultural diplomacy policy debates.[34] Again, these representational practices were implicated in situating the US and the Latin American region as undergoing a process of convergence and cultural amalgamation, articulating a historical basis for the legal and institutional frameworks of regional order that the US sought to institute.[35] These representations situated America in the narratives of historical progress, as can be observed, for example, in early statements made by the political scientist Harley Notter, soon to join the Department of State in its post-war policy planning division. Notter had situated the US's sponsorship of political and cultural cooperation in the Western Hemisphere in 1939 as:

> part of the epic of greater America which we share with the other

[31] Ben Cherrington "Cultural Relations in the Department of State," Attachment to letter from Jesse MacKnight to Howland Sargeant and William T. Stone, (January 19, 1948), p. 1; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953 (IIA. 1938-53); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).

[32] Waldo Leland, "International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems," University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, p. 23; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.

[33] Messersmith quoted in Arndt, *First Resort of Kings*, p. 60.

[34] As highlighted in chapter one, I draw on the notion of integrative logic within Klien, *Cold War Orientalism.*

[35] On the range of broader treaties and agreements that US sought to institute at the 1933 and 1936 Pan American conferences see Esponosa, *Inter-American Beginnings.*

> nations of this hemisphere. The present-day life of our country is also only to be understood, not by an examination of it alone, but by an examination of all the great movements and progress among the American republics...The trend is in the direction of a cultural amalgam.

Notter became one of the most prominent advocates of cultural diplomacy in the context of the administration's liberal internationalist principles for the post-war global order. Notter envisaged that cultural bonds would complete the global "liberal revolution" that had begun the nineteenth century. To do so, these post-war planners claimed that "the United States would have to become the mainstay of a new order that merged the political, economic, and cultural aspects of life into a comprehensive unity."[36] By no means were these sweeping depictions of historical change and regional convergence confined to the early cultural diplomacy program, however: they would be taken up in a much broader way after the Second World War as Washington articulated its plans for a liberal, institutional global order. The cultural programs to Latin America constituted a forum for the articulation of new conceptions of international interdependence and the New World as a source of liberal principles, especially in relation to the question of how America's singular status as an anti-imperial power could be reconciled with the pursuit of international cultural and political influence.

In its first months of operation, the Division of Cultural Relations held a series of meetings in Washington to bring together educators, artists, philanthropists and policy-makers to determine how to establish a program of US-Latin American cultural relations. A smaller General Advisory Committee was also constituted at this time to serve as an ongoing policy forum for the cultural diplomacy program.[37] The staff of the

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[36] Harley Notter, "Cultural Relations with the Other American Republics," p. 5; Subj 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA; Frank Ninkovich, "The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State Department, 1938-1947," *Diplomatic History* 1, (no. 3, Summer 1977), p. 220. Notter was, interestingly, a scholar of Woodrow Wilson's internationalism. See, e.g.: Harley Notter, *The Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson*, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1937).

[37] A reflection of the modesty of the Division's first program is that participants from across the country who attended the advisory conferences held in 1938 were not recompensed for their travel or accommodation to Washington while attending the conferences.

General Advisory Committee included leading figures in the field of international education such as Waldo Leland, as well as international relations scholars such as James T. Shotwell and the Reverend Edmund A. Walsh. The Departmental Order constituting the Division had simply stated its role as "encouraging and strengthening cultural relations and intellectual cooperation between the United States and other countries."[38] Consequently, there was much to be resolved in terms of how the Division was to embody America's identity and Washington's foreign policy objectives within its approach to cultural diplomacy.[39]

The cultural policy program initially built on the existing US philanthropic frameworks of interaction with Latin America. Between 1937 and 1939 at least seven new American cultural centres had been established in Latin American capital cities, and the Division's work in its first months included a survey of these centres in preparation for extending government funding to existing institutions and establishing new ones.[40] By 1946 the Division was operating 47 American cultural centres across the world. At this stage the Division's work also encompassed funding of radio broadcasting to Latin America, a point later overlooked when the Division's staff

[38] Division of Cultural Relations, "Progress Report of the Division of Cultural Relations," 1940, p. 3; Box 2, File 5; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.

[39] The search for a policy role was left open also because Congress did not play a role in determining the Division of Cultural Relations' policy mandate during this period. Although it hadn't formally mandated the US cultural diplomacy program, Congress expressed support for the Division in 1939 in the form of House Resolution 5835. This did not provide funding: the Division's funds ($27,920 for the first year, and $75,000 for 1939-40) fell within executive appropriations. It was only after 1941 that the Division was funded through the Congressional appropriations process. US House of Representatives, *House Resolution HR 5835 Authorising President to render closer and more effective relationship between American Republics*, April 26, 1939; (Y4 F76/1:In2/5); Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1939, p. 307. On funding, see also: *Chronological Outline of the Organisation and Ranking Officers of CU 1938-1945*, (no author, undated) p. 39; Box 2, File 2; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville. Other secondary sources have cited different figures on the Division's budgets, depending on how they have calculated the figure. See, e.g.: Arndt, *First Resort of Kings*, p. 60.

[40] Trueblood, (First name unrecorded), "Recommendations for Strengthening United States Cultural Institutes in South America 1940," Attachment to Letter from Charles A. Thomson to Ben M. Cherrington, November 30, 1940, p. 1; Box 5 ff 40; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.

sought to distance their own 'cultural diplomacy' projects from the State Department's more instrumental wartime 'information' initiatives such as the Voice of America.[41]

The Division had been in operation less than a year before it faced a major quandary in terms of how to uphold reciprocity and anti-propagandism as guiding principles within its policy program. With the outbreak of war in Europe in 1939, US cultural diplomats were compelled to reflect on their work in pragmatic as well as morally progressive terms. Although the US was not directly involved in the fighting, the international emergency itself and the ideological threat that Axis military expansion signified challenged the prevailing apolitical self-reflexive representations of American cultural diplomacy. While still defining their work as a manifestation of America's inherent international progressivism and morality, the Division's staff also undertook to locate cultural diplomacy activities in the context of challenges to "national security [which] made it imperative that the United States counter the aggressive propaganda activities of Germany with a more vigorous program of its own."[42]

Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish, who would soon enter the State Department as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, emphasised in 1940 that cultural diplomacy provided a vital opportunity to convey America's condemnation of Axis expansionism. He argued that by virtue of its ideals, America was implicitly engaged in the ideological struggle between democracy and totalitarianism: "cultural relations are not irrelevancies. They are everything...[For the democracies] cultural defeat is a defeat on the one front on which defeat cannot be accepted."[43] In recognition of America's moral obligation to condemn totalitarianism, MacLeish arranged a series of anti-fascist symposia at the Library of Congress. These brought together US and European intellectuals to assess the cultural implications of the war. MacLeish also appointed the celebrated German émigré novelist Thomas Mann as a

[41] On the schisms between the cultural diplomacy and information programs, see: Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 120-2.
[42] Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, p. 139.
[43] Archibald MacLeish quoted in Arndt, *First Resort of Kings*, p. 98.

consultant on international cultural relations and the war to the Library of Congress.[44] Significant here is that Washington's global obligations were framed in ideological terms despite its stated neutrality. In using his official position to call the symposia and engage consultants at the Library of Congress, MacLeish was an early entrepreneur of the position, which would soon achieve much wider resonance, that an international ideological 'threat' in itself could not be left unanswered by America.

The United States joined the Allied war effort after the December 7, 1941 attack on the US Navy at Pearl Harbour by Japan. The war delivered a substantially larger funding appropriation for the Division, which extended to sending the first posting of US cultural attaches abroad, to several Latin American embassies. The US film exchange program sponsored by the Division was also expanded, and a total of 550 motion pictures were eventually distributed to Latin America by the US government between 1939 and 1942. The film exchange policy provoked debates as to whether the Division ought to distribute controversial films in the name of democratic openness or should seek to cultivate a more selective image of America. One former US diplomat, John M. Begg, recalled that a film version of John Steinbeck's *Grapes of Wrath* was of particular concern in Washington due to the film's critique of depression-era American capitalism.[45] In response to questions as to the film's suitability for official distribution, the US embassy in Chile advised in favour of the piece, despite a June 1940 advisory that films "marred by the inclusion of objectionable details" such as overt bias toward special interests or negative images of the US should be excluded from the cultural diplomacy program.[46] The embassy had reported how showing American poverty in an honest way have given the Chilean audiences a basis for

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[44] Thomas Mann had been written several pieces in 1940 on the connection between culture and politics from a humanist perspective. Wolf Lepeneis, *The Seduction of Culture in German History*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), p. 60.

[45] John M. Begg, "Oral History Interview," July 11, 1975; Harry S. Truman Library Oral History Project; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division. See also "Memorandum," Herbert Edwards to Lloyd A. Lehrbas, (June 28, 1948); Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

[46] See Begg, "Oral History Interview." See also: Division of Cultural Relations, "Progress Report of the Division of Cultural Relations," 1940, p. 73; Box 2, File 5; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.

identifying with Americans, and that this openness and honesty had supplied credibility to the US programs. Soon after, the Division of Cultural Relations adopted a different approach to defining the limits of American 'openness' in its film program, and began routinely advising the studios through State Department officials posted to Hollywood on how to make films better suited to official purposes.

America's creed of individual liberty was frequently stated as a key point of emphasis within the US cultural programs directed to the Western Hemisphere. Official program statements framed cultural diplomacy as a co-optive practice in the context of a shared regional identity, suggesting that it should emphasise how "we of the Americas share in common a fundamental belief of the most far-reaching importance. We believe in the value of the individual human being whatever his race or creed or economic status may be."[47] By celebrating the liberties of the New World, US policy-makers also implicitly constituted American republicanism and independence as a factor that distinguished US policy from the imperialistic practices that had underscored the cultural diplomacy practised in conjunction with formal imperialism by the European powers.

More challenging to sustain as the US began to reframe its cultural diplomacy for wartime purposes than its credentials as the rightful regional power within the New World, however, was the distinction that was articulated between US 'cultural diplomacy' and immoral 'propaganda.' These framing issues became a particular preoccupation in policy statements authored by figures such as Leland, Cherrington and Shotwell, given their intellectual backgrounds and longstanding interests on international cultural relations. As scholars, they had grappled with some foundational philosophical questions associated with the nature propaganda, culture and education in response to the inter-war propaganda debates. Cherrington, for instance, sought to maintain the Division's apolitical mandate even as figures such as MacLeish provided eloquent arguments in favour of the idea that Washington must articulate to the world a firmer defence of democracy against the global propaganda onslaught of Nazi Germany. Having insisted that the cultural activities were to be "definitely educational

[47] Shaw, "Text of Radio Address by Assistant Secretary of Shaw," *Department of State Bulletin* 1662, (November 8, 1941), p. 370.

in character," so that the Division could not be seen to function in any identifiable way as a "diplomatic arm or a propaganda agency," Cherrington emphasised the temporary nature of wartime ideological antagonisms and the somewhat selective approach within the Division's programs that the antagonism demanded.[48] His successor as director, Charles Thomson, had challenged this point in a foundational debate with Cherrington during the early 1940s by arguing that propaganda could be 'instructive' or 'destructive' depending on the intent and nature of its author. By approaching the targeted audience as equals rather than inferiors, urging them to "simply...think as [America] thinks" rather than adopting manipulative or forceful rhetoric, Thomson framed the Division's work as being able to encompass some more strident or instrumental elements because US intentions were fundamentally benign: what was important was that its intentions were not to *be* a propagandist, even if some policy strategies adopted resembled the practice.[49] Thomson's view essentially prevailed in operational terms after this debate, and the Division increasingly used cultural diplomacy as an instrument of US national interests during the war. However, Cherrington's liberal representation of cultural diplomacy as a mode of international interchange retained a clear symbolic purchase within US cultural diplomacy debates, and the reciprocity, openness and anti-propagandism he articulated remained resonant ideas within the discourses of US policy-making after 1936.

Though Cherrington remained a committed advocate of a humanist, apolitical format for long-term international cultural engagement, the outspoken General Advisory Committee member, Waldo Leland, and the head of the Division's research section, Ralph Turner, both engaged more readily with the Charles Thomson's position that the US should conduct its cultural diplomacy in an instrumental manner during the war. Leland, writing in 1943, situated 'propaganda' as an acceptable term for American foreign policy, but in a qualified sense. He classified the cultural program objectives in the following terms:

> The war effort calls for active propaganda at the intellectual level, the development of moral solidarity among the United Nations, and

[48] Cherrington quoted in Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 31.
[49] Thomson quoted in *ibid.*, pp. 40 & 60.

> the assurance of good will towards the United States. Hence much that is done in the name of cultural relations has objectives that are not primarily cultural. This situation is likely to be prolonged well into the post-war period when activities aimed at restoring areas that have been devastated by war and at relieving their peoples will have almost as large a place in the attention of the national Government as the activities of the war have at present... it is important to try to distinguish between activities that have purely cultural and intellectual objectives and those that, though cultural in form, are designed to influence the course of the war and to assist the work of post-war restoration. [50]

Meanwhile Turner argued that the cultural diplomacy program should "support concretely the foreign policy of the United States" and foster "an international situation under which American democracy can be secure and develop."[51] These depictions not only sought to ensure that the significance of culture as a diplomatic tool would be acknowledged in Washington, but also foreshadowed the emergence of a wider rendition of America's national interests in a post-war context. As Assistant Secretary of State Adolf Berle had put it in 1939, cultural diplomacy was inherently a more politicised practice than simply cultural interchange. For Berle, cultural diplomacy also conveyed national power and could legitimately be used by Washington to transform international relations. The cultural program must thus, in Berle's terms, embrace its potential as a function of US foreign policy that could establish a "materially different...moral conception" of world order.[52]

'Enlightened and Far-Sighted Leadership:' Extending Cultural Diplomacy to the Near East and China

In early 1941 the scope of the Division's work widened from Latin America to include China and the Near East, and with this development its staff rose from eight in late 1939 to seventy-six by 1943. In 1941 the suggestion that the US undertake a

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[50] Waldo Leland, "International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems," University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, pp. 26-7; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.

[51] Ralph Turner (1942) cited in Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 67.

[52] Berle, "Speech of A. A. Berle Jr.," pp. 1, 8.

program of cultural diplomacy in Europe had been raised, only to be dismissed by the State Department's Division of European Affairs on the grounds that extensive private cultural and intellectual ties already spanned the Atlantic. The Near Eastern cultural relations program drew on earlier requests by the Arab regions for information and educational assistance from the United States during the 1930s, and hence had considerable early success. The program placed a particular emphasis on subsidising American schools and universities in the region, in the hope that Washington could demonstrate its anti-colonialist sentiments by association with these independent institutions, and that by improving living standards and technical sophistication the US would become synonymous in the Arab mind with modernity and progress.[53] As Frank Ninkovich has noted, these discourses of American modernisation, "idealism and anti-imperialism" that were propagated by the American Near Eastern program caused some friction between the US and the existing colonial powers in the region. "By drawing an explicit contrast between European imperialism and disinterested American policy, the United States was priming itself, if not for a political competition, then for a cultural contest on informal terms."[54]

In 1944 one American diplomat posted to Turkey had similarly characterised the Washington's interest in the Middle East as having a 'secular-missionary' orientation. The cultural diplomacy program was warranted because Washington needed "to have this small but strategically located country not only friendly to us but also able to think things through in patterns similar to our own in politics, economics, social welfare, and the many other phases of our culture."[55] This statement embodied the modernising imperative that became a key theme in the articulation of US cultural diplomacy programs toward the Third World after the Second World War.[56] It

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[53] Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 51-2.

[54] *Ibid.*, pp. 53-5. See also: Division of Cultural Relations, "Memorandum Respecting Inter-American Cultural Relations," (undated), p. 10; Box 5, ff 43; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.

[55] Donald E. Webster quoted in Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 53.

[56] I adopt the term 'modernising imperative' in order to draw a parallel between the kinds of principles of US influence in the Third World that had been articulated in policy-making discourses, and the 'modernisation' discourse that developed within US academic discourses in the post-war period. It was a discourse of political influence, poverty alleviation and social reform in the underdeveloped world, which became the dominant paradigm of US policy studies of the Third World: "North American academic interest in, and the very idea of, the Third World expanded

reflected an underlying and soon-to-be prevalent view of American cultural diplomacy as a force for modernisation, democratisation and technocratic administration in relation to the Third World. This narrative of modernisation and technical assistance, as a basis to spread democracy, built on and extended representations that had initially been mobilised in an inter-American context.

A US cultural program was established in China following the extension of American lend-lease economic aid to the Nationalist government in June 1941, and as a consequence of the increasingly dire warnings from 'China hands' such as Pearl Buck and Willys R. Peck that considerable US assistance was required to keep China in the war.[57] As the first director of the Division's program in China Stuart E. Grummon had claimed, the US had a longstanding interest in China's political development and should develop more explicitly politicised activities in China than those that had been used in the inter-American context. Grummon even advocated that informational functions be taken up within the context of US cultural diplomacy:

> If it was deemed important before the outbreak of hostilities with Japan to develop a radio program directed to the Chinese people to encourage them in their resistance against Japan and to emphasize certain phases of American life which might contribute to strengthening their morale, the need is now clearly greater.[58]

With a US broadcasting program already in place, radio was ruled out of the Division's range of activities. However, printed material and films were extensively distributed as part of the Division's activities in China, alongside less directly politicised activities such as the conservation of cultural artefacts and educational exchanges.

The development of the Division's China program warrants a sustained look within my discussion both for the precedent it set in articulating the terms of

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dramatically after 1945. The imperatives of the Cold War meshed with a long-standing missionary paternalism which continued to perceive the people of Latin America, Asia, Africa and Oceania as being in need of guidance, education and reform." Berger, *Under Northern Eyes*, p. 14.

[57] Peck's views are particularly significant because he succeeded Stuart Grummon as the second head of the Division of Cultural Relation's China section. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 10.

[58] Grummon, (1942) quoted in *ibid.*, p. 14.

Washington's post-war cultural diplomacy with the Third World, and because China looms large as a key priority for the Division of Cultural Relations during the Second World War. The Division's policies toward China exposed many of the operational quandaries that American cultural diplomats and foreign policy officials subsequently faced in dealing with the Third World after the war, and proved a testing ground for how officials would articulate an effective response to these quandaries. The China program thus brought the export of democracy to the fore as a key objective of US cultural diplomacy:

> The items of the program approved are almost exclusively designed to convey as early as possible to wide sections of the Chinese public, including Government and university circles, the merchant class, and the people of village and country, the real interest taken by the United States in China's present plight; its desire to be of every possible assistance; its own parallel defence program and war effort; and some idea of those American institutions and emergency undertakings which might be of assistance to the Chinese in stimulating their own progress along democratic lines, as well as presenting another, and a more constructive, picture to counter the very extensive and highly organised Axis propaganda, principally Japanese and German, which has long been disseminated throughout the Far East in Japanese, Mandarin, Chinese dialects, and English, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese, Italian, Siamese, Mongolian, Arabic, and other languages.[59]

In emphasising the promotion of democracy as the central purpose of American cultural diplomacy the Division's staff had to resolve a sharp contradiction between what was stated to be America's traditional anti-propagandism and the strategic purposes that had necessitated this intervention in Chinese domestic politics in the first place. This tension was especially acute within policy debates concerning the extent to which the US cultural programs would be received in China and elsewhere as a symbol of unconditional US support for the Nationalist government. Although the Nationalist regime was the internationally-recognised government of China, the Division's cultural diplomacy programs were an arena in which concerns about the prospects for

[59] Harley Notter, "The Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations: A Report to The Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session, January 1942," p. 14; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.

democracy in Asia could be voiced by US diplomats and officials. The State Department's China Desk cautioned the Division not to press the democratic point, urging it to bear in mind 'Chinese sensibilities' and avoid distributing material with 'democratic' themes that could be interpreted as tacit critique of the Kuomintang regime for the duration of the war.[60]

The Division responded to this moral quandary, as Ninkovich points out, by articulating a technocratic vision of American cultural diplomacy as a basis for the political and cultural modernisation of China: "cultural lend-lease...became the program's dominant policy concept." America's idealism was somewhat "muted," and it was hoped modernising or technocratic influences would be "of the most immediate benefit to China" and might well be sufficient to stimulate democratic change in the future.[61] Framing US policy in these modernising terms effectively deferred the moral problem associated with extending the US cultural assistance to China. Cultural modernisation was a forward-looking discourse that contained the promise of future democratisation within it without compelling US cultural diplomats to confront the authoritarianism of the Chungking regime directly. Democratic transformation would necessarily *follow from* American cultural assistance, but it was no longer a precondition for extending it, as had been the case within depictions of the inter-American cultural diplomacy program as building on the shared democratic sensibility and republicanism of the Western Hemisphere.[62]

As Wilma Fairbank subsequently observed, the State Department's cultural diplomacy program in China failed to achieve this social and political transformation through cultural/technical relations. There was a wide "gap between the strenuous efforts and good intentions of the China program administrators in Washington and the

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[60] Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 56-7.

[61] *Ibid.*, p. 56. See also: Harley Notter, "Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations A Report to The Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session, January 1942," p. 14; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.

[62] On China as a topic of debate in the General Advisory Committee after 1941, see "Compilation of Policy Statements on the Cultural Relations Program, Approved by the General Advisory Committee," (June 15, 1944); Box 5 ff 38; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver. See also Cherrington's statements in: Division of Cultural Relations, "Memorandum Respecting Inter-American Cultural Relations," (undated), p. 10; Box 5, ff 43; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.

circumstances, material, psychological and, above all, political, of the recipients in Free China." [63] Logistical troubles, local corruption and Chinese factional disputes undermined the US cultural program during the war and in its aftermath. Many American cultural diplomats were concerned that Washington had entered into too close an association with the Nationalist regime, thereby jeopardising America's democratic credibility in the pursuit of cultural diplomacy for strategic purposes. One dispatch from China thus reported that:

> any American working...[in cultural relations] is to some degree a press agent for the Kuomintang and the Chinese government. No matter how careful he may be, and I have tried to be careful, he is part of a fabric of deceit. Certain facts about China- facts of no military significance- he must not write...Any American working for the Ministry is part of an organisation which would not permit anyone to send to America a sanely written and wholly accurate article about of the Fascist tendencies of the Chinese government, which are little known in America, the country from which China is so anxious to obtain help.[64]

The State Department's John K. Fairbank, stationed in China during the war, echoed the point that the modernising ideal behind US cultural diplomacy in China had deferred crucial political and moral questions to both America and China's detriment:

> ideas are as important as techniques. American technical assistance may hasten the industrialisation of China, as it did of Japan, without necessarily bringing China and the United States closer in thought and feeling. It is worth remembering that the last generation in the West was highly gratified at the 'westernisation' of Japan, although to us it is now clear that this 'westernization' was but a means serving Japanese ends. We do not fear China's aims, but we should not delude ourselves by assuming that railroads and factories will make China into a second United States. International understanding is not to be achieved by the export of goods and services alone.[65]

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[63] Fairbank, *America's Cultural Experiment in China*, pp. vii, 24.
[64] Floyd Taylor quoted in *ibid.*, p. 70.
[65] Fairbank's call for an end to the mythologising of China in US policy discourse was particularly prescient in light of the statements of Ballantyne and others cited below. John K. Fairbank and T. L. Yuan, "Sino-American Intellectual Relations," (December 31, 1942), p. 1; Records Relating to the China, Burma, and India Theatres, 1942-5; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208; National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, College Park, MD.

In this context, Fairbank argued that democracy-promotion ought to be at the forefront of US cultural diplomacy policy, rather than being regarded in somewhat vague terms as an outcome of US technical and economic assistance. To underline the importance of democracy-promotion even during wartime, Fairbank cautioned that "China is in the American world and if the United States is to play its part properly in this new world it must understand the other actors."[66] With the considerable obstacles to China's democratisation present, however, these warnings did not lead to successful policy outcomes for the Division either during or after the war.

Other officials within the China program were more certain that democratic modernisation could eventually occur through US cultural and educational assistance to China, and they drew on a framework of alterity to great effect in this context. A 1942 public address by US Foreign Service officer Joseph W. Ballantyne, for instance, described effective cultural relations with China and East Asia as:

> our greatest hope of rebuilding a new world on progressive lines out of the sorry plight in which we now find ourselves in enlightened and far-sighted leadership, which can only be provided by men of broad and liberal culture...our contributions can be large along spiritual and intellectual lines- especially in the field of political ideologies.[67]

Ballantyne's piece appeared in both the *Department of State Bulletin* and the *Foreign Service Journal*, indicating that it had some resonance as a statement of Washington's intentions for long term political reforms in East Asia. Ballantyne's analysis adopted the premise that a cultural harmony underpinned a congruence of regional interest between the US and China. China's 'ancient' culture was situated as a contrast to the 'warlike' foundations of Japan's culture, in suggesting what the lynchpin of Washington's vision for a post-war Asian order should be, Ballantyne noted that Washington could rely on the "essentially democratic character of Chinese national institutions and the historically peaceful character of Chinese national policies."[68] In a

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[66] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[67] Joseph Ballantyne, "Cultural Factors in the Far Eastern Situation," *Department of State Bulletin* 1740, (May 9, 1942), pp. 397, 402.
[68] Joseph Ballantyne, "Cultural Factors in the Far Eastern Situation" *Foreign Service Journal* 19, (no. 7, July 1942), pp. 364-7.

similar vein, a 1944 policy paper from the Division remarked on China's peaceful and democratic trajectory, noting that "China has become our neighbour and every further advance in science will draw her still closer."[69] Data on US cultural diplomacy spending in 1946 shows that these aspirations were backed in operational terms: China was the largest component of the US cultural relations program that year, costing $797,107.[70] A form of alterity was also present within these representations: though they were at different stages in history, the United States and China shared 'democratic' cultural foundations, rendering cultural diplomacy and political cooperation between the two acceptable, in contrast to Japan's 'warlike' identity.[71] The extension of US cultural, economic and diplomatic assistance to the Nationalist regime was thus, the concerns of Fairbank and others notwithstanding, represented as simply speeding up China's democratic development. The realisation in 1949 that this modernising imperative constituted misplaced faith appeared to find an outlet in the strenuous way which Washington subsequently sought to diplomatically isolate the Chinese Communist regime.[72]

There are several significant implications that can be drawn from the foregoing discussion of Washington's cultural engagement with the Near East and China. Discourses of international interdependence and American modernity, building on discourses first mobilised in the context of inter-American relations, functioned to enable the extension of US power into the Near East and China. Key propositions were

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[69] Haldore Hansen, "America's Need for Understanding China." *Department of State Bulletin* 2220, (November 26, 1944), p. 626.

[70] Curiously, the second largest allocation of US funding was to Brazil, which for 1946-47 was allocated $449,267. It remains unclear whether these figures were drawn just from the Division of Cultural Relations program or whether they included sundry expenditures of the Foreign Service covering types of activities that might be classified as cultural relations. Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, to William Benton, "Comparative Expenditures and Personnel by Country-Europe," Appendix A; Foreign Office of the United Kingdom to William Benton, (November 7, 1946); IIA, 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

[71] This also suggests that the post-war reversal of China and Japan in the US's thinking on the post-war order in Asia was partly due to a shift in how cultural alterity was envisaged within US foreign policy discourse, with Communism becoming the category upon which conceptions of the other were determined.

[72] Denial of membership to Communist China in Unesco is an example that will be surveyed in this study. The US delegation to China did not gain a reputation for fair-mindedness when it sought to block Red Chinese membership at the same time as supporting fascist Spain's entry into the institution.

extracted from the Good Neighbour Policy and reconstituted as a broader narrative of America's progressive anti-conquest of the Third World.[73] Depictions of America's modernising impact on China were also articulated in order to resolve the contradiction between Washington's democratic principles and the extension of its assistance to a plainly authoritarian ally. As the material cited above attests, however, it was not predominantly public concerns that created these debates about the extent of the Chungking regime's authoritarianism. Rather, it was largely for self-reflexive purposes that these modernising representations and logics of alterity were mobilised in the context of US cultural diplomacy to China. The constitution of Washington's role as the exemplar of democracy and modernity in this period also set a powerful precedent for the framing Washington's cultural and political engagement with other colonised or underdeveloped regions in subsequent years.

Planning for Post-War Influence: Developing Narratives of US Hegemony

How did this image of US cultural diplomacy as a basis for modernisation and understanding develop in policy statements beyond the China program? To what extent did the modernising imperative of American cultural diplomacy shape US foreign policy at a general level? The Division of Cultural Relations hosted debates about the cultural programs and Washington's broader role in the post-war order, especially the European post-war order, that were multifaceted and complex. In many respects, the modernising narratives articulated in the context of Third World regions such as China and the Near East were transposed onto a European context after the war, particularly when US officials articulated their role in Europe as democracy-promotion through cultural reconstruction and rehabilitation. At a broader level, during the closing stages of the war and in its early aftermath narratives of historical progress informed how cultural diplomats characterised US plans to institute a just, stable and open post-war order. Here, exceptionalist sentiments informed the ways in which US cultural officials characterised Washington's global role. The US was scripted as both universal, in its

[73] I adopt this term from the work of Christina Klein. Klein, *Cold War Orientalism.*

ability to formulate a just peace upon universal principles, and singular in its possession of the power that was required to institute it.

A further warranting argument that was often articulated in favour of the projection of US cultural diplomacy was that the people of Europe needed instruction in America's traditions of 'freedom.' These incorporated freedom of speech and political association, but importantly also 'free markets,' and the latter came to predominate when the State Department sought to propagate its message in opposition to Western European socialist movements. Finally, the notion that America had historical ties to Europe played out in a complex way during the planning and implementation of the post-1945 settlement. On the one hand, American cultural traditions were represented as the democratic fulfilment of European traditions and therefore a universal solution to the problem of international disorder and war. On the other, Europe's difference from America was played up as American cultural officials reflected on the ethnic and ideological antagonisms that had caused repeated bloodshed on the European continent, and presented American cultural traditions as a way to reform European politics. In this section, I shall explore how American cultural diplomats articulated the relevance of their work in relation to US foreign policy in the post-war order, much of which dates back to the early phases of US involvement in the Second World War itself.

The Division's second director Charles Thomson spelled out a tripartite rationale for a US cultural program of global scope in 1942:

> 1, Cultural relations provide our own people with a realistic appreciation and comprehension of other peoples, and in consequence provide likewise a more solid democratic basis for our international policy. 2, Cultural relations develop in the minds of other peoples not necessarily a more friendly, but beyond question a more fair and accurate idea of us. 3, Finally, the cultural program makes for more mutually helpful relations with other countries by developing the habit of planning and working together.[74]

[74] Charles Thomson, "Address Delivered by Mr Charles A. Thomson, Chief Division of Cultural Relations, Department of State, at the Pan American Day Exercises of the University of Texas, Austin, Texas, on April 14, 1942," p. 7; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.

However, the cultural diplomacy program's supporters also found it necessary to acknowledge the program's strategic significance in relation to the war effort, and in this context issues of 'power politics' shaped the articulation of US cultural diplomacy's rationale as post-war planning began. The Division had in this vein noted to a Congressional appropriations hearing in 1942 that "books, as well as bullets, can serve in the defence of the Americas."[75] From 1942 onwards the General Advisory Committee had largely taken up Thomson's concept of US practices as 'instructive propaganda' as opposed to Cherrington's commitment to a scrupulously apolitical posture. The work of the Committee increasingly framed US cultural relations as an 'instrumentality' in the struggle against Nazism: a term used frequently by James T. Shotwell.[76] After leaving the Division and in his capacity as an ongoing member of the General Advisory Committee, Cherrington continued to oppose this pragmatic view of cultural diplomacy that was developing in this period, partly as a way of coming to terms with the future place cultural diplomacy within US foreign policy. Cherrington insisted that at the very least, the question of whether cultural relations were 'national' or 'international' in character needed further debate before an instrumental posture could be adopted.[77] Concerns therefore remained, as international education advocate Lawrence Duggan put it, whether "any implication of a tie-in between cultural interchange and foreign policy would invalidate the effect of the cultural activities."[78]

The Division's staff did not wholly depart from the reciprocal, anti-propagandistic premise of US cultural diplomacy of the 1930s, however. Indeed, one of the most important functions of discursive practice in the context of US cultural diplomacy was to resolve the contradictions that emerged with the extension of American power during the war by representing particular practices in multiple ways to

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[75] Harley Notter, "Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations," p. 10; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.

[76] Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, p. 194. The program was described as "one of the basic instrumentalities for modifying international relations and attitudes, and for maintaining a better stabilized world order...Our leadership in international action in the cultural field will be as decisively necessary as in the political and economic fields." *Ibid.*, p. 195.

[77] As noted above, Cherrington remained on the General Advisory Committee after he left the post of Director of the Division of Cultural Relations. *Ibid.*, p. 196.

[78] Lawrence Duggan quoted in *ibid.*, p. 197.

different audiences. US foreign policy officials outside the cultural programs often queried the reluctance of cultural diplomacy officials to stridently condemn the ideological threat and the misrepresentation of America perpetrated by the Nazi regime. Harley Notter had debated these key issues in policy correspondence of early 1943, in which his interlocutor queried: "why is it so important to avoid causing resentment on matters of education and culture...should policies on these matters differ essentially from those on economic and political matters, which in some cases will be enforced whether they cause resentment or not?"[79] Notter's answer was that cultural diplomacy's purpose was to convey a more lasting message about America than an expedient wartime approach required. The Division should remain a civilian program and hence "avoid the natural tendency during war to expand disproportionately a program of cultural relations. This inevitably would create an abnormal situation that would lead to an undesirable reaction at the termination of the war." US cultural diplomacy would remain "divorced from such propaganda activities as the government might find necessary during the war...long range objectives [must remain]...the preoccupation of the Division."[80] Waldo Leland similarly advocated circumscribing of the Division's functions so that it would remain a symbol of America's singular commitment to reciprocity and openness:

> there is grave risk of doing violence...if a government decides what is good for the people of another country and then proceeds to dish it out to them in the name of a program of cultural relations. Suspicion and misunderstanding are sure to result...The principle of mutual acceptability also implies that a government does not use a program of cultural relations as a tool to further or to implement its political social or economic policies.[81]

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[79] B. Fosdick (reviser, author unrecorded), "Statement of Policy on Participation in Educational and Cultural Reconstruction by the Department of State," (January 25, 1944); Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.

[80] Division of Cultural Relations, "Progress Report of the Division of Cultural Relations, Department of State," 1940, p. 14; Box 2; File 5; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.

[81] Waldo Leland, "International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems," University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, pp. 27-8; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.

In recent work Richard Arndt has argued that from this early period onward US cultural diplomacy officials depicted their work as an expression of the 'culturalist constituency' within the United States rather than an instrument for the pursuit of narrow national interests.[82] This culturalist impulse, as captured in the concept of mutual acceptability, was a key principle in framing US cultural diplomacy as an exceptional category of practice even at the height of the Second World War. In a letter of February, 1943, State Department Latin America specialist Sumner Welles reflected on the quandaries that war posed to the practices of cultural diplomacy when he queried how Washington might pursue mutual understanding and simultaneously prosecute the war:

> Should a true cultural relations program be used to implement the foreign policy of any one country; or should it provide a vehicle for the interchange of ideas and the deepening of understanding in order to aid people in the determination of their destiny?[83]

As Ninkovich contends, the challenge for American cultural diplomats in this period was "whether in the pursuit of security or in the service of ideals...[wartime] developments foreclosed a return to more detached uses of cultural relations" during peacetime.[84] The policy debates in this phase reflected this uncertainty of purpose as to how actively or instrumentally Washington ought to pursue cultural and ideological influence, and the policy debates of the period show how central the effort to find an appropriate lexicon of cultural diplomacy was in resolving the tension.

With these attempts by American cultural diplomats to reconcile the implications of US involvement in the Second World War in relation to Washington's traditional reluctance to pursue propaganda, there developed a broad consensus that, at

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[82] Arndt, *First Resort of Kings*, p. 180.

[83] Sumner Welles to Charles A. Thomson , with Enclosure: "Memorandum Concerning a Long-Range Program of Cultural Relations for the United States, Sep 15, 1941," (February 22, 1943); Box 5 ff 43; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.

[84] My emphasis added. In claiming that the cultural diplomacy program was conducted in the name of the American cultural elite not Washington these kinds of discourses implicitly conveyed the US's repudiation of power politics. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 35.

the very least, the geographical scope of US cultural diplomacy would need to be global in the post-war period. Ben Cherrington noted that the necessity for a global US cultural program was a function of global inter-dependence and the importance of presenting the US as a cultural and political template of modernity. Once again, however, he distanced US cultural diplomacy from Washington and its strategic interests. Reflecting on the modest origins of the program and the 'culturalist constituency' for which the US cultural diplomacy program spoke:

> it is neither possible or desirable following the conflict to confine to the western hemisphere the government's cultural relations activities. In our integrated world, it would be futile to attempt permanently to maintain cultural enlightenment in the western hemisphere while the rest of the world was in the grip of cultural decadence. Evidence is lacking that the *men of science, letters and the arts in the Americas* would consider such a policy.[85]

The assumption that the promotion of American culture and ideas, with impetus coming from American civil society rather than from the government, would be warranted in the wake of the conflict for the purposes of cultural regeneration therefore went some way toward assuaging internal concerns that US cultural diplomacy had become too instrumental in tone.

In this vein, the pluralism of US society and its tradition of civic, as opposed to ethnic, culture was discursively situated as a counterweight to the philosophies of national aggrandisement and collectivism that had been propagated by the Axis powers. To confront Nazi propaganda claims that America's immigrant society lacked spiritual unity, the Division's cultural programs often utilised foreign-born American citizens as spokespeople for America.[86] As early as 1940, US foreign policy-makers had claimed

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[85] Division of Cultural Relations, "Memorandum Concerning a Long Range Program of Cultural Relations for the United States, September 15, 1941," p. 1; Box 5 ff 43-2; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.

[86] General Advisory Committee on Cultural Relations, "Compilation of Policy Statements on the Cultural Relations Program, Approved by the General Advisory Committee," (June 15, 1944), p. 3; Box 5 ff 38; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver. On the Nazi claims, see: Aristotle A. Kallis, *Nazi Propaganda and the Second World War*, (Basingtoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), pp. 75-6. In a rather absurd twist, the 'entertainment' segments of Nazi international propaganda broadcasts incorporated American-style swing and jazz music due to their popularity in Europe. There was some debate about this since

that American pluralism could also be mobilised as an instructive principle for the modernisation of the Third World. One Divisional official had argued that US cultural diplomacy was needed because America "had no 'official culture' to sell any of our neighbours. The idea of an official culture is repugnant to us."[87] It bears noting, however, that a rather selective vision of American pluralism was employed in this context. It was a stated policy platform within the Division that US cultural diplomacy would downplay the realities of racial segregation within the US.[88] Christina Klein has also noted how representations of America's social pluralism shaped its relations with the colonised world:

> Washington defended democracy during the war as a universal political philosophy applicable to all peoples regardless of race, and by doing so it helped move into the mainstream the idea of America as a harmonious nation made up of people from diverse ethnic, racial, national, and religious backgrounds... The United States thus became the only Western nation that sought to legitimate its world-ordering ambitions by championing the idea (*if not always the practice*) of racial equality.[89]

For US policy-makers, cultural diplomacy could also communicate the tenets of US political culture by striving to incorporate pre-existing private initiatives as an expression of America's tradition of voluntarism and the cultivation of civic virtue. In emphasising pluralism and civic virtue in cultural diplomacy discourse, US officials sought to locate Washington's new foreign policy demands and practices as expressions of longstanding tenets of US political culture.

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some quarters of the Nazi hierarchy branded the popularity of jazz in Germany during the 1930s as a Semitic plot to bring about the 'musical race defilement' of Germany, and issued a policy banning jazz- 'musical decadence'- from the domestic airwaves in 1933. See: Horst J. P. Bergmeier and Reiner E. Lotz, *Hitler's Airwaves: The Inside Story of Nazi Radio Broadcasting and Propaganda Swing*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997), Ch. 5.

[87] Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, p 148.

[88] See Harold B. Hoskins, "Memorandum: Mobilizing 38,000,000 Foreign-Born Citizens for Effective Psychological Warfare," (January 7, 1942), p. 2; Box 6 ff 1; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.

[89] My emphasis added Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, p. 11. Michael Hunt's study has made the opposite point, however, and highlights how notions of racial inequality constituted the US's foreign policy approaches at various historical moments. See: Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987).

As the Allied military situation in Europe improved from halting successes during 1942-43 to a full-scale rollback of Axis forces in 1944, US cultural diplomats began to draw up more specific plans for a post-war cultural program that would function to ensure that the overall settlement would find public acceptance in Europe and elsewhere. As had been articulated within the China program after 1941, from 1944 planning for the post-war cultural program framed the objectives of US cultural diplomacy to war-ravaged European areas in forward-looking, transformational terms. Both the staff of the Division of Cultural Relations and post-war planners within the State Department envisaged a close relationship between political/ideological reorientation, economic reconstruction, and US-led cultural rehabilitation. In this context, cultural influence was understood to be one of Washington's most important resources in consolidating a legitimate and durable post-war settlement. It was a testament to just how broad the State Department's vision for reformulating the post-war world order had become. As Cherrington informed the Division's General Advisory Committee in 1944:

> Political and economic arrangements of international life must be undergirded by a world public opinion friendly to their successful operation and cultural relations may be the means of attaining such public opinion...Three obvious principles should guide any program of international cultural relations: 1) the cultural relations activities should be reciprocal and no slightest suggestion of imposing one people's culture upon another. 2) international exchange in culture should never be exploited as an instrument of national policy 'designed to serve some irrelevant purpose of state.' 3) wherever possible the exchange of cultural interests should involve the direct participation of the people and institutions concerned with those interests in their respective countries- the program should stem from the authentic centers of culture.[90]

This statement reflects an ongoing tendency within policy memoranda concerning the post-war settlement to frame US cultural diplomacy was a distinct category of practice in relation to the propaganda of other states, and that the post-war settlement that

[90] Howland Sargeant, to Barrows and Charles Thomson, "Notes on 'America's Future Cultural Relations' by Ben Mark Cherrington from the "Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1944," Enclosure in Howland Sargeant to Barrows and Charles Thomson, (January 29, 1948), p. 1; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

Washington was to put in place would be singular in its rationality and generousness. In this context, Cherrington represented American national interests as distinct from those of the imperialist European powers in its embodiment of a reciprocal, open approach. In this rendition, the US sought long-term international stability, economic prosperity and democratic change, but not imperial dominion or self-aggrandisement.

One of the most acute issues in foreign policy discourse that emerged as policy-makers articulated US cultural priorities at the end of the war was the rise of anti-colonialist movements, particularly in Asia. Anxious to define the US "not only as a nonempire, but as an antiempire,"[91] the cultural programs attempted to convey to the greatest extent possible the egalitarianism of America's civic culture and its historical and political critique of European civilisation. As I noted above, the cultural diplomacy programs mobilised an image of America's racial pluralism and harmony to garner support from international audiences, and few US diplomats seemed willing to reflect on the domestic reality of racial segregation within the American South during the 1940s in articulating this policy strategy. Cultural diplomacy officials mobilised a conception of world politics in which relations of influence and inter-dependence between "East and West [could now] be understood...outside the coercive ties of empire."[92]

In relation to India, for example, cultural diplomacy had been utilised by Washington to express symbolic support for the Indian independence movement, angering the British colonial administration in the process. A 1943 US Army report circulated to US diplomatic posts in India narrated the anti-imperial approach through which the US traditionally exercised its power in Third World areas:

> The British are...embarrassed by our attitude on the colonial question. Obvious American disinclination to engage in colonial expansion, the American record in championing Asiatic states threatened by aggression and repeated American pronouncements extolling the virtues of liberty

[91] On the distinctive and paradoxical ways in which the US understood its own colonial past as well as that of its European counterparts see Paul Kramer, "Empires, Exceptions, and Anglo-Saxons: Race and Rule between the British and United States Empires, 1880-1910," *The Journal of American History* 88, (no. 4, March, 2002), p. 1316. See also Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism.*

[92] Klein, *Cold War Orientalism*, pp. 11-2.

and self-determination have in the past given the United States a good reputation in Asia.[93]

In promoting Indian political independence, Washington not only caused British distemper but had also risked a potentially disastrous disruption of its military supply lines into East Asia should an Indian civil war erupt. In this context, the publicity propagated by US cultural diplomats in India was contrary to US strategic interests, and yet it was undertaken because it constituted America's identity as a liberal power and served to spell out Washington's more long-term intentions for the global order. In a similar process to that through which policy-makers rationalised their politically compromised dealings with the Chinese nationalists, cultural diplomacy discourse provided an outlet for US concerns about the moral compromise that had been made in undertaking military cooperation with the British Empire in Asia.[94]

I have noted in the foregoing section several elements of the representation of US cultural diplomacy during the course of the Second World War. A modernising, technocratic vocabulary of cultural diplomacy was established as US policy-makers began to contemplate the extensiveness of the tasks of Third World reform: post-war reconstruction; and construction of a lasting peace. Although cultural relations were now being associated with the practical and rather instrumental requirements of securing the post-war settlement, the Division's officials continued to frame their work as a manifestation of reciprocal purposes and long-range moral and political objectives. They did so by characterising their policies in the language of the liberal inter-war

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[93] John Davies, "Anglo-American Cooperation in East Asia," (November 15, 1943), p. 4; Confidential Files, 1943; Records of the New Delhi Mission, India; Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State; Record Group 84; National Archives and Records Administration of the USA, College Park, MD.

[94] At the same time as Washington promoted its own vision for India's independent future to Indians, in London US diplomats had argued that the activities in India were purely cultural and apolitical in nature and should not be contradicted by British publicity. As official correspondence to the Foreign Secretary Earl Halifax commented, British attempts to publicise *its* position on India within US had provoked indignation. "Unfortunately, for practical purposes, 'propaganda' ... is what the Americans believe it to be, and they have made it abundantly clear (for many years) that objective publicity to counter what *we* regard as *their* misconceptions is, to them, the most obnoxious kind of propaganda." File Notes, regarding Letter Leo Amery, to Viscount Halifax, (no author), (June 7, 1940); FO 371/2454; Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, Kew. Emphasis in original.

critique of propaganda, and by pointing to the ongoing involvement of private American initiative as evidence of this liberal posture. These cultural discourses depicted Washington as a non-coercive, progressive, far-sighted and modernising power in the Third World, and thereby licensed the Division to make an obvious statement on Indian political affairs over the heads of the British imperial authorities. I have also traced in the discussion above the emerging significance of cultural diplomacy as a basis for the US to articulate 'narratives of anticonquest' that legitimated the extension of American power into post-colonial areas. In the next section I explore how these narratives and other representational practices shaped the development of American cultural diplomacy in the aftermath of the Second World War.

The Challenge of Post-War Cultural Diplomacy: Courting Propaganda

In Washington it was felt at the end of the Second World War that a durable post-war settlement depended on the marshalling of the forces of international understanding and cultural rehabilitation in the interests of peace. As Secretary of State Edward Settinius had asserted:

> the United States is in 'for keeps' this time. Our interests are deeply involved in the peace and well-being of Europe, as they are in the peace and well-being of Asia and we shall support our interests...not in any sense for domination or advantage but in the spirit of...peace and security.[95]

In an address made shortly after assuming office on April 12, 1945, President Harry Truman similarly declared an American commitment to international understanding as the basis for a lasting peace:

> Ignorance and its handmaidens, prejudice, intolerance, suspicion of our fellow men, breed dictators. And they breed wars. Civilization cannot survive an atomic war...And so we must look to education in

[95] Edward Settinius. "Mobilisation for Peace and Reconstruction through the United Nations Organisation: London, October 19, 1945" *Department of State Bulletin* 2399, (October 14, 1945), p. 560.

> the long run to wipe out that ignorance which threatens catastrophe. Intelligent men do not hate other men just because their religion may be different, because their habits and language may be different, or because their national origin or color may be different. It is up to education to bring about that deeper international understanding which is so vital to world peace.[96]

Both confidential and public policy statements on cultural diplomacy in this period rendered America's objectives as broadly conceived *internationalist* interests rather than narrower national priorities. And there were some wider reasons why these kinds of representations in US cultural diplomacy were resonant during the post-war phase. In June that year Washington had taken a leading role at the founding conference of the United Nations Organisation in San Francisco. President Roosevelt had been the key instigator of the UN proposals in the lead-up to the conference, having ensured British and Russian support for the idea at the Yalta Conference in February, and having hosted the Dumbarton Oaks UN planning meetings, as well as sponsoring the Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference from mid-1944. These broader developments encouraged cultural diplomats in their depiction of American national interests as singularly global in their character, and the language they mobilised that America had a cultural claim to exercise global leadership in turn reinforced the transition toward the embedding of American power within the global order. However, despite this general embrace of embedded internationalism in US foreign policy, and given the costs these new initiatives had imposed on the US, Congressional funding for cultural diplomacy was slashed in 1945-46, and a series of disruptive bureaucratic reorganisations ensued.[97]

In 1944 the functions of the Division of Cultural Relations had been transferred to a new Science, Education, and Art Division under a newly created Office of Public Information.[98] By early 1945 an Assistant Secretary of State for Public and Cultural Relations position was created. It was first occupied by Archibald MacLeish, then subsequently by William Benton after 1945, George V. Allen from 1948, and

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[96] Harry Truman, "Fordham Address," *New York Herald Tribune* May 12, 1946.
[97] On these disruptions see, e.g.: Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, Ch. 5.
[98] Later that year the Science, Education, and Art Division was subdivided into internal geographical divisions, and its name was changed to the Division of Cultural Cooperation.

Edward Barrett from 1950. The Division of Cultural Cooperation (as it had become known during the war) was abolished in 1946, and integrated into an overarching Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, which itself was replaced the next year by an Office of Information and Educational Exchange. The legislative basis for the State Department's cultural diplomacy program was also left uncertain in this period, and ongoing efforts from 1939 to introduce bills in Congress for a permanent cultural diplomacy program beyond the provisions of the 1936 Pan American treaties were unsuccessful.[99] Although these unsettled bureaucratic arrangements hampered Washington's cultural diplomacy operations, they also prompted numerous restatements of the cultural diplomacy program's basic premises and approach. There is thus ample evidence during this phase from which we can assess how US policy-makers discursively located the functions of cultural diplomacy in the context of the post-war settlement and how they represented US foreign relations in general.

As Henry Kellerman's memoir of the American occupation of Germany observes, America's cultural and educational approach in consolidating the Allied victory, was a:

> case without precedent. For the first time in modern history a victor used the vast range of his cultural resources and the potential of his citizens in a common and contributing effort to assist the vanquished in rebuilding his national institutions and his relations with the entire world. Indeed, the reeducation or reorientation program must have appeared as a wholly inconsistent and unorthodox undertaking to a people who remembered the reparations of the 'dictate of Versailles' and could therefore rightfully expect far more severe retribution.[100]

During the Allied occupation German educational and cultural institutions were overhauled, and as early as 1946 the long-term goals of this policy were defined as ensuring "the development of educational methods, institutions, programs and materials designed to further the creation of democratic attitudes and practices through

[99] See Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy*, pp. 226-7.
[100] Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy*, pp. 10-1.

education."[101] However there were tensions between this politically instrumental role that cultural diplomacy was to play in reorienting formerly belligerent societies and the presupposition of US anti-propagandism that cultural officials had traditionally sought to uphold. The modernising imperative behind US cultural diplomacy in relation to China and India had been one thing, but the outright occupation of Axis areas presented a more acute rhetorical challenge. The principle of reciprocity was contradicted by the very nature of the occupation functions, and in this context "the conflict between [cultural diplomacy] purists and pragmatists was never fully resolved" in relation to the post-war occupations.

> Political considerations continued to motivate and often to shape policies governing the US exchange program. Fundamentally humanitarian and avowedly 'nonpolitical,' the educational and cultural relations program sponsored by the Department of State was established because international communication and understanding through cooperative person-to-person relations were considered to be a necessary aspect of foreign relations. Mutual understanding through this means was considered to be an important part of the larger foreign policy goal of international peace. Thus the exchange program was from the beginning a part of the international political scene.[102]

One British memorandum on cultural relations from this period had defined 'propaganda' as the total identification of a national culture with the objectives and purposes of a particular regime or political ideology.[103] As Kellerman's reflections highlight, when the US sought to rehabilitate occupied areas and eliminate residues of Nazi sentiment America's post-war cultural diplomats sought to justify why their work had moved rather closer to this kind of activity. The tension between connecting

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[101] Joint Chiefs of Staff Memorandum #1779 quoted in *ibid.*, p. 21.

[102] *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9. On the shift from post-war 'democratic re-education' to anti-communism within US cultural diplomacy, and on the perceived intersection among State Department officials between economic aid and political consciousness (for example, Marshall Plan funds supplied for German home-ownership so that the German people would develop a greater appreciation for capitalist norms of private property rather than turning to socialism), see: Rebecca Boehling, "The Role of Culture in American Relations with Europe: The Case of the United States's Occupation of Germany," *Diplomatic History* 23, (no. 1, Winter 1999).

[103] "The British Council and the Maintenance of British Influence Abroad," (no author), p. 9; General Correspondence on Cultural Propagnada 1919-1938, FO 431/4; Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, Kew.

America's liberal commitment to freedoms to the exercise of power (and the circumscribing of Europe's freedom to choose its own political future in the process) was an underlying paradox within the narrative of post-war European reform that cultural diplomats articulated in this period. It was not, and indeed could not, be fully resolved in this period.

In his history of post-war Austria Reinhold Wagonleitner similarly notes that a fundamental dilemma arose between the political values of US cultural diplomacy and the pragmatic requirements of occupation. Specifically, US cultural diplomats faced a particularly acute tension between narratives that stressed the open, pluralistic tone of America's democracy, and the need to circumscribe free speech for the sake of forestalling socialism on the European continent at the operational level.[104] In addition to promoting democracy through cultural diplomacy, the principles of free trade and free markets had been elevated as key principles to convey as part of the Department of State's broader conception of how to bring about material and ideological progress in Europe.

> On the one hand, US planners were thoroughly convinced that the 'liberal' capitalistic system of the United States could, as it were, be equated with the culmination of all previous human forms of organization, superseding all other social systems not only materially but morally as well. On the other hand, the need of the conquered people to *change their culture* was equally based upon the unshakable, optimistic faith in progress, assuming that long-range political reforms and the establishment of Western democracy can be achieved only by an open, pluralistic, liberal education.[105]

Richard Pells also notes in a detailed study of US-European relations that Washington's cultural and intellectual engagement with Europe was particularly strident when it came to making the point that capitalism was crucial to Europe's future political and social stability, as if the moral dilemmas of circumscribing political freedoms could be sublimated by Washington's sponsorship of free enterprise. Discourses of enterprise

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[104] Reinhold Wagonleitner, *Coca-Colanisation and the Cold War: The Cultural Mission of the United States in Austria after the Second World War*, trans. Diana M. Wolf, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994).

[105] My emphasis added. Wagonlietner, *Coca-Colanisation*, p. 67.

and free markets were entering the realm of cultural diplomacy discourse to the extent that:

> when officials in Washington tried to 'reeducate' the Germans, or offered Europeans the Marshall Plan, or helped Hollywood reclaim its European markets, or defended the ideals of free trade in the face of Europe's cultural protectionism, they were acting on a set of assumptions rooted in America's Puritan and Jeffersonian past, and in its more entrepreneurial present. If- with assistance from America- people elsewhere were given the same democratic freedoms and the same economic skills, if they modernised along American lines, if they purchased American consumer goods and learned English well enough to enjoy America's mass culture, then they would surely turn into 'Americans' themselves.[106]

In situating economic freedom as a key principle for post-war reforms in Europe, cultural diplomacy officials greeted the rise of social democratic movements in Europe with incomprehension and, in some cases, condemnation. The linkage between capitalism and freedom that the discourses of post-war cultural reconstruction encompassed thus became the basis of one of the key tenets of Washington's role in the Cold War struggle. As one US diplomat has reflected:

> It seems, in retrospect, it's going to very difficult to explain to our children that we had a problem when we were in the process of giving the Europeans the wherewithal to start their economies up, and we were making these enormous sacrifices and having this extremely forward-looking economic policy, and yet we had to argue with the Europeans and explain it.[107]

Although reciprocity had been in a key framing and operational principle of the early phase of US cultural diplomacy, when it came to the economic reconstruction reciprocity and openness had limits. As Pells reflected, the American cultural policies were not wholly successful, and the propagation of American capitalist ideology in Germany can be regarded as "a case study of how a country that was determined to defend its national traditions and local customs in the face of enormous outside

[106] Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*, (Basic Books: New York, 1997), pp. xiii-xiv.
[107] Harold Kaplan, "Oral History Interview, October 19, 1990," p. 16; Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection; Georgetown University Lauinger Library Special Collections.

pressure." The German people demonstrated how it was possible to "adapt to, modify, and resist the political and cultural policies of the United States." This mixture of acquiescence and defiance, according to Pells, would shape Western European responses to American power for decades to come.[108]

In addition to economic ideology, international interdependence was a key theme that featured as Washington's cultural role in the post-war order was narrated, both in endogenous policy contexts and to international audiences. An undated memorandum from the Division of Cultural Relations written during the Second World War had set out these assumptions in unequivocal terms:

> In the interdependent world of today the activities of every nation vitally affect the peoples of other nations. It is recognised that other peoples are concerned mainly with the impact of the United States on their particular interests and territories. They feel that the United States affects them in at least three important respects: 1) By the contribution of the United States to the maintenance of peace; 2) By the impact of American foreign policy and of non-Governmental United States activities on their areas; 3) By the ways in which American practices, beliefs, and activities are relevant to the needs of their areas.[109]

The deepening of international interdependence was narrated by US policy-makers as a function of imminent technological and economic change that required harnessing by the exercise of US power and the establishment of international institutions. As the

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[108] Pells, *Not Like Us,* p. 42. Nico Wilterdink has argued that while European populations often appeared to incorporate US cultural products and practices into their lives, there was also a degree of hesitancy and self-censorship in how they resisted US cultural dominance. US cultural officials and many historians since have thus misunderstood the extent to which US culture dominated and was incorporated into European society in the early post-war period. Rather, this was a matter of short-term European acquiescence to US cultural programs, stemming from their gratitude for the US for the war effort. See: Nico Wilterdink, "The Netherlands Between the Greater Powers: Expressions of Resistance to Perceived or Feared Cultural Domination," in *Within the US Orbit: Small National Cultures Vis-à-vis the United States*, ed. Rob Kroes, (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1991). Rob Kroes has also surveyed in numerous elements of cultural reistance to US power. See, e.g.: Rob Kroes, *If You've Seen One You've Seen the Mall: Europeans and American Mass Culture*, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1996); Rob Kroes, "American Empire and Cultural Imperialism: A View from the Receiving End," *Diplomatic History* 23, (no. 3, Summer 1999), pp. 463-77. William Hitchcock's *France Restored* also makes a valuable contribution. In it he surveys France's use of cultural diplomacy and multilateral influence to recover their lost prestige and capabilities in the post-1945 world order. William Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe*, 1944-1954, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998).

[109] "Objectives and Principles of the International Information and Cultural Program," (no author), (July 11, 1946), p. 1; IIA 1938-1953; RG 59; NARA.

Division of Cultural Relations' Haldore Hanson had argued in 1944, the war had signified the 'shrinking' of the world, revealing processes that "may change the nature of international relations of our generation more completely than any other generation." With the advent of more rapid communications and travel, Americans "will be informed about our neighbours...they in turn will be in a position to learn about us. The attitudes of the people of one nation toward the people of another are likely to exert an ever-increasing influence upon foreign policy."[110]

The principle of diplomatic reciprocity was brought into these discourses of international interdependence and the necessity of strengthening the Washington's global influence to manage it. The representation of Washington's hegemonic global role in this phase highlights how the more longstanding commonplaces of US cultural diplomacy discourse- as a vehicle for the international expression of a liberal political culture- could be refashioned to suit the much broader parameters of American foreign policy in the post-war period. This was emphasised in January, 1945, in correspondence on cultural diplomacy and the Foreign Service received by Assistant Secretary of State Edward Barrett.

> The role of the information officer particularly must be reciprocal. He will have far more effective if he constantly stresses that he is interested in the exchange of information between the United States and other nations. A good article on French music placed in an American journal may have far more effect that half a dozen articles on American music in French periodicals. I think the people of any nation are probably less interested in the United States than they are interested in what the United States thinks of them. While we are not primarily concerned with feeding this latter interest, our outposts have demonstrated again and again that it can be used most effectively in the placing of our particular message.[111]

Although the familiar terms of discourse in cultural diplomacy policy-making had been maintained in these kinds of statements, the Division faced ongoing dilemmas about

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[110] Haldore Hansen, "America's Need for Understanding in China," pp. 624-5.

[111] Emphasis in original. H. H. Arnason to Edward W. Barrett, (January 29, 1945), p. 3; Chronological File 1944-45; Records of Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

how to approach cultural engagement with post-war Europe, particularly in the light of the post-war successes across the Continent of Soviet propaganda. Frank Ninkovich characterises the 1945-47 period as a phase during which debates among cultural diplomacy officials between 'pragmatists' and 'idealists' emerged, and discursive practices were central to how proponents of each view sought to shape policy decisions.[112] Advocates of the traditional 'idealistic' approach to US cultural diplomacy emphasised that the cultural programs could navigate the issues of post-war European reconstruction and confronting the USSR by maintaining the principles of reciprocity and anti-propagandism. A public address by the Division's Charles J. Child on engaging with the Soviet public was able in these terms to express the conviction that "people can speak more directly to each other through the medium of the arts," and with a strong program of Soviet-American exchanges "we can gradually build a trade in ideas which will leave lend-lease far behind in value given and received."[113]

However, by the late 1940s a wartime posture had returned to the cultural diplomacy program, and 'pragmatism' gained increasing purchase as an inducement to extending the cultural diplomacy programs and other US diplomatic tools into areas where they might forestall the advance of Communism. By late 1947, the Soviet cultural program was being routinely characterised as having "an energy and resourcefulness which showed that Stalin's regime, for all its monolithic intractability, could avail itself of an imaginative vigour unmatched by western governments."[114] With the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill through Congress in January 1948- a response to wider concerns about Soviet propaganda- American cultural diplomacy had a legislative basis for the first time, and the discourses of US cultural diplomacy took on a more combative tone, though this shift was not without its own sources of ambiguity and paradox.[115] In the next section I examine how the discursive practices of

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[112] Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 126

[113] Charles J. Child, "Cultural Cooperation with the Soviet Union," *Department of State Bulletin* 2430, (November 18, 1945), pp. 815-6.

[114] Frances Stonor Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters*, (New York: The New Press, 1999), p. 17.

[115] The Smith Mundt Bill (Public Law 402) passed Congress in January 1948. The Bill's formal title was The United States Informational and Educational Exchange Act, 1948, however it is more often referred to as the Smith Mundt Bill. It provided the first comprehensive legislation for information and cultural activities. The immediate impact of the Bill was felt most within the international information program, and a more comprehsive discussion of the Bill is provided in the next chapter.

US cultural diplomacy were shaped by these early Cold War concerns, and specifically how representations of threats within the international order enabled the adoption of a more instrumental and politicised program of US cultural engagement.

Cultural Diplomacy and the Cultural Cold War

During 1945-46 US diplomats increasingly feared that cultural diplomacy had been adopted by the USSR as a vehicle for propaganda and subversion rather than for 'peaceful' objectives such as the deepening of international understanding and the consolidation of the post-war order.[116] Not only was cultural diplomacy now a routine and accepted component of US foreign relations, international tensions had rendered cultural subversion and covert psychological warfare more acceptable to the Truman administration for the purposes of ideological combat. A 1945 report to the head of the American Office of Strategic Services foreshadowed the adoption of covert cultural operations, locating Soviet cultural diplomacy as an instrument of international combat in an era of mass participation in geopolitics:

> our enemies will be even freer...to propagandise, subvert, sabotage and exert...pressures upon us, and we ourselves shall be more willing to bear these affronts and ourselves to indulge in such methods- in our eagerness to avoid at all costs the tragedy of open war.[117]

By February, 1946, George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' from the Moscow embassy had warned of the depth of Soviet antipathy toward the United States, predicting that "lip service will...be rendered to desirability of deepening cultural contacts between peoples, but this will not in practice be interpreted in any way which could weaken the

[116] As Walter Hixon notes, the Soviet cultural diplomacy program had been restarted as a consequence of Stalin's resentment toward the West over war strategy issues. Hixon also suggests that the USSR extended its cultural programs due to the expectation that the US and Britain sought to infiltrate the USSR through their technical assistance and cultural diplomacy programs. It is important to thus note that this move toward suspicion of the other's cultural motives appear to be mutual. Walter Hixon, *Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture and the Cold War, 1945-61*, (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997), p. 7.

[117] Gregory Bateson (1945), quoted in Frances Stonor Saunders, *Cultural Cold War*, p. 17.

security position of Soviet peoples."[118] With the President's proclamation of the 'Truman Doctrine' for economic aid to Greece and Turkey in March, 1947, a significant new departure in American grand strategy was heralded. A wide-ranging strategy of economic and political assistance was adopted to forestall the extension of Communism within Europe.[119] The implementation of the Truman Doctrine also incorporated cultural functions, and situated the significance of cultural diplomacy in US foreign policy as an instrument of reorientation and reconstruction, not 'understanding' or 'reciprocity.' In extending US assistance to the Greek and Turkish education systems, the State Department envisaged cultural diplomacy as a mechanism to consolidate the 'democratic' factions within these states.[120] These developments signalled new understandings of cultural diplomacy, as having a more central place in US grand strategy and national security policy.

The State Department's cultural diplomacy program was increasingly being envisaged as an instrument with which to undermine Soviet influence. Washington's superior openness to cultural interchange was represented as its key advantage in the context of these debates as a basis to expose the increasingly dogmatic and unilateralist format of the Soviet programs. As one State Department memorandum on bilateral cultural exchanges with the Soviet Union of November, 1946 had noted, in its cultural diplomacy programs: "the United States has an opportunity to demonstrate to the Soviet Union its earnest desire for friendship in a way not otherwise possible and in a manner which will not interfere with our diplomatic position." But in the event of a Soviet snub, advantage could be gained by making the world aware "that we had done the best to be friendly and was [*sic.*] spurned...the Department cannot lose by making such an offer."[121] These kinds of policy strategies indicate how the internationalist paradigm of cultural interchange was being alloyed with a contending view of cultural diplomacy as an instrument of the Cold War conflict.

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[118] Kennan quoted in Nigel Gould Davies,"The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, (no. 2, April 2003), p. 198.
[119] Harry Truman, "Truman Doctrine" in *The Truman Administration: A Documentary History*, eds. Barton J. Bernstein and Allen J. Matusow, (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 251-6.
[120] Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 134.
[121] Fred Warner Neal, to William T. Stone, "Exchange of Persons with Russia," (September 26, 1946), p. 1; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

In 1947 US spending on cultural diplomacy increased for the first time since the post-war cutbacks. Funds for the cultural diplomacy programs in Germany alone that year reached a peak of $6,040,064. However, US spending on cultural and informational diplomacy combined was still comparatively low at a sum of $30,123,086, having not yet surpassed the United Kingdom's combined budget of $42,588,452 according to British figures.[122] More significant, however, is that it was on the grounds of 'defence' rather than 'international understanding' that the US funding increases passed Congress. In the course of 1947 the rationale for extending US cultural diplomacy practices shifted away from the construction of a liberal political and economic order in Europe toward the defence of the continent against Communist subversion. Throughout 1947 the State Department received numerous direly-worded memoranda from US diplomats stationed in Europe claiming that America had been subject to a barrage of Soviet verbal attacks in all manner of cultural and intellectual frameworks. A report from the Moscow embassy in July, 1947 had warned of Washington's dwindling ability to influence the ideological debate Europe. By this time the USSR had launched a cultural initiative known as the 'Peace Offensive,' and in this context the Embassy had reported that:

> [u]nbelievable as it may seem, the Soviets appear to be steadily convincing the mass of the people of many lands that in the USSR lies the great white hope of the future, while the US constitutes the dark terror...It is unfortunate that almost at the inception of an international cultural program by the US government developments should take place which make it necessary to consider introducing into that program an element of contest. Yet the developments are taking place and we have a responsibility of squarely facing up to the issue, something which it seems we have not yet done.[123]

In addition to the growing realisation that cultural diplomacy had been turned into an instrument of Soviet hegemony, particularly within the US intelligence agencies, the

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[122] On US spending to Germany, see: Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy*, p. 9. On comparative figures see: Foreign Office of the United Kingdom, to William Benton, "Comparative Expenditures and Personnel by Country- Europe," Appendix A, (November 7, 1946); IIA, 1938-53; RG 59; NARA. See also: Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 132.

[123] Mose Harvey, Moscow Embassy, to William T. Stone and staff, (July 3, 1947), p. 1; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

State Department's geographical bureaus- especially the Western and Eastern Europe Divisions- became increasingly interested in cultural foreign policy instruments from 1946-47. After two years of occupation in Germany, the Department of Defence also took more interest in cultural diplomacy and international educational policies as vital determinants of the ideological trajectory of Europe.[124]

This broader instrumentalist view of cultural diplomacy across Washington encouraged the return of ideological struggle (initially articulated against the Axis) as a key rationale for US cultural diplomacy within policy discourses of the Division of Cultural Relations during 1947.[125] The tenure of William Benton as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs was a particularly important factor in hastening the rise of Cold War antagonism as the prevailing frame for US cultural diplomacy. As a strong advocate for informational operations with a commitment to finding better measurements for the impact of cultural and informational programs, Benton's role as Assistant Secretary has been characterised as imbibing a sense of 'international salesmanship' into the diplomacy of American culture and information.[126] One memorandum of April, 1947 had optimistically suggested that Washington could integrate its liberal traditions and the new instrumentalism that circumstances demanded, asking: "must we abandon our efforts to inform the peoples of the world about the US, and turn to thrust and counter-thrust against Communist doctrine and propaganda?...We do not need to abandon one objective in order to work toward the other."[127] The statement captures the dilemma of the period, but it did not halt the shift toward a combative, instrumental tone within the cultural diplomacy program. Although the language of liberalism remained pervasive within cultural policy debates,

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[124] On the role of Defence in cultural and educational reconstruction programs see Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy*. Europe was very much the focus of the cultural diplomacy debates in this period. US interests in Asia, Latin America, and other regions were somewhat neglected, particularly as far as the envisaging of culture as an instrument of ideological struggle was concerned. In particular, the ideological struggle in China was absent from these discussions of US cultural diplomacy policy.

[125] Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas,* p. 118. See also Arndt, *First Resort of Kings*, Ch. 8. For an account of the parallels between anti-Fascist and anti-Communist discourse in US foreign policy see: Les K. Alder and Thomas G. Paterson, "Red Fascism: The Merger of Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia in the American Image of Totalitarianism, 1930's-1950's," *American Historical Review* 75, (no. 4, 1970).

[126] *Ibid.*, p. 120.

[127] W. R. Tyler, to William T. Stone, "Notes on the OIC Program," (April 22, 1947), p. 2; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

liberalism had been somewhat reformulated in this context. In line with extant understandings of Washington's exceptional global responsibilities in the post-war era, US cultural diplomacy took on a sense of liberal absolutism, more akin to a global liberal crusade to actively undermine the enemies of liberalism than a reciprocal, free and open approach to cultural interchange. As Ninkovich observes, international tensions led the US cultural diplomacy program to be 'ideologised.'[128]

A significant milestone in American Cold War cultural diplomacy was the passage of the Information and Educational Exchange Act, better known after its Congressional sponsors as the Smith Mundt Bill, through the US House of Representatives in January, 1948. Several of the non-government US institutions that had remained advocates of cultural internationalism during the war, such as the Institute for International Education and the American Library Association, had publicly supported the Bill on the basis of its pledge to provide more funding to cultural and educational activities. However, the Smith Mundt Bill was fundamentally pragmatic and ideological rather than internationalist and reciprocal when it came to articulating the purpose and approach for the official cultural diplomacy operations.[129] References to the 'emergency importance' and 'tremendous utility' of government-sponsored cultural diplomacy, educational exchanges and international information repeatedly emerged within Congressional debates on the Bill. By deeming that the broad outlines of cultural diplomacy policy would be set by the Assistant Secretary's office, Smith Mundt presaged a more a more consolidated and politicised approach to US cultural diplomacy.[130] Still committed to his liberal rendition of cultural relations as distinct from propaganda, Ben Cherrington warned during the Bill's final passage that Congress's provisions were not yet 'in line with American traditions.'[131]

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[128] Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 132.
[129] *Ibid.*, p. 131.
[130] As a consequence of the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill, the cultural diplomacy program was also fragmented. The cultural centres and libraries were given to a separate Division of Libraries and Institutes, and the cultural programs were placed in another separate division within the State Department. The reorganisation is discussed in more depth in Gilbert Crandall, "Winning Friends South of the Border," *Foreign Service Journal* 27, (no. 9, September, 1950).
[131] Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 129-33.

After 1948, the framing of American cultural diplomacy policy situated the broader objectives of cultural relations as 'positive action' on behalf of US interests in the context of an international 'contest' of wills. Washington's obligation to intervene globally on behalf of political and economic freedom was increasingly narrated in the context of US cultural programs in Europe. As one advisory report on the Smith Mundt Bill had warned, with the Soviet grip on Eastern Europe tightening: "more and more people are barred from understanding America's intentions and experiencing our freedoms. We can no longer afford to observe passively the rapidly shrinking area of freedom throughout the world."[132] As Gary Kraske suggests, the concept of ideological warfare that the official cultural programs had adopted to wage the Second World War became the Division's routine approach after 1948: "Cultural activities, like economic and military matters, were viewed as tools to use for realising strategic objectives...the distinction between unilateral propaganda and reciprocal co-operation became blurred."[133] The tensions that accompanied this shift are evident in the fact that the General Advisory Committee continued to advocate a traditional apolitical and reciprocal format for cultural diplomacy. In its September 1948 report the Committee reflected an ongoing propensity to render the cultural diplomacy program in idealistic terms. As the Committee had put it, the cultural programs must retain their focus on fostering "cultural exchange- not cultural penetration." The Committee also reported that:

> it is a basic fact that such a program of [cultural and educational] exchange is the natural expression of the democratic principles on which and for which we stand. The cultural achievements of the civilized world have been brought about by such cooperation... We shall continue, in cooperation with other peoples, to build the

[132] William C. Johnstone, "Cooperative Exchange Programs Under the Smith-Mundt Act," *Department of State Bulletin* 3365, (December 12, 1948), p. 739. The Smith Mundt Bill was an important milestone in the US cultural and informational programs. It provided the first formal legislative sanction of the programs, and from then on the achievements of the cultural and informational program would be subject to scrutiny in the context of the Congressional appropriations process.

[133] Gary Kraske, *Missionaries of the Book: The American Library Profession and the Origins of United States Cultural Diplomacy*, (Westport: Greenwood, 1985), p. 259.

good life which flows across national boundary lines.[134]

Overwhelmingly, Europe was the focus of the renewed and increasingly instrumental US cultural diplomacy effort after 1948. An American cultural program to China had been maintained into the post-war period, however, and policy-makers continued to emphasise educational and technical exchanges in the interests of Chinese modernisation. One of the earliest bilateral Fulbright educational exchange agreements was also signed with China in October, 1947. However, none of these initiatives had the scope to bring about the kind of long-term political changes it was hoped would occur. Although US diplomats had warned Washington that China was at the "political-cross roads," the State Department was ill-equipped to prevent Communist advances during China's civil war.[135] The official and non-government cultural diplomacy institutions proclaimed their ongoing interest in cultural exchanges with China after the Communists seized control of the Chinese mainland in 1949, however Ninkovich characterises the State Department's post-1949 cultural diplomacy efforts as drastically reduced and only 'ameliorative' in their aims.[136]

The nature of American culture itself and what it symbolised internationally was also rearticulated as a consequence of Soviet propaganda advances and the instrumental paradigm for cultural diplomacy that the Smith Mundt Bill had formalised. The non-elitist, 'civic culture' that had earlier been lauded as the basis of America's cultural appeal in Latin America and China gave way to an emphasis on American high culture and intellectual prestige in the late 1940s. This was tied to the demands of waging ideological warfare specifically within the European context.[137] Left-wing European intellectuals had become a target audience for the cultural diplomacy program as they were envisaged as key protagonists in the ideological struggle against

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[134] Report of the chair of the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange (1948) quoted in Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy*, p. 7.

[135] W. Bradley Connors (1947) quoted in Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 143. See also, Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 142-4.

[136] *Ibid.*, p. 144.

[137] At this stage, the US retained some cultural diplomacy ties with the Eastern bloc. Several of the United States Information Service posts in Eastern Europe were closed in 1948-49 at the insistence of their host governments, but many, including America House in Moscow, remained open. Consequently, my discussion of the Division's 'European' policy refers to both Western and Eastern Europe.

the Soviet Union, and various government agencies, including the newly-founded US Central Intelligence Agency, began a concerted effort to engage them.[138] American artistic and musical works were also utilised to convey American ideological prestige in a European context.[139] The changing definition of culture mobilised here is indicative of the terms of Washington's new Cold War relationship with Europe, and perhaps of several different and conflicting ways in which America was now to be positioned in relation to European political traditions. The articulation of American cultural diplomacy prior to and during the war had narrated American culture as an expression of its significance as the 'New World' and the spirit of modernity that America's historical position had garnered. America was situated as apart from Europe within this representational framework: there was an implicit logic of alterity at play, which set the US up in contra-distinction from Europe's pathological nationalism, elitism and cultural homogeneity, intended to appeal to the aspirations of colonial peoples.

However, as the US became more deeply embroiled in the cultural struggle against Soviet power in Continental Europe, policy debates within the Division began to view America's achievements in high culture and their cognisance with European aesthetics as a key resource in the Cold War struggle. Dispelling the "presupposition of American cultural retardation" thought to shared by European intellectuals thus became a component of the anti-Communist struggle.[140] Cultural policy directives increasingly took note of the way that intellectuals enjoyed "unusual respect and influence in Europe" and how intellectual prestige was one of the Soviet Union's most potent weapons in its efforts to garner support among them. For the Soviets:

> intellectuals are mobilised in part to sustain the myth that all intellectuals worthy of the name acknowledge the superiority of Marxist logic and view with sympathy the elaboration of the 'Great Socialist Experiment'...Outstanding leaders in the realm

[138] Frances Stonor Saunders provides an excellent survey of the CIA's attempt to woo European intellectuals after 1948. Stonor Saunders, *Cultural Cold War.*

[139] In this context several scholars have noted the promotion of *avant-garde* painting and music, some of it quite controversial. See, e.g.: Frank Ninkovich, "The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State Department 1938-1947," *Diplomatic History* 1, (no. 3, Summer 1977). On *avant-garde* and classical music see also Stonor Saunders, *Cultural Cold War.*

[140] W. G. Headrick (OMGUS Information Control Division, 1946) quoted in Stonor Saunders, *Cultural Cold War*, p. 20.

of the arts and sciences are also exploited.[141]

The notion of Soviet 'exploitation' reflected the prevailing constructions of the Soviet adversary as immoral, totalising, and highly instrumental in its use of culture and academia as a diplomatic instrument, prompting US policy-makers to consider how they might compete with the USSR on these terms. This constituted a move toward embracing the shared cultural traditions between Europe and America, as a foundation upon which Washington could build a better appreciation of freedom and a posture of influence among European cultural practitioners.

Richard Pells has reflected in some depth on these efforts by the US to promote its intellectual and high cultural achievements to the European intelligentsia during the late 1940s. He contends that US policy-makers, and State Department officials in particular, had difficulty understanding the sources of social democratic and pro-Marxist sentiment among the intellectuals of Western Europe, and failed to effectively engage them during the post-war period.

> It was the intelligentsia of Western Europe, more than any other group, whose refusal to distinguish between the United States and the Soviet Union most mystified and exasperated American policymakers. Edward Barrett, the assistant secretary of state for public affairs who was in charge of the campaign of truth, acknowledged Washington's bewilderment: "We are stunned to find ourselves...persistently criticised by the intellectual elite of other nations. We are baffled when we find affluent, well-educated non-Communists in France or Sweden...groping publicly for a middle course.' US officials felt that, of all people, Europe's intellectuals should realise how much their own survival was at stake in the conflict between freedom and totalitarianism, between America's reverence for civil liberties and the Stalinist repression of dissent.[142]

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[141] Public Information Committee, "The Soviet 'Peace' Offensive," (December 1, 1949), p. 6; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1947-50 (PPM. 1947-50); General Subject Files 1947-50 (Subj. 1947-50); Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1947-1950 (ASPA 1947-50); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).

[142] Pells, *Not Like Us*, p. 68.

Yet as Pells further indicates, the development of a more instrumentalist approach to cultural diplomacy in the context of US grand strategy during the late 1940s had diminished the Division's ability to engage in reciprocal and open cultural interchange.

Although a new effort to promote America's 'high' culture prevailed as the US sought to engage European context after 1948, conveying America's fundamental respect for individual initiative was still frequently highlighted as US cultural diplomats articulated the principles of American culture to the European public. Whereas a discourse of individual liberty had been a basis for attracting elite and public sentiment in the colonised world prior to 1948, US liberalism was also co-opted as a tool of ideological warfare in Europe after 1948. In this vein, in 1949 the State Department Public Information Committee guidelines suggested that, in counteracting left-wing critiques of the US in Europe: "Greater emphasis should be given the vertical mobility which characterises the fluid social structure of the US. It is useful in this connection to point to the proportion of worker-farmer children enrolled in American universities today."[143]

Assistant Secretary of State George Allen, who replaced Benton in 1948, drew in a statement of that year on the underlying sentiment of American exceptionalism that underscored prevailing representations of US culture, including the idea of America's singular social mobility. He characterised US policies as traditionally open and honest; Americans were "not obliged to present ourselves to the world as models of perfection," hence:

> [t]he primary advantage we have over the propaganda efforts of totalitarian states today is the fact that...[t]he United States has so many virtues to overcome the shortcomings that we need not fear the effect of our being thoroughly known abroad... We have the enormous advantage...that we are willing to admit our imperfections.[144]

[143] Public Information Committee, "The Soviet 'Peace' Offensive," (December 1, 1949); PPM 1947-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.
[144] George V. Allen, quoted in Lloyd Leheras, "Information Please, International," *The American Foreign Service Journal* 25, (no. 9, 1948), p. 10.

Such a statement belied the increasingly selective format that US cultural diplomacy initiatives were adopting in the post Smith Mundt phase. While State Department officials were also quick to condemn the USSR for rejecting US cultural and scientific exchange proposals in the late 1940s, by 1950 Washington was placing its own obstacles in the way of Soviet travel to the US with the first of two McCarran Acts, which restricted the number Soviet-bloc visitors allowed into to the United States.[145] Allen's statement also belied the selective approach symbolised by instructions issued in 1948 to US government-run libraries throughout the world advising them to stock more explicitly anti-Communist literature, much of which had been directly commissioned by the US government. In a particularly embarrassing incident for the State Department in Germany, after being unsure of how to dispose of literature that was no longer allowed in the USIS library, the purged titles from the American library were destroyed in a bonfire outside the US Embassy.

However, anti-propagandism, reciprocity and openness remained key frames within both public and internal statements on Washington's approach to cultural diplomacy. One policy statement on the library and book exchange program noted that despite the pressures of Soviet propaganda, liberalism and free speech remained the philosophical inspiration for the program.[146] The US libraries abroad were thus a 'vital responsibility' because:

> Leadership cannot assert itself through power alone. American leadership is meaningless if it isn't built upon respect for our moral purposes in the world. This has been recognised by the American people from our earliest beginnings as an independent nation. Our Declaration of Independence speaks of a 'decent respect' for the 'opinions of mankind'. Everything of a major nature we have done in our history has taken into account such a 'decent respect' for the opinions of others. We are concerned about the opinions of others because a free nation has the obligation in the conduct of its foreign affairs to justify its actions before the world community.[147]

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[145] On the State Department's condemnation of Soviet travel restrictions see: Department of State Press Release, "Efforts to Establish Cultural-Scientific Exchange Blocked by the USSR," *Department of State Bulletin* 3479, (April 3, 1949), P. 403. The McCarran Act (1950) is formally known as the Internal Security Act, and sometimes as the Subversive Activities Control Act.

[146] Department of State, *Report on the Book and Library Program, July 1953*, Unpublished Report. Lauinger Library: Georgetown University.

[147] *Ibid.*, p. 64

The ongoing relevance of America's founding principles in the framing of America's approach to cultural relations was also highlighted in an editorial in the *Foreign Service Journal* in 1951, which noted:

> Periodically, for ourselves, we need a rediscovery of America, a new turning to the political foundations of our country, its religious forces, its literature, art and educational institutions...As this rediscovery of our own resources takes place the world will know it. For the world is hungrier for ideals than for gadgets. Let us therefore, in the midst of our planning...for the free world, reserve a special place for ideals. These we need and these the world needs.[148]

These statements drew on longstanding themes within the discursive representation of US cultural diplomacy by situating the Washington's global role as a manifestation of apolitical, reciprocal impulses. Yet behind this celebration of free speech a more narrow conception of cultural diplomacy, as an instrument of ideological warfare, was being adopted within Washington. Hence, articulating America's tradition of free speech in this way seems part of the 'irony' of Washington's Cold War posture that Reinhold Niebuhr identified, and also an indication that this 'irony' was a source of symbolic power within the US cultural diplomacy programs.[149] Celebrating America's commitment to liberalism was the grounds upon which engagement in ideological warfare was seen to be necessary after 1948, even though the tenets of liberalism would seem to contradict the kind of selective policies the Division was developed.

Conclusion

With the reorganisation of American informational diplomacy by President Dwight Eisenhower in 1953, the apolitical cultural internationalism that the staff of the Division of Cultural Relations had articulated during its existence as an autonomous Division was submerged within a broader self-regarding and instrumentalist approach

[148] "Aims and Ideals: Editorial," *The American Foreign Service Journal* 28, (no. 8, 1951), p. 26.
[149] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 133.

to ideological warfare in Washington. With the National Security Council more heavily involved in shaping the objectives and approach of US cultural diplomacy, fewer opportunities existed after the 1953 reorganisation for a diversity of opinion and debate among policy-makers.

The pre-1953 period represents a phase in which the contradictions and challenges in framing a conceptual and discursive basis of American cultural diplomacy remained fluid and subject to contending perspectives. The discursive constitution of American cultural diplomacy was formative in the context of Washington's identity as a hegemonic power because cultural and ideological issues were deeply bound up with the struggle against the Axis and the USSR undertaken in this period. The notion America had singular capabilities as a practitioner of cultural diplomacy, due to its political heritage, civic culture and reciprocal approach, served as a foundation for narratives that subsequently situated American culture as a global template of modernity and democracy. This narrative of liberal politics and civic cultural traditions had symbolic significance as a frame that depicted American national interests as non-aggrandising or *internationalist* in character, a premise that was deeply resonant in policy debates concerning post-war US foreign policy. The modernising, technocratic logic that informed US cultural diplomacy within Third World contexts highlights the function of discourse in opening new avenues for foreign policy. Washington's engagement with authoritarian regimes was *made possible* by the discourses of cultural modernisation in China, with democracy scripted as the outcome, but not the prerequisite, of American cultural and technical assistance. In all cases, while I have focused on the construction of Washington's global role in terms of cultural diplomacy, many aspects of America's broader foreign policy posture and entanglements were tied in with the representations of the US self and the international others Washington that sought to engage.

In a key sense, the cultural narratives that framed US cultural diplomacy objectives mobilised a vocabulary of American singularity and global vindication that resonated across the spectrum of US foreign policy discourse in the 1945-46 period and shaped the America's global role more broadly. In the terms of this discourse the US could stand apart from aggrandising practices and promote democratic change in the

post-war order on the grounds of its domestic cultural attributes and political virtues. This post-war exceptionalism also fed into the re-emergence of conditions of ideological struggle after 1947-48, and in key respects the paradox between liberalism and power was a generative tension that encouraged Washington's deepening involvement in world affairs. The liberalising functions that policy-makers ascribed to cultural diplomacy helped to constituted the USSR, in a relation of alterity, as an inherent threat to the United States from 1947. Although some policy-makers expressed concerns that America's identity was being compromised by the use of culture as an instrument of ideological struggle in the early Cold War, America's singular ability to resolve these tensions also figured in the construction of the USSR's of alterity and encouraged the adoption of a Cold War posture of cultural combat in this period.

I shall return to these observations about the broader characteristics of discursive practice and the formation of US cultural diplomacy policy in the concluding chapter of this study. In it I shall survey the discourses connecting American identity for its foreign relations and international influence across the three areas of policy examined here. In the forthcoming chapter, I turn to the discursive practices associated with the formation of US information policy during 1942-53. Similar patterns of representation to those which were undertaken in relation to cultural diplomacy can be detected, as policy-makers grappled with the 'propagandistic' implications of unilateral information broadcasting by the Voice of America radio station, and in how the transition to a Cold War posture in US informational diplomacy was affected through the articulation of logics of alterity in relation to the USSR.

CHAPTER FOUR

MOBILISING INFORMATION: THE VOICE OF AMERICA AS A 'JOURNALIST' AND A 'DIPLOMAT'[1]

The Voice of America (VOA) made its first international radio broadcast, a German news bulletin, on February 24, 1942. The feature was broadcast from studios located in New York City that had been hastily assembled in the 79 days since Japan's surprise attack on the U.S. Navy at Pearl Harbour. VOA's mandate was initially a modest one, spanning three general objectives: to garner public support for the Allied war effort among both neutral and allied populations; to undertake psychological warfare in Axis and occupied areas; and to convey general and unbiased news about the US and the war effort to both. Although the Executive Order establishing VOA had specified that the station would be given general policy direction by the Department of State, Voice staff in New York retained significant independence in determining the editorial and programming style of the station at its founding and into the early post-war years. Consequently, the staff of the Voice tended to characterise their work in terms of VOA's third objective- supplying unbiased news and information- during the

[1] I would like to remind the reader at this point of some caveats issues the historical sources used in this chapter. I have drawn extensively on the archival records of the Office of War Information (OWI) and its successor agencies in researching this chapter. As the overarching authority with the responsibility for setting the Voice's policy, the OWI's records contain a large amount of evidence reflecting the discursive practices associated with US broadcasting policy. I would also remind the reader that here I almost always use the term 'informational diplomacy' to refer to the Voice of America alone, although in more general contexts one might use this term to cover such practices as international broadcasting, printed media, and film distribution collectively.

I have included evidence in the form of directives for general US information policy- covering the Voice as well as other components of the US information programs such as print and film- *as well as* directives that were specific to the Voice. Both general and specific directives are, I believe, important indications of the discursive practices of US informational diplomacy. The reader is referred to the introductory chapter to note that this chapter does not cover Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.

Finally, the terms used here to cover the dual paradigms of VOA's functions are 'journalistic' and 'diplomatic' discourses. The 'journalistic' paradigm of US information programs was a term coined in Shawn J. Parry-Giles's account of Eisenhower-era US informational diplomacy, and highlights the ways in which US informational diplomacy was represented as taking an apolitical, supplementary media role. I use the 'diplomatic' paradigm to encompass the more pragmatic, instrumental vision of the function of cultural diplomacy that many quarters in Washington held during the Second World War. See, Shawn J. Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency, Propaganda, and the Cold War, 1945-1955*, (Westport: Praeger, 2002).

war and in its immediate aftermath. They represented VOA as far broader in scope than simply waging the military and ideological struggle of the Second World War, despite the fact that it was the circumstances of war that had enabled informational diplomacy to be contemplated as a feature of US foreign policy in the first place. Rather, from the outset the Voice constituted its role as having the wider objective of establishing a liberal information order and spreading democracy internationally, mobilising in the process a conception of America's place in the world that was singular and embedded, and thus clearly distinct from what it had been the war.

In the case of VOA, with its unidirectional diplomatic format, the issue of how to clearly distinguish US information policy from 'propaganda' was particularly acute. Hence, the way in which policy-makers represented America's information programs played a particularly important function in rendering information activities a possible and desirable component of US foreign policy. VOA's stated function as seeking to both inform and persuade its audience placed policy-makers in something of a quandary: how could the underlying ideas about Washington's liberal, rationalist credentials be embodied as an informational practice? On occasion the term 'propaganda' was used in public or confidential contexts to describe the Voice's work, but almost always in a qualified sense, with terms such as 'true propaganda' or 'white propaganda' coming into usage. Assistant Secretary of State Ed Barrett went so far as to suggest that Washington's approach to international information was so fundamentally distinctive that it constituted an entirely new category of diplomatic practice, in which advocacy on behalf of US interests could be contemplated but "the old concocted type of horror stories were out of bounds."[2] Elsewhere Barrett stated that American information work could be called propaganda, but only 'in the best sense of the word.'[3] 'European' power politics and the purely instrumental deployment of information was held up in contrast to Washington's empancipatory and anti-imperialist approach to international information in this period. Elmer Davis, who

[2] Edward W. Barrett, "Oral History Interview July 9, 1974," Harry S. Truman Presidential Library Oral History Project, Library of Congress Manuscripts Division, p. 5.
[3] Edward W. Barrett, "Mobilization of American Strength for World Security," *Department of State Bulletin* 4012, (November 6, 1950), p. 735.

made several interesting public addresses on the question of propaganda and US policy, echoed the 'authorship' idea mobilised in the context of US cultural diplomacy to argue that what was distinctive about the US programs was its intention.

> It may be said that [State Department programs] must be propaganda in intention, otherwise why should the State Department conduct it? ... the intention is to see that foreign countries get a complete picture of what is going on in America...I believe that in the long run that the total picture will create a good impression of the United States however bad things may look momentarily.[4]

In this context, an implicit narrative of America's advancement along the path of modernisation was promulgated, which played up America's historical break from Europe in casting the New World as an agent of global democratic renewal, global stability and economic liberalisation.[5]

In articulating the Voice's broadcasting style as a unique kind of diplomatic activity- an 'information' effort not a 'propaganda' operation- US officials mobilised several elements of the inter-war anti-propaganda critique to articulate their new conception of American informational diplomacy. Grammars of predication classified US informational practices as seeking to *affirm* the American people's repudiation of propaganda. This practice of predication was a key process in enabling Washington to undertake informational diplomacy. Informational policy-makers frequently located their work (in terms similar to the idea of an American culturalist constituency in the cultural diplomacy programs) as the voice of the American people amplified onto the world stage, downplaying in both internal and public statements VOA's function as an instrument of Washington. Most significantly, the paradox between the foreign policy function and liberal principles that VOA encompassed was resolved through a dual discursive representation of the Voice. VOA was articulated as both a 'journalistic' institution that reported the truth and publicised American society and culture, as well as a 'diplomat' in simultaneously seeking to influence international outcomes and co-

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[4] Elmer Davis, "Address of Elmer Davis to the Chicago Rotary Club, 26 February, 1940," p. 9; Box 4; Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division. p. 9.

[5] The logic of opposition is illustrated in the following piece: Alexander Rapoport, "The Russian Broadcasts of the Voice of America," *Russian Review* 16, (no. 3, July, 1957), p. 3.

opt global political attitudes.[6] These descriptors created ambiguities and contradictions in VOA policy debates, particularly during the Second World War, and sustaining them required an ongoing rhetorical effort. Two quotes illustrate the contrasting vocabularies of the Voice's composite role, the first rendering the Voice's work in 'journalistic' terms, the second emphasising 'diplomatic' contribution informational diplomacy could make to US foreign relations.

> We must make the truth known to the peoples of the world... Truth in the world today is a political force...we will make plain the essential bond of common beliefs, and common interests that underlie differences in national customs and circumstances.[7]

> While the American Government did not originate this new practice of appealing directly with foreign peoples, I do not regard the development as disadvantageous to us. Quite the contrary. I believe we can play the game as well as the next man, and much better than any totalitarian government can play it.[8]

In a post-war context these contradictory representations of the Voice worked more in the Voice's favour, because sustaining representations of the station as *both* a journalistic and diplomatic institution gave the discourses of US informational diplomacy an elasticity and resonance in the articulation of a post-war informational program that either, in isolation, would not have provided. While the 'diplomacy' descriptor suggested that the projection of information was still warranted, the paradigm of 'international information/journalism' located the information functions as an expression of America's liberal political culture. At different times, or to different audiences, either of the two characterisations of VOA's role could thus be emphasised.

The journalistic paradigm was a particularly crucial in enabling the

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[6] I draw in this section on Shawn Parry-Giles's discussion of the 'journalistic paradigm' of the US information programs. This was a theme in interviews I conducted with former VOA officials Walter Roberts, Alan Heil Jr., and Barry Zorthian. See Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency*.

[7] Dean Acheson, "Support for an Expanded Information and Education Program," *Department of State Bulletin* 3913, (July 17, 1950), pp. 100-1.

[8] George V. Allen, "Telling Our Side of the Story," *Department of State Bulletin* 3413, (January 13, 1949), p. 142.

information programs to be established in that it informed how VOA's work was presented to an American public still wary of propaganda. This journalistic discourse signified that the Voice spoke not for the narrow interests of the US government but rather conveyed the broad and morally superior impulses of the US people. Yet according to its charter the Voice *was* as a mouthpiece for the US government in a way, for example, that its British equivalent, the BBC, was not. As Alan Winkler defines the Voice's approach, the rationale for the station was a '*strategy* of truth:' i.e. the journalistic techniques were qualified by the point that the Voice was nonetheless a foreign policy organ.[9] To Congress and the Department of State, sceptical of VOA's usefulness until the late 1940s, the diplomatic functions of the Voice were often asserted so that the station's work could be viewed as worthy of ongoing funding and support when necessary, particularly in the context of the debates leading up to the 1948 Smith Mundt Bill.[10] The composite representation of the Voice was grounded in, and in turn reinforced, an underlying sentiment of American exceptionality after the war. In the terms of this discourse, the US could *afford* to be truthful and democratic in its attempts to persuade and attract international audiences. Actively pursuing informational influence was therefore not purely a self-interested act on Washington's part but rather a process of international enlightenment.

From 1947, the articulation of US informational diplomacy shaped the new demands that had arisen with Washington's emergence as a protagonist in the Cold War. When confronted with evidence of Soviet propaganda gains informational officials contended that a renewed informational program had, as during the Second World War crisis, become a matter of national security rather than a mechanism for international progress. Yet by continuing to insist that the information programs still

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[9] Alan Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: the Office of War Information 1942-1945*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 13.

[10] There were particular difficulties for the Voice's image in Congress, as the discussion below will highlight. See David F. Krugler, *The Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles*, (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 2000). As Alan Heil explains, diplomatic traditionalists among the US foreign service and within the State Department had also been sceptical of the Voice, and discourses emphasising the diplomatic influence that international information could deliver were partly directed to these audiences. See Alan Heil, *Voice of America: A History*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), Ch. 2.

inherently rejected the propaganda techniques, US information policy discourse maintained continuity between the demands of the emerging Cold War struggle and tenets of American liberalism. When these could be resolved, these contradictory propositions had a strong resonance in legitimating Washington's conception of America itself as a Cold War protagonist. However, as the policy debates charted in this chapter show, while some information advocates reformulated America's information effort into a posture of liberal absolutism,[11] not all informational officials could accommodate the more selective style of US Cold War informational practices within the tenets of American political culture. Ambiguities and tensions were also present within the discursive representation of VOA and its place in US foreign relations in this period: US informational diplomacy was thus frequently a contested process in the years before 1953.

My account of the development of VOA in this chapter will proceed in the following stages. I first examine the founding of the Voice, and discuss how representational practices enabled the adoption of radio broadcasting in US foreign policy by actually incorporating into VOA's policy lexicon the concepts of anti-propagandism that had featured in academic and public debates during the inter-war period. In surveying the Voice's wartime activities I shall elucidate the key representations that shaped the (occasionally heated) debates over the nature of US information policy between the staff of the Voice in New York and their overseers in the Office of War Information in Washington. Emphasising VOA's reluctance to engage in the manipulation of information functioned to situate America in broad terms as an agent of international openness and progress in a way that differed profoundly from the expansionist Axis powers.

I then turn to the 1944-46 period, which was marked by an effort to reframe the role of the Voice for post-war purposes. On the one hand, the compromises that had been demanded of the Voice when it transmitted psychological warfare broadcasts in conjunction with US military operations ended in 1945 and the journalistic functions

[11] I draw on Louis Hartz in my conception of Cold War liberal absolutism. Louis Hartz, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Company, 1955), pp. 58-9.

of the station could be more freely expressed and embodied in this phase. The war had demonstrated how powerful propaganda could be as an instrument of war, opening space for supporters of an ongoing US information program to represent VOA as an essential tool for Washington to counter the subversive impacts of international propaganda in future. As had been contended in the pages of the *Department of State Bulletin* in 1945:

> one can no longer rely simply on the understanding and knowledge of the politician and of the statesman for the formation of our foreign policy. In the modern world the peoples as well as the governments participate in the formation and development of foreign policies.[12]

As we saw with the cultural diplomacy programs, however, funding cuts and unsettled bureaucratic arrangements undermined the Voice operations after 1945, since informational diplomacy had few supporters in Congress.

In addition to articulating the premise that radio had become an essential tool of international influence that must be seized by Washington, in the post-1945 phase the Voice's functions were also framed in positive (as opposed to 'zero-sum') terms by international information advocates, as a source of substantive political progress that was as essential part of Washington's plans for the post-1945 peace settlement. International information was situated here as way to hold American up to the world's public (particularly the decolonising regions) as a template for the spread of democracy, self-determination, pluralism and liberal economics to underscore a new global order.[13] In this sense, the representation of international information fed into Washington's embrace of a posture of post-war global restructuring and leadership. 'Freedom of information' was a doctrine of international communications articulated as a basis to promote Washington's political goals during the post-war settlement. As the information programs' Joseph Grew argued:

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[12] Dorothy Fosdick, "International Understanding: A Foundation for Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2346, (February 25, 1945), p. 296.

[13] Dean Acheson quoted in W. Phillips Davidson, "Voices of America," in *Public Opinion and Foreign Policy*, ed. Lester Markel, (Council on Foreign Relations Publications. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1949), p. 157.

> International communications should and will expand beyond all recognition in the years to come, and it will be our responsibility as a people to see that this expansion will be a force for good and not a force for unmitigated evil as it would have been in the hands of our Nazi or Japanese enemies.[14]

The impact of the Smith Mundt Bill on informational and cultural exchange in 1948, and the wider move toward global ideological struggle and liberal absolutism as the rationale of US informational diplomacy will then be examined. Here, I reflect on the contending ways in which US policy-makers viewed the early Cold War struggle. The increasingly instrumental language of VOA policy directives, particularly at the start of the Truman Administration's Cold War information initiative known as the Campaign of Truth, will in this context be surveyed. I shall show how, despite strong dissenting voices within the information programs, the articulation of US informational diplomacy eventually helped to constitute Washington's identity as a Cold War protagonist during the early 1950s.

Origins of the Voice and Early Developments

Although the US government did not adopt a policy of official international information broadcasting during the 1920s and 1930s, Franklin Roosevelt had made use of radio, his 'fireside chats,' for domestic information purposes from his 1933 inauguration onwards. Radio infrastructure was well-developed during the inter-war period in the United States due to private enterprise, and international short-wave broadcasting had even been attempted from 1929 by both NBC and CBS via their own dedicated international frequencies. Advertising revenues proved too low for these operations to be considered viable as an ongoing project for either company, however, and as a consequence American *international* radio infrastructure was relatively underdeveloped until the early 1940s.[15] Some philanthropic interest in international

[14] Joseph Grew, "Freedom of Information," *Department of State Bulletin* 2346, (June 17), p. 1098.

[15] It was on the basis of this prior neglect of international broadcasting operations that the prominent US information advocate Robert Sherwood had urged that government broadcasting be undertaken by a new and wholly government-run radio operation rather than by the corporations being engaged by the government to undertake this work. Robert E. Sherwood, letter to William J. Donovan, (July 12, 1941),

short-wave broadcasting had been tentatively shown prior to 1942, but this was on a small scale compared with the international educational, developmental and cultural activities that had been pursued by the major US foundations and was built on by the State Department after 1936. One former information official has estimated that only seven philanthropic international short-wave broadcasters were in operation at the time of VOA's establishment, all of which were requisitioned by the government operation in 1942 along with the dedicated short-wave frequencies owned by NBC and CBS.[16] VOA therefore had far smaller non-government precedents to draw on at the start of the 1940s in both operational and rhetorical terms than the bilateral cultural diplomacy programs.

By the late 1930s, many of the American academics and commentators who had been staunch critics of propaganda in the 1920s revised their views in light of the spectacle of Nazi propaganda successes, and began to consider how an official US information program might be perfected for the purposes of mass mobilisation and public morale-building in the event of US involvement in another general war. The Pulitzer prize-winning playwright Robert E. Sherwood went to some effort in this context to cast an official informational policy as an acceptable policy strategy in Washington, as did Leo S. Rowe, director of the Pan American Union, who had long been a prominent supporter of the idea of an official information program to promote US interests in Latin America.[17] There was even some Congressional support for the idea of a US informational diplomacy program: three bills to establish a US government short-wave broadcasting program had unsuccessfully been presented to the House by Congressman Emmanuel Celler from 1937. The US government Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs run by Nelson Rockefeller had also begun to

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p. 2; bMS Am 1947 (1101) Robert E. Sherwood Personal Papers. By permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University.

[16] Former IBM vice-president Walter S. Lemon funded one such philanthropic operation: a station located in Boston called WRUL. One staff member who had volunteered with this station and went on to work for the Voice noted internationalist sentiments and journalistic values that these small-scale philanthropic broadcasters had adopted, which were carried on by the Voice. William R. Tyler, "Oral History Interview December 1, 1987," Foreign Affairs Oral History Collection. Georgetown University Lauinger Library Special Collections, pp. 5-9.

[17] Shulman, *The Voice of America: Propaganda and Democracy, 1941-1945*, (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1990), pp. 38-9. Rowe had been former chief of the Latin America Division at the Department of State, and had urged that the US government adopt an official radio operation since the 1920s.

channel funding into philanthropic short-wave broadcasting to Latin America from mid-1941, delivering programs with a mixture of advertising, language-instruction and entertainment. An undated memorandum from Nelson Rockefeller's Office had informed the President that its information work was intended:

> to encourage the fair presentation of news which will indicate to Latin Americans that there are many things in their life and culture which we respect and admire. It does this in the belief that the irritation in these countries towards us has grown out of a lack of appreciation on our part of their achievements and culture, and that admiration thereof will stimulate greater good will.[18]

The US Navy also possessed short-wave frequencies which it had used for *ad hoc* broadcasting to Latin America in the 1930s, which it leased to the Voice in 1942.

These assorted broadcasting activities were not well-known by the American public or even in Washington and they lacked coherent objectives.[19] Despite the fact that many of the American 'interventionists' within and outside government during the late 1930s had argued that the US must confront Axis military expansion with an information program, a taboo against overt government propaganda still remained at the political and public levels. It was not until the founding of the Voice that a clearly defined rationale for US international radio broadcasting with a clearly identifiable agency and approach developed.[20] With the establishment of the Voice an effort to discursively construct America's role as an international information agent in terms that

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[18] Nelson Rockefeller, *Program of the Communications Division*, undated; Box 5; President's Official Files 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park NY, p. 2.

[19] Arndt's assessment of Rockefeller's work is particularly scathing, and few accounts of the radio programs even bother to mention these early efforts in Latin America. Richard Arndt, *The First Resort of Kings: American Cultural Diplomacy in the Twentieth Century*, (Washington DC: Potomac Books, 2005).

[20] The work of the Coordinator's Office was also a significant development in the context of a US information policy because the Office argued that an effective information program had to encompass all forms of media such as print, radio and film, with the Office sending an advisor to Hollywood in order to ensure that US films could be more useful abroad. Rockefeller's office observed in this context that "unconscious practices...have made motion pictures a source of trouble to our public relations in these countries. This trouble has arisen from practices of two kinds: first, the production of films containing characters or incidents offensive to [Latin American] people; second, the showing of films reflecting unfavourably on our own life, such as *Mr Smith Goes to Washington*." Nelson A. Rockefeller, *Program of the Communications Division*, p. 6; Box 5; President's Official Files 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park NY.

were congruent with American political culture as well as international circumstances was first undertaken.

After two decades of considering an official US propaganda program unnecessary to US foreign policy, in 1936 the Department of State set out to survey the *ad hoc* elements of official information distribution that had been taking place under and beyond its auspices, presumably with a view to determining how feasibly these might be consolidated into a sharper informational instrument for US foreign policy.[21] Franklin Roosevelt made no equivocal statements in support of an official US international propaganda policy in this pre-war phase, however he did appoint a special committee in 1940 to study allied war propaganda and determine the role of international information in the Axis's early victories in Europe.[22] Under the Committee's auspices one of Roosevelt's political advisors, William Donovan, travelled to the UK to study British fifth-column work as a prototype for a US psychological warfare/international information program in the event that the US joined the war.[23]

Early in 1941 the Office of the Coordinator of Information (OIC) was established within the Department of State under Donovan's directorship. OIC was intended to serve as a propaganda monitoring division but lacked the mandate to conduct a comprehensive international information program.[24] Robert Sherwood was

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[21] Claude G. Bower, "Rebel press Attack on the United States at Lima: Confidential Report for Secretary and Under-Secretary, December 7, 1938;" Box 76; President's Secretary's File 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.

[22] Although Wallace Carroll reports that Roosevelt shared the public's concerns that propaganda was an 'un-American' practice, I would suggest that this overlooks three well-known aspects of Roosevelt's leadership style and political views. Firstly, Franklin Roosevelt did not seem overly troubled with the consolidation of government power or the 'imperial' presidency as he pursued the expansion of the powers of the Executive office, and sought (unsuccessfully) to stack the Supreme Court after it blocked elements of the New Deal legislation. Secondly, Roosevelt was a skilled politician who shared his 'real' views with very few people, and it is difficult to say with any certainty what he thought of an American propaganda policy. Finally, Roosevelt was an interventionist and in this period sought to assist the Allies in any way possible. It thus seems unlikely that he would have had any political scruples concerning the use of international information given his ardent interventionism. See: Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1948), p. 23.

[23] Donovan also forged connections with British intelligence officials during his visit, paving the way for extensive cooperation between the Allies in the areas of covert operations and psychological warfare as well as propaganda during the war. Shulman, *Voice of America*, p. 14.

[24] The Office was established by presidential directive, not Executive Order, and as such Congress had no oversight role whatsoever in relation to the US information operations in this pre-OWI phase.

installed as the head of one of OIC's divisions; the US Foreign Information Service (FIS), in mid-1941. At the same time as these new offices were established in Washington, a government short-wave operation located in San Francisco had also begun to broadcast 'official' US perspectives to Asia, but as was the case with the Latin American broadcasts of this period the San Francisco operation had no clear policy direction, no apparent State Department sanction, and an *ad hoc* broadcasting schedule. These activities of these various offices collectively constituted the beginnings of US official informational diplomacy, but they were hampered by vague delineations of policy responsibility and a lack of clear political sanction. OIC did not even report directly to the White House. Nonetheless, Donovan and Sherwood both had the confidence of Franklin Roosevelt and consequently a strong informal conduit existed between the Presidency and these early information functions.

In the two years prior to the Pearl Harbour attack, some quarters of US government had begun to assess whether Washington could speak out on behalf of democracy in a time of ideological struggle, partly as a consequence of the interventionist lobby. Presidential advisor Harry Hopkins, for example, appeared to support the suggestion that the US should develop morale-boosting information features to broadcast to the British and European nations fighting Nazism in this period. One 1941 memorandum retained within Hopkins's political files emphasised that a stable post-war order would be contingent on Washington's willingness to export its ideology:

> We must immediately set about the business of developing and educating an American leadership which will grip the imagination of mankind...[This is a] *whole new phase* in which the struggle for democracy- a positive phase, from which will emerge the concept of a new *industrial democracy* upon which the American people can found their faith. The President, who represents democracy to all the world...is the man to launch this new future.[25]

A gradual shift toward self-representations that depicted a much more engaged, ideological and transformational global role for Washington was steadily gathering

[25] Russell W. Davenport to Harry Hopkins, (June 16, 1941), Attachment: "Memorandum," p. 3; Box 324; Papers of Harry L. Hopkins Papers; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.

pace prior to Pearl Harbour. Sherwood had written to Donovan in mid-1941 to argue that in a time of ideological struggle in Europe the US government urgently required its own media outlet:

> consisting of [presenters and researchers] who are good linguists and are able to follow all foreign broadcasts in all languages, news men, psychologists, first-rate writers, artists, actors, musicians, [who must] carry on a twenty-four hour a day program. There is no way in which our right to do this can be challenged for the Axis is waging a radio war against us and has done so for years.[26]

In this piece Sherwood characterised the Axis radio broadcasts to Latin America since the 1930s as amounting to 'war' against the US, charging that Washington should adopt a 'positive program' as a legitimate response to this encroachment on its sphere of influence. On the question of how Washington should construct an official American information program, Sherwood contended that some propaganda techniques could be legitimately incorporated into a US program given the emergency of Nazi expansionism. He thereby noted the necessity of "a definite policy...a specific objective" and that the US program "must stick to the same thing in a thousand different forms of expression."[27]

Sherwood's public writing also developed this theme. He emphasised in a 1940 play entitled *There Shall be No Night* that America already led the world by example in the struggle against totalitarianism.[28] Sherwood had also publicly stated

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[26] Robert E. Sherwood, letter to William J. Donovan, (July 12, 1941); bMS Am 1947 (1101) Robert E. Sherwood Personal Papers. By permission of the Houghton Library, Harvard University, p. 2.
[27] *Ibid.*, p. 2.
[28] Whereas Sherwood's previous plays had been explicitly anti-Fascist, *There Shall Be No Night* tells the story of the Finnish resistance against the Soviet invasion in 1939-40, and develops the theme of equivalence between Communist and Fascist authoritarianism. The subtext of the play's closing scenes is the role of America as a beacon of democracy to occupied lands. As a character in the closing scenes of the play declaims: "I have often read the words which Pericles spoke over the bodies of the dead, in the dark hour when the light of Athenian democracy was being extinguished by the Spartans. He told the mourning people that he could not give them any of the old words which tell how fair and noble it is to die in battle. These empty words were old, even then, twenty-four centuries ago. But he urged them to find revival in the memory of the commonwealth which they together had achieved; and *he promised them that the story of their commonwealth would ever die, but would live on, far away, woven into the fabric of other men's lives.* I believe that these words can be said now of our own dead, and our own commonwealth. I have always believed in the mystic truth of the resurrection. The great leaders of the mind and the spirit- Socrates, Christ, Lincoln- were all done to death that the full measure of their

that: "The Nazis have established the world's most thorough despotism, trampling over the decayed body of liberty to achieve authority; we still strive to perfect the world's finest democracy," and that decisive intervention against Nazism in word (and deed) was therefore incumbent upon the United States.[29] Alan Winkler has characterised the staff that were recruited to found VOA as having been drawn from the sector of the US media and intellectual community exemplified by Sherwood, who, as "liberal and articulate interventionists,...had a vision of their nation's responsibility in the war." In advocating a response to fascist ideology that propagated American liberal political culture internationally, the interventionist lobby had already "determined the basic [ideological] directions the information program would take."[30] Narratives of global modernisation and technological integration were situated as inexorable forces that had pulled the US into this struggle. Hence, there was frequent reference in policy announcements and debates to the fact that new radio technology had enabled Germany to spread propaganda within the Western Hemisphere. These representations subsequently enabled US informational advocates to situate the VOA as a defensive response to these new technical realities rather than an endogenous expression of the drive to domination or conquest.

Accompanying these early representations of the Axis propaganda threat was also a developing conception that the US could craft an 'information' program that embodied the tenets of US political culture, distinct in tone and objectives from the 'propaganda' of the European states. References to a truthful or democratic approach and empancipatory impacts had been made by the interventionists, though at the same time it must be noted that Sherwood had also seemed to embrace some traditional propaganda techniques as a basis for a US information program. Radio broadcasts are, by definition, unidirectional and hence essentially unilateral diplomatic practices.[31] Therefore unlike the cultural diplomacy programs the information advocates could not begin with a clear conception of what an American 'liberal' and 'democratic'

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contribution to human experience might never be lost." My emphasis added, Robert E. Sherwood, *There Shall Be No Night*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1941), pp. 175-6.

[29] Robert Sherwood (1939-40) quoted in Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, pp. 16-7.

[30] Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda.*, p. 8.

[31] Some efforts were made to incorporate written listener feedback into radio segments and incorporate a diversity of voices from within the US, but the fact remains that the Voice was essentially a unidirectional process of communication.

information program, as distinct from the propaganda of others, might look like. How was information to be made into an effective instrument of US foreign policy, while at same time remaining attentive to, and indeed palpably embodying, a liberal political culture? In the next section I shall survey how VOA's staff responded to this quandary associated with establishing the tone and approach of the American international information program.

Pearl Harbour: Discourses of American War Information

After the Pearl Harbour attack and the US entry into the Second World War, the White House was given the requisite emergency legislative powers sufficient to formalise and extend the existing *ad hoc* US information operations. Roosevelt immediately expanded OIC and FIS into a worldwide US information and psychological warfare program, instructing Sherwood to find staff and establish production studios for an official, multilingual short-wave broadcasting operation as quickly as possible. The operation was to be located in New York in order to draw on the expertise of the major US media corporations located there. By early 1942 the range of functions Roosevelt had granted OIC was found to be too narrow, and the Office was disbanded in 1942 to be replaced with an Office of War Information (OWI). FIS was integrated into the new office as OWI's international branch. As a reflection of his special interest in fifth-column work (and given his pattern of frequent disagreements with Sherwood during 1941) William Donovan was placed in charge of US psychological warfare operations as head of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), precursor to the Central Intelligence Agency, within the Department of Defence.

The OWI's top echelons had been given responsibility for setting and harmonising policy across the censorship, international and domestic information programs all covered by the Office. Despite this demarcation of responsibility, however, disputes between Sherwood, Donovan, and the newly appointed head of OWI Elmer Davis over how to harmonise the tone and functions of the international

information program became a significant operational problem for the Voice.[32] OWI also had a difficult relationship with the Department of State: the Office was ostensibly separate from State, reporting directly to the White House, but conflicts between the two developed because the Office had been given wide-ranging powers that often overlapped those of the State Department.[33] These broader disputes over the direction of VOA policy were exacerbated by the basic ambiguities and tensions in the Voice's rationale and approach. From its inception VOA officials were forced to operate within contradictory journalistic and diplomatic paradigms. Davis and other State Department officials in Washington frequently urged the Voice to utilise any means possible to secure diplomatic results, while Sherwood and the New York staff imposed journalistic strictures on their own work as a way to ensure the Voice's credibility among international audiences and remain cognisant with American political culture. Hence, effectively representing VOA to its international and domestic constituencies and well as to its overseers in Washington was a key challenge for the New York staff in this early phase.

The Voice's first broadcast was directed to Europe, in German, in February 1942. In what has since been regarded as the founding public declaration of the Voice's journalistic ideals, the broadcast began with an assurance to its audience that "[t]he news may be good for us. The news may be bad. But we shall tell you the truth."[34] The renowned radio producer John Houseman produced this first broadcast and emerged as a key figure in encouraging the journalistic paradigm within the Voice's early programming. Houseman had most famously collaborated with Orson Welles on *War of the Worlds*, and had been approached by Sherwood soon after Pearl

[32] Davis tended to concentrate his efforts on the domestic functions of the Office of War Information, but nonetheless did not have a good working relationship with Sherwood. The hostility between Donovan and Sherwood, both of whom had strong views on how the international information programs should be operated, became particularly problematic during the 1940s. Donovan, as an advocate of psychological warfare without scruples, was one of the key figures engaged involved in the information policy debates in Washington. His approach particularly rankled with Sherwood, who wished to preserve the journalistic integrity of the Voice as an embodiment of American democracy. See, e.g.: Holly Cowan Shulman, *The Voice of Victory: The Development of American Propaganda and the Voice of America, 1920-1942*. PhD Dissertation, (University of Maryland, 1984), Ch. 8.

[33] See: *Ibid.*, pp. 140-1.

[34] Voice of America, "Introduction to VOA," http://www.voanews.com/english/About/introduction-to-voa.cfm (accessed November 2, 2006).

Harbour to help set up the Voice studios and supervise the building of its radio studio infrastructure. As chief of the VOA Radio Program Bureau Houseman was an outspoken proponent of the 'truthful' rendition of the Voice's work. He reflected subsequently that in early 1942 "we had little choice," the news for the Allies was "almost all bad" and the US had no choice but to avoid dishonesty or "weaselling." But in this way VOA had also established a "reputation for honesty that we hoped would pay off on that distant but inevitable day when we would start reporting our own invasions and victories." Elsewhere, Houseman described the approach of the early Voice operations as having had "absolutely no direction from anyone as to what we should broadcast other than the truth."[35]

Alongside his conviction that a truthful approach would best serve America's interests and most effectively convey the essence of America's political culture to international audiences, Houseman brought to the Voice expertise in radio drama and encouraged his staff to find ways to incorporate dramatic techniques in VOA features. As Alan Heil notes, a key difference between the Voice and other Western international broadcasters such as the BBC in this period was VOA's adoption of this dramatisation style. Even factual programs such as *America Calling Europe* used dialogues, sound effects, and music to present American perspectives and boost Allied morale.[36] As one British observer noted, the Voice's resemblance to radio serials and advertising created a tone that was "hammy...rather like selling...toothpaste, urgently."[37] Interestingly, the question of whether the Voice's adoption of dramatic techniques could be thought of as a propagandistic strategy; whether it was appropriate to enhance the emotional purchase

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[35] John Houseman quoted in Heil, *Voice of America*, pp. 35-7. Due to the time-pressures of news production, translation and operating around European time-zones, VOA scripts were rarely sent to Washington for approval.

[36] Heil, *Voice of America*, pp. 37-8. Shulman reinforces the distinctiveness of VOA's dramatic style, citing John Houseman's recollections about the philosophical differences between his (and the Voice's) dramatic approach and the pre-war work of some of the more stringent journalists at the Voice: "For them...the news was an essential and inviolable thing...[but] to me it was the raw material from which it was my job to fashion shows." Houseman (1979) quoted in Shulman, *Voice of Victory*, p. 301. In Shulman's own terms, John Houseman brought 'show business' to the Voice. Shulman, *Voice of Victory*, pp. 301, 312-3.

[37] Shulman, *Voice of Victory*, p. 336. Other official British views of the Voice's function were more positive, however, with one official from the Ministry of Information reflecting that the exuberant and dramatic qualities of the VOA's broadcasting was important for "keeping alive and stimulating the democratic view of life and of stating as powerfully as possible the achievements and purposes of democratic nations." Unnamed official quoted in Shulman, *Voice of America*, p. 43. VOA officials, on the other hand, often charged the BBC with being too heavily censored.

of US broadcasts through dramatic techniques, does not appear to have been a point of debate among Voice officials in this period despite their wish to avoid 'manipulative' practices. Like Houseman, Robert Sherwood's tendency was simply to state that the Voice's wartime role affirmed the spirit of American democracy and was thus historically resonant on a global scale despite the specific techniques adopted. In policy directives and public statements Sherwood frequently expressed the conviction that the Voice had developed a unique style in international persuasion that embodied America's democratic qualities: "the truth, coming from America, with unmistakable American sincerity, is by far the best form of propaganda."[38] By framing the VOA's work in this way, the representation US informational practices by the New York staff sought to show how it was necessary for Washington's wider foreign policy objectives that America be seen as standing apart from the illiberal, coercive practices of the totalitarian powers as it extended its influence into the international system.

In addition to news, the Voice broadcast informative features, music and serials on themes relating to both the war and American politics and society in general, and efforts were made in many programs to tailor broadcasts to particular sectors of the VOA audience. In one 1942 broadcast, for example, the women of France were addressed by francophone American women to support the French Resistance, who noted that their own husbands and sons were "out there fighting for freedom, same as your boys" and that "the American people are putting their whole soul into the job of winning the battle for freedom."[39] US labour leaders informed the left-leaning workers of Europe that the economics of war had set in motion a "process of levelling, a gradual evaporation of privilege, an extension of social and economic security, and an advancement of democracy" in US society.[40] Dramatisations of key episodes in Latin American history were beamed south via the Voice in a radio serial portraying the Western Hemisphere as a 'New World of Peace,' narrating the successes of the Good

[38] Robert Sherwood quoted in Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, p. 76.
[39] Voice of America, "French Women;" Recording; Sonic Catalogue Reference: LWO 5554 GR 13 8A4; Library of Congress Recorded Sound Archive.
[40] Voice of America, "Labour Voices from America;" Recording, Sonic Catalogue Reference: LWO 5833 GR 34 13B3; Library of Congress Recorded Sound Archive.

Neighbour Policy as a basis for Washington's objectives for the post-war global order.[41]

Archibald MacLeish, whose role as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs led him to comment frequently on the information programs, refashioned the terms of the inter-war propaganda critique in repeating Sherwood's view that the journalistic tone of the Voice connected America's democratic global aspirations to its informational practices.

> The government of a democracy, by virtue of its existence as a democratic government, has a very different function in relation to the making of opinion. It is the government's function to see to it that the people have the facts before them- the facts on which opinions can be formed.[42]

As the policy liaison between VOA in New York and the OWI in Washington, James Warburg represented US informational diplomacy as part of an epic ideological struggle between "those who want freedom for mankind and those who want freedom for themselves at the expense of others." America's wartime broadcasting policy was thereby framed in emancipatory terms, intended to inform the world that Washington's plans for the post-war global order would prove to be "so permeated by justice that the majority of men will not be moved by violence."[43]

Holly Cowan Shulman's account of the early years of the Voice emphasises that this founding group of officials, including Warburg, Houseman and Sherwood,

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[41] Voice of America, "This New World of Peace," vols. 1 and 2; Recording, Sonic Catalogue Reference: LWO 5554 GR18 17A2-A3; Library of Congress Recorded Sound Archive.

[42] Archibald McLeash public address (1942), quoted in Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, pp. 13-4.

[43] Warburg (1941) quoted in Shulman, *Voice of America*, p. 22. James Warburg was another key information official at the Voice who strongly affirmed the journalistic discourses of VOA policy. He served in this period as Chief of Policy Planning for the Voice, a position that required him to act as a conduit between policy decision-making in Washington (as a member of the Overseas Planning and Intelligence Board) and the broadcasting operation in New York. Warburg had been a prominent New York banker during the 1930s, an outspoken interventionist after 1939 (he was a member of both the Committee to Defend America by Aiding the Allies and Fight for Freedom) and had joined Donovan's OIC shortly before the Pearl Harbour attack. Warburg's phrase that the State Department sought 'order so permeated by justice that the majority of men will not be moved to violence' was subsequently used by the Department of State in official publicity for the US's war aims. James P. Warburg, *Peace In Our Time?* (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1940), p. 48. In 1944's *Foreign Policy Begins at Home* Warburg urged that that US people think carefully about the opportunity for global reform that the war presented, so that effective institutions for global peace and reform be put in place. James P. Warburg, *Foreign Policy Begins at Home*, (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1944).

none of them career policy-makers, first mobilised the journalistic tenets that enabled Voice officials to situate their work as a symbol of American liberalism in subsequent years. As Alan Winkler has reflected, in the early phase the New York staff of the Voice "had no doubt about what they wanted to avoid. Fighting against fascism, they were insistent that their efforts bear as little resemblance as possible to those of the fascists." The overwhelming sentiment was that "the United States, even in the context of a total war, could not afford...deception, which would only lend credence to the Axis charge that American ideals were hypocritical and hollow."[44] In this context, the New York staff at the Voice were particularly scrupulous to avoid the 'atrocity' stories that had been deployed for manipulative purposes during the First World War within British and US propaganda.[45] The propagandistic implications of the Voice's work were eased in this period by affirming the strictures of the Voice's journalism and by framing this journalistic paradigm in turn as an expression of the tenets of American liberalism in an informational context. In the process, informational diplomats discursively constituted America's global role as an exceptional, liberal power within the global order.

As the war progressed it became clear that OWI, which had been made responsible for setting the Voice's policy direction and general editorial direction, had a decidedly more strategic or 'diplomatic' interpretation of the Voice's role than the New York staff. OWI's founding directive, Executive Order 9182, had defined the information programs as having a factual and informative basis but also encompassing advocacy in the context of US foreign policy. The Office was instructed to:

> [f]ormulate and carry out, through the use of press, radio, motion picture, and other facilities, information programs designed to facilitate the development of an informed and intelligent understanding...of the status and progress of the war effort and of the *war policies, activities, and aims of the Government.*[46]

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[44] Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, pp. 19, 76.
[45] Shulman, *Voice of Victory*, p. 351.
[46] My emphasis added. "The Office of War Information;" Executive Order #9182, (June 13, 1942); Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953 (IIA. 1938-53); General Records

This rendition of the US informational functions encompassed some of the fundamental contradictions I noted above. Although it affirmed the significance of truth and a journalistic approach as a source of global progress, it also tied the rationale of the Voice to foreign policy objectives and hence to a 'diplomatic' understanding of the purpose of US international information. OWI director Elmer Davis, for instance, routinely cast the Voice's role in quite selective and pragmatic terms:

> OWI told foreign peoples the truth, but it did not tell them the truth for their entertainment or edification, it told them the truth to advance the interests of the United States; which meant that the selection of and emphasis of news sent to a particular country at a particular time was often determined by the need to support specific military or political objectives.[47]

The diplomatic function of informational diplomacy was also emphasised at a higher level: a 1942 memorandum to Franklin Roosevelt noted that, in waging the ideological struggle, the US information program must take a selective approach to informational practice, and should be guided exclusively by psychological warfare objectives. In this rendition the Voice would provide "interpretive news stories covering matter not covered, or not covered in full, through regular news channels."[48] In correspondence from one US diplomat in Britain to Sherwood 'interpretation' was situated as an essential component of an official program. There was:

> an intense curiosity about America all over the British Isles. It will be either fed creatively or wisely by us, resulting in an understanding of the real America, or it will be fed haphazardly, resulting in misunderstanding and frustration...the job of giving information cannot be distinguished from interpretation, and thus

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of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).

[47] "OWI Report to the President 1942-5," p. 92; Box 4; Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.

[48] Unattributed, "An American Press Service Jan 11, 1942," attachment to letter from George Fielding Elliot to William Donovan, (February 2, 1942), p. 5; Box 128; President's Secretary's File, 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.

from propaganda.[49]

Correspondence from the Secretary of State to the president within the first six months of the Voice's founding similarly noted the "intimate relationship between the means of communication and the execution of American foreign policies," and the importance of ensuring that the US government would maintain a system of "world-wide communication under such degree of Government control as to ensure that it will be operated in the national interest" in the post-war period.[50]

Although it is evident from the foregoing material that the Washington staff tended to mobilise a more instrumental understanding of VOA's functions than those within the New York operation, the synthesis of both positions after 1945 served to produce a discourse of American identity that was able to accommodate liberalism and the pursuit of international influence, and which helped to constitute the new ways in which US policy-makers were articulating America's position within the global order. During the war, however, this tension between Washington and New York proved difficult to manage and often hampered VOA's operations, as the next section demonstrates.

Journalist, Diplomat or Psychological Warrior? VOA and the War Effort in Europe

Throughout 1942 the Voice's operations had expanded rapidly. French, Italian, and English language desks had been added in the days shortly after the Voice's first German broadcast in February. By April, VOA had started broadcasting 24 hours a day. In the same month VOA's outpost in San Francisco was reporting a strong signal in Asia, and was planning to expand staff on the West Coast from 96 to 150.[51]

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[49] Herbert Agar to Robert Sherwood, (November 30, 1942), p. 1; Outpost Records 1942-6; Records of the Historian; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).

[50] Cordell Hull, to the President, "Memorandum," (June 29, 1942), p. 1; Box 71; President's Secretary's File; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.

[51] Halifax, "From Washington to Foreign Office," (April 17, 1942); FO 317/31779; Public Record Office of the United Kingdom, Kew. An analysis of how ineffective (from the US perspective) American

By June, the Voice had 23 short- and medium-wave radio transmitters and was broadcasting in 27 languages. As one US official involved in wartime broadcasting noted, programmers at the Voice hoped to contribute to "morale building...making the people over there feel that victory would come in the end, that the United States was on the side of victory, as we had always been."[52] With this expansion of VOA operations, particularly into the European theatre of military operations, there came further challenges for VOA officials in terms of how to sustain their journalistic broadcasting practices and the liberal self-representations of the Voice operations that were connoted by the journalistic paradigm. Tensions about just how pragmatic and selective the information operations could legitimately be, and over how much Washington should compromise its political ideals to achieve desired military outcomes, were played out in these wartime policy disputes. The functions of discursive practice in relation to foreign policy-making are thus particularly apparent in this wartime phase of VOA's operations. The liberal, self-critical journalistic paradigm that VOA officials had articulated in the founding phase led them to broadcast material that contravened the wishes of their superiors in Washington over the content of programming. Hence, the underlying issue that was contested during these disputes between New York and Washington was how easily American traditions of free debate could be maintained during the exigencies of warfare itself, and in light of the fact that the war itself was seen to have broader significance as a defence of democracy from the scourge of totalitarianism.

In early November VOA faced one its most significant wartime policy dilemmas when it was directed to undertake tactical broadcasting in North Africa as a psychological warfare component of the roll-back of Axis forces. During the Allied invasion of North Africa, codenamed Operation Torch and led by General Dwight D. Eisenhower, VOA was instructed to broadcast into enemy areas and persuade the people of the region and the occupying Vichy forces that the invasion was the first step in the Allied liberation of Europe. Explicit directives for Voice broadcasts in the

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propaganda was in Asia, due to the compromises made with British hegemony, can be found in Winker, *The Politics of Propaganda*, pp. 82-3.

[52] Tyler, "Oral History," pp. 15-6.

context of the Operation were issued from the Departments of War and State, and they significantly curtailed the journalistic freedom of the station. OSS head William Donovan was placed in charge of Voice programming in the context of Operation Torch, and he instructed the Voice to intersperse news, stories on Hollywood celebrities and American popular music with statements about America's ultimate victory to have maximum persuasive effect with French troops.[53]

This psychological warfare operation proved to be a major concern for the New York staff, who felt the station's integrity as a journalistic institution was being compromised. Of particular concern were instructions that Voice broadcasting must persuade the Vichy French forces and their Commander François Darlan to join the Allies. Darlan eventually did so, and was rewarded with an appointment as the Allied High Commissioner of North Africa.[54] This became a watershed issue for the Voice news staff since many of the staff of the French desk were émigrés that had fled the Vichy regime, and felt the US had compromised its most fundamental ideals by courting and rewarding Darlan. The French desk directly contradicted Donovan's orders by running editorials to France overtly criticising Darlan and condemning the Vichy government for their fascist collaboration. The administration's dealings with the Vichy commander were declared in these broadcasts to be 'unsettling' and 'ambiguous.'[55] The psychological warfare demands imposed on the Voice during Operation Torch brought to the fore underlying ambiguities of VOA's role that had been present since 1941. The episode led to criticisms of the Voice in Washington and further disputes with New York over VOA's broadcasting approach.

The most controversial episode in VOA's wartime broadcasting occurred in July, 1943. During the Allied invasion of Italy, VOA had broadcast an opinion feature in English branding Italy's King Emmanuel III, who had been installed by US forces as

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[53] The theory here also was that if enemy troops were discovered listening to US broadcasts they could argue that the program was 'music' rather than political. "Memorandum: Operation Torch," William Donovan to Franklin D. Roosevelt, (January 24, 1942); Box 128; President's Secretary's File 1933-1945; Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library; Hyde Park, NY.

[54] David Stafford, *Roosevelt and Churchill: Men of Secrets*, (London: Abacus, 1999), pp. 192-4.

[55] Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, p. 88. On the internal controversies associated with the US's ongoing recognition of Vichy France see also Wallace Carroll, *Persuade or Perish*, p. 13. Shulman's book on the French Desk at VOA has a detailed discussion of Operation Torch and VOA perspectives on Darlan and Vichy France. Shulman, *Voice of America*.

the interim head of state, a 'moronic little king.' The editorial also described the US occupation of Italy as "a political minuet and not the revolution we have been waiting for."[56] The ensuing dispute between New York and Washington led to a reassertion of the OWI's authority over US information policy-setting, and Elmer Davis demanded the resignation of James Warburg, as well as control desk chief Edd Johnson and the head of the radio news and features division Joseph Barnes. John Houseman had departed of his own accord shortly before the scandal, and Robert Sherwood was demoted and sent to London as an OWI liaison officer. Edward Barrett succeeded Sherwood as director of the Voice, and sought to impose a more instrumental rendition of the international information functions on Washington's behalf. The journalistic paradigm propounded by founding figures as Sherwood, Barnes and Warburg had proved costly to the Voice, yet there remained an obvious determination within the New York operation to articulate policy in such a way as to repudiate a propagandistic or instrumental approach.

What is most striking about VOA's insubordination during the Darlan and Emmanuel episodes is the contrast it presents with how the staff within the US informational diplomacy program saw themselves during the early Cold War. Whereas even at the height of the Second World War it was considered appropriate to criticise America's allies on democratic grounds, later in this chapter we shall see how the Cold War posture of the US information programs became considerably more instrumental or 'diplomatic' on the question of whether it was legitimate for America to court authoritarian regimes than in the 1941-45 phase. Under Cold War conditions American liberalism would not be expressed through this kind of self-criticism, but rather by condemnation of Soviet totalitarianism and strident advocacy on behalf of America's ideological system.

[56] Voice broadcast quoted in Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, pp. 94-5.

Narratives of Anti-Conquest and Anti-Propagandism in the Projection of War Information

Given Washington's wide military responsibilities and the consequent expansion of America's sphere of political involvement in world politics during the war, Voice broadcasting was also undertaken in Asia and the Middle East. In the context of these efforts, and linked to the journalistic paradigm situating VOA operations as an exemplar of democratic openness to debate, information officials represented their objectives as communicating America's moral support and traditions of free speech in the interests of post-war democratisation and self-determination in colonised areas. The representation of VOA's functions in information policy discourse fed into a broader shift in which Washington came to see a key pillar of its post-war role as fostering Third World modernisation and political independence. Narratives about America's own path of democratic development and Washington's anti-colonial foreign policy traditions implicitly fed into the characterisation of the practices and functions of US informational diplomacy. Hence, by conveying information, analysis and features on US society that could instruct the peoples of the Third World in how free societies operate, the US information programs constituted America as an exemplar of democratic politics and an anti-imperialist that would empower Third World peoples to seek to independently determine their own political futures. The policy debates surrounding the American information programs in China, for example, situated the modernisation and the democratic empowerment of the Chinese people as contingent on its adoption of Washington's vision of the post-war global order. OWI policy guidelines from 1944 thus emphasised that the US policy should take the 'broadest possible' perspective on US national interests in Asia, and therefore set in motion a "long term process of bringing the Chinese people into the world community, so that they will be capable of keeping their own house in order and of making their independent contribution to the life of other nations."[57]

[57] Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, "Guidance for OWI Informational Work in Unoccupied China, Oct 24, 1944," p. 2; Chronological File, 1944-45 (CF. 1944-5); Records of Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945 (MacLeish

America's own success as a republic of the New World that had risen to the status of world power would be an instructive example for China: US broadcasts would "show that our military success derives from a productive potential which is based on our political and social institutions."[58] For China to adopt the role of a regional power in the way that the US had in the Western Hemisphere, information officers were instructed that:

> To strengthen China internally, we must first of all try to convey to the Chinese a realisation of all the advantages to be derived from, and the techniques to be used for, the political organization of a country on a truly democratic basis. For this purpose we must present a picture of the workings of a genuine democracy elsewhere. We should also make plain the hope of the American people that China will develop toward real democracy in the political sense without interruption....we must also show that a nation's prestige and influence in the international sphere are closely dependent upon the degree to which it has succeeded, internally, in creating a healthy national economy and a governmental administration that enjoys the respect and confidence of its citizens.[59]

US information policy toward China was therefore framed by representations of America's own democratic politics and its significance as a beacon of political development, as well as, implicitly, America's distinction from an imperialistic Europe.[60] US information policy debates represented the source of America's strength as its commitment to individual freedom and America's ability, following from this, to realise global common interests through its foreign policy. Not only was the embedding of American power in the Third World permitted by this discourse, it was also scripted as being warranted in the interests of global justice and prosperity.

1944-5); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD (NARA).

[58] "Memorandum," George Taylor to Laughlin Currie, (May 7, 1943), p.3; Records Relating to the China, Burma and India Theatre, 1942-5; Records of the Historian; Records of the Office of the War Information, Record Group 208; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

[59] Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, "Guidance for OWI Informational Work in Unoccupied China, Oct 24, 1944," pp. 2- 3; CF. 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.

[60] This was often emphasised in US dealings with Britain in relation to the post-war order in Asia. Stanley Hornbeck, "Report of Mr Hornbeck on His Recent Trip to London on Postwar Problems in the Far East," (October 28, 1943), pp. 3, 6; 791-13, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).

Several memoranda on US information policy in the Third World also stressed the importance of affirming that the American search for economic ties did not amount to a search for commercial advantage or economic imperialism, once again casting Washington as a new, progressive and anti-imperial force in world politics.[61]

In the 1944-45 period policy directives and decisions surrounding the work of the Voice began to locate information broadcasting in relation to the requirements of the imminent post-war phase. In reflecting on post-war informational objectives, VOA officials continued to represent their work in terms of the distinction between the 'propaganda' pursued by other international actors and the singular approach to information that was being crafted by the US. This discourse factored into the wider imagery in VOA policy documents of the integrative and liberal/progressive basis for American hegemony in the post-war global order. As one memorandum on post-VE day broadcasting policy cautioned:

> We cannot say that...operations in Europe are to be exclusively either 'information' or 'propaganda'. Our primary task is to present the United States itself and the United States Government's war and peace policies as convincingly as possible in order to win respect for this country and support for its policies and aims. In the best sense of the word, we are primarily *active propagandists* for the United States....In our radio, news and other media, we should not resort to evangelical persuasion. As before, we report, we quote, and we comment in a dignified, objective way. In general, we depend upon selection and emphasis for our propaganda effect in these media.[62]

Rather than embracing any means possible to promote a post-war settlement favourable to the US, American information officials represented the Voice's challenge in the post-war period as to continue to embody the truthfulness and openness that were hallmarks of American political culture. Archibald MacLeish had urged the Senate Foreign

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[61] Information Policy Committee, "US Information Policy in French Morocco," (February 10, 1944), p. 1; 1379-29, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A. Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).

[62] R. Edgar Moore, (probable author), Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information, "Memorandum on Post-VE Propaganda," (May 14, 1945), p. 3; CF 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.

Relations Committee in December 1944 that public opinion should be a key consideration in designing and implementing American plans for the post-war settlement, noting the:

> basic change in the relation of peoples to each other which the modern development of the art and technique of communications had brought about... It would not be too much to say that the foreign relations of a modern state are conducted quite as much through the instruments of public international communication as through diplomatic representatives and missions.[63]

In an undated draft statement on international information written during the war, Harley Notter had also claimed that given its vast economic and military resources, the US would be in a position to affect major global changes if it took seriously the emergence of public opinion as a key factor in world politics, and pursued the comprehensive international information strategy that was warranted by this shift.

> With the victory of the United Nations, the United States will have to play an increasingly important part in world affairs. The likelihood is that the United States will emerge as a more vigorous entity than any other...Doubtless, new ideologies will develop...there will be a continuing struggle of democracy against totalitarianism...It is inconceivable that the international voice of the United States should be silent or remain weak in the post-war world that will be struggling competitively both in commerce and in ideologies.[64]

The Voice's role in the post-war order was thus discursively represented as a function of America's historical claim to global leadership. Washington was narrated as having in a new position emerging out of historical transformations that, axiomatically, obliged America to impart the lessons of its political development to the rest of the world. In this context a synthesis between the journalistic and diplomatic functions of the Voice

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[63] Archibald MacLeish, "Statement of Archibald MacLeish on his Appointment as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee," (December 12, 1944); CF 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.

[64] David Sarnoff, "International Broadcasting After the War," attachment to "Subcommittee of the Division of Cultural Relations Report on Sarnoff Proposals," (June 3, 1943), pp. 1-3; Miscellaneous Subject Files 1939-1950; Records of Harley Notter; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

had begun to develop, in accordance with the hegemonic structure of *pax Americana* that was being planned in Washington in the closing stages of the war.

'Threats to Our Virtue:' Propaganda, Information and the Post-War Order

1945: The Voice's Positive Role

The significance of the Voice and the nature of its contribution to the Allied victory became a key topic of debate among the Voice's New York staff and US information advocates in the aftermath of the war. This debate occurred as a result of funding cuts from 1945 that had forced US information officials to identify aspects of the VOA program to be discontinued, downscaled or delegated to the private corporations engaged by Washington to produce 40% of the post-war 'VOA' programming. In addition to these cuts and outsourcing arrangements, the Voice operations were downscaled as a consequence of the military taking over the running of the information programs in occupied areas such as Germany, Austria and Japan.[65] The military were increasingly acknowledging the validity of informational and cultural activities as diplomatic instruments in this period, although this awakening had not yet extended to Congress, which remained highly sceptical of the Voice and its relevance to American foreign policy. The Voice was a costly operation among a set of informational and cultural functions that Congress had little time for, and cuts to State Department funding hit VOA particularly hard. The year 1945 had seen the Office of War Information with its highest ever appropriation of $54 million. This was downscaled to $40 million within a year, and cut even further after that. The Voice bore the largest share of the cutbacks. Several of the Voice's foreign language services had to be discontinued completely in this period.

On August 31, 1945, even before Japan's official surrender, the OWI and the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs were both abolished and their functions were transferred to an Interim International Information Service within the

[65] See, e.g.: Henry Kellerman, *Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1978).

Department of State.[66] On January 1, 1946 an Office of Information and Cultural Affairs was established, and given responsibility for setting informational policy. These funding cuts and the reorganisation forced many of the Voice's staff back to private industry careers in journalism and radio production. Those who stayed, however, continued to articulate a journalistic approach for US informational diplomacy. They represented the Allied victory in VOA broadcasts, and in internal debates connected the journalistic practices that they had undertaken during the war, as a symbol of the creeds of democracy and justice that America most embodied of all the victorious powers.

When it came to representing the Voice's objectives and approach in the immediate post-war context, Washington's proposals for a post-war order built on the global embedding of liberal norms provided a better fit with the 'journalistic' discourse of the Voice than the combative approach that OWI had articulated during the war. This congruence between the role that VOA officials had claimed for themselves during the war and the order-building, integrative thrust of US foreign policy in general seemed to indicate that the New York operations and Washington were now in harmony, or working 'positively,' for the same international objectives.[67] This congruence had not always been apparent during the war, particularly during the Darlan and King Emmanuel controversies. The State Department's effort to establish a regionalist, multilateral and economically liberal global system, as well as its effort to bring about to political, educational and cultural rehabilitation in war-torn areas, served to affirm the liberal, progressive conception of American foreign relations that the staff of the Voice had claimed was the basis of their criticisms of US strategic policy during the war.[68] The democratic principles that underpinned Washington's post-war plans

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[66] Edward W. Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon*, (New York: Funk and Wagnels, 1953), p. 51.

[67] The notion of a 'positive' phase is drawn from the following article in the *Department of State Bulletin:* Henry Villard, "The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2256 (January 28, 1945).

[68] Reform of the conditions of economic autarchy were emphasised in broadcasts to former Fascist occupied areas in the closing stages of the war. See, e.g.: Unattributed, "Propaganda For Italy" (undated); 791-18, p. 3; *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A. Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987). The democratic kinds of information and cultural influence that the US must use in post-war occupations was noted in the following memorandum: L. W. Fuller, "Germany: Occupation Period: The Propaganda Ministry and the

seemed to indicate to Voice officials, who during the war had felt removed from Washington's concerns, that with the end of the war their democratic aspirations could find full expression.

Within this 'positive' rendition of the role of informational policy *vis-à-vis* US grand strategy Voice officials situated 'freedom of information' as a pillar of America's domestic information culture that could be applied internationally to facilitate Washington's global liberalising objectives. The narrative elements that this discourse plotted how America's belief in the free exchange of ideas had led the American people to reject propaganda during the inter-war decades. As a principle of US foreign policy in the coming era, this narrative suggested that freedom of information would serve to embed the traditions of American democracy and free debate within the international order. Archibald MacLeish, for instance, had represented freedom of information in the following terms:

> We believe in the greatest possible freedom of...[international] communication. Freedom of communication, freedom of exchange of ideas, is basic to our whole political doctrine. But at the same time we cannot help but realise that complete freedom of international communication, particularly when that communication is instantaneous and has all the emotional urgency of immediate and first-known things, can be dangerous also. We have seen skilful and dishonest demagogues pervert the instrument of international communication to their own purposes without the knowledge of their victims...We should be less than intelligent and certainly less than realistic if we did not take account of these things in deciding how we propose to live in the world we shall have to live in.[69]

In expressing these sentiments, MacLeish sought to link the practices of the Voice to the liberal traditions of American political culture, and thereby scripted the relevance of these domestic principles to the international order. However, there was a caveat to the principle of freedom of information, as articulated by MacLeish, that reflected the position of global leadership and influence that the US was assuming.

Chamber of Culture," (March 1, 1944); 1520-H-132, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).

[69] Archibald MacLeish, "Popular Relations and the Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2247, (January 14, 1945), p. 50.

Liberal informational principles would be enshrined within the global order, but in the early phases of the post-war order the US would also oversee and institutionally regulate the informational practices of other states. Dorothy Fosdick similarly noted in the *Department of State Bulletin* that the international order had become a 'democratic' structure, but that Washington's role in the regulation of international information into post-war order should nonetheless remain an active one.

> ...[O]ne can no longer rely simply on the understanding and knowledge of the politician and of the statesman for the formation of our foreign policy. In the modern world the peoples as well as the governments participate in the formation and development of foreign policies ...If ill-tempered and irresponsible talk prevails, constructive efforts are imperilled. If men doubt each other's purposes and misunderstand each other's intentions, the hands of their governments in trying to organise the world for peace are seriously weakened.[70]

The inherently democratic and distinctive celebration of free information and individual autonomy within US political culture would thus distinguish the practices of *pax Americana* from the kinds of instruments through which totalitarian regimes had sought international dominance before the outbreak of the war. Partnership between the US government and America's media corporations would provide a further impetus to embed the free exchange of information into the post-war era. The post-war moment had provided "supreme opportunity and responsibility [to] the communications industries to give such a truthful picture of America that the outside world will never again doubt our power and our devotion to the ideals in which we believe."[71]

In sum, post-war American discourses of international freedom of information had several dimensions. On the one hand, the principle was conveyed as an expression of the continuities between American domestic political culture and the constitutive principles of the planned post-war order: this was a self-reflexive discourse that connected America's domestic creeds to its intentions as an international agent. In a related sense, freedom of information was articulated as an indispensable tool for the general pacification of world politics, by eliminating international public mistrust and

[70] Fosdick, "International Understanding," p. 296.
[71] Joseph S. Grew, "Freedom of Information." *Department of State Bulletin* 2346, (June 17, 1945), p. 1098.

undermining propaganda as a tool of war and totalitarianism. But at a deeper and largely implicit level, the discourse of freedom of international information that US informational diplomats articulated was also tied to ideas about Washington's ongoing position of leadership and entitlement to regulate the global order. Freedom of information was to this extent a circumscribed concept, designed to facilitate the spread of pro-Western information and consolidate the post-war order on Washington's terms, as the forthcoming chapter's discussion on Unesco will also illustrate.

By representing the Voice as a mechanism for the internationalisation of US political culture, supporters of US informational diplomacy presupposed that the deployment of America's cultural and ideological resources, not only to advocate but also show by example the benefits of a democratic political system, was an essential accompaniment to the projection of material influence by Washington. As one information programming report from early 1945 put it, the Voice had been called upon by the peoples of the world to "impart, explain, and illustrate the working of the inherently democratic temper of the American people as it simultaneously expresses itself and reinforces its strength in the many-sided activities of free American citizens."[72] This point also appealed to the staff of the Voice in New York, who had in any case traditionally seen themselves as speaking for the American people rather than the government as such. With the global democratic discourse that accompanied the building of a new global order in 1945-46, the journalistic and diplomatic discourses of the Voice both easily applied and thereby synthesised.

In articulating the Voice's 'positive' role in the post-war order, the open and transparent characteristics of the information program as a journalistic practice were also seen as a basis for the spread of America's democratic norms internationally:

> because we are convinced that America stands up well under examination and that knowledge of this nation fosters respect for it and confidence in it. We try to present a really balanced picture of America. To present the case for democracy not by argument but by example. The US believes that democracy is

[72] Management Planning Office, Office of War Information, "Program Guide for France," (April 1, 1945), pp. 1.2.2-1.2.3; CF. 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.

> the best form of government yet devised and that the country which adopts a democratic form of government is far less likely than any other to plunge the world into war. However, we do not help the cause of democracy by bluntly telling non-democratic countries that their forms of government are inferior. We should illustrate how democracy works here and let our audiences reach their own conclusions.[73]

Information policy was thus also depicted as a mechanism to ensure that the post-war settlement would not be regarded as the punitive exercise that Versailles had been. As with the US cultural diplomacy, the 'internationalist' character of America's national interests framed assertions that Washington had developed an exceptional format for conducting international informational diplomacy in such a way as to promote, not undermine, democracy and free debate.

However, at the same time as informational diplomacy was being depicted as essential to consolidating the post-war settlement and a 'positive' congruence between the journalistic functions of VOA and US grand strategy could be asserted, the Voice was confronting a strong Congressional determination to cut foreign policy spending.[74] This created an awkward challenge for the Voice's advocates: while attempting to assert the significance of the Voice's positive role in relation to the international context of the post-war period, VOA officials also had to confront the issue that the instrumental or 'diplomatic' functions of international information were not seen to be sufficiently compelling by Congress to sustain a full-scale operation.[75] Whereas the war had supplied the justification for the Voice's establishment in the first place, the circumstances of war were represented by the Voice's supporters as having been a temporary constraint on the purely journalistic function that its staff wished to pursue, yet it was this lack of 'diplomatic' credentials that Congress pointed to as evidence of VOA's irrelevance to US foreign relations. Without the rise of Soviet hegemony in Europe in 1946-48 and the key US decisions to forestall Communism in Greece,

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[73] R. Edgar Moore, (probable author), Overseas Operations Branch of the Office of War Information, "Memorandum on Post-VE Propaganda," (May 14, 1945), p. 2; CF 1944-5; MacLeish 1944-5; RG 59; NARA.

[74] Krugler, *Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles*.

[75] On the Congressional critics of the information programs in this period see: *ibid.*, Ch. 2.

Turkey and the Western zone of Germany it is unclear whether the Voice could have continued to function on any significant scale.

The two most significant elements in the recovery of VOA's stature within Washington after 1945's funding cuts were the energetic advocacy for informational diplomacy undertaken by Assistant Secretary of State William Benton, and the establishment of a legislative basis for US informational and cultural diplomacy with the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill (Public Law 402) in 1948. Both came about as a result of general unease that was developing in Washington about Soviet expansionism. In presenting their views, both Benton and the supporters of the Smith Mundt Bill revived the rhetoric of global ideological struggle that had been mobilised in the Voice's founding phase during the Second World War, arguing that the US had been thrust into an increasingly volatile and precarious political position *vis-à-vis* Europe. These images of international volatility and threat that were mobilised as advocates of VOA sought to emphasise the salience of their work fed into more generalised principles in US foreign policy thinking in which America came to be situated as the key defender of democracy and guarantor of stability in Europe. In this sense, representation of VOA's work in the late 1940s helped to constitute and enable the assumption of a Cold War posture of liberal absolutism in US informational diplomacy, and helped to constitute the ideological foundations of the Cold War struggle for a wider audience in Washington.

International Information and Cold War Advocacy: Benton, the Smith Mundt Bill, and the Return to a Diplomatic Role

The information programs gained an effective advocate in Washington with the appointment in late 1945 of the former advertising executive, businessman and president of the University of Chicago William Benton to the position of Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs. After the OWI was dismantled it was largely Benton's vision of an ongoing American peacetime information operation and his considerable powers of persuasion that effectively resituated the Voice as an essential component in any US response to the extension of Soviet influence in post-war Europe.

One of Benton's most effective themes in arguing for an ongoing information operation was that US power was being undermined by a sophisticated, extensive and highly-resourced Soviet publicity onslaught. To an appropriations hearing in May, 1946, he predicated the functions of America's international information program in the language of international security and national survival:

> The course ahead for the United States in coming years will be at best a difficult one. We are determined not only to avert another war, but to build a living, abundant peace for ourselves and our wives and children. Let us not neglect any essential part of the structure we are erecting. The State Department information... program is an essential part of the structure.[76]

As Alan Heil notes, Benton became a key figure in the Voice's post-war recovery by seizing on the 'geopolitical tides' of late 1946 in how he articulated US national interests, and by consistently noting the contributions that the Voice would make in pursuit of them. However, the imagery of Soviet threat that pervaded Benton's efforts to revive US informational diplomacy had important implications for the changing tone and role of VOA in US foreign policy. Increasingly, the Voice was cast less and less as an exemplar of democratic politics in the discourses of US informational diplomacy, and was instead situated as a spearhead for US strategic interests. Drawing on concerns about the ongoing Soviet military occupation in Eastern Europe, the failure of the Allies to reach consensus over the future of Poland at the Potsdam Conference, and Winston Churchill's 'Iron Curtain' speech in October, Benton framed the challenge of US foreign relations in this period as overcoming ideological impasse in Europe, which had partly come about as a consequence of Congress's reluctance to fund the information programs in 1945.

> Hardly a day passes without some important decision or action being taken by Americans here or in London, Paris, Tokyo, Nanking or elsewhere- and each individual action poses a problem in world information. [We must explain] our actions and attitude toward

[76] William Benton, "Statement to the US Senate Appropriations Subcommittee Hearing 8 May, 1946;" *State Department Appropriation Bill, 1947*; Y4 Ap6/2:st2/947; (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1947).

> Spain, the Balkan countries, Germany, Palestine, Japan, China, Russia, Indonesia, Siam, Iceland, and a host of other countries, not only in terms of current decisions but in terms of the reasons for them, the goals we are trying to achieve, and their background in our history and development...the eyes of the people of the world are upon our internal as well as our international activities. The starving millions of the world wonder about the United States- how we live, what we do, where we are going. A strike in coal mines, an increase in living costs, a tornado in Kansas, a decrease in locomotive production, the colour of the bread we eat- all have a direct impact on the economic and living conditions of other peoples.[77]

In this vein, Benton urged for the renewal of America's global ideological promise as a way to diffuse the sources of potential Communist subversion within a fracturing European geopolitical order.

Similar rhetoric depicting post-war Europe as a terrain of ongoing ideological struggle was also adopted by the Truman administration's key foreign policy spokespeople such as Secretary of State George Marshall and Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson. Both increasingly attributed the problems of post-war governance in Europe to the "irreconcilable ideologies" of the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. A key working paper prepared for the President on the need for economic aid in Europe had noted that in conjunction with material assistance, US interests demanded an equally strong effort to transmit public information and explain the "conflict between free and totalitarian or imposed forms of government."[78] George Marshall had also noted in that year the danger of undermining the goodwill America had gained in the post-war settlement:

> Our actions do not always speak for themselves unless the people of other countries have some understanding of the peaceful intention of our people. An understanding of our motives and our institutions can come only from a knowledge of the political principles which our history and traditions have evolved, and of daily life in the United States.[79]

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[77] *Ibid.*, p. 24.

[78] State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee Subcommittee on Information (1947) quoted in John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972), pp. 349-50.

[79] George Marshall quoted in Davidson, "Voices of America," p. 157.

This renewed emphasis on the informational instrument in Washington presented a profound dilemma for VOA officials. On the one hand they wished to retain their journalistic ethics as an expression of America's liberal political culture and democratic system, but on the other hand these international circumstances appeared to call for a more strident and selective form of advocacy within their broadcasts. Like the earlier efforts to represent US 'information' programs as a distinctive form of practice compared with the 'propaganda' of other states, Marshall's statement reflected how US foreign policy-makers were seeking to resolve this dilemma by framing Washington's motives for engaging with international public opinion in a new, exceptional way as the leader of the free world. A more strenuous form of advocacy on America's behalf was enabled in this post-war phase by the articulation of America's posture of foreign relations as seeking the democratisation and enlightenment of the world's people, which supplied moral license to the projection of international influence, rather than narrow or self-aggrandising domination. However, a persistent tension seemed to remain between this enlightening, progressive and long-term function of US informational diplomacy and the idea that there were more immediate security requirements that could also be fulfilled by VOA in the post-war context.

The idea that effective publicity could pay security dividends was also made frequently in public statements on the information programs. The director of the Office of International Information and Cultural Affairs, William T. Stone, had addressed an Ohio public forum on US foreign policy in early 1946, arguing that "the public interest requires that international radio be adequately financed. As a means of expressing America, its culture and its ideals, short-wave radio will pay incalculable dividends to the American taxpayer."[80] The importance of maintaining support within world public opinion was defined in similar terms by the President: in early 1946 Harry Truman contended that "the nature of present day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to maintain informational activities abroad as an integral part of the

[80] William T. Stone, "International Broadcasting- A National Responsibility," *Department of State Bulletin* 2526, (May 12, 1946), p. 906.

conduct of our foreign affairs." [81] Truman's support for an information program in 1946 signalled that the Voice was being situated as an important instrument of US foreign policy at the rhetorical level, but both the Department State (under the indifferent tenure of Secretary of State James Byrnes) and Congress failed in the immediate post-war period to supply the Voice with practical support, additional funding or clear policy direction. Furthermore, with such contradictory threads of justification and debate in play during this post-war phase it is clear that VOA's supporters had yet to find a coherent way for justifying their position informational diplomacy had an essential role to play in American foreign policy.

Constituting the Cold War Circumstance, 1947: The Soviet Propaganda Threat

1947 saw a significant shift in how VOA presented its broadcasts, and in the ways in which US diplomats characterised America's global role and the international order. A more instrumental format and rationale for US broadcasts was adopted as concerns about the Soviet propaganda threat became more pressing, although traditional discourses of American openness and journalistic values of free debate and openness were still often stated as constitutive principles of America's global role within these discourses. As I shall show in the discussion below, this juxtaposed imagery within US informational discourse enabled a more instrumental and selective broadcasting approach to be adopted, on the grounds that Washington's most vital international obligation was now to mount a defence of the free world in the context of the Cold War struggle. This was illustrated in February 1947, when a Russian language service was added to VOA's broadcasting for the first time. The service was instructed to provide an honest dialogue about the US and its policies, but directives for the Russian broadcasts encompassed a clear element of advocacy for US policies: "Special attention will be given to important statements and speeches by high United States officials explaining American aims and policies."[82]

[81] Harry Truman quoted in Heil, *Voice of America*, p. 46.
[82] Heil, *Voice of America*, pp. 46-7.

As a consequence of Benton's efforts to generalise a geo-strategic rationale for the US broadcasting programs during early 1947, the State Department's public affairs division undertook a review of the Voice's operations and assumptions. To William T. Stone a policy study completed that April reported that VOA's objectives remained too "inconclusive and theoretical" to effectively confront Communist propaganda, and noted that the overall information program was "inadequate in proportion as the exigencies of the international situation present an increasing challenge to us." The way in which this report went on to describe the problem of Communist influence evoked the paradox of the Voice's wartime role, framing the challenges of international persuasion in terms of the virtues and values of the United States.

> [A]s anti-American propaganda has increased in volume and intensity the threat of psychological warfare has reared its ugly head *like a threat to our virtue. We fear increasingly the loss of the ethical basis, or the idealistic inspiration of our work.* We are torn between the desire to restrict ourselves to the presentation of a 'full and fair picture' of our land and our people, and the realisation that to engage in this task alone is not enough, in the face of the intense and systematic campaign against our policies and our motives which are today turning the minds of men against us, while masquerading under the banners of freedom and democracy.[83]

The report went on to address the dilemmas of how to craft an appropriate tone for American information policy abroad:

> There need be no forced choice between 'a full and fair picture' and 'psychological warfare.' At the risk of being called Jesuitical, may I plead for the selection of the means necessary for achieving the desired end? These means should not be more distasteful, or ethically deplorable, than the accepted necessity of having recourse to war in order to ensure national survival.[84]

This review candidly represented the information programs as a strategic tool to be calibrated with the general objectives of US foreign policy, rather than an apolitical and

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[83] My own emphasis added. W. R. Tyler, "Notes on the OIC Program," to William T. Stone, (April 22, 1947), pp. 1-2; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
[84] *Ibid.*, p. 2.

humanistic reflection of US society. Its engagement with the question of national survival and the sense of urgency in relation to the anti-Communist struggle in 1947 articulated a decidedly more instrumentalist account of the purpose of US informational diplomacy.

Deepening tension between the US and the Soviet Union over the slow withdrawal of Soviet troops from Iran and the US decision to extend economic aid to Greece and Turkey had led to strident attacks on the US in the Soviet state media.[85] The Truman administration's policies in this period had consolidated around a hard-line approach to Soviet expansion, which created some anxiety among information officials that the administration's motives would be misunderstood by foreign audiences. By the middle of that year yet another report had warned that "unbelievable as it may seem, the Soviets appear to be steadily convincing the mass of the people of many lands that in the USSR lies the great white hope of the future, while the US constitutes the dark terror."[86] By December, 1947 the depth of Soviet animosity toward American policies had become a key frame for information policy directives:

> Under present circumstances its efforts necessarily centre on counteracting Soviet propaganda attacks and reaffirming the policies, institutions, beliefs and ways of life of the American people...United States information operations should not imitate the propaganda pattern of the Soviet Union. Otherwise there is a danger of other peoples equating the US with the USSR and presuming that this country is merely competing with the latter for the right to dominate them, and is equally responsible with the Soviet Union for creating a situation that may lead to war.[87]

In the discourses of international informational diplomacy in this period the journalistic paradigm of VOA operations had thus been reformulated. Rather than an embodiment of American ideals and a forum for open debates or self-criticism, the journalistic credibility of the Voice was seen as simply a persuasive technique or veneer to enhance the persuasive purchase of pro-US information.

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[85] Heil, *Voice of America*, p. 47.
[86] Mose Harvey, Moscow Embassy, to William T. Stone & staff, (July 3, 1947), p. 1; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59, NARA.
[87] Unattributed, "US Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda," (December 1, 1947), p. 2; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

In 1947 VOA officials were increasingly returning to the logic of ideological struggle as the rationale for US informational diplomacy, depicting the Communist enemy as having developed a totalising, efficient and manipulative approach to propaganda that impelled equally vigorous counter-action by the US. Another memorandum to Stone framed the quest to secure international ideological influence as the central feature of the post-war order, and consequently as a national security consideration.

> The USA and the USSR, both great powers and the only great powers and each standing as the protagonist of a politico-socio-economic system in opposition to that of the other, cannot equally survive equally well in the present day world. In other words, because the USA and USSR alone rate as 'great' powers and because the ideologies they stand for are incompatible, no arrangement, no agreement to live together in the world as equals is possible. The power and influence of one of the other must diminish. No 'balance of power' between the USA and the USSR is possible.[88]

The recommendations within this memorandum suggested that a wartime information posture was once again warranted: "In the use of media the value of repetition must be given top priority. A few themes about the US pertinent to conditions in each country, of interest to people we want to influence should be hammered at continuously from every angle."[89] Another report suggested that the Cold War constituted a type of emergency unprecedented even during the Second World War: the apolitical approach taken by the founders of the Voice and the officials in the first information programs was now unsuitable because it:

> did not take into account the present need for counteracting a campaign of misrepresentation and distortion of US aims and policies, and did not suggest the means required to facilitate the attainment of our national objectives in the face of the unscrupulous measures and techniques currently employed against us by elements seeking to discredit the US...To report the truth objectively and factually continues to be the basic principle

[88] W. R. Tyler, "Notes on the OIC Program," to William T. Stone, (April 22, 1947), p. 1; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
[89] *Ibid.*, p. 7.

> of our news broadcasts, and Wireless Bulletin. However, to present the policies and practice of the US without reacting or referring to the charges brought to bear against us, is no longer enough. The sponsors of the anti-America campaign have traded on our reluctance to engage in polemics and have enjoyed the advantage of attacking us without correspondingly specific and hard-hitting refutation... It has become evident, particularly in the last six months, that US information policy must take into consideration this attempt to turn world opinion against the United States, and devise means of counteracting it.[90]

This franker consideration of a propagandistic format for the presentation of US broadcasts during 1947 was a significant development in how informational diplomats were implicitly constituting Washington's wider global role in the course of formulating policy. It highlighted the transition from discourses of informational diplomacy emphasising the Voice's democratising and integrative functions in 1945 to representations of America's involvement in ideological warfare and international information as a narrower instrument of influence by the end of 1947.

Yet efforts to frame VOA as a journalistic institution which strove to be truthful and incorporate multiple perspectives continued into 1947. As E. H. Biddle advised Stone in late 1947, the question of whether the US should adopt a 'slanted' perspective or simply hold up a 'mirror' on world politics should not yet be considered a settled issue. Although it was "axiomatic" that a great power such as the US would adopt some kind international information policy, Biddle that, as with the British experience of informational diplomacy,

> experience has convincingly demonstrated that a 'freedom of information' policy, i.e., straight, unslanted news and the freest possible cultural exchange apart from its superior moral value, is the best and most repaying policy. Furthermore, there exists convincing proof that the most effective governmental information and cultural exchange programs actually have been conducted on this basis.[91]

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[90] Unattributed, "US Information Policy With Regard to Anti-American Propaganda," (December 1, 1947), p. 1; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
[91] E. H. Biddle, Letter to William T. Stone, (August 25, 1947), p. 17; IIA 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

Even under conditions of Cold War ideological warfare the liberal, democratic values first articulated by the Voice officials in New York were recalled as framing principles during the articulation of new information initiatives. Hence, according to the Biddle memorandum, a key asset of the Voice was its appeal to the masses abroad, and the station should strive to demonstrate to the peoples of the world practical workings of American democracy:

> A great many phases of US life on the 'grass roots' level- which we take for granted- are manifestations of US democracy at work and illustrate techniques and methods applicable to similar activity at the grass roots level abroad. We should explore ways and means of publicising these phases of US life abroad to those groups which can utilise our experience. Detached and scholarly explanations of our own high-level activity- national government etc. are often interesting but ineffective.[92]

Overall, these representations of journalistic practice did hinder the palpable shift toward and embrace of instrumentalism within VOA's policies during 1947. Alan Winkler defines this phase in US information policy as one in which State Department gradually accepted a need to actively publicise the basic message that US was "a powerful and righteous nation." Consequently, its information and cultural policies "were sometimes complicated by an unfortunate sense of superiority."[93] The concept of America's leadership of the free world, defined both in terms of Washington's military strategic posture and its role as the democratic protagonist in the ideological struggle, was the key premise in US informational diplomacy documents during this period. Analysing the discourses of informational diplomacy reflects how notions of 'superiority' and liberal absolutism came to shape Washington's information policy posture during the early rhetorical struggles with the USSR, and thus contributed to the momentum of the early Cold War. Because US policy-makers found it necessary to simultaneously specify the material impacts of US information *and* frame their work as

[92] W. C. Johnstone, "Observations Concerning the Information and Cultural Program," to William T. Stone, (December 1, 1947), p. 8; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.
[93] Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda*, p. 157.

morally superior to propaganda, the constitution of Washington's informational role in the post-war order clearly rested on a rather paradoxical, exceptionalist set of propositions.[94]

The constitution of America as a protagonist in the Cold War struggle through logics of alterity was a key feature of the discourses of US information and Soviet propaganda during this period. Frequent references to the Soviet practice of distorting the truth and undermining international freedom of information, linked to depictions of the USSR and the United States as 'protagonists' in a global struggle, constituted an understanding of the Cold War in propaganda terms as a Manichaean struggle between the two most powerful and complex agents in the international system.[95] Freedom of information and the journalistic paradigm of free debate and openess were upheld as a testament to America's hopes for global emancipation in this period, and to its strong moral sensibility as an international agent (in contrast to the illiberal, manipulative and immoral USSR).

More thoughtful US officials seemed to note the contradictions posed by VOA's return to a posture of information war. There were fears in this context that America's distinctive and progressive identity as a global power was being compromised by Washington's engagement in ideological tit-for-tat and the increasingly strident tone of American informational policy. Informational policy-makers continued to argue that the US must eschew propaganda techniques and manipulative intentions, but this sentiment was increasingly obviated by the urgent instructions issued to the Voice by Washington in which the information program was told to take all measures necessary to undermine Soviet political influence in contested regions such as Eastern Europe. As one memorandum from the US Embassy in Moscow queried in mid-1947: "We doubtless make men everywhere marvel and envy, but do we offer them something which they can adopt and follow that they and their children can live?"[96]

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[94] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952).
[95] See, e.g.: Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Foreign Policy as Social Construction: A Post-Positivist Analysis of US Counterinsurgency Policy in the Philippines," *International Studies Quarterly* 37, (no. 3, 1993).
[96] Mose Harvey, Moscow Embassy, to William T. Stone & staff, (July 3, 1947), p. 3; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59, NARA.

Washington's emergence as a protagonist in the Cold War was, as we shall see, not a simple, uncontested or unambiguous process. Although ideas about the exceptional way in which the US had used international information during the Second World War and post-war settlement were intrinsic to Washington's claim to be the moral protagonist in the struggle against Communism, there were also internal quandaries as to whether participating in Cold War antagonisms compromised these intrinsic American ideals in the first place.

1948: A Legal Basis for US International Information

The year 1948 was an important turning point for the American international information programs in several key respects, most notably due to the impacts of legislation passed by Congress that gave VOA a firmer role in US foreign policy and increased funding. In articulating the role of international information within US foreign policy, 1948's legislation gave VOA a more unambiguously instrumental role. Although some critics objected to the way in which international information had been tied to US national interests rather than the more nebulous goal of serving as an exemplar of free debate and a source of unbiased information to other societies, the 'journalistic' function of the Voice was largely a rhetorical phenomenon from this period onwards. Underpinning the developing consensus that VOA must be more instrumental and more deeply implicated in the Cold War struggle was a logic of alterity that situated the USSR as an irretrievably corrupt and manipulative propagandist, and conversely licensed the US to exercise 'leadership' on behalf of democracy and freedom. Washington sought to demonstrate this leadership with a strident persuasive effort directed at America's allies, its enemies, and increasingly too at a third category of 'neutral' states that were proving highly obstructive and problematic within US Cold War thinking.

In January 1948, a Congressional fact-finding mission returned from a tour to study economic and political conditions in Europe that had been taken to consider legislation proposed by Senator Alexander H. Smith and Representative Karl Mundt to

expand the American informational diplomacy program. The Smith Mundt Bill, as it came to be known, passed through the Republican-dominated Congress in the same month and through the Senate six months later. It instructed the Department of State to "promote a better understanding of the United States in other countries, and to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and other countries."[97] After Smith Mundt, the Voice's broadcasting languages were increased. The station added several new Middle Eastern services, and its English language broadcasting was expanded. Smith Mundt was unambiguous in its intention. It saw informational broadcasting as an instrument of American national interests rather than an exemplar of democratic practices for other nations to emulate if they so chose. However, the passage of the Bill masked the continuing objections to any American 'propaganda' effort that were still held by some sectors of the US public, as the US academic Ralph Block observed:

> In a world in which propaganda has increasingly overshadowed diplomacy as an instrument for influencing the course of international events, Americans remain uneasy in making concessions to its use, even as an instrument of defence. Indeed, it is possible that more Americans approve of the use of the atomic bomb in defensive warfare than approve of the use of propaganda to forestall war.[98]

Despite these concerns, the impact of the Smith Mundt Bill on the objectives and approach taken within the US information program were significant. US international information, cultural and educational policies were recognised and funded to a level commensurate to the globe-spanning 'ideological struggle' in the context of which their functions were increasingly represented. The Smith Mundt Bill became a major constraint to the independence that the VOA had retained during the Second World War, by enhancing Presidential control of the US information program. Shawn Parry-

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[97] Heil, *Voice of America*, p. 47. The Smith Mundt Bill also reaffirmed the ban on VOA broadcasting any material to a domestic audience.

[98] Ralph Block, "Propaganda and the Free Society." *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 12, (no. 4 Winter, 1948) p. 678. David Krugler charts Congressional reservations about broadcasting in some depth. He notes that "the ease with which the VOA's authorisation [Smith-Mundt] became law is deceptive. Considerable suspicions about the information program and personnel remained." See Krugler, *Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles*, p. 70.

Giles has argued that the more strident and Executive-oriented nature of US informational diplomacy brought about by the Smith Mundt Bill ultimately exacerbated the emerging Cold War conflict. "The increased control of the first two Cold War presidents over multiple communication channels secured a unified message about communism, routinised covert operations...and naturalised a propaganda apparatus as an integral part of the government's Cold War operations."[99]

Beginning with publicity surrounding the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill in January, 1948 turned out to be a year punctuated by expansive statements about the geopolitical purpose and promise of the American international information program. The term 'Cold War' came into routine use in information policy debates in the course of 1948. After successfully lobbying Congress to support the Smith Mundt Bill in January, Benton spent much of 1948 seeking to persuade the American public and major media organisations to join America's global crusade against Communism.[100] However, Benton's claims about the benefits of an ongoing international information operations were set back by a scandal over poor-quality VOA broadcasts that year. A series that had been outsourced to CBS and NBC after the war entitled 'Know North America' was the source of the offending material, which included features that described Pennsylvania's Quakers as "a social problem," and described Wyoming's Native Americans as living "naked and feathered."[101] During the State Department Appropriations hearing of that year William Benton argued that the grave responsibilities that had been assumed by the information programs could not be dismissed on the grounds of the scandal. In a Cold War context:

> the United States needs friends and supporters, and to have friends

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[99] Parry Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency*, p. xxiv.

[100] Associated Press and United Press were steadfastly opposed to government broadcasting in this period, and refused to supply their news services to the Voice even though they still supplied these services to the Soviet propaganda agency TASS. Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon*, p. 60.

[101] The offending broadcasts were from the 'Know North America' series. The congressional report on the broadcasts charged that the corporations had "failed to correctly interpret the spirit of and intent of the Congress" that had engaged them as government broadcasters, and charged that the material had "incensed, as well as disgusted" the people of the United States. United States House of Representatives Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *Investigation of the State Department Voice of America Broadcasts*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1948). See also George V. Allen, "The Voice of America," *Department of State Bulletin* 3336, (November 7, 1948); Krugler, *Voice of America and the Domestic Propaganda Battles*, pp. 80-4.

> the United States needs to be understood; its policies and the background that gives rise to these policies...Trust is built upon knowledge, sympathy has its roots in familiarity, and suspicion breeds in ignorance. Is it right, is it safe, for us to assume that the other peoples of the world know enough about us to trust our lead?[102]

Benton was succeeded as Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs by former US Ambassador to Iran George V. Allen in 1948. Like Benton, Allen proved an articulate and influential advocate of informational diplomacy, yet he propounded an even more unambiguously instrumental approach to the diplomacy of culture and information than Benton had and played a key role in the hardening of VOA's anti-Communist tone in this period. During his tenure as Assistant Secretary of State, US information policy directives were predicated by a vision of the global order as composed of two mutually exclusive and inherently opposed ideological blocs, and an inherently illegitimate 'neutralist' camp that required a particularly concerted persuasive effort on Washington's part.[103] Within these underlying terms of alterity the US was now obliged to unify and lead the free world, to consider possibilities for outright war between the superpowers that the 'neutral' states were perhaps unwilling to contemplate. Hence, the articulation of Cold War circumstances supplied a warranting argument in favour of a more selective, strident and single-minded tone in American international informational broadcasting.

After regaining responsibility for its programming from CBS and NBC, as a consequence of the increasing proportion of career diplomats in staffing the information programs, and owing to Allen's oversight, the Voice's operations were calibrated even more closely with US foreign policy imperatives in 1948.[104] Broadcasting directives in this period frequently instructed that VOA's approach "should not be such as to create the belief that the US is conducting an ideological crusade...We should avoid entering into sterile ideological debates, blow for blow retaliation, or the use of propaganda

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[102] William Benton, Statement to Senate Appropriations Subcommittee; *Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce Appropriation Bill for 1948*; Y4.Ap6/2:st2/948; (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1948).
[103] George V. Allen, "US Information Program," *Department of State Bulletin* 3218, (July 18, 1948), p. 90.
[104] Heil, *Voice of America*, p. 49.

patterns like those of the Soviet Union."[105] George Allen later recalled in hindsight that despite these expressions of broadcasting openness, the approach at the Voice became much more propagandistic in this period. He reflected that "perhaps our tone wasn't justified. A calm, persuasive tone is much better than a mere calling of names."[106]

The European Recovery Program or Marshall Plan was announced in 1948, and policies adopted in this context sought to make aims and objectives of US economic aid known internationally through an extended cultural and information program. Although Benton had left office, he continued to laud the US cultural and information programs in this period, likening them to a 'Marshall Plan for Ideas.' The information programs were defined in this context as having a vital responsibility in seeking to "close the mental gap between ourselves and the rest of the world" so that the nature of US economic assistance would be properly interpreted by targeted populations.[107]

With the Yugoslav-Soviet split in 1949 and Washington's subsequent declaration of support for the Tito regime, including a pledge of American assistance against any future Soviet aggression against it, American information programs to Yugoslavia were instructed to immediately cease their critique of Communist ideology and do as much as possible to consolidate the Yugoslav break from the USSR. Fostering 'heretical' forms of Communism became a new platform for the US international information program, as a mechanism which "could, without military action, reduce and eventually eliminate preponderant Soviet power from those areas which have fallen under USSR control as a result of World War II."[108] This was a significant watershed in the compromise of the Voice's journalistic role in favour of a more pragmatic approach. The implications of such a move in light of the proposition

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[105] Unattributed, "US Information Policy with Respect to Soviet Anti-American Propaganda Campaign" (November 13, 1949), pp. 2-3; IIA. 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

[106] George Allen quoted in Heil, *Voice of America*, p. 49.

[107] James P. Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), p. 97; Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation (The League Experience and the Beginnings of Unesco)*, (Warsaw: Zaklad Narodwy Im. Ossolinkich, 1962), p. 152.

[108] Public Affairs Policy Advisory Staff, "Special Guidance Paper #25: Yugoslav-USSR Relations," (November 15, 1949), p. 2; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1949-1950 (PPM 1949-50); General Subject File 1947-1950 (Subj 1947-50); Files of the Assistant Sec of State for Public Affairs, 1947-1950 (ASPA 1947-50); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).

that the US rejected power politics and moral pragmatism were not explicitly debated by VOA staff, but they did feed into an underlying tension within US informational diplomacy discourse during the late 1940s. As the discussion in the section below will show, the liberal, journalistic rendition of VOA's approach were still present as framing principles when informational officials articulated the *principles* of US broadcasting policy into the early 1950s. However, the *practices* adopted at VOA had clearly diverged from the openness, objectivity and multiple perspectives that the journalistic paradigm implied. Continuing to frame VOA in this way appeared to have an important symbolic function, however, in connecting the traditions of American political culture to the Cold War circumstances in which US foreign policy was being crafted. As I illustrated in the foregoing discussion, articulating a commitment to journalistic practices enabled VOA officials to continue to see their work as legitimate and superior to the manipulative practices of other national information services, particularly that of the USSR.

1950: The Campaign of Truth, the Cold War and the Demands of Pragmatism

In May 1950 President Harry Truman proclaimed that America would pursue a 'Campaign of Truth' against Soviet expansionism, which was to consist of an expanded international information effort, as well as a renewed focus on cultural and educational exchanges. The rhetoric associated with the Campaign synthesised the journalistic and diplomatic paradigms of US radio diplomacy, and hence the ideas of free debate and strenuous advocacy were combined, on the grounds that Washington possessed an underlying truth that must be propagated to combat Communist tyranny. In announcing the Campaign, Truman depicted the Cold War as "a struggle, above all else, for the minds of men. Propaganda is one of the most powerful weapons the Communists have in this struggle. Deceit, distortion, and lies are systematically used by them as a matter of deliberate policy." To public audiences Truman claimed that America still inherently repudiated the propaganda instrument. It would confront Soviet propaganda with "truth- plain, simple, unvarnished truth- presented by

newspapers, radio, and other sources that the people trust." The US information programs would therefore assume the responsibility to:

> present the truth to the millions of people who are uninformed or misinformed or unconvinced. Our task is to reach them in their daily lives, as they work and learn...This task is not separate and distinct from other elements of our foreign policy. It is a necessary part of all we are doing to build a peaceful world. It is as important as armed strength or economic aid.[109]

Edward Barrett, who had succeeded Allen as Assistant Secretary of State, noted that by 1950 the President and the foreign policy establishment in Washington had come to believe in the connection between effective foreign policy and favourable international opinion.[110] In this context, Barrett stressed the significance of American-authored information within the Cold War global context:

> The time has come to stop taking halfway measures in the international information field. Call it getting to know each other, or even call it propaganda (in the best sense of the word), if you will. The fact remains that the time has come for an all-out effort in this field not only by our government but by other free nations and by private groups.[111]

The period during which Campaign of Truth was announced was a difficult phase for the Truman administration. There had been charges in the media that the President was not waging the Cold War struggle in a sufficiently strident manner. There were numerous McCarthyite attacks on, and investigations of, the State Department for potential 'un-American' activities, and criticism in Congress over the 'expendable' status of Taiwan in the administration's newly-announced Far East security policy. In this period, the Communist threat could no longer be identified only with the Soviet Union, but could be found in China, Korea and elsewhere, and also, it

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[109] Harry Truman, "Going Forward With A Campaign of Truth," *Department of State Bulletin* 3832, (May 1, 1950), p. 669.

[110] The information programs had also recently gained an ally in the new Secretary of State Dean Acheson.

[111] Edward W. Barrett "Truth Campaign Needs Support of Private and Government Groups/ Mobilization of American Strength for World Security," *Department of State Bulletin* 4012, (November 6, 1950), p. 735.

was thought, had infiltrated the US via subversive left-wing groups within American society. The more strident informational policy developed for Asia was, therefore, partially intended to dispel the image of the geo-strategic 'siege mentality' that many enthusiastic Cold Warriors had criticised Truman for. The Campaign of Truth was framed in such a way as to convince the public that the White House had adopted at least one assertive strategy to recover the upper hand from the USSR.[112] The broadcast hours and languages of VOA in Asia were to be increased during 1950: Vietnamese language programming was added in July, and the Korean and Cantonese services were extended in September, the latter with a psychological warfare component in relation to the Korean War that had begun two months before. As a consequence of the additional languages and extended range of the Voice's signal, and most likely also as an indication of the Campaign's more strident tone, correspondence from VOA listeners increased dramatically that year. By mid-1950 the number of letters received per month had doubled within the space of one year to 20,000 per month.[113]

VOA also began to openly incorporate public relations specialists into the US information programs in an advisory capacity from 1950.[114] Structured propaganda content analysis became a frequent feature of internal evaluations of both US and Soviet broadcasts from 1951.[115] Targeted programming to specific social groups was revived as a broadcasting technique in this period. Instructions for the Argentinean service, for example, indicated that American information must appeal to:

> the young men and women...rising to influence under the Peron regime who have not yet adopted the anti-American attitudes of some of their leaders. This group will be of importance to us even if the Peron regime is over-thrown...Of special importance are the

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[112] The highly influential National Security Council Memorandum #68, was also written between April and May 1950, also gained an enthusiastic reception by the administration partly because it seemed to symbolise in international affairs the beleaguered situation that the administration was subject to in Washington. Krugler, *Voice of America and the Domestic propaganda Battles,* Ch. 4, especially pp. 96-7, 114.

[113] Barrett, *Truth is Our Weapon*, p. 77.

[114] Edward W. Barrett, "Need for Public Assistance in the Campaign of Truth," *Department of State Bulletin* 4041, (December 18, 1950), pp. 968-70.

[115] Research Center for Human Relations, New York University, "Broadcast in English to Europe in the 'Cold War' and Korean Periods (Spring 1950 and Winter 1950-1)," 1951; IIA- 1938-53; RG 59; NARA.

primary and secondary school teachers, and the small businesses.[116]

The directives suggested that the US ought to foster attraction but simultaneously express disapproval in relation to Peron's supporters: the US ought to be:

> making [Argentinian opinion leaders] feel welcome within the community of nations; to show that the United States is not trying to dominate Latin America but that there is room for a nation of superior economic and mental level on this hemisphere in a position of respect; yet at the same time not to show the United States as either approving the regime in Argentina or kowtowing to her for political motives.[117]

Elsewhere, saturation techniques were recommended to enhance the effectiveness of US informational diplomacy. Given the steadily declining influence of Britain and France in Egypt the US information programs were instructed "to permeate Egyptian channels of communication and make American influences felt at all levels of Egyptian life."[118]

With Allied military campaign in Korea suffering major setbacks toward the end of 1950, US information guidelines reflected the sentiment that the US was falling behind in all its spheres of international interest, and reinforced the urgency of the representations of ideological struggle within informational diplomacy debates.

> Korea has shown that the USSR is militarily strong as well as morally uninhibited. Military strength added to ruthlessness, oppressive conduct form a terrifying combination particularly to nations and peoples sensitive to the realities of power. The upshot of all this is that the US today finds itself in a precarious propaganda position. The line which we have been propagating so assiduously threatens to boomerang (not because of inherent logical facilities but rather because it was not accompanied by the required military strength) at least until such a time as our information media can reflect establishment of impressive and reassuring facts of strength. For while one can afford the luxury

[116] Morril Cody, "Argentina: Country Papers on USIE program requested in January 1950," p. 1; PPM 1949-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.
[117] *Ibid.*, p. 1.
[118] John Devine, "Egypt: Country Papers on USIE program requested in January 1950," p. 4; PPM 1949-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.

> of reacting to evil with righteous indignation when one is strong, great power directed by evil strikes terror in the hearts of the weak and the exposed.[119]

Once again, the constitution of an American identity, defined by the alterity of the Communist other, can be observed within these discourses of US informational diplomacy. The righteous and reassuring global presence of US power was held up in contrast to the Soviet practice of using 'terror' to prey on the 'weak.' The particular threat that the USSR represented was that it matched the US in its ability to (at least temporarily) influence world public opinion, but also presented a dire moral challenge due to its 'evil' ideological principles. The move toward a moral vocabulary of the Cold War struggle was a particularly resonant discursive shift in the context of Washington's grand strategy, since it constituted an inducement to project American influence abroad to guarantee US national security as well as its moral integrity.[120] By 1950 more equivocal Congressional support for the information programs had also developed, reflected in a letter written by a large group of US Senators to the President in August, which endorsed the Campaign of Truth and advocated the expansion of the information programs in the context of the Korean struggle:

> we urge upon you that a psychological and spiritual offensive against the Kremlin, devised to bring the Russian and American people into contact and into relations of mutual brotherhood...We are now saying this in an indirect and partial way through the Voice of America. We need more funds and a great expansion of facilities. But more than money, we need a new vigour, a new imagination, a new directness and plainness of speech. We need the message to be continuously, indefinitely reiterated. We need to use means new and old, thought of an unthought of, traditional and revolutionary.[121]

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[119] Lewis Revey, "Holding the Political and Psychological Initiative," to Philips (first name unrecorded), August 16, 1950, p. 2; PPM 1949-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.

[120] As such, these developments factor into Campbell's point about the existential and moral reading of the Cold War in US 'security' texts of the late 1940s and early 1950s. David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998).

[121] United States Senate, to President Harry S. Truman, August 19, 1950, pp. 1-2; President's Official File; Harry S. Truman Presidential Library, Independence MO.

The now widespread instrumental rendition of the Voice's functions in this period now saw the traditional reluctance of the US to be viewed as propagandistic and a tool to attract an international audience, not a stricture imposed upon it by the tenets of American political culture.

In contrasting the Campaign of Truth's hard-hitting and emotional approach with the journalistic style of British international information, Ralph K. White noted: "The Voice of America is definitely more hard-hitting, more outspokenly anti-Communist, than the BBC, and this policy has reaped dividends in Iron Curtain countries where the audiences crave hope and vicarious expression of their own hostility to the Stalinist tyranny."[122] By presupposing that a more strident form of informational agency could still be regarded as within the bounds of existing representations of the Washington's informational approach, US policy-makers could thus legitimately endorse techniques that amounted to 'propaganda' at same time as condemning the USSR's use of similar techniques as totalitarian and immoral. A relational logic of alterity was again at work in constituting Washington's international posture: Moscow and Washington were equally powerful as co-protagonists in the Cold War struggle, in a way that London for example was not, yet they were also in a relationship of deep moral antithesis and antagonism. A more hard-hitting approach could be acceptable because Washington possessed an underlying truth and an emancipatory force, while in contrast the fact that Soviet propaganda was inherently manipulative condemned Soviet actions as absolute tyranny.

The Voice's funding for the 1951 fiscal year had increased from $9 million to $13 million, with an incidential appropriation of $50 million to construct a ring of short-wave transmitters around the Soviet Union to overcome jamming of the US radio signal.[123] The expansion of the Voice's language services and programming brought with it the burden of more frequent and detailed assessments of VOA's objectives, approaches and effectiveness. After the costliness of the post-war cuts, resources could

[122] White grants that the BBC had a more news worthy reputation than the Voice, but that the Voice's emotional appeal was greater. Ralph K. White, "The New Resistance to International Propaganda," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 16, (no. 4, Winter, Special Issue on International Communications Research 1952-3), p. 547.
[123] Heil, *Voice of America*, p. 49.

finally be devoted to more consistent oversight of the international information programs, particularly given that assessments of international public opinion had come to be seen a basis on which to measure the outcomes of the diplomatic struggle within which the US had become embroiled. Policy directives for the Voice were often contradictory and inconsistent due to unsettled policy oversight arrangements, although Smith Mundt had done much to overcome these disruptions. Although the Truman administration had endorsed the international information program as an indispensable instrument of Cold War diplomacy, some scepticism toward VOA's work remained among diplomatic traditionalists in the State Department and the Foreign Service.[124] George Kennan, for instance, had cautioned his fellow policy-makers in Washington that US efforts to undermine the government of the USSR through international information were unlikely to be effective:

> talking by one nation to another about the latter's political affairs is a questionable procedure, replete with possibilities for misunderstanding and resentment...It is a shallow view of the workings of history which looks to such things as foreign propaganda and agitation to bring about fundamental changes in the lives of a great nation.[125]

Kennan's judgement of the impact of more long-term cultural and social message of the Voice was more positive, however. Just as Reinhold Niebuhr had conceded 15 years earlier, Kennan also noted that although there was often a misplaced faith in the prospects for preventing war in an immediate sense, the Voice's legitimate functions in faithfully representing America's *cultural* characteristics could do little harm, and might be of some long-term benefit to US interests.[126]

Nonetheless, an ongoing rhetorical effort was undertaken in order to distinguish the intentions of US international information from those of the Soviet

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[124] 'Diplomatic traditionalism' also characterises Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's attitude to international information after 1953, and the decision by Dwight Eisenhower to establish an US information agency outside the State Department that year.

[125] Kennan, quoted in Hans Speier, "International Political Communication: Elite vs. Mass," *World Politics* 4, (no. 3, April, 1952), p. 306.

[126] *Ibid.*, p. 306. We shall see in the next chapter that Niebuhr's view of cultural diplomacy had developed considerably by the 1950s. He joined the US National Commission for Unesco and became a prominent public advocate of US participation in multilateral cultural cooperation.

'propaganda machine' at the Voice. As the Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations wrote in 1952:

> Our term 'Information program' is hardly applicable to the Soviet Union. All information and mass communication media there are an integral part of a gigantic, all-embracing propaganda machine which is geared not to the furtherance of understanding and good will among nations but to enlarging the cleavage between the governments and peoples of the Communist and non-Communist world.[127]

In 1952 the ambiguity of VOA's role was compounded when the station came under investigation by four separate Congressional committees, all of them associated with McCarthy's House Committee on 'Un-American' Activities. In the six months prior to the start of formal hearings on the Voice in February, 1953, numerous rumours circulated in Washington suggesting Communist infiltration within VOA, many of them fuelled by disgruntled or opportunistic Voice employees. Although the investigations ultimately found no evidence of Communist subversion in VOA, the hearings were disruptive and ultimately tragic for the Voice: planned upgrades of short-wave signal relay stations were delayed, and one VOA engineer, investigated but later cleared of any wrongdoing, was driven to suicide.[128]

In the midst of this difficult period for the Voice, a new President was also assuming power. Dwight D. Eisenhower proved a keen advocate of international information as a pillar of US grand strategy, having observed the impacts of psychological warfare during his military career and as commander of initiatives such as Operation Torch. Plans to extensively reform the information programs were announced shortly after Eisenhower's election, and when he assumed office three new advisory committees assessed the issue of how the US information programs ought to be administered. In consultation with Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, Eisenhower concluded that information belonged in an independent Executive Agency

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[127] Committee on Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Overseas Information Programs of the United States, *The Soviet Propaganda Program*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1952).
[128] See Heil, *Voice of America*, pp. 51-3. See also Robert W. Pirsein, *The Voice of America: An History of the International Broadcasting Activities of the United States Government 1940-1962*, (New York: Arno Press, 1979). Piersein also charts how the head of the VOA's religious programming desk was subject to an investigation because he was rumoured to be an atheist.

so it could be flexible in policy terms, closely monitored by the President and the National Security Council, and would not (at the insistence of Dulles) burden the State Department with additional complex functions. The proposals led to the establishment of the United States Information Agency (USIA) on August 1, 1953. With this development, information policy was subject to far greater Executive control than ever before, and the Voice's more strident approach to broadcasting was formalised for the duration of the Cold War conflict.[129]

Conclusion

In this chapter I have charted the key bureaucratic and policy developments associated with the Voice of America radio station, taking a strong interest in the ways in which VOA's functions were discursively represented in internal policy memoranda and public statements. The character and operations of the Voice were characterised in wide-ranging terms: as an expression of America's liberal political culture; a basis from which to articulate US geopolitical objectives; a supplementary media outlet in regions where there was no independent media or where state media was propagandistic; and as a mechanism to communicate and demonstrate the principles of democracy abroad.

As I have argued in the discussion above, even the everyday functions of the Voice posed a challenge for policy-makers in relation to the established scepticism on the part of the US government and people toward propaganda practices. The manipulation of public opinion had been depicted by scholars and commentators during the inter-war period as contravening American political culture because it undermined both the rationality and morality of democratic society. Under the pressures of the Second World War, however, it became clear that the US could not feasibly avoid adopting some form of international informational policy. At issue for the officials engaged to found the Voice operations, was not simply the fact that that the US public might object to an information program: Executive war powers had already ensured that that the station would operate for the duration of the war at least. Rather, the

[129] Heil, *Voice of America*, pp. 58-9. As noted above, Eisenhower's use of international information is surveyed insightfully in Parry-Giles, *The Rhetorical Presidency*.

challenge for supporters of American informational diplomacy was to articulate a new understanding of America and its legitimate role and behaviour in world politics. The staff of the US information programs fashioned the existing critiques of propaganda into a positive statement of VOA's function, as an expression of the liberal sentiments that had led Americans to condemn propaganda in the first place. By contending that the US had a singularly honest and open identity as an agent of 'information' rather than distortion and manipulation, the vindicationist sensibility that was emerging within US foreign policy planning at a general level was also affirmed. Significantly, connecting the domestic and international strictures of American political behaviour in this way constituted a more extensive definition of the purview of American foreign policy than a narrow, instrumental conception of American 'propaganda' would have presupposed. The idea that the US was an exceptional kind of informational diplomat in turn enabled Washington to contemplate far-reaching restructuring plans at the end of the war.

Most of the key memoirs and histories of VOA have noted that during the early Cold War the Voice's work moved closer to the propaganda practices that it had sought, during 1942-45, to repudiate. By adopting an account of policy discourse as productive of the global roles and forms of agency that states pursue in world politics, I have supplemented these accounts by analysing the contested process through which this shift occurred. The discursive practices of the US information program had initially *made possible* the founding of US international informational diplomacy by suggesting how a journalistic approach of free debate and self-criticism could be adopted as a way to affirm American political culture, rather than adopting manipulative propaganda practices that would undermine it. But at the same time, this paradoxical rhetorical construction created constraints, tensions and ambiguities within the US international information program. The discourses of the Voice and the US information programs illustrated how the United States could be scripted as a morally exceptional international agent, based on the *intentions* of its information program rather than the operational features of VOA. The contradiction between these liberal intentions and the selection practices demanded by the Cold War was, however, seen by some officials as a major problem for the Voice. These critics clung to a conception of

what America was and how it should behave as an informational diplomat that owed more to the journalistic ethos of VOA in the Second World War than the posture of Cold War ideological struggle that had developed in Washington. For these critics, America's identity as a liberal power was increasingly belied by the selective, repetitive, strategic and extensive format of VOA broadcasting after 1948. Although these contributions to US information policy debates in the late 1940s provide a useful corrective to accounts of America's Cold War posture as somehow inevitable or uncontested, they ultimately had little substantive impact. Instead, VOA ultimately adopted a strident posture of information warfare, an absolutist faith in the export of liberalism, and began to see a close relationship between geo-strategic priorities and US information policy.

In the next chapter I examine the discursive practices of US cultural diplomacy in a multilateral context: Unesco. In this discussion I shall assess how America's approach to multilateral cultural diplomacy was articulated. This case also allows me to assess how Washington's allies and co-members in Unesco responded to US initiatives. In the case study to follow I will show that it was not only the internal contradictions debated by US policy-makers as Washington assumed a posture of global cultural hegemonic that posed rhetorical challenges, but also the perspectives of other actors that were articulated through the Organisation. Unesco's multilateral structure had provided other states with a mechanism to question and challenge the assumptions and representations that accompanied the projection of US cultural power in the post-war period. As the discussion to follow will show, it was an opportunity that was seized.

CHAPTER FIVE

'A FORUM IS ALSO A BATTLEGROUND:'[1] US DIPLOMACY IN UNESCO, 1943-1953.

The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation (Unesco)[2] was born out of a series of discussions on post-war cultural and educational reconstruction that took place in London from 1942. The talks were initially composed of exiled European cultural and educational officials and their British counterparts. An American delegation joined the talks in 1943 after the British Board of Education began to officially sponsor the meetings. US involvement supplied vital political and financial backing to the proposals, so that they could be considered as a basis for a permanent post-war cultural and educational institution rather than being confined to post-war reconstruction alone.[3] The Department of State's planning for multilateral cultural diplomacy situated the proposed institution as source of post-war moral and political renewal: it would seek to foster a global "state of mind conducive to establishing and maintaining and enduring peace."[4] Within a year the London talks were formally incorporated into plans for the overarching United Nations Organisation (UN) under discussion at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington. With its non-governmental origins and the diverse interests that had been subsumed within the early proposals for post-war cultural cooperation, Unesco had a rather sweeping and nebulous set of proposed functions and approaches at this planning stage.

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[1] Allen, George V, "Abstract of Speech to be Given by Mr Allen at San Francisco," (April 19, 1948), p. 4; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1947-50 (PPM 1947-50); Subject Files 1945-1952 (Subj. 1945-52); Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1947-1950 (ASPA, 1947-50); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).

[2] 'Unesco' is not capitalised here, in keeping with some of Unesco's own documentation in the period and so as not to disrupt the flow of the text for the reader.

[3] Scientific cooperation was a later addition to the Unesco proposals. The scientific component of Unesco's work is not emphasised in this chapter, largely because scientific cooperation was not the touchstone for controversy that education and culture became. US efforts to impose global controls on atomic science, for instance, mostly played out outside Unesco.

[4] Waldo Leland, *Unesco and the Defenses of Peace*, (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1945), pp. 1-2.

As the wartime proposals were refined into a draft constitution for a United Nations Special Agency for culture and education, it became clear that although Unesco shared several characteristics with the League of Nations International Committee for Intellectual Cooperation,[5] the Unesco proposals differed from this earlier forum for multilateral cultural cooperation in one significant respect. Unesco was, according to one European delegate to the Organisation's Executive Board, "designed to fulfil a conscious political purpose. It [would] not work just to promote education, science and culture in themselves," rather it had the "avowed....aim of building and strengthening peace...throughout the world."[6] As Assistant Secretary of State William Benton stated to the first Unesco General Conference, Unesco's central objective in its capacity as a UN agency was to promote cultural and educational interaction in a democratic way, in order to build a "firm peace built on genuine understanding among the peoples of the world."[7] From 1946 the Organisation embarked on projects that embodied this spirit of democracy and peace-building, including educational and cultural reconstruction, adult and child literacy projects, school text book revision, book distribution and library support, and sponsorship of international academic congresses.

However, the concepts of perpetual peace and democratic progress that Unesco sought to cultivate proved highly vulnerable to conflicting interpretations by the national delegations that comprised Unesco's members. The Organisation was prone to internal conflicts over its policies and philosophy from the outset. Many of these controversies over Unesco's goals and approach were sparked by the US national delegation's particular sense of entitlement, given the large proportion of funding it supplied and the vital sponsorship Washington had given to the UN system in general,

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[5] As Jan Kolasa notes, Unesco did not adopt any single philosophy in this period, but it resembled the League Institute insofar as the various renditions of Unesco's guiding philosophy resembled the universalist tenets of inter-war cultural cooperation, particularly the first Unesco Director General's 'evolutionary scientific humanism,' and the dialectical materialism emphasised by Yugoslav delegate to the Executive Board Vladislav Ribnikar. Jan Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation (The League Experience and the Beginnings of Unesco)*, (Warsaw: Zaklad Narodwy Im. Ossolinkich, 1962), pp. 152-3. In some contexts, Ribnikar is referred to as 'Vladimir.' I use the Serbo-Croat version of this name within my discussion, in keeping with the usage in the proceedings of the first Unesco General Conference: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/14593e.pdf. I would like to thank Glenda Sluga for pointing out this potential source of confusion.

[6] Gian Franco Pompei, "History of the Organisation," in *In the Minds of Men: Unesco 1946 to 1971*, (Paris: Unesco, 1972), p. 16.

[7] William Benton, "First General Conference of Unesco," *Department of State Bulletin* 2701, (December 1, 1946), p. 996.

to determine how the basic objectives and approaches of the Organisation would be translated into policy. From 1946 American representatives regarded Unesco in increasingly instrumental terms and attempted to direct the Organisation towards projects that supported Washington's vision for the post-war order. This instrumental view became particularly apparent during 1947-48 when the US delegation sought to make Unesco a conduit for pro-Western information in the context of the Cold War. This provoked efforts to counterbalance US influence in the Unesco General Conference and administrative offices. Ill-feeling toward the US deepened in mid-1950 when American diplomats attempted to persuade the Unesco Executive Board to undertake a pro-Western global information campaign about the Korean War. Although the war was undertaken with the legal sanction of the United Nations Security Council, many Unesco members felt that for Unesco to engage in an information campaign while the fighting raged would constitute 'war propaganda' and unduly compromise the Organisation's credibility as a vehicle for open global interchange. From 1951 further controversy emerged over US support for extending Unesco membership to right-wing authoritarian states such as Spain, while membership was being withheld from Communist China.

What kind of discursive practices were adopted by American diplomats as they formulated US positions within Unesco prior to 1953? I shall show in this chapter that similar process of self-representation of America as a liberal, reciprocal power to that which had been undertaken in the context of the bilateral cultural relations programs enabled Washington's early engagement with Unesco. Stanford University's Grayson Kefauver, a prominent figure in Unesco's planning, had defined the proposals in 1945 in reciprocal terms by stating that the US delegation saw Unesco an "international clearing-house for the exchange of ideas and information not merely between governments but especially between peoples everywhere."[8] The new realities of international interdependence and total war, a function of technological change and the ravages of world war, was situated as a warranting argument in favour of

[8] Grayson N. Kefauver, "Proposed Educational and Cultural Organisation: Interview with Grayson N. Kefauver," *Department of State Bulletin* 2386, (September 16, 1945), p. 407.

Washington's diplomatic and financial sponsorship of Unesco in the immediate post-war period. In this context, Unesco was represented as an important part of Washington's post-war efforts to facilitate the spread of democracy and deepen the bonds of cultural understanding between national populations so as to guarantee the peace. However, as the State Department began to move away from this concept of openness from 1947 and increasingly adopted a more instrumental view of its own cultural and informational diplomacy functions, it encountered particularly acute rhetorical tensions and diplomatic challenges in exporting this vision to Unesco.

Operating in a multilateral context exposed some key tensions that accompanied the way in which US policy-makers characterised Washington's interests, identity, and role during the early Cold War struggle. Here it was not simply that the State Department's increasingly instrumental view of cultural diplomacy challenged established *endogenous* conceptions of America's liberal posture of cultural reciprocity. The criticisms made by other national delegations to Unesco in response to American policy proposals added an additional challenge for the US delegation in their discursive effort to connect Washington's post-war geopolitical strategy to America's longstanding commitment to liberalism and freedom of opinion. Once again, the representational practices of US policy-making in this period, particularly the narration of America cultural influence, frequently turned on an underlying effort to classify Washington's foreign policy as distinct from, and morally opposed to, propaganda, and thus to situate the US as a different kind of dominant power from the imperialistic or self-aggrandising practices of others. The irony here was that the State Department's approach to multilateral cultural cooperation was more politicised, more 'governmental' in Unesco parlance, in this founding phase than that of the founding member states from Europe. US diplomats framed Washington's effort to cultivate global cultural influence, in line with the broader terms of its emerging posture of international hegemony, as the means to bring about a state of international stability, modernisation and political interdependence in the immediate post-war period. However, as the analysis below will suggest, stating these credentials seemed to be a strategy designed to license Washington's effort to bring its diplomatic and financial influence to bear in order to pursue narrower ideological interests through Unesco.

As the US delegation sought to direct Unesco's program toward distributing anti-Communist information and educational materials from 1947-48, the significance of individual rights and democracy, as declared at Unesco's founding moment, were cited as a justification for Unesco to adopt a more overtly ideological policy program. However, by 1950 the terms in which the US delegation framed their approach to Unesco had become overtly instrumental, with cultural and ideological warfare apparently seen as the underlying premise of the Organisation. In confidential sources, American diplomats in Paris characterised Unesco as a 'lever' in the struggle against the Soviet Union, noting that the US had an exceptional obligation to exercise 'leadership' within the Organisation. Similarly, they emphasised that a US-led 'militant pacifism' must prevail over the irresponsible neutralist posture that several other Unesco members had articulated in relation to the Cold War. At the same time, US diplomats continued to couch their public statements, and some internal documents, in the universalist, reciprocal principles that the Unesco constitution articulated. The rhetoric that informed Washington's diplomatic position within Unesco as the Cold War deepened thus increasingly straddled contradictory elements: policy-makers wrote in general terms to affirm the democratic, apolitical premise of the Organisation, while simultaneously urging the Organisation at an operational level toward a rather one-sided, ideological set of policies on the other.

A key event that highlights the tension within America's rhetorical position on Unesco and the Cold War was the US delegation's effort to establish a pro-United Nations information effort by Unesco in relation to the Korean War. American diplomats framed the US-led action in Korea as a defence of democracy in the context of a global struggle against Communism. In this context it was stated that the US delegation's main priority in proposing that Unesco adopt a global information program was to "tirelessly...urge Unesco on to a more affirmative and effective action [for democracy] and also continue to evaluate these activities with a view to improved action in future similar cases, which seem bound to arise."[9] It is evident that US

[9] Unesco Relations Staff, Department of State, "Report on the Unesco Secretariat's Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea," (7 March, 1951), p. 13; Records of the Unesco Delegation, 1950-54 (Unesco 1950-4); Records of the Paris Embassy, France (Paris Emb.); Records of the Foreign Service Posts, Record Group 84 (RG 84); National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA).

interests in Unesco in this period were being articulated through the prism of the containment doctrine, which had recently emerged as the prevailing rationale of US security policy. As the representational practices surveyed below will show, under the Manichaean terms of containment and the Cold War struggle 'neutrality' was increasingly scripted as inherently illegitimate and subversive position for Unesco and its members to adopt. This American ideological absolutism was also evident during membership controversies that arose during 1950-51, as the US attempted to construe its ideological objectives as the fulfilment of Unesco's democratic constitution and commitment to multilateralism in a similarly self-serving way. The US delegation was diplomatically isolated as it selectively lauded multilateralism and universalism when it was likely to favour the entry of right-wing authoritarian states liable to favour US perspectives within Unesco, but at the same time vigorously opposed Communist China's repeated requests for membership.

This chapter's discussion of the discursive practices that accompanied US membership of Unesco considers how Washington's pursuit of ideological and administrative influence within the Organisation was discursive represented both in internal and public contexts. I take a particular interest in how US officials situated America as a global cultural leader in the context of Unesco during the post-war period. During the multilateral talks from 1942 to 1945 that led to Unesco's founding, Washington established a strong administrative and budgetary base within the Organisation. The US delegation sought to vindicate this influence by affirming the humanistic and democratising principles that the key European members had articulated as the guiding philosophy of Unesco in these planning phases. However, the US delegation differed from many of the European delegates in its view that the Organisation must work closely with national governments and must be more obviously engaged with international politics than the League Committee had been. The US delegation promoted this viewpoint in order to ensure that Unesco would be congruent with America's emergent global role as a democratising and integrationist hegemonic power during the closing stages of the war, and thereby secure support for Unesco in Washington. Many of the principles that had informed American bilateral cultural

diplomacy such as reciprocity, internationalism, the democratic foundations of US political culture, and an intention to pursue substantive international reforms in the interests of peace, could therefore be situated as a source of congruity between the existing rationale of American cultural diplomacy and the purposes that had been proposed for Unesco.

In 1946 Unesco's first General Conference was held in Paris, and as the discussion below will highlight, at the Conference the US delegation framed Unesco as a reflection of the post-war settlement and of the 'positive project' that the embedding of American power and liberal norms within the international system was understood to signify.[10] There were several parallels between this rendition of the purposes of American engagement with Unesco and the rationale of national cultural and informational programs pursued by the Department of State. I show how, from 1947, the US delegation placed a particular emphasis on the informational functions of the Unesco by arguing that 'freedom of information' should be a key objective within Unesco policy and the post-war order. As the Department of State's Howland Sargeant had observed in a mid-1948 memorandum, from the standpoint of US interests, the gravity of the Soviet ideological threat in Europe constituted "a logical and convincing [indication] that Unesco will wither on the vine and die if it does not face up to some of the immediate explosive issues of our times."[11] Assistant Secretary of State George V. Allen also saw Unesco as a framework through which to prosecute Washington's Cold War information interests. In a draft public address Allen had written: "[w]e recognise in Unesco an international forum of academy, where speech is free. We recognise, however, that a forum is also a battleground. We go to it prepared not only to defend, but to advance our principles, forcefully and vigorously."[12] This effort to situate information functions as a key feature of Unesco's program met with little success:

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[10] As I have noted in foregoing chapters, I use the term 'positive project' to denote the prevailing sentiment in Washington that its national interests were not exclusive (or 'zero-sum' in contemporary parlance) but rather working toward mutual benefit by fostering global cooperation and interdependence.

[11] Howland Sargeant, Memorandum for George V. Allen, (May 3, 1948), p. 1; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1947-50 (PPM 1947-50); General Subject File 1947-50 (Subj. 1947-50); Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs 1947-50 (ASPA 1947-50); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD (NARA).

[12] Allen, George V, "Abstract of Speech to be Given by Mr Allen at San Francisco," (April 19 1948), p. 4; PPM 1947-50; Subj. 1947-50; ASPA 1947-50; RG 59; NARA.

several key European members felt it was both an undue extension of political interest into Unesco's apolitical functions and a violation of its multilateral purpose.

My discussion will then examine how the US delegation articulated its proposals for Unesco policy in the lead-up to the pivotal Beirut Conference in 1948. Attempts by the US delegation to secure a more explicitly ideological policy program for the Organisation were enabled by internal debates that represented US anti-Communism as entirely congruent Unesco's 'democratic' premise. The discourses of US foreign policy more broadly were increasingly locating America as the apex of global civilisation and morality in contra-distinction from the USSR, and 'freedom of information' was explicitly situated in these discourses as a way of propagating 'civilised' ideas to combat Soviet propaganda. The US renewed its efforts to exercise its influence over the Organisation's position on ideological conflict in 1949: one dispatch to the Assistant Secretary of State, for instance, emphasised America's incumbency to lead the Organisation. The dispatch thereby noted the "growing importance of Unesco and [the US government's] vital interests in the Organisation and its objectives carry with them the obligation to assume a leading role in the proceedings."[13]

However, attempts in 1951 by US diplomats to frame their proposals for an information effort explaining the Korean War in pro-Western terms won scant multilateral support in Unesco. The normally acquiescent British delegation went so far as to distance itself from the American position during the controversy. The Korean War episode thus highlights that while Washington had already come to accept that there was an active, strident and ideological approach to bilateral cultural diplomacy and information in this period, representations of ideological struggle and the defence of the West did not serve to effectively co-opt diplomatic support for the US in a multilateral context. Finally, this chapter will examine how US diplomats engaged with Unesco in relation to the divisive question of extending Unesco membership to right-wing authoritarian states, and how the delegation belied its universalist rhetoric with more instrumental, self-regarding policy proposals.

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[13] Letter to George V Allen, (no author), (November 8, 1949), p. 1; Unesco 1945-49 (U 1945-49); Department of State Decimal Files (DF); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA).

The Origins of Unesco: Discursive Practice in Instituting of Multilateral Cultural Cooperation

Multilateral proposals for a permanent post-war cultural and educational institution arose out of a series of meetings that were held in London during the course of 1942, which brought together exiled ministers and educators from occupied Europe. The meetings had initially convened to discuss questions of post-war cultural and educational reconstruction, particularly in Axis-occupied regions, but became a basis for formal diplomatic meetings after 1943 and came to be known as the Conference of Allied Ministers of Education (CAME). Europe's intellectual and cultural elite had reflected during the war on the importance of propaganda techniques in Hitler and Mussolini's political successes. Drawing on this general trend, the London discussants sought to determine how international education programs could be used to prevent a repeat of the spiral into aggressive nationalism that had occurred in the 1930s. Past efforts at cultural and educational cooperation under the auspices of the League Committee and the International Institute for Intellectual Cooperation were criticised in this context for their preoccupation with 'high culture' and failure to engage with mass cultural and political issues that had instead been co-opted by totalitarian regimes. These early statements articulating a popular and politically substantive basis for Unesco's functions opened an aperture for the US to seek a key role in the discussions, given that its existing bilateral cultural diplomacy program had framed American international objectives in similar terms of popular impact and substantive political reform.

After mid-1943 the inclusion of the US as one of eight new provisional CAME members extended the purview of the discussions beyond Europe and led to a shift in emphasis away from post-war cultural and educational reconstruction toward considering the scope for a permanent cultural and educational relations organisation to strengthen the post-war peace. By October, 1943, a Unesco Executive Bureau of diplomatic representatives was constituted in London to work full-time on refining the

CAME proposals into a draft constitution. At this stage both the United States and the USSR were involved in the planning of Unesco as fully-fledged members of CAME, and both played prominent roles in the planning debates. By 1944, the London proposals had been incorporated into the planned United Nations Organisation: the Chinese delegation to the second Dumbarton Oaks Conference had successfully proposed that the CAME proposals should be considered as the basis for a United Nations Special Agency under the auspices of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).[14] During 1944-45 scientific cooperation was incorporated into the proposals, although advocates of a post-war multilateral scientific organisation, particularly its key proponent Cambridge biochemist Joseph Needham, had initially hoped a separate multilateral scientific congress would be founded after the war.[15]

While the London proposals were refined into a concrete draft constitution over the course of 1944, the USSR had expressed increasingly strong concerns that the Organisation's activities might infringe Soviet educational sovereignty, and eventually withdrew from CAME. Despite several requests from the Executive Bureau to return for the founding conference of Unesco in 1945, the USSR did not return to Unesco until 1954.[16] The popular focus of Unesco, particularly its emphasis on childhood and adult education, was hailed as a key principle of the Unesco proposals during this period. CAME members, particularly those officials from the US who took part in the talks, were thus able to represent their work as an effort to envisage how "education for democracy throughout the world" could be promoted. [17]

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[14] The November Conference was the first founding conference for a UN agency to be held outside the US.

[15] James Sewell's account provides a good, concise history of how science became incorporated into Unesco. Science has often been downplayed in accounts of this phase of Unesco because it was a modest component of Unesco's program, and one in which ideological schisms were relatively absent. The US delegation saw less at stake in the scientific components of Unesco's program than it did in mass communications and educational cooperation, consequently it is not prominent in my discussion of discourses of US engagement with Unesco. Needham, as head of the Sino-British Science Cooperation Office and a member of several other international scientific congresses, was a key advocate of international scientific interchange during this period. James P. Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics: Engaging in International Relations*, (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1975), pp. 48-52.

[16] On Soviet education concerns see *ibid.*, pp. 61-2. On the attempts to persuade the USSR to rejoin the discussions at the founding conference see John A. Armstrong, "The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco," *International Organization* 8, (no. 2, May 1954), pp. 217-8.

[17] John Studebaker quoted in Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-50*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p.77. For a brief account of the

The Department of State had supported the CAME proposals since the US joined the discussions in 1943, and there was strong enthusiasm for the proposals within the Division of Cultural Relations and the various Offices engaged in post-war planning, such as the Office of Special Political Affairs and the Office of European Affairs. Of these agencies, it was the Division of Cultural Relations that was given oversight of American participation in the CAME meetings. The Division had brought a prominent international education advocate Grayson Kefauver, from Stanford University, to Washington on a full-time basis in 1943 as a consultant on multilateral educational and cultural cooperation. Kefauver became an articulate advocate of the scope for global peace through education within US preparatory discussions. Meetings of the US International Educational Assembly in 1943 in Harpers Ferry, Virginia, and a conference between educators at Hoods College in New York City in 1944, were both able to supply advice to the State Department in relation to the CAME proposals. They situated US participation in post-war educational and cultural interchange as essential to the post-war peace, and emphasised the progressive and apolitical purposes the proposed institution must serve.[18] The Division of Cultural Relations established a Subcommittee on Post-War International Organisation to consider this advice in relation to the London proposals in 1944. From 1944, the Division of Cultural Relations also sought input on the London proposals from its General Advisory Committee, as well as consulting with officials from various other US foreign policy agencies such as the Office of War Information, the Division of Military Government,

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projects set up by Unesco's to further the study of international relations see Richard McKeon, "The Pursuit of Peace Through Understanding," *The Yale Review* 38, (no. 2, December 1948), pp. 263-4.

[18] The Harper's Ferry meeting was the more influential of the two, and incorporated international members. The discussions had, recalled Waldo Leland, "brought together thirty-one educators of the United States and twenty-four from foreign countries. No one in the Assembly possessed representative authority, but all were amply qualified to express the views of colleagues and to speak on the basis of firsthand knowledge." Leland, *Unesco and the Defenses of Peace,* p. 7. On the variety of US organisations and views concerning international educational cooperation see: "Enclosure No. 3 to despatch No. 1476 of 27//3/44 from the Embassy at London, England: Plans for the Creation of an Inter-Allied Bureau for Education," (March 27, 1944); 860-PIO-329, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter,* (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).

the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation, and the State Department's geographical divisions.

The need to mobilise global popular sentiment to consolidate the post-war settlement was a key theme emphasised by both the official and non-government US advisory bodies on Unesco, and this discourse enabled US interests in relation to the post-war settlement to be rendered cognisant with multilateral cultural and educational cooperation. As one address from the head of the State Department's Division of African Affairs had emphasised:

> Without the intellectual tools to which our civilization has become accustomed, economic and social disorganization is intensified and moral despair easily sets in...this Government should participate in an international program to help the war-torn countries...in repairing the moral, spiritual and physical damage.[19]

A 1943 report prepared for the General Advisory Committee also argued that international structures to promote popular education would ensure that liberal sentiments would be enshrined as a pillar of the post-war global order. This argument drew partly on the failures of inter-war multilateral cultural institutions to generate the bonds of popular international understanding that might have prevented the Second World War.[20]

Assistant Secretary of State Archibald MacLeish was a key supporter of US involvement in the London meetings. He represented Washington's interest in joining the proposed post-war educational and cultural organisation during this founding phase in terms of substantive global progress and democracy-building. Here he noted the overlap between US foreign policy's 'positive phase' of building institutions and promoting liberalism for the mutual benefit of all states and the premises of the Unesco proposals. MacLeish lobbied Congress to support Unesco because ultimately it was only with the reorientation of nationalist passions that the coming global order could be

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[19] Henry S. Villard, "The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2256, (January 28, 1945), p. 140.

[20] I. L. Kandel, "Memorandum on the Organization of Intellectual Cooperation," 1943, pp. 1-2; Box 6 ff 5; Personal Papers of Ben M. Cherrington; Special Collections Division, Penrose Library; University of Denver.

guaranteed to be a peaceful one. Fascism had revealed that rapid communications and mass ideologies were instruments capable of shattering peace on a global scale. Consequently:

> The difference between Unesco and its predecessors [would be], in part, a material evolutionary difference. Men who regarded international activity in the field of education as impossible in 1919 now regard it as not only possible but essential...the greater directness of Unesco's approach to the problem lies, in my opinion, in the new realisation, not abroad in the world, that the mutual understanding of the peoples of the world is essential to the hope of peace- that in a world armed with weapons of such terrible destructiveness as those which men contrived during the last war, the only hope for peace lies in the mutual understanding not of Foreign Offices alone but of the peoples themselves.[21]

In a 1945 publication entitled *Popular Relations and the Peace* MacLeish had observed that an active defence against propaganda's role in stoking international disagreement and war was a vital function of Unesco from Washington's perspective: "What is essential...is not to correct each mischievous inaccuracy, each intended falsehood, each outburst of divisive propaganda. What is essential is to see to it that the peoples of the world know each other as peoples, that they understand each other as peoples."[22] Elsewhere MacLeish argued that, while the Uneco proposals "broke new ground" in the organisation of international life and "moreover...the stated objectives of the new organisation are objectives which have been regarded, hitherto, as idealistic rather than practical," they would nonetheless be essential in enabling Washington to prevent the kinds of crises that had led to war in the past.[23]

The US delegation that would attend Unesco's founding conference was briefed in similar terms. Without a strong international commitment to moulding international public opinion, war-devastated regions would "tend toward internal disorder and external difficulties and may create new threats to the economic stability and political security of the world, upon which in fact depend the well-being and peace

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[21] Archibald MacLeish, "Statement by Archibald MacLeish to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives," *Department of State Bulletin* 2508, (April 14, 1946), p. 629.
[22] Archibald MacLeish (1945) quoted in Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, p. 148.
[23] MacLeish quoted in *ibid.*, p. 140.

of the American people." Hence, in the Department of State's view "the rebuilding of essential educational and cultural facilities of the war-torn countries in the period immediately following hostilities is an important service in the national interest of international security."[24]

In addition to this vision of post-war progressivism articulated by Divisional planners in relation to the CAME proposals between 1943 and 1945, internal State Department memoranda had also made the point the proposed institution could be a useful instrument of US foreign policy. It was noted that US national interests in the post-war era depended upon a 'consensus' among the global public on the 'ideas and values' that should guide their political and economic future.[25] In setting out Washington's operating assumptions for Unesco and its proposed cultural program in Europe, one State Department report claimed that an integrated approach to economic development and cultural/educational reconstruction was imperative for any post-war settlement conducive to US national interests:

> The concern of the Department of State in this field is deepened by the fact that the early achievement of decent living conditions and a normal social life in the liberated and enemy countries will increase the likelihood of general international security and enhance the possibility of mutually beneficial exchanges of goods and services.[26]

This report sought to articulate the connections between Unesco and the broader multilateral global system that the US sought to institute during the post-war period, particularly in terms of the 'collective security' principles the settlement.[27] At this planning stage, questions had also been asked (but not definitively answered) as to whether the USA and the Eastern Bloc, with their irreconcilable political and economic philosophies, could work together in an institution for cultural and political

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[24] Department of State, "Letter to the Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference of the Ministers of Education of the Allied Governments, March 29, 1944," p. 2; Miscellaneous Subject Files 1939-50 (Subj. 1939-50); Records of Harley Notter (HN); General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59 (RG 59); National Archives, College Park, MD (NARA).

[25] Assistant Secretary of State Shaw, "Cultural Cooperation Program of the Department of State," *Department of State Bulletin* 2125, (May 13, 1944).

[26] B. Fosdick, (reviser, no author), "Statement of Policy on Participation in Educational and Cultural Reconstruction by the Department of State," p. 1; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG RG 59; NARA.

[27] Here I note that collective security was a rhetorical feature, but I do not wish to suggest that the United Nations Charter was a document pledging collective security in the strictest sense.

interchange.[28] Consequently, in addition to the liberal internationalist rendition of US objectives in relation to multilateral cultural cooperation, there were also undercurrents of instrumentalism and a desire to ensure that Unesco would not stray from the promotion of Western 'democratic' values that enabled State Department officials to pursue engagement with Unesco.

The American delegation that attended the founding conference of Unesco in London in November, 1945 was headed by Senator J. William Fulbright, and included officials from the Division of Cultural Relations and the US education sector such as Archibald MacLeish and Grayson Kefauver. The delegation brought with it to London a US-authored draft constitution for Unesco, which evoked similar principles of reciprocity and liberalism to those that had been espoused in the context of America's bilateral cultural diplomacy policy after 1936. The US draft constitution also affirmed the importance of mass participation alongside a doctrine of cultural 'humanism' as a practical basis for affecting substantive political reform in the post-war order.[29] As the preface to the US draft constitution emphasised:

> The cold-blooded and considered destruction by the enemy countries of the cultural resources of great parts of the continents of Europe and Asia...have created conditions dangerous to civilization, and, therefore, to peace, not only in the countries and continents ravaged by the enemy powers, but throughout the entire world. To deprive any part of the inter-dependent modern world of the cultural resources, human and material, through which its children are trained and its people informed, is to destroy to that extent the common knowledge and the mutual understanding upon which the peace of the world and its security must rest. [30]

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[28] This is reflected in the transcript of a Press conference of the United States Delegation to the CAME. Luther H. Evans, *The United States & Unesco: A Summary of the United States Delegation Meetings to the Constituent Conference of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, in Washington and London, October-November, 1945*, (Dobbs Ferry NY: Oceania Publications, 1971), pp. 10-1.

[29] These humanist ideas saw culture as a mechanism for reconciliation and bonding between societies, as opposed to the 'anthropological' view that was shortly to become dominant in US Cold War thinking of culture as a source of irreconcilable divisions between nations. On the expression of humanist principles in Unesco's founding see, e.g.: Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*. On the distinction between cultural and anthropological theories of culture in this period see Julie Reeves, *Culture and International Relations: Narratives, Natives and Tourists*, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2004).

[30] Evans, *The United States & Unesco*, p. 150-1.

Archibald MacLeish had reflected that with the US-authored constitutional proposals, Washington wished to convey its desire "to repair, in so far as is possible, the injury done to the common cultural inheritance of the world by the Fascist powers."[31] Building on wartime discourses of a global ideological struggle of democracy against totalitarianism, the representation of American national interests in this context emphasised the cultural divisiveness of totalitarianism, and conversely constituted the US as defending the general principles of Western civilisation and assuming a leading role in the process of cultural rehabilitation in Europe. The global sweep and multilateral structure of the Unesco proposals were depicted as a mechanism to enable the US to take up this wider global cultural responsibility. In this context, the discourses of US participation in Unesco in this preparatory phase articulated a conception of America as entitled and obliged to exercise 'leadership' within the Organisation. This self-perception licensed an American strategy of diplomatic influence and ideological dominance within the Organisation during the mid-1940s, which subsequently provoked an effort by the other national delegations to counteract US initiatives, and led in turn to more strident US assertions of its 'entitlement' to lead Unesco.

The question of whether Unesco would be composed of diplomatic delegations or whether it should be a non-governmental institution like the League Committee was expected to be a significant point of debate at Unesco's founding conference in 1945. At issue within the ambiguous question of membership was how closely the various parties to the talks were envisaging the Organisation would cooperate with national governments to secure its objectives. There was strong French

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[30] *Ibid.*, pp. 150-1.

[31] Archibald MacLeish, Preamble of 1944 draft constitution, quoted in Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, p. 131. On the destruction and restoration of cultural artifacts see also: Harley A. Notter and Charles A. Thomson, "Joint Memorandum from the Division of Cultural Relations and the Division of Political Studies: The Restoration of Cultural Objects," (Jan. 21, 1943); 506-2, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987). On intellectual rehabilitation see: Abbot, Buck, and Archibald MacLeish, (first names unrecorded), to the President (January 22, 1944); 1375-3, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).

and British support for the idea of including non-government representatives within the proposed institution (especially in light of the cosmopolitan nature of Unesco's premise). However, given that unofficial membership had been adopted by the League Committee and was seen to be the source of its failures, the US delegation took the position that the institution ought to be composed of diplomatic representatives so as to remain politically relevant. The US delegation argued that the kind of cultural rehabilitation functions that Unesco would take on should take place within a governmental paradigm. This was something of a departure from the philanthropic, apolitical discourse of cultural diplomacy that the Division of Cultural Relations had upheld in its early stages, but in keeping with the political structures of post-war order that Washington was seeking to institute in other spheres of international relations. The influential British delegation's support for a non-government representation was a significant obstacle to the US delegation's intention to see Unesco as an inter-state institution. The British had argued that Unesco would lack credibility and impact if it was not globally regarded as aloof from the inequalities of national power.[32] Ultimately, a compromise incorporating diplomatic and non-government representation was adopted: the Secretariat and Executive Board would be composed of both individuals and diplomatic delegates; the General Conferences would be made up of national diplomatic delegations; while the individual Unesco National Commissions would seek as much as possible to incorporate private institutions and individuals. In terms of policy-setting within Unesco, however, subsequent events indicate that the State Department's view that the Organisation should provide a conduit between government interests and mass public sentiment prevailed in operational terms. The National Commissions played only a small role in the formation of Unesco policy, and the formulation and funding of policy initiatives centred on the General Conference and the Executive Board.

[32] Despite the fact that the British stood to benefit from governmental representation (particularly if proportional to financial contributions), their delegation was in favour of Unesco being composed of individuals. On US debates about the merits of national representation see: Evans, *The United States & Unesco* pp. 27-33.

The doctrine of international freedom of information was a prominent and divisive rhetorical feature of US diplomacy in Unesco toward the end of the 1940s. As early as 1944 Adolf Berle had claimed that the 'emblematically' American values of unfettered political debate and free communications ought to be adopted as a key pillar of the post-war order, even despite the possibility that information hostile to the United States might be more freely projected as a consequence.[33] Drawing on the assumption that US political culture had superior qualities to offer as an ideological basis for the post-war order, MacLeish observed how:

> freedom of communication, freedom of exchange of ideas, [which] is basic to our whole political doctrine...The only possible protection against misuse of international communication, or misinterpretation of international communication, is not less communication but more.[34]

Similarly, the head of the US delegation to Unesco's Preparatory Commission, Esther Buranuer, had also framed Unesco's significance as its ability to convey "the determination of peoples throughout the world to establish *truth* as a guide to public action...the peoples of the world don't always know the truth, but the common search for it....will save the world."[35] In a speech on ECOSOC, under which Unesco would be constituted, a Department of State spokesperson had observed that one of the most significant benefits of the UN system was its ability to propagate America's historical commitment to a liberal democratic creed.

> The constant goal of the American people has been the attainment of a society marked by greater individual liberty granted to all men... The Bill of Rights in the American Constitution is a great landmark

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[33] Adolf A. Berle Jr (probable author); "Agreement on the Principle of Freedom of Information," (September 6, 1944), p. 2; 1375-6, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987). Another US memorandum on the US information programs notes the way in which the USSR implicitly contested US ideology by propounding the notion of freedom of thought and information, which "clearly...could not be meant in the sense in which it is understood in the United States." Arthur W. McMahon, "Memorandum on the Postwar International Information Program of the United States," (July 5, 1945), p. 12; 860-PIO-507, *Post World War II Foreign Policy Planning: State Department Records of Harley A Notter*, (Washington DC: Congressional Information Service, 1987).

[34] Archibald MacLeish, "Popular Relations and the Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2247, (January 14, 1945), p. 50.

[35] Esther Buranuer quoted in Sewell, *Unesco in World Politics*, p. 97. Emphasis in original.

> on the road to human liberty. It has been an inspiration to many freedom-loving men of many nations. While the attainment of civil liberty in each country is a struggle which the citizens of each country must wage for themselves, nevertheless we believe that it is possible and right for freedom-loving peoples to give help to those who aspire to freedom.[36]

The principle of freedom of information was also articulated in American Unesco policy discourse as a mark of the State Department's rejection of self-interested 'propaganda' practices as an instrument of foreign policy. In this context, the representation of the US and Unesco's purposes as both seeking freedom of international information was a way of representing US engagement in Unesco as a basis to promote truth and embody its opposition to propaganda. Once again, the discourses of US participation in Unesco were enabled by their connection to established principles of liberalism and exceptionalism already in play within the existing bilateral cultural program.

As the foregoing discussion has illustrated, the terms according to which Unesco planners within the US regarded the proposed Organisation had several key premises. Whereas the Division of Cultural Relations had embraced a non-governmental paradigm prior to the Second World War, within internal debates on Unesco's form and function American policy-makers envisaged the Organisation as a conduit for global cultural rehabilitation incorporating a strong element of political influence. US policy planners envisaged political and economic reconstruction, as well as cultural rehabilitation and free communications as the foundation for an enduring post-war peace. Cultural rehabilitation and freedom of information were both key functions of Unesco articulated in such a way as to draw on the broader 'positive' rendition of US foreign policy functions, which as I noted above was a way of characterising US interests as internationalist and progressive in the post-war phase. In this way State Department planners were able to engage with Unesco because they

[36] Henry S. Villard, "The Positive Approach to an Enduring Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2256, (January 28, 1945), pp. 136-7. Freedom of information was also assuming some dominance in domestic US foreign policy discourses in this period: during the Congressional election of 1944 both parties framed freedom of information as a principle that should rightly occupy a key place in the US's foreign policy, and a congressional resolution to internationalise the First Amendment to the US Constitution was also adopted that year.

situated it within extant depictions of Washington's novel and extensive approach to a post-war order organised around the principles of multilateralism and liberalism. This suggests that US hegemony, or 'leadership,' was clearly an emergent concept within the framing of the US delegation's vision for Unesco, with US sponsorship of the proposals both implicitly and overtly situated as the means to prevent the collective peril that another world war would pose.

Founding Debates: Post-war Reconstruction and the Framing of Multilateral Cultural Cooperation

The founding Conference of Unesco was held in London in November 1945, and opened with an address by the British Prime Minister Clement Atlee, co-authored by Archibald MacLeish, which famously declared that Unesco's mandate was nothing less than to supply the foundations of a lasting global peace. Unesco was premised on the fact that 'wars begin in the minds of men' and that it was only there that substantive 'defences of peace' could be erected.[37] Although 44 national delegations attended what came to be known as the November Conference in 1945, the founding debates of Unesco were dominated by the larger European and US delegations and the disputes that had emerged between them over what Unesco's basic purpose and philosophy should be.[38] Rhetorical practices came to the forefront of the negotiations as the key delegations attempted to situate their national claims as the truest and most workable interpretation of Unesco's rather nebulous, universalist premise. These debates were partly a function of changes to post-war European balance of power. The French delegation had seen itself as being entitled to dominate the post-war regime of international cultural diplomacy, as the main governmental supporter of multilateral cultural cooperation prior to 1945. This was a view the United States and Britain, the

[37] Unesco, Constitution.
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

[38] As Sagarika Dutt notes, this was the source of the politicisation of Unesco in the early years "Since it was created by western states, in the initial years, the western states, especially the US, felt justified in using Unesco to further their political interests and purposes, which in the 1940s and 1950s was mainly the containment of communism." Sagarika Dutt, *The Politicisation of the United Nations Specialised Agencies: A Case Study of Unesco*, (Lewiston NY: Mellen University Press, 1995), p. 44.

latter claiming a right to influence proceedings as the key sponsor of the CAME proposals, did not share. However, the founding of Unesco was an arena of world politics in which France saw an opportunity to recover its lost prestige and diplomatic influence after the Vichy occupation and the economic depredations of the war. Consequently, few opportunities were missed by the French delegation during the planning of Unesco to emphasise their nation's claim to historical leadership in the field of cultural diplomacy over those of the British and, to a lesser extent, the Americans.[39]

The location of the November Conference in London had provoked disputes between Britain and France in the lead up to the meetings, culminating in a sarcastic communiqué sent by the French Foreign Ministry to the British Foreign Office observing that since cultural diplomacy was "a question which has always engaged its attention and that of French intellectuals...France could not fail to appreciate the offer made to its Government by the British Government that [Britain] associate herself as a Host Nation."[40] At the Conference itself, the French delegation hoped at the very least to ensure that Paris would be named the permanent seat of the Organisation. The French delegate Leon Blum lauded France's 'old' claim to host the institution, since "France's claims are older than those of other nations...French culture has always been marked by a tendency towards universality...Paris...remains one of the cities in the world where the future Organisation would find a natural seat."[41] As sponsor of the meetings since 1943, and determined to see Unesco play a more popular role than the French-dominated and elite League Committee had, the British delegation opposed French assertions of such claims to global cultural leadership during the November

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[39] On the general objectives of post-war French diplomacy see William I. Hitchcock, *France Restored: Cold War Diplomacy and the Quest for Leadership in Europe, 1944-1954*, (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1998). For a good account of how the State Department viewed French behaviour see Charles Ascher, "Forces in the Development of the Work-Plan of Unesco," (January 13, 1950); Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb; RG 84; NARA. Jan Kolasa's account provides a particularly good overview of these tensions and the heritage of the League Committee within the proposals the delegation from France had brought to London. See: Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation.* On the European tendency to respond to post-war US military and economic domination of the continent, and particularly the complex and contradictory factors that came with post-war German cultural self-assertion (beyond Unesco), see: Rebecca Boehling, "The Role of Culture in American Relations with Europe: The Case of the United States's Occupation of Germany," *Diplomatic History* 23, (no. 1, Winter 1999).

[40] Letter from French Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the British Ambassador in Paris, August 21, 1945, reprinted in Leland, *Unesco and the Defenses of Peace*, p. 214.

[41] Leon Blum quoted in Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 77.

Conference.[42] The slight against the British hosts that these French claims represented was apparent in these founding debates. London's *The Times* newspaper had consequently reported that "it would...be dishonest to disguise the divergent views that are held regarding the policy, functions, and financing of the proposed organisation."[43] The possibility of disputes between France and Britain had been foreshadowed in US planning meetings ahead of the Conference, with US policy-makers noting that this should be seized by the US delegation as an opportunity for the New World to exercise its influence by presenting US ideas as compromise solutions where possible.[44]

The sense of entitlement and cultural universalism that Leon Blum's statements reflect was not limited to the French position at the November Conference. The US delegation had also approached the meetings well aware that a large proportion of the funding for the Organisation would be provided by the US government and believed this should grant the US delegation considerable leverage in shaping the functions of Unesco. As the discussion above has highlighted, they were also convinced that the internationalist character of American cultural and educational principles in the context of the post-war project in US foreign relations was entirely congruent with Unesco's premises. As I noted in the context of my discussion of the bilateral cultural diplomacy program, State Department officials depicted Washington's role in the post-war period as a 'positive project' in the sense that new institutions and substantive bonds of international inter-dependence were being put in place, and in that historical trajectories were perceived to have vindicated this posture of American global leadership. It became apparent to the US delegation at the conference that, despite its sponsorship of post-war reforms, the view that the US should be entitled to lead Unesco was not wholly shared by the other national delegations and the post of interim Director General of Unesco was not given to an American.

The post was instead given to the British educational diplomacy advocate Julian Huxley. An American, Walter Laves, was appointed interim Deputy Director

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[42] In his memoir of the founding of Unesco, US delegate to the November Conference Luther H. Evans proffers a possible explanation for British frustration with the French proposals: a lack of coherent proposals of their own. Evans characterised the British delegation as "the most incredibly disorganised and undisciplined delegation at the Conference." Evans, *The United States & Unesco*, p. 133.

[43] "Common Tasks in Education," *The Times*, (October 17, 1945).

[44] Evans, *The United States & Unesco*, pp. 27, 34.

General. Another piece in *The Times* speculated on the reasons for this rebuff: concerns already existed on the part of the British and French delegations about the institution's vulnerability to financial domination by the US. Although it had previously been agreed that funding for Unesco would be provided on the same proportional scale as the United Nations, many members of Unesco were concerned that the assumption of almost half of all funding for Unesco by the US would be particularly damaging to the Organisation's apolitical mandate. There were few other alternatives in the immediate post-war period, however, and British commentators noted that this structuring of funding:

> places the proposed organisation in a vulnerable position, making it from the start an easy victim to national economics in the international field...it does nothing to provide safeguards against the domination or limitation of its purposes and functions by the richer and presumably more powerful nations.[45]

The issues of cultural prestige and diplomatic influence that were at stake in formalising multilateral cultural cooperation in the post-war order were thus clearly apparent during the founding stages of Unesco. While the US delegation sought to claim a legitimate right to influence in the institution by virtue of America's universalist culture and financial burden, other members were already concerned that the US would exercise disproportionate financial, administrative and political influence within the Organisation. The future significance of Unesco as a framework through which declining or less powerful states sought to exercise prestige and counter-balance US hegemony in the cultural realm was foreshadowed at the Organisation's founding conference.

Although the contending draft constitutions that had been brought to the founding conference had led to extensive debate on questions such as how Unesco's representation policy and administration would be structured, these key administrative issues remained somewhat ambiguous in the completed Unesco constitution. Overlap

[45] "Mutual Aid in Education: Issues of Relief and Reconstruction: The London Conference," *The Times*, October 27, 1945.

between the policy-making functions of the General Conference and the Executive Board subsequently became a source of confusion, and encouraged lobbying by member states that wished to influence Unesco's program.[46] Despite the controversy and cultural prestige-seeking that the November Conference had brought to the fore, compromises such as placing the headquarters of the Organisation in Paris and affirming Unesco's commitment to post-war reconstruction projects created sufficient agreement for the draft constitution to be sent for ratification.[47] The successful outcome of the November Conference was noted favourably in the US Congress. Representative Chester E. Merrow of New Hampshire, who had visited the November Conference, reported to the Congressional Committee on Foreign Relations that Unesco would serve as "one of the great foundation stones in the United Nations' structure." US participation in the Organisation was ratified by the Senate without significant controversy or delay.[48] Polls cited in Congress in 1945 placed US public support for an institution that geared at deepening 'world understanding' at 85%.[49] Archibald MacLeish, addressing Congress, reflected that Unesco's significance to world politics would be its practical contribution as a mechanism for international peace and security, defining Washington's global position and the sentiments of American citizens in internationalist terms:

> A very large number of the delegates at the London conference were men and women who had played a leading part in the resistance movements of their countries under the Nazi occupation... They were determined that an attack should be made upon the problem of war and peace at the one level where success is possible- the level of human beings themselves...[Their view] is shared...by enormous numbers of men and women in the United States who believe, and believe with conviction, that the hope of the world lies

[46] Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 75. Unesco's administrative ambiguities exacerbated its proneness to assertions of political influence by key powers. Political tensions looked set to continue, for although Paris had been designated as the seat of Unesco as a concession to France, the US and Britain had managed to position their nationals in the majority of administrative positions

[47] Paris was not, strictly speaking, the permanent seat of Unesco. The constitution stipulated that with a 2/3 majority in the General Conference the headquarters of Unesco could be relocated. It has never subsequently been moved.

[48] Congressional Record quoted in Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, 140.

[49] Statement of Benton to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives reprinted as: William Benton, "The Role of Unesco in Our Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 2508, (April 14, 1946), p. 629.

> where the hope of America has always lain- in the things of the mind and of the spirit- in the education of children, and the full and just information of the citizens, and the fullest possible development of science and scholarship and the fine arts.[50]

Having drawn on such themes as the deepening of global interdependence and international understanding as well as the liberalisation of international information at Unesco's founding, the US delegation would return to these themes in their characterisation of Unesco during subsequent years. As William Preston has observed:

> The United States brought [to Unesco] a wish list of national political priorities linked to its traditional foreign-policy aims and its current status as the postwar world's dominant power. It still believed in the open-door concept of informal empire, a free-trade/free-market position that regarded international organisations as important elements in reducing barriers to free flow of all kinds.[51]

Multilateralism was also a key point that enabled Unesco to be seen as an extension of US national interests in fostering liberalism and open interchange within the post-war world order. As Harley Notter had emphasised in 1943, the significance of Unesco's multilateral structure in the context of US national interests was its ability to co-opt global support for Washington's broader political purposes: "the smaller states with which the relationships are to be established [could] feel or be made to feel themselves associated as responsible participants in activities of *mutual* benefit."[52] In the US government's domestic publicity on Unesco, the principles of reciprocity and the internationalist character of US interests were narrated as longstanding principles of American politics that had found concrete expression in the principle of inter-governmental cultural multilateralism. To the American public, the Department of State emphasised that Unesco would capitalise on the:

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[50] Statement of Archibald MacLeish to the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives, reprinted as Archibald MacLeish, "The Role of Unesco in Our Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 2508, (April 14, 1946), p. 629.

[51] William Preston Jr., *Hope and Folly: The United States and Unesco 1945-1985*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), p. 37.

[52] Harley Notter, Letter to Charles P. Thomson, (March 24, 1943), p. 1; Subj. 1939-50; HN; RG 59; NARA.

> very great significance...[of] the long-range furtherance of educational and cultural relations among nations. The Department wishes increasingly to encourage democratic international cooperation in developing reciprocal and desirable educational and cultural relations among the nations and peoples of the world, especially looking toward the promotion of free and friendly intellectual intercourse among them in the interest of international peace and security.[53]

In this context, Washington's official publicity on Unesco seemed to emphasise the multilateral structure of the proposed organisation in order to articulate its overarching claim to legitimate, consultative, hegemonic dominance, rather outright international domination.

The official founding of Unesco was to take place at its first formal General Conference in Paris one year after the November Conference. Much had been left unexplained in terms of the administrative and decision-making functions of Unesco, and there were ongoing concerns in the international media during the lead up to the first General Conference that the wealthier member states could afford to permanently station diplomatic staff in Paris would unduly influence the Executive Board and Secretariat.[54] The fact that more than two-thirds of the Secretariat staff were from Britain, France and the US seemed in any case to portend that the Organisation would have a distinctly 'pro-Western' character.[55] The likelihood that Unesco would be answerable to Western interests also seemed to be confirmed by the Department of State's planning for the first General Conference. As the US delegation prepared to travel to Paris, many of the key features Washington's rhetorical position on Unesco had already been put in place, and drew on the positions taken within Washington's

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[53] Department of State, "Participation of the United States in Emergency Educational and Cultural Rebuilding of the War-Torn United Nations," *Department of State Bulletin* 2094, (April 1, 1944), pp. 299-300.

[54] Indeed, as Sewell observes this kind of lobbying had been going on in relation to the Preparatory Commission that had been constituted in London after the November Conference to examine ongoing administrative issues in the lead up to the first General Conference. "The interval between the London conference and the first General Conference was further to reveal participants' inclinations and shape the character of their nascent organisation. Provisional work by a Preparatory Commission staff was left to the responsibility of signatory states whose governments were willing to post interim delegates in London." Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, pp. 83-4. On the work of this commission, and the role of UK scholar and delegate Alfred Zimmern at the Preparatory Commission see: C. H. Dobinson, "Unesco-The Greatest Hope of the Twentieth Century," *The Journal of Education*, (January 9, 1946).

[55] Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, p. 144.

bilateral cultural diplomacy program. Concepts of global interdependence; the internationalist character of US interests and embedded US hegemony; multilateralism; freedom of international communications; and the democratising influence of US political culture were all emphasised US foreign policy discourse as the US formulated its policy positions ahead of the 1946 General Conference.

'The Greatest Hope of the Twentieth Century:' 1946-7 [56]

Unesco formally came into being on November 4, 1946. After taking its preamble from Atlee's speech and asserting that peace, like war, originates in the minds of humanity, the Unesco constitution went on to define the Organisation's purpose as seeking substantive reform of the international system and multilateral cooperation. Unesco was:

> to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal respect for justice, for the rule of law and for the human rights and fundamental freedoms which are affirmed for the peoples of the world...by the Charter of the United Nations.[57]

The final constitution had stipulated that Unesco would consist of a General Conference to set the broad outlines of policy, an Executive Board that would refine these broad initiatives into specific policy proposals, and a Secretariat to implement the Unesco program. Consequently, much of the debate at the first General Conference considered how to transform the vague procedural framework agreed to in London into an effective administrative and policy-setting structure. A budget of $6,950,000 was approved for the first year's program, with more than 40% to be supplied by the US.[58]

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[56] Dobinson, "Unesco- The Greatest Hope of the Twentieth Century."

[57] Unesco, Constitution. http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.php-URL_ID=15244&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html

[58] Unesco, "General Conference 1st Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 December, 1946," http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/114580e.pdf, pp. 256-7. In two years the budget had risen only marginally, by less than $1 million, with large contributors such as the US and Britain allocating far less to Unesco than to their national cultural programs. See Unesco, "Records of the General Conference of the United Nations Educational, Cultural and Scientific Organisation 3rd

In Unesco's first year a large administrative staff and broad range of policy activities were put in place by the 24-member Executive Board.

From the formal founding of Unesco onward, the US delegation worked consistently toward strengthening the governmental paradigm with the Organisation. What this suggests is that multilateral cultural diplomacy was being increasingly regarded by the US delegation through the prism of US national interests and its wider foreign policy positions, rather than as a vehicle for apolitical cultural cooperation, defined in terms of long-range reforms to the global order. By seeking to enhance the role of official representatives within the Unesco Executive and Secretariat organs, the US delegation sought to bring discrepancies of national power to bear on the policy functions and ideological positions adopted by Unesco. This shift toward viewing Unesco as a vehicle for American interests is also evident in the tension that developed at the 1946 conference between the US view that Unesco's role was to bring about 'cultural democracy,' and support Western political interests, and the interim Director General Julian Huxley's conception of Unesco as a vehicle for 'evolutionary scientific humanism.' American national interests also underpinned the US delegation's repeated efforts to situate international information functions as a key part of Unesco's program. Although international freedom of information was espoused as a liberal initiative by the US delegation in the context of these efforts, the distribution of information was perceived in Washington as a basis to give Unesco a more direct role in the waging of the post-war ideological struggle. The evidence suggests that this was precisely how other members of Unesco viewed American proposals, and accounts for the opposition to US information proposals that most of the other national delegations expressed.

The key issue at the 1946 General Conference was to establish a basis for Unesco's first practical initiatives. Unesco's proposed program had been set out by the Executive Board in the run up to the Conference according to the doctrine of 'evolutionary scientific humanism:' a theory of world politics developed personally by the interim Director General Julian Huxley. In this view international cultural and

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Session, Beirut, 1948," vol. 2: Resolutions, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/11459e.pdf, p. 39.

educational exchange should be a vehicle for international integration and modernisation that would, over the long term, foster peace.[59] Huxley's philosophy looked toward the "emergence of a single world culture," and situated science and education as a framework of international interaction that could resolve the "two opposing philosophies of life from the West and from the East."[60] He also strongly repudiated the view that Unesco should take a position on economic philosophy, to the annoyance of the US delegation. Huxley had argued that:

> [f]rom acceptance of certain principles or philosophies, Unesco is obviously debarred...Neither can it espouse one of the politico-economic doctrines competing in the world today to the exclusion of the others- the present various of capitalistic free enterprise, Marxian communism, semi-socialist planning, and so on. It cannot do so, partly because it is contrary to its charter and essence to be sectarian, partly for the very practical reason that any such attempt would immediately incur the active hostility of large and influential groups, and the non-cooperation or even withdrawal of a number of nations from membership.[61]

Between 1946 and late 1948 William Benton and other members of the US delegation in Paris registered their displeasure with diffuseness and anti-ideological stance that Huxley's philosophy entailed. They made their concerns about the doctrine plain in lobbying the Executive and Secretariat to ensure that Huxley published any statements of evolutionary scientific humanism as personal remarks rather than official Unesco positions. Rather than a diffuse, evolutionary doctrine of cultural harmony, it was clear the US delegation was envisaging that a more political approach to the diplomacy of culture, education and science, as part and parcel of the Allied post-war settlement, would be taken by Unesco.

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[59] Huxley's philosophy was ultimately criticised from several quarters and Huxley was dissuaded from seeking election to the first full Director Generalship of Unesco. To distinguish himself from Huxley and from the US position, the first elected Director General of Unesco, former Mexican foreign minister Jaime Torres Bodet, articulated a third overarching term for Unesco's work: 'practical humanism,' the connotations of which remained inscrutable.

[60] See Julian Huxley, *Unesco: Its Purpose and Its Philosophy*, (Washington DC: Public Affairs Press America, 1947); Charles S. Ascher, "The Development of Unesco's Program," *International Organization* 4, (no. 1, February 1950), pp. 18-9.

[61] Julian Huxley quoted in Brenda Tripp, "Unesco in Perspective," *International Conciliation* 497, (March 1954), pp. 341-2.

As a counterweight to Huxley's teleological theory of cultural interaction and apparent reluctance to associate Unesco with a 'pro-Western' ideology, Benton became an entrepreneur for the concept of 'cultural democracy' as an alternative premise for Unesco's work. To the General Conference in Paris, Benton had therefore declared:

> Men have struggled for centuries to bring into being the ideal of political democracy...More recently men have struggled for economic democracy. I propose for Unesco the development of adequate means to a third goal: the goal of cultural democracy; the opportunity for all to share in the ideas and the knowledge that will enable them to participate intelligently in the affairs of the world community.[62]

Benton's concept represented the international sphere as progressing toward pluralist integration in similar terms to those which underpinned the State Department's bilateral cultural diplomacy. In his report on the Paris Conference to the State Department, parts of which were published, Benton drew parallels between the cultural principles that Washington claimed to represent and what Unesco ought to strive for, locating 'cultural democracy' as firmly in the spirit of America's civic cultural tradition.[63] In Washington's terms, Unesco's policy program should adopt cultural democracy as its operating principle, and consolidate its range of activities to ensure that mass participation and democratic politics was consistently applied in all Unesco's programs. As Benton had declared to the General Conference:

> Unesco is founded on the belief that neither the forced unification of the world of the spirit, nor the forced standardisation of the world of the mind can give men peace, but only a world democracy of mind as well as spirit... The cultural democracy which Unesco proposes is a democracy of mind and spirit in which every culture shall be free to live and develop in itself and in the great community of common culture.[64]

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[62] William Benton, "Speech to the First General Conference of Unesco;" "General Conference 1st Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 December, 1946," http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/14593e.pdf, p. 64.

[63] William Benton, "Report on the First General Conference of Unesco," *Department of State Bulletin* 2720, (January 5, 1947).

[64] William Benton, "Speech to the First General Conference of Unesco;" "General Conference 1st Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 December, 1946," http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/14593e.pdf, p. 64.

In his subsequent report to the American government and public Benton situated the doctrine of 'cultural democracy' as a basis to ensure that the nebulousness of Unesco's premises would not obstruct its role in consolidating the Allied peace settlement, and thus by implication its ability to support US national interests:

> Unesco's projects should be few in number at the start. They should not overtax the financial ability of the smaller countries during this critical year of financial strain. They should be practicable. They should meet squarely the test question: will this project contribute to peace?[65]

Benton's rhetorical posture at the 1946 General Conference reflects the increasing prominence of the concept of ideological struggle in Washington's approach to Unesco. He had referred in 1945 to an emerging "struggle over the empire of ideas," and shortly after had observed that in the post-war era "the great stakes of diplomacy...involved the winning over of 'peoples.'"[66] Upon his return from Paris, Benton had thus characterised Unesco as:

> a political force of the first magnitude...It can be a major force in the security program of the United States, and in the furtherance of the broad objectives of American foreign policy- peace and prosperity among all peoples of the world...It was also a political conference. That fact is of great importance to the American people. Power in today's world is not merely economic power and military might. It also lies in the field of ideas. As older empires lose economic and military power, and as new ones emerge, they are eager to gain strength on this new frontier- the frontier of the mind- where peace and security can be waged.[67]

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[65] Benton, "Report on the First General Conference," p. 20.

[66] William Benton quoted in Preston, *Hope and Folly*, pp. 39, 48. Benton frequently employed a narrative structure in making such assertions. In the following quotation, he draws explicitly on America as an exceptional power in historical terms: "today the peoples of the world wield greater power by far than ever before. All of us know, 170 years of American example are at least partially responsible for this rise in power of the peoples of the world...the world's best hope for peace lies in their rising to power. That is why it is vital to our interest that the peoples of other nations- and not merely their rulers- acquire an understanding of the United States." William Benton, "Understanding Among Peoples," *Department of State Bulletin* 2493, (March 17, 1946), p. 409.

[67] Benton, "Report on the First General Conference," pp. 20-1.

Benton's report on the Conference noted that for all its broad objectives Washington's interest in seeing Unesco adopt 'realistic' approach to waging peace. He noted in the context of emerging global ideological division that international freedom of information must be a key priority for Unesco.[68] In similar terms, one State Department report on the United Nations system had recommended that the US secure a multilateral treaty on international freedom of information. The national interest in such an agreement was thus that "if its principles were to embrace all modern forms of information, including the press, the radio, and the motion picture, and if approved by a large number of states, [such an agreement] would constitute a realistic foundation for more adequate exchange" of ideas about the global order and the sources of war.[69] Just what was a 'realistic' foundation for the exchange of ideas was defined within the bounds of America's own ideology and national interests, however. In the Unesco context it became evident that there was a discrepancy between the kinds of principles that were seen to indicate Washington's liberal global posture and toleration of free debate in the context of America's *internal* foreign policy discourse, and what the other national delegations to Unesco found acceptable in the context of Unesco's humanistic premise.

Benton had demonstrated his commitment to international information as a key feature of US foreign policy by establishing a special Committee of Consultants on Mass Media earlier that year, which was intended to ensure that the American National Commission for Unesco and the American diplomatic legation in Paris were provided with detailed policy advice on:

> the quality of international communication through the mass media and...the means by which the mass media may be of more positive and creative service to the cause of international understanding and therefore of peace.[70]

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[68] *Ibid.*, pp. 20-1.

[69] Dorothy Fosdick, "International Understanding: A Foundation for the Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2273, (February 25, 1945), pp. 296-8.

[70] US National Commission for Unesco, *Report of the US National Commission for Unesco With Letter of Transmittal from Assistant Secretary Benton to the Secretary of State*, (United States Government Printing Office: Washington DC, 1946), pp. 13-4.

However, US efforts to situate international freedom of information and 'creative' informational initiatives as a key objective in Unesco policy proved divisive within the Organisation. While Washington viewed the distribution of information as a basis to ensure that the post-1945 peace settlement could be consolidated through the promotion of democratic perspectives, other national delegations were concerned that Washington already had excessive influence over information and media in the post-war global order. US information proposals prompted outright objections by the Yugoslavian delegation, which argued that the types of 'information' commenting on global politics that the US wished to see more freely distributed was not likely to acknowledge the legitimacy of dialectical materialism as a political philosophy.[71] The head of the Yugoslavian delegation (who later joined the Executive Board), Vladislav Ribnikar, consequently branded American-sponsored freedom of information principles as an imperialistic strategy intended to push Unesco into circulating anti-Communist propaganda. He publicly queried why Unesco made:

> no reproof against those who preach war, their press, their broadcasts, their publications; nor is there any word on the possible means, either for dealing with such enemies of peace and co-operation or for opposing the destructive activity of Fascist and pro-Fascist elements which, in many countries, are still able to exist....a whole series of proposals by the Preparatory Commission, misusing the principle of 'free flow of ideas,' provides for the penetration of the masses by a propaganda devised by the adversaries of peace and the instigators of new wars.[72]

British commentators also publicly criticised the US delegation's particular preoccupation with what was proving a divisive policy. British MP John Hardman publicly stated in 1947 that Unesco should work toward a pluralist global information order celebrating cultural self-determination rather than the global distribution of

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[71] Benton, "Report on the First General Conference," p. 21. There were perhaps grounds for the Yugoslavian concerns. As Jan Kolasa observes: "Western civilization in its capitalist version was markedly predominant both at the London Conference and during the subsequent years of the existence of Unesco." Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, p. 161.

[72] Vladislav Ribnikar (1946) quoted in Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 141.

American-authored statements.[73] Later that year, after further efforts by the US Unesco delegation to foster a proactive informational program within Unesco, which included a failed plan in August for Unesco to establish its own short-wave radio station,[74] the Polish delegation put forward a resolution in the General Conference to criminalise 'war propaganda.'[75] The Polish proposal was broadly regarded as a rebuff of the US position on freedom of information. It was eventually defeated by the US delegation because the definition of 'war propaganda' was seen as deliberately wide, and hence likely to restrict their plans to see Unesco distribute information that favoured Western interests.[76] While the rhetoric of freedom of information was universalist in scope, the implication that the United States, with considerable private and government resources to bring to bear, would be able to dominate the global information order was the subtext both within the position taken by the American delegation and its critics within Unesco.

During the 1946-47 period the United States delegation continued to take the position that US hegemony could legitimately be pursued within Unesco's multilateral structure according to the terms of America's cultural universalism. Prevailing representations of American interests in fostering democracy and multilateral consensus, as reflected in their rhetoric of media freedom and 'cultural democracy,' were seen as entirely congruent with the pursuit of diplomatic dominance within the Organisation. The broader discourses of US cultural diplomacy and information that have been observed in preceding chapters regarded Washington's effort to cultivate influence through the diplomacy of culture and information as the fulfilment of international interests and democratic vindication, rather than 'power politics' or imperialism. These fed into the rhetorical position adopted by the US Unesco delegation that US influence would do no more than further the cultural rehabilitation

[73] John Hardman (1947) quoted in *Ibid.*, p. 99.
[74] This possibility had been debated, and rejected, during the founding conference of Unesco in 1945. Department of State, "Is Unesco the key to International Understanding?," (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1946).
[75] One article branded the delegations from Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia 'substantive refugees' in Paris who lived in fear of being recalled home and hence kept the lowest possible profile at Unesco meetings. See T. H. White, "Unesco is Dying", *Continental Daily Mail*, (July 25, 1950). This is ironic given that exiled Czech, and Polish officials had been associated with the Unesco project from 1942.
[76] Clare Wells, *The UN, Unesco and the Politics of Knowledge*, (London: Macmillan, 1987), pp. 66-9.

and democratic goals of Unesco. After strong lobbying at the 1947 General Conference, a Unesco information program was placed high on the agenda in the Executive Board's discussions of Unesco's policy program in 1948. However, this occurred in the context of Washington's increasingly strident anti-Communist posture in other areas of foreign policy, and thus generated concerns among a number of the national delegations that an effective diplomatic counter weight to US hegemony must be found so that Unesco would not be a forum for Cold War antagonisms. The exercise of US power and its efforts to move Unesco into more politicised terrain such as informational diplomacy encouraged the formation of a 'post-colonial' voting caucus within the 1948 General Conference.

Beirut, 1948: 'Demonstrating Forcefully [America's] Desire to Collaborate'[77]

1948 was a significant watershed for whether Unesco could pursue its cultural, educational and scientific policy program beyond the international ideological fault-lines that had developed in other arenas of world politics. As I illustrated in the previous chapters, the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill through the US House of Representatives in January that year signalled the culmination of a broader shift in terms of how instrumentally Washington was framing the US national cultural and informational diplomacy programs. In the lead-up to Smith Mundt, US cultural and informational diplomacy had increasingly been characterised as part of an urgent and necessary response to the extension of Communist ideology in Eastern Europe. In some cases, this provoked disputes between enthusiastic Cold Warriors within the cultural and informational programs and those individuals who remained attached to a more reciprocal and apolitical vision of US practices. However, unlike the debates about the appropriate tone and style of US cultural diplomacy that emerged within the Division of Cultural relations, it was predominantly the Cold War posture that shaped how the US delegation (with its higher proportion of staff who were career diplomats) approached Unesco. The notion that Washington had an obligation, as a victorious power, to exercise 'leadership' within the Organisation was a prominent feature of the

[77] Letter to George Allen, (no author), (November 8, 1948), p. 1; U 1945-9; DF; RG 59; NARA.

American policy documents of the period, and was often articulated in the context of narratives that situated the Allied victory in 1945 as the global vindication of liberal democratic politics symbolised by the American revolution itself. The 1948 General Conference also reflects the emergence of a new form of alterity within US cultural diplomacy discourse, which cast Cold War 'neutrality' as a subversive and dangerous ideological category within, and beyond, the Unesco framework. In this context US officials characterised the efforts by other national delegations to ensure that Unesco remained aloof from the ideological schism between the superpowers as a recalcitrant, obstructive and inherently illegitimate diplomatic position. A distinctly instrumental rendition of US interest in Unesco was articulated during 1947-48 as a consequence, as the US sought to use Unesco as a lever against Cold War neutrality *and* the Communist threat. The domineering diplomatic style the US delegation adopted was evident to the other national delegations. Consequently, the 1948 Unesco General Conference, held in Beirut, witnessed perhaps the earliest instance of an organised anti-American voting caucus within the United Nations system.

American policy debates and publicity on Unesco from early 1948 clearly reflect a hardening American stance on international ideological issues and the increasingly instrumental lens through which multilateral cultural cooperation had come to be regarded. Escalating Cold War tensions between the US and the Soviet Union had led to the Soviet blockade of West Berlin from June that year. Covert psychological warfare was being situated in several spheres of US foreign policy thinking as a basis on which to rollback Soviet advances in propaganda and intellectual prestige, particularly in Europe. The US position had been spelled out in National Security Council Memorandum 10/2 in June, 1948, which instructed the newly-formed CIA to launch a covert counter-propaganda and cultural subversion program against the Soviet Union.[78] In a US national delegation policy paper ahead of the General

[78] The CIA's budget increased nearly fourteen-fold between 1949 and 1952, highlighting the significance of counter-propaganda and subversion in the prosecution of the early Cold War. Frances Stonor-Saunders, *The Cultural Cold War: The CIA and the World of Arts and Letters* (New York, 1999), pp. 39-1. A historiographical debate exists on the Berlin blockade, which emphasises the ways in which the crisis was constructed as a symbol of global ideological conflict in US diplomatic discourse. See, e.g.: William Stivers,"The Incomplete Blockade: Soviet Zone Supply of West Berlin, 1948-9," *Diplomatic*

Conference in Beirut in November, 1948, it was observed that US diplomatic efforts to impress its vision for a Unesco-authored information program on the Executive Board had not gone far enough in light of the perils of Soviet expansionism.

> It is felt...that Unesco's contribution to [transmitting information] should be increased. To date, Unesco has devoted more effort to the study of technical means in the field of mass communications than it has to the positive promotion of freedom of information and a beginning should be made during this year to achieve a better balance in Unesco's approach to this work.[79]

Several advisory studies of technical and organisational issues for international communications had been initiated by Unesco in 1948 as a consequence of the program recommendations that the US delegation had secured at the 1947 General Conference. However, US diplomats were frustrated that Unesco's Executive Board had avoided commenting in a substantive way on the errors of Communist propaganda and the escalating tensions caused by the USSR in Germany and elsewhere.[80] In the lead-up to the Beirut Conference, French commentators had branded the US doctrine of freedom of information "mass media imperialism," while the British had speculated it was "an effort to spread US culture by a mass media network." Even American commentators, such as Alan Barth, articulated some concern that if freedom of information meant the penetration of global information networks by the US "some pretty serious excesses, banalities, outright untruths and offences against decency and good taste" might be perpetrated against the unwitting global public.[81] However, the State Department remained committed to the principle of international freedom of information as a basis

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History 21, (no. 4, 1997); Carolyn Eisenberg, "The Myth of the Berlin Blockade and the Early Cold War," in ed. Ellen Schrecker, *Cold War Triumphalism: The Misuse of History After the Fall of Communism*, (New York: New Press, 2004).

[79] United States Delegation to Unesco "Third Session of the General Conference of Unesco Beirut, November 17, 1948: Position Paper on Unesco Program Concerning Freedom of Information," (November 17, 1948), p. 2; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.

[80] United States Delegation to Unesco, "Third Session of the General Conference of Unesco Beirut, November 17, 1948: Position Paper on Unesco Program Concerning Freedom of Information," (November 17, 1948), p. 2; U 1945-4; DF; RG 59, NARA. See also John B. Whitton, "Cold War Propaganda," *The American Journal of International Law* 45, (no. 1, January 1951), pp. 151-3. The US failure to implement its views of Unesco's proper information functions was subsequently recalled by the former director of Unesco's information exchange division Theodore Besterman, *Unesco: Peace in the Minds of Men*, (London: Methuen and Co., 1951), p. 63.

[81] Alan Barth and other unattributed quotations in Preston, *Hope and Folly*, p. 55.

to direct Unesco's policies towards what they saw as ideologically relevant outcomes in the context of the Cold War. While some internal State Department correspondence still sought to present freedom of information as the basis of liberal, pluralist and integrated global order, an instrumental conception of international communications, in line with Washington's obligation to supply 'leadership' to the free world in the context of the Cold War struggle, appeared to predominate. The US delegation had, in this vein, signalled a willingness to exert strong institutional pressure to ensure their proposals would get off the ground.

> The Untied States must still carry the major burden of putting across its concept of the role of mass communications in Unesco. Only by strong US insistence was it possible to push through the convention for the exchange of audio-visual aids- and then it passed by such a narrow margin that it will need much more nursing by us before it becomes effective. We will have to supply leadership in ideas (constructive not negative criticism) and personnel to carry them out.[82]

In addition to these efforts to direct Unesco policy, US diplomats also unsuccessfully proposed that a freedom of information policy be adopted by ECOSOC, and during 1945-46 had sought to include freedom of information in the mandate of the UN Commission on Human Rights. Eleanor Roosevelt was sent to Geneva to head a subcommittee within the Commission on freedom of information and the press. Most significant were calls for a multilateral UN Conference on Freedom of Information, eventually held in Geneva during 1948, to consider a multilateral treaty that had been drafted by William Benton and others. The Conference failed to secure any substantive agreement on freedom of information, however, prompting the State Department to place even greater emphasis on furthering this objective through Unesco.

The 1948 Unesco General Conference in Beirut was in this context shaping up as a significant test of the durability of Unesco's apolitical mandate. The location of

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[82] Arthur A. Compton, to George Allen, "Confidential Report on Third Session Unesco General Conference, November- December 1948," p. 2; D 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.

the conference in Beirut foreshadowed the rise of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a point of controversy in Unesco in addition to witnessing the emergence organised opposition to US power. Holding the General Conference in Lebanon at a time when war with the newly partitioned region of Israel had broken out prompted an extraordinary conference of the Executive Board ahead of the Conference. It considered the question of whether Beirut, the capital of a state engaged in the conflict, was still a suitable destination for the conference given Unesco's overarching commitment to peace.[83] It was decided to keep Beirut as the location, though the 'deteriorating' political context in the Middle East remained a concern for some national delegations.[84] Despite the fact that the Beirut Conference in many ways announced the arrival of Cold War antagonisms within the Organisation, no representatives from the Soviet bloc actually attended Beirut: the Polish, Czechoslovakian and Hungarian delegations had made it known that they objected to the conference location, branding Lebanon "an aggressor" against Israel in "violation of UN high policy."[85]

Washington had taken the controversial step of extending diplomatic recognition to the Republic of Israel at its independence that year. However, the US delegation's response to Lebanon's step of turning back a non-government Israeli delegation of observers when they reached Lebanon's border was not particularly decisive. British documents on the issue suggest that the UK delegation had planned not to support Israel's application for membership in Unesco in keeping with its general policy of diplomatic non-recognition of Israel. US delegates therefore urged the British to follow the humanist 'spirit of Unesco's constitution' and join the US in supporting

[83] Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure "Report on General Political Relations During Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut," p. 1; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.
[84] J. L. Henderson, *Unesco in Focus*, (New York: Anti-defamation League of B'nai B'rith, 1949), p. 33.
[85] Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure "Report on General Political Relations During Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut" p. 2; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA. The Yugoslavian delegation had not been widely viewed as a proxy for Soviet interests within Unesco during this founding period, Ribnikar's celebration of dialectical materialism notwithstanding, and in any case Yugoslavia had been expelled from Cominform, cementing the break between Tito and Stalin, in June 1948.

Israel's application.[86] By the beginning of the conference, however, the US had abandoned its lofty sentiments on the issue, recognising instead the need to build support for its own positions on Unesco's information functions among the existing Unesco members, a significant proportion of which were Arab states. A rumoured post-colonial caucus composed of Latin American and Middle Eastern Unesco members, with the support of France and Italy, had also raised concerns in Washington that the 'Western' values the US had sought to promote within the Organisation could be undermined. A preparatory report had instructed the US delegation to drop its support of Israeli candidature as a consequence of these concerns, instructing them to be attentive to the concerns of Arab states and find any available:

> possibility of influencing them separately and also weaning them away from the Latin-American block. In future conferences much can be done with this group (which is basically sympathetic to the US) by careful exposition of our views and a show of understanding for theirs.[87]

What particularly troubled the United States delegation was the intellectual and ideological support that the French and Italian delegations had given to what was perceived as the nascent anti-American post-colonial movement. The post-colonial states, as one report observed, were "greatly influenced by French intellectual leadership," and had individually voiced their objections to the US proposals for freedom of information on the grounds that the principle would overwhelm their publics with anti-Communist 'mass persuasion' material.[88] In branding themselves as

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[86] "Report on Executive Board Meeting of 15 October 1948," (no author); "Third Session of the Unesco General Conference, Beirut, November, 1948;" FO924/648; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.

[87] Arthur A. Compton , to George V. Allen, "Confidential Report on Third Session Unesco General Conference, November- December 1948," p. 1; DF 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA. On the emerging voting bloc (which secured agreements against the US's wishes on cultural centers and language issues in Beirut), see also: Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure "Report on General Political Relations During Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut," pp. 4-5; DF 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.

[88] Controversy over American administrative norms emerged at a number of points during the period under discussion here, and American reflections on this matter contrast American and European or British views on the role of a chief executive. As far as can be gleaned from the American delegation's impression of this tension, the American view was of a more proactive role for the chief executive (or Director General) in directing policy and setting priorities. Opposition to America's interpretation of the Director General's role by the French, Italian and British delegations was therefore often put down to contrasting administrative traditions by the US, rather than a genuine concern about the concentration of

'post-colonial,' the counter-hegemonic caucus seemed to critique US proposals on the very same anti-imperialist grounds that Washington had claimed for its own foreign policy posture at the end of the war.[89]

The following extract highlights the extent to which the US delegation viewed the post-colonial movement as an affront to its rightful position of leadership within Unesco, and goes so far as to suggest that external issues be brought to bear on their national governments to undermine the caucus:

> It should be noted that the characteristics of [Unesco] leadership is shifting slightly to the 'latin' (both American and European) from its original 'anglo-saxin' [*sic.*] domination. One of the most effective ways of dealing with this group is to maintain effective US participation at all times by forceful well-briefed persons with great influence. On really vital issues, many (if not most) Board members can be influenced through their governments (but this must be done discreetly and not too often).[90]

Whereas the US had claimed, through its bilateral cultural diplomacy, to be the supporter and exemplar of self-determination and political interdependence to the peoples of the Third World during the war, under Cold War conditions these liberal principles appeared to have found their limits.

At the 1948 General Conference the US delegation also expressed concerns that, since their efforts to promote freer communications had been ineffective, a more direct exertion of diplomatic influence should be undertaken to keep Unesco anti-Communist in character.

> Every effort should be made to assure better US representation in top positions. The US should put up outstanding candidates for, 1. DDG. [Deputy Director General] 2. Head of Administration... 3. Head of Mass Communications Department, and, 4. Head of Public Information. It would also be useful to develop further

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power within the institution. See e.g.: Arthur A. Compton, to George Allen, "Confidential Report on Third Session Unesco General Conference, November- December 1948," p. 2; Unesco 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.

[89] Considering that France retained parts of its formal empire at the time, this was a particularly ironic way to subvert US hegemony.

[90] Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure "Report on General Political Relations During Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut," p. 2; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA.

> candidates for intermediate positions in these fields and others of importance such as the Executive Assistant to DG, Secretary of Executive Board, External Relations Officer for National Commission, etc.[91]

The US delegation's attempt to place American Walter Laves in the position of the first elected Director General went awry early in the Conference, and eventually the US delegation switched their support to the post-colonial bloc's choice of Jaime Torres Bodet, who had previously occupied the posts of both Foreign and Education Minister of Mexico. As Charles Ascher notes, the State Department had assumed, as it had in London, that having been saddled with 40% of the costs of Unesco, it would have been understood by the other delegations an American was entitled to the office.[92]

After Torres Bodet was confirmed as Director General the US delegation departed from notions of multilateral consensus, and the State Department advised that external US-Mexican relations could be brought to bear on the Director General (even though he was not, strictly speaking, a diplomatic representative) to ensure US interests would receive the attention they were due.

> [T]he key part played by the US in the election of Torres-Bodet as Director General should be recognised and used. In him we have a leader who is not necessarily going to be sympathetic to the US views. He appears to be independent and more than slightly influenced by his Latin-French background...It would appear that our best method of procedure would be to present carefully considered views to him on basic issues that would appeal to him on the basis of their merits. *Being a man of no small political experience, he should also be susceptible to political influence (applied appropriately) on the most vital matters.*[93]

Assistant Secretary of State George Allen headed the delegation to Beirut, and his subsequent statements reflect an explicitly instrumentalist discourse of US interests in Unesco. As Allen observed in 1949, "while Unesco draws its mandate from the will of

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[91] *Ibid.*, p. 3.

[92] Charles S. Ascher, *Program-Making in Unesco 1946-1951: A Study in the Processes of International Administration*, (Chicago: Public Administration Clearing House, 1951), p. 10.

[93] My emphasis added. Arthur A. Compton, to George V. Allen, Enclosure "Report on General Political Relations During Third Session of the Unesco General Conference Beirut," p. 3; U 1945-9; DF; RG 59; NARA.

the peoples of the world, it must be operated...as a part and parcel of the system of the United Nations."[94] Unesco came to be seen as an instrument of Western purposes based on prior notions that America was entitled to exercise leadership as a victorious power in the Second World War, and on the grounds that the US delegation (with its emphasis on governmental representation) had seen Unesco as an inevitably political institution anyway. Unesco was represented less and less as forum of consensus and openness, and increasingly as a tool for Washington's more immediate concerns in waging the ideological struggle against Communism.

James P. Sewell has noted that by the late 1940s, with the Unesco administrative organs having settled into established patterns of operation and with the Organisation as a whole seeking to concentrate its policy program, the national delegations and individuals involved in Unesco had also come to accept that:

> However endlessly Unescans proclaimed the non-political character of their enterprises, Unesco unavoidably exposed political sensitivities. To the extent that Unesco proposals carried potential for serious change in anyone's status quo- and from the beginning such change was the hope of many- they...stimulated political reactions. Beneath the rhetoric of international solidarity more candid voices conceded and occasionally relished the political opportunities offered by Unesco.[95]

The 1948 General Conference in Beirut had provided a stark indication of the inevitably political character of Unesco's work. A brief to the US delegation after the Conference indicated that a language of ideological struggle and America's entitlement to lead post-war cultural cooperation had become the prevailing basis on which Unesco was regarded in Washington.

> The growing importance of Unesco and our vital interests in the Organisation and its objectives carry with them the obligation to assume a leading role in the proceedings of the Conference....
> The members of the Delegation should, individually and collectively, take the initiative in supplying information based on the resources and experiences of this country which may be of assistance in promoting the objectives of Unesco.

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[94] George Allen (1949) quoted in Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, p. 155.
[95] Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 139.

> From the outset the United States has demonstrated forcefully its desire to collaborate in this program through substantial contributions of thought, effort and funds on the part of its citizens, both public and private. Through these efforts the United States has assumed leadership in the preliminary tasks of Unesco and will undoubtedly be called upon to continue to maintain this role of leadership if Unesco is to accomplish its purpose. However, in a truly cooperative international enterprise such as this one an overriding influence by any single country would obviously detract from the usefulness of the Organisation, and it is important to avoid *giving the impression* that the United States wishes to wield such influence.[96]

While discourses of ideological struggle had come to be the dominant framework through which Washington's posture toward multilateral cultural cooperation was constituted, there were few indications that the other members of Unesco regarded the Cold War in the same urgent terms. The US delegation thus appeared to be constituting America's international cultural posture not as one of reciprocity and interchange, but rather in such a way as to situate culture as the frontline within a global struggle or crusade. Whether other delegations disagreed appeared to be less relevant under these Cold War terms of American engagement with Unesco; what mattered instead was that the Communist threat must be confronted in all spheres of international relations. The 'wrecking' implications, as Clare Wells has termed it, of the way in which the US delegation sought to make Unesco as a forum of ideological struggle were revealed even more starkly during 1950, in the form of disputes that emerged over how Unesco should respond to the Korean War.[97]

'Special Project K:' Korean War Information and the Exercise of US Hegemony[98]

The Korean War was a pivotal moment in the first decade of United States' post-war foreign policy. Washington viewed the conflict as a test of America's wider credibility as the chief defender of the 'free world,' with the added challenge that the

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[96] Letter to George V Allen, (no author), (November 8, 1949), p. 1; U 1945-49; DF; RG 59; NARA. My emphasis added.

[97] Wells, *The UN, Unesco and the Politics of Knowledge*, p. 13.

[98] 'Special Project K' features in several US policy documents as a term for the effort to ensure Unesco would distribute information on the Korean war.

Communist adversary was no longer confined to the Soviet Union but had now spread to Asia, and to regions that some sectors of Washington regarded as directly within the US sphere of influence. As the conflict took an increasing toll on American lives and expenditure, Washington was confronted with a significant publicity challenge at a domestic level. Positive international opinion also proved difficult to sustain, given deepening international concerns about the risk of outright war between the nuclear-armed superpowers, and the position of neutrality that many states felt compelled to adopt in response to these fears. Although the US intervention had been legally mandated by the United Nations Security Council, disagreements within Unesco about how to comment on the conflict indicated that many delegations felt that the UN action in Korea had been provocative, or at the very least that Unesco must stand aloof from the Cold War in order to work toward diffusing it over the long term.[99] A posture Cold War neutralism had also been articulated since 1948 by many of the national delegations to Unesco, especially the diplomatically self-assertive France, as a basis to reclaim Unesco from US domination. The US proposal that 'Unesco-authored' Korean War information be distributed seems almost tailor-made as a rallying point for these efforts to counterbalance US diplomatic influence and its ideological view of Unesco's work. Consequently the US delegation found itself in somewhat of a bind when presenting their Korean War proposals to Unesco. If it failed to secure its objective, the US delegation risked undermining Unesco's standing in the eyes of Congress and the American public, and might provide an opportunity to enthusiastic Cold Warriors to brand Unesco as a vehicle for subversive influences and call for a complete US withdrawal from the Organisation.

The invasion of South Korea by the Communist North on June 25, 1950 had a catalysing impact in Washington by seeming to supply a vindication that the extension of Communism was all but guaranteed unless strong counter-balancing in all spheres of

[99] As Gaddis notes, initial international support for the conflict is often downplayed in historical accounts, and the Truman administration was restrained in escalating its response into a war with China by its allies. John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 75.

international activity was pursued by the US.[100] US President Harry Truman's message to Congress on the outbreak of war had also charged that the global psychological implications of the conflict were paramount in the way Washington sought to respond to the invasion: "Korea is not only a country undergoing the torment of aggression- it is also a symbol. It stands for right and justice."[101] The language of officials within the American cultural relations sphere who had previously asserted progressive internationalist sentiments, such as Waldo Leland, Unesco Executive Board vice-chairperson and former chief administrator of the Library of Congress Luther H. Evans, and George Stoddard from the University of Illinois, had also hardened in the two years following the Smith Mundt Bill into a doctrine of cultural and ideological 'containment.' Stoddard, for instance, had by 1950 taken to referring to Unesco as a 'counterforce' in a 'war of ideas,' rather than the sponsor of global integration and pluralism.[102] William Benton had left the Department of State to run for election to the US Senate, and in his election campaign in early 1950 he condemned Unesco's 'aloofness' from the global ideological struggle at hand, urging the Organisation to take up the role of a "political instrument in the Cold War." From the Senate, he argued that

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[100] As John Lewis Gaddis has argued, wider support within the government for the broader outlines of the Containment doctrine was assured in the wake of the attack "in large part because of the remarkable way in which the Korean War appeared to validate several of NSC-68's most important conclusions. One of these was the argument that all interests had become equally vital; that any further shift in the balance of power [however] small, could upset the entire structure of post-war international relations. There was almost immediate agreement in Washington that Korea, hitherto regarded as a peripheral interest, had by the nature of the attack on it become vital if American credibility elsewhere was not to be questioned. 'To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack' John Foster Dulles warned, 'would start [a] disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war.'" John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 109. In other work Gaddis has noted that the Korean War led Truman to take up the propositions of NSC-68 and its recommendations that the US should triple its defence spending and undertake a much greater publicity effort to undermine Communism. Gaddis, *We Now Know*, p. 76. Note that I use the term 'containment doctrine' when discussing broader acceptance of the NSC-68 report's analysis. The report was not made public, however the doctrine of containment as Acheson notes in his memoir, its essence was noted in the press and in the government's public statements. Dean Acheson, *Present At The Creation: My Years in the State Department*, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1969), p. 375. On the alternatives to containment that were debated in the Department of State see: Robert L. Messer, "Paths Not Taken: The United States Department of State and Alternatives to Containment, 1945-1946," *Diplomatic History* 1, (no. 4, Fall 1977).

[101] "Text of Truman Message to Congress on State of Union," *New York Herald Tribune*, (January 9, 1951).

[102] Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 154-5. The connection cannot be proved, but it is interesting to reflect that George Kennan's 'Long Telegram' from Moscow of February, 1946 also used the term 'counterforce' as a description of the posture Washington needed to adopt in confronting Soviet expansionism. Messer, "Paths Not Taken," p. 298.

Unesco's goals must be "identical with American policy," and that the Organisation should seek to "pierce the iron curtain" by adopting a short-wave radio policy and broadcasting into Eastern Europe.[103] Assistant Secretary of State Edward Barrett similarly constituted the Korean War as a global public opinion issue:

> Few realise that the US-UN decision to resist in Korea was, broadly speaking, a propaganda decision. On world military maps Korea was not strategically important; indeed the United States could not hope to hold it in the early days of a world conflict. Economically and politically, it was less vital to America than other areas. What was important and what all hands recognised was that a failure to resist unprovoked aggression would be interpreted world-wide as a sign of weakness...It would be an invitation to neutralism or to Communism. As expected, the quick decision to defend Korea had an electrifying effect throughout the free world. In Asia, millions took it as the first sign that the UN and US meant business, that they could be counted on for help in an emergency, and that resistance to Communism was hence worthwhile.[104]

Unesco was now situated well within US discourses of global ideological struggle and the instrumentalism of cultural, educational and scientific diplomacy in Cold War terms. In this context neutrality was classified as an obstacle to the peaceful functioning of the global order that had already been jeopardised by the prospect of Communist expansion in Asia. By declining to take a position against the threatening, immoral Soviet 'other,' non-alignment was constituted as a troublesome, subversive and obstructionist position in the context of US efforts to defend democracy and freedom internationally. Within this framework of meaning about the nature of the Cold War, the strident, polarising and patently obstructive positions that had been taken by the US delegation after 1948 begin to make sense. America's moral position in the Cold War was the basis upon which Benjamin Cohen, an American and the Assistant Secretary-General of the United Nations, was still able to characterise Washington's Unesco strategy as a legitimate effort to combat complacency among uncommitted states and undermine the recalcitrance of the neutralists. America's role was a

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[103] William Benton quoted in Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 140.
[104] Edward Barrett, quoted in Leon Gordenker, "United Nations Use of Mass Communications in Korea, 1950-1951," *International Organization* 8, (no. 3, August 1954), p. 336.

crusading one. Consensus was no longer the overriding objective in Unesco; rather America had an obligation to show leadership and to "awaken the conscience of the world with regard to security." Washington was scripted, in this context, as having legitimate grounds in "organising...every means of information" to forcefully communicate the "reasons for the struggle."[105]

As a consequence of the instrumental vision of Unesco's functions and the ideological significance of the Korean War that had been articulated by the State Department, shortly after the outbreak of the war US diplomats proposed to the Unesco Executive Board that a world-wide information program justifying the UN police action be undertaken as an urgent priority. The US delegation to Unesco had reported that on transmitting their suggestions to the Unesco Secretariat an angry 'excitement' ensued, and that:

> Although there had been some warning that such a suggestion might be expected in view of previous conversation on this subject, it was immediately interpreted, by those all too ready to criticise 'American domination of Unesco,' as a US effort to change the nature of Unesco... This brought an immediate negative reaction from the French Foreign Office in the form of a telephone call... The opinion of the French is that any Unesco action on this matter should be taken upon requests received from the appropriate organs of the UN.[106]

The US delegation, with the sanction of Director General Torres Bodet, convened a special session of the Unesco Executive Board to consider the proposals to be held that August. Even before the meeting convened, US diplomats had requested the Unesco Executive Board unilaterally declare its support for UN actions in Korea, which was declined.[107] The Director General was the focal point for US lobbying, given that he had been quoted publicly just a few days before the outbreak of war in Korea

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[105] Cohen quoted in Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 149.

[106] United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher "Paris 166 (Unesco Series) August 4, 1950 'Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending July 29, 1950,'" pp. 2-3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84, NARA.

[107] US officials went so far as to write the statements they wished Torres Bodet to present on the Korean situation. Sewell, *Unesco in World Politics*, pp. 148-9.

proclaiming Unesco's neutrality in the global clash of economic ideologies, stating that all the components of the Organisation's program must "take care to become neither auxiliaries nor victims in the disputes by which the world is torn."[108] At the Unesco General Conference in Florence that May, Torres Bodet was also reported to have claimed that Unesco must not be subject to selfish national interests, but rather was to be "a union of nations moving forward to a definite ideal under his leadership...all one needed was freedom to act along the right lines."[109]

At the same Conference, however, the US had successfully proposed a resolution which articulated, albeit vaguely, a new rendition of Unesco's information function stipulating it would "reaffirm...its decisions...within the limits of its acceptance, to cooperate closely and actively in the programme of peace of the United Nations."[110] Internal US correspondence noted Torres Bodet's contrary views, and instructed the US delegation that any available political leverage over him on the Korean information issue should be sought and exploited. As one advisory report noted: "in this connection it would be interesting to know how much he is influenced by the philosophy of 'Neutralism' and how much by the pressure of or desire to please those opposing the US point of view."[111]

Although many of the national delegations to Unesco might have supported some kind of response to the Korean War on Unesco's part, none publicly endorsed the adversarial information program that the US favoured in the lead-up to the Executive Board meeting. As the US delegation had observed in preparing for the talks:

> It seems apparent that [Torres Bodet's] feeling is shared widely among Europeans who emphasise the concept of Unesco as an international cultural organisation rather than primarily a political instrument. In the field of reconstruction, however, the Secretariat has already begun an effort to try to work out plans for the development of a campaign for scientific, educational and cultural reconstruction in Korea and it appears

[108] Torres Bodet quoted in Julian Huxley, "Unesco: The First Phase," *Manchester Guardian*, (August 10 1950).
[109] Alan Morehead (1950) quoted in Sewell, *Unesco in World Politics*, pp. 144-5.
[110] Unesco General Conference resolution (1950) quoted in Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, p. 155.
[111] Unesco Relations Staff, Department of State, "Report on the Unesco Secretariat's Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea," (March 7, 1951), p. 4; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.

> that a special program along these lines would obtain substantial support, although it is generally recognised that such a program is long range and could not be expected to have a substantial effect during the present 'hot war' phase of the Korean crisis.[112]

After a month of lobbying for an informational policy on Korea one dispatch from the US delegation to Washington explained the recalcitrant position taken by some Board members: "the Executive Board, contrary to the wishes of the American Representative and even of the Director General, had in mind a somewhat limited rather than a broad interpretation of these two resolutions as far as the use of Mass Communications was concerned."[113] The US delegation dismissed these concerns about the odious implication in supplying war information, suggesting that fears were "more apparent than real...around the question of where information stops and propaganda begins."[114] This symbolises how instrumentalist Washington's approach to Unesco had become by 1950. As we have seen in the foregoing case studies, the question of how to categorise America's own policies as 'information' not 'propaganda' had been a significant concern within the US cultural and international information programs after 1936.[115] The symbolic value of the anti-propaganda frame is attested by the ongoing rhetorical effort within the cultural and informational programs to maintain it. As the language of global survival and ideological crisis pervaded the making of US foreign policy in 1950, strenuous informational advocacy was now being countenanced as an essential function of ideological warfare.

Torres Bodet had been presented with a difficult dilemma during the controversy. Although the US had been the deciding factor in placing him in office and had lately impressed upon him that Washington's ongoing financial support of Unesco

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[112] United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher "Paris 166 (Unesco Series) August 4, 1950 'Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending July 29, 1950,'" pp. 2-3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.

[113] Unesco Relations Staff, Department of State, "Report on the Unesco Secretariat's Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea," (March 7, 1951), pp. 2-3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA. On Torres Bodet and the Unesco secretariat's views of the role of Unesco in Korea, which conflicted with the US's more expansive vision, see Sewell, *Unesco in World Politics*, p. 149.

[114] United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher "Paris 179 (Unesco Series) August 29, 1950 'Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending August 25, 1950,'" p. 1; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.

[115] See, e.g.: Howland H. Sargeant "Major Tasks of Unesco in Establishing Communication Among Peoples of the World", *Department of State Bulletin* 4055, (January 1, 1951).

was at stake, the Director General also understood the potentially damaging implications for Unesco if it adopted a wartime informational program at the Americans' behest.[116] Ultimately, it was Torres Bodet who proposed a compromise resolution to the August Executive Board meeting. His compromise affirmed Unesco's commitment to a post-war reconstruction role in Korea, which most Board members favoured, but also rather ambiguously suggested that some current informational functions might be necessary to pave the way for the reconstruction functions. The compromise was approved by the Board, but subsequent public and private comments by a number of delegations indicated that the information corollary was unpopular. The British, for instance, professed to be 'considerably embarrassed' by indications that the American delegation "appear to wish to involve Unesco in propaganda work."[117] Elsewhere, British Foreign Office officials reflected that Washington's goals for Unesco were becoming increasingly expansive and impractical as the Cold War struggle deepened. One memorandum predicted that by pushing the boundaries of the Organisation's policy program, Washington had nobody but itself to blame for its thwarted proposals.[118] Twenty-three of the national members of Unesco formally submitted comments on the resolution: only six were positive, four were openly negative and four expressed no opinion but merely acknowledged the communiqué. Two states had also added provisos that they accepted that UN action in Korea was warranted, but the involvement of Unesco in the conflict was not. As Jan Kolasa notes, the response 'spoke for itself:' "The involvement of Unesco in the Korean war on the side of United States policy revealed...that this organisation had transgressed its original assumptions of political neutrality."[119]

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[116] See, for example: United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher "Paris 162 (Unesco Series) July 27, 1950 'Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Weekly Period Ending July 21, 1950,'" p. 3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.

[117] Draft Telegram "August 1950: Unesco and the Korean Situation;" FO 371/88901; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.

[118] D. S. Cape , Draft Letter to F. R. Cowell, (August 16, 1950), pp. 1-2; FO371/88901; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew. See also: Unesco Relations Staff, "Report on the Unesco Secretariat's Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea," (March 7, 1951), pp. 2-3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb..; RG84; NARA. On Torres Bodet and the Unesco secretariat's views of the role of Unesco in Korea, which conflicted with the US delegation's instrumental view of culture see also Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 149.

[119] Kolasa, *International Intellectual Cooperation*, pp. 156-7.

The State Department took the Director General's compromise resolution as a victory, however, and subsequently pushed for a stronger operational interpretation of the information provision in the Executive Board resolution. US delegates reported to Washington that a process had begun by which it could "[u]se the Korean case as a lever to improve and strengthen the orientation of the Secretariat toward the UN and 'Peace and Security.'" Drawing on the presupposition that Unesco had an inevitable ideological function, the American Unesco staff railed that "Militant Pacifism, not 'Neutralism' nor academism should be the prevailing spirit" of Unesco's program.[120] The dispute also led the US delegation to articulate some longer-term objectives for the institution as an ideological instrument:

> the Korea question is having a salutary effect in creating a more realistic atmosphere among some rather fuzzy thinking people in the Secretariat concerning its position in the present day world. The expression has been used that the Secretariat members are now more than ever before being forced to 'stand up and be counted' as to their personal politics in favour of either the Eastern or Western form of democracy. This salutary effect has the accompanying problem, however, of causing considerable unrest among the Unesco staff- I believe that this can serve as a point in our favour if we adopt a calm, logical and energetic attitude in support of our views. It is needless to emphasise the importance in this connection of the appointment of a first class American DDG.[121]

By January, 1951, provisional funds amounting to $175,000 out of the Unesco Executive budget had been drawn for the conduct of "emergency relief and eventual reconstruction in the field of education, science and culture for the people of Korea" as well as, crucially, for "information through Unesco media and through all Unesco's educational facilities...on the necessity for Collective Security."[122] Shortly after,

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[120] The placing of 'peace and security' and 'neutralism' in quotation marks by the Unesco staff is an interesting feature of this document. It suggests that the public and private sides of US language pertaining to the Cold War were increasingly bifurcated. Unesco Relations Staff, "Report on the Unesco Secretariat's Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea," (March 7, 1951), p. 12; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb; RG 84; NARA.

[121] United States Delegation to Unesco, Paris, to Department of State, Cipher "Paris 167 (Unesco Series) August 9, 1950 'Report of Activities at Unesco House for the Week Ending August 4, 1950,'" p. 5; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.

[122] Unesco Relations Staff, "Report on the Unesco Secretariat's Carrying Out of Unesco Executive Board Resolutions on Korea," (March 7, 1951), p. 1; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.

printing began on Unesco-authored publicity interpreting the conflict in pro-United Nations terms, despite the fact that the project was still unpopular and Executive Board meetings were "sometimes far from calm."[123]

Ironically, after forcing through its unpopular policy to propagate information on behalf of the US action in Korea, the Department of State began to question Unesco's usefulness for furthering Washington's national interests. In the middle of 1951, for instance, one American delegate to Unesco warned his superiors that Unesco should be a minor priority for the Department of State since the organisation had lost credibility with some of its most important official and public supporters in Europe.[124] James P. Sewell characterises how Washington now regarded Unesco in succinct terms:

> United States leaders had advanced their institutional engagement rather convulsively with an intention of controlling important Unesco policies; now, having failed, they disengaged discernibly if not conclusively on grounds that Unesco had refused to make itself relevant to the 'real' world.[125]

Cold War Antagonisms, 1951-53: Membership Controversies and the End of Non-Governmentalism in Unesco.

From 1951, membership controversies and the intrusion of Cold War antagonisms within Unesco signalled that the humanist, apolitical vision that had been articulated for the Organisation at its founding had been convincingly undermined. The Soviet Union had almost never mentioned Unesco in its official media during the 1940s, in keeping with its generally isolationist stance on bilateral cultural relations in these years, but broke its silence after 1950 with a series of articles in several publications condemning American 'dollar imperialism' and its attempt to use Unesco as a proxy for its ideological self-interest.[126] Membership controversies arose over the

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[123] *Ibid.*, pp. 2-3.
[124] Arthur A. Compton, Letter to Charles A. Thomson, (February 9, 1951), p. 2; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
[125] Sewell, *Unesco in World Politics*, pp. 150-1.
[126] Armstrong, "The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco," pp. 217-33. This is supported by at least one other account stressing Soviet cultural isolationism prior to 1952. Frederick C. Barghoorn and Paul W. Friedrich, "Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy," *World Politics*, 8 (no. 3, April 1956).

deposition of instruments of acceptance for ECOSOC and Unesco by Francoist Spain (despite the fact that the *Falange* regime had once refused to allow a Unesco human rights display to enter the country), and by Japan, Austria and West Germany's accession to full membership. Washington declared its support of Unesco membership for these right-wing authoritarian states, and had thereby provoked strident criticisms in the official media of the Eastern Bloc former Unesco members and the USSR, as well as condemnation of the US position from exiled Spanish intellectuals and their supporters in Europe. Comment in the Soviet media had strongly condemned the defeat (by thirty votes to four, with thirteen abstentions) of a Czech proposal at the 1950 General Conference to replace the delegation of Nationalist Taiwan with one from Communist China, a proposal that had been framed in relation to Unesco's founding commitment to humanism and international understanding.[127] As Armstrong notes in his study of Soviet diplomacy in Unesco: "It may seem paradoxical that, at the same time that they used the appeal of universality as a device to enlist sentiment for the admission of communist China, [Eastern Bloc] spokesmen [*sic.*] bitterly opposed this same sentiment when it favored the admission of nations which they sought to exclude from UN bodies."[128] Yet the same could be said of how Washington constituted its interests in relation to the criteria for Unesco membership in these years, as its exceptionalist sense of its own entitlement to exert leadership within the organisation had led to a highly selective interpretation of Unesco's universalist membership principle. In 1952 the Eastern Bloc members officially withdrew from Unesco in protest, and though the Yugoslavian delegation remained, Vladislav Ribnikar resigned in protest over membership issues from the Executive Board.[129]

In 1952 a budget freeze imposed by the British and American delegations was accompanied by demands by Washington and London that the Unesco program be concentrated on politically relevant issues. This led to Torres Bodet's permanent

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[127] Sewell, *Unesco in World Politics*, p. 145

[128] Armstrong, "The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco," p. 229.

[129] On the Eastern Bloc withdrawal see: Polish Ambassador in Paris, Letter to the Unesco Director General, (December 5, 1952); "Admission of New Members to Unesco; Admission of Spain in Spite of Protests; Withdrawal of Poland From Unesco; Speculation as to Reasons for Portugal's Not Applying to Join;" FO371/95913; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.

resignation from the post of Director General.[130] He was replaced by Luther H. Evans, an American, who immediately sought to distance himself from the excesses of US anti-Communism by publicly opposing Senator Joseph McCarthy's attacks on the State Department. The appointment of an American to this key position appeared nevertheless to critics of US dominance within Unesco as yet another manifestation of America's effort to channel the activities of international cultural cooperation into anti-Communist propaganda. British Foreign Office records note France's 'fury' at the election: the "strength of anti-American sentiment...inspired by the evident fact that [Evans] would not be the staunch upholder of French culture and the French language which the French had in Torres Bodet."[131] Meanwhile, Unesco continued to be framed in largely instrumental terms by Washington, with policy-makers representing multilateral cultural diplomacy as an arena for ideological struggle rather than a framework for apolitical cultural cooperation. Ensuring that Unesco staked a clear, 'pro-Western' position in the Cold War struggle was thus stated as the central priority for the Department of State's Unesco staff in a memorandum of August, 1952: neutralism and anti-Americanism were characterised as the most urgent obstacles to the US in the immediate future, implying they were essentially the same thing.[132] Here, once again, a triangular framework of alterity is evident in US foreign policy discourse in relation to Unesco. US officials constituted American interests here both in relation a totalising, immoral and threatening Communist 'other,' but also as the vanguard of the free world in relation to the recalcitrant, obstructive and irresponsible neutralist 'other.'

Washington's instrumental view of Unesco in this period was also reflected in the US delegation's support for a proposal forwarded by the British delegation (strongly opposed by France), to amend Unesco's constitution so that the Executive Board and Secretariat would become a body of government representatives. Luther

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[130] The Director General had made a dramatic resignation speech after disputes at the General Conference that had been held Florence in 1950, but was convinced to return just days later.

[131] "Unesco Director General," (no author), (June 19, 1953), p. 1; FO371/107236; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew. "Candidates for Director-Generalship of Unesco; Election of Dr Luther Evans, of the USA, as Director General at a Special Session of Unesco in July 1953," (no author); FO371/107236; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.

[132] Robert S. Smith, to Charles A. Thomson "Report on Trip to the United States, July 21-August 8, 1952," (August 13, 1952), p. 3; Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.

Evans, as Sewell notes, had been a longstanding proponent of governmentalism within Unesco, and he was in a clear position to promote US interests in subsequent years.[133] He had represented the Organisation in this period as "definitely an intergovernmental organisation, subject to the limitations and procedures inherent in official action...The fact remains that Unesco works for its Member States, that it works largely through the governments of Member States."[134] As T. V. Sathyamurthy notes, the prevailing approach within the Department of State and the American Unesco National Commission symbolised that US interests in multilateral cultural cooperation, and America's cultural diplomacy in general, "had come a long way from the idealism that had characterised it at the beginning." As such "[t]here was no longer any mention of breaking down national sovereignty," and Unesco was seen "no longer [as] a non-political organisation of the United Nations."[135]

The Soviet Union and the Soviet Republics of Belorussia and Ukraine applied to join Unesco in 1954.[136] The Department of State, in keeping with its posture of diplomatic dominance and its overarching view of Unesco as a political instrument, greeted the news with instructions that the US representatives within Unesco should "do all possible to fill vacant high ranking posts in Unesco, in order to forestall a Russian demand to place its nationals in these posts."[137] As an ex-Secretariat member of Unesco from New Zealand reflected, the developments of 1951-52 and the subversion of cultural diplomacy by the superpowers for their own strategic and political gains had signalled that "[w]hatever the future holds, it is certain that, from now on, Unesco will be of greater significance to politicians as well as to scholars."[138] Similarly, of this period one historian has subsequently noted that "For years the façade of nongovernmentalism [had] stood despite its widening fissures" but even this crumbled by the early 1950s.[139]

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[133] They were successful in implementing this provision before the USSR's entry into Unesco in 1954.
[134] Luther H. Evans (1957) quoted in Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 166.
[135] T. V. Sathyamurthy, *The Politics of International Cooperation: Contrasting Conceptions of Unesco*, (Geneva: Droz, 1964), p. 158.
[136] Armstrong, "The Soviet Attitude Toward Unesco;" Barghoorn and Friedrich, "Cultural Relations and Soviet Foreign Policy."
[137] Charles A Thompson, Office Memorandum, (April 20, 1954); Unesco 1950-4; Paris Emb.; RG 84; NARA.
[138] Clarence Beeby quoted in Sewell, *Unesco in World Politics*, p. 170.
[139] Sewell, *Unesco and World Politics*, p. 169.

Conclusion

The course of American diplomacy within Unesco between 1946 and 1953 reflected the broader shifts in how the practices and significance of US cultural diplomacy and international information was represented in the course of US foreign policy-making. The US had framed its hopes for the Unesco during the planning stages of the Organisation in the terms that had also been used to characterise US bilateral cultural diplomacy: reciprocity; non-governmentalism; voluntarism; and engagement with popular education and culture. Multilateralism was heralded as a co-optive organising principle that reflected the liberal and exceptional character of US national interests themselves. After the founding of Unesco in 1946 the US delegation continued to presuppose its engagement with international cultural cooperation in similar terms: noting how cultural cooperation was central to ensuring the post-war settlement could be translated into a basis for long-term global peace and prosperity. As William Preston has suggested, these internationalist sentiments were central to the self-narration of US cultural diplomacy:

> In spite of the strong currents of national interest lurking below the smooth surface of benevolence, the United States maintained a deep seated conviction that Unesco would itself avoid politics. Having successfully masked its own ideological agenda from itself and mastered the art of cognitive dissonance, the US expected to join an organisation committed to its own liberal definition of the postwar world.

Within this discourse of US engagement with Unesco, the Organisation "would serve US ends through strictly technical international means devoid of partisan advantage."[140] At the same time, however, from the founding debates of Unesco onward it was clear that the United States delegation had an emergent 'governmental' approach to international cultural cooperation in mind, which differed from that of European participants such as Britain and France. In declaring an interest that Unesco be

[140] Preston, *Hope and Folly*, p. 41.

composed of official delegations, the US position actually sought to subordinate cultural, educational and scientific cooperation to political interests, and thereby limited the prospects for free debate and compromise between different viewpoints in practical terms. The articulation of this governmental paradigm conveyed the premise that US leadership was both necessary and legitimate for the viability of multilateral cultural cooperation itself. Both 'governmentalism' and the notion that US hegemony was indispensable to the ongoing viability of Unesco were emphasised as the US delegation sought to pursue Cold War antagonisms through Unesco during the late 1940s.

The year 1948 pivotal for both Unesco and American bilateral cultural and informational diplomacy in general. It witnessed the culmination of strands of foreign policy thinking within Washington that revived the discourse ideological struggle as the key rationale for US cultural and informational diplomacy. In January, 1948 cultural and informational diplomacy began to occupy a more prominent role in the spectrum of American foreign policy with the passage of the Smith Mundt Bill. However, for Congress to remain satisfied that cultural and informational diplomacy was relevant to US national interests the programs were somewhat divested of the progressive liberal sentiments that had initially shaped how US officials constituted Unesco's role.

Of the three case studies examined in this dissertation, the case of US Unesco policy most sharply illustrates how extensive and significant this discursive shift toward instrumentalism within US cultural and informational diplomacy was. The policy proposals that the US delegation put forward in Unesco in 1948 and 1950 represented the practical expression of an instrumentalist (rather than 'positive') view of the functions of multilateral cultural diplomacy and Washington's national interest in it. The notion of Unesco as a 'lever' in the global struggle against Communism, the dismissal of concerns that Unesco-sponsored 'information' might be construed as 'propaganda,' and the eventual rejection of non-governmentalism as a constitutive principle for Unesco were significant departures from the approach that characterised US cultural diplomacy during the Second World War and its immediate aftermath. By 1950, as Frank Ninkovich observes, within Washington's bilateral and multilateral cultural diplomacy programs:

> the rhetoric of idealism masked the pursuit of power...Although standard liberal prescriptions were clearly inadequate to treat postwar disorders, the accumulated force of tradition remained, and it was powerful enough to prevent the adoption of alternative policies and institutions based nakedly on the principles of power politics.[141]

Here, Ninkovich points to the enabling function that the rhetoric of idealism played, in that American policy-makers appeared to still see themselves as agents of liberalism and democracy, even despite the domineering diplomatic strategies that they resorted to within Unesco's organs. The significance of Unesco in my study is that it highlights the kinds of international responses that were elicited by the discursive constitution of America's posture of cultural and informational diplomacy during 1936-53. While the cases of bilateral cultural diplomacy and unilateral US information policy-making illustrate how discourses of US cultural and informational practices managed to sustain progressive *self*-representations of American foreign policy, when it came to convincing the other members of Unesco that US remained an 'internationalist' agent despite Cold War conditions, American rhetoric had considerably less purchase.

In the next chapter, which concludes this study, I shall explore the commonalities and contrasts across the case studies examined in this dissertation, and engage with the conceptual and theoretical implications of the historical findings of the foregoing chapters. In this discussion, I shall revisit the theoretical ideas explored in chapter one in order to specify some general conclusions that can be drawn from my case studies, and articulate possibilities for further research applying a constructivist theoretical framework to cultural and informational diplomacy.

[141] Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas*, p. 168.

CONCLUSION

> We've sold the world everything from soap to Senator Byrd's apples. We've sold them our machines and our technology. We've sold them our movies, our music, and our dentistry. We have sold them everything but the most important item of all, our spiritual heritage of freedom and our intense belief in it.[1]
>
> *Novus Ordo Seclorum.*[2]

Although many Americans believed there were significant moral and political grounds precluding Washington from utilising propaganda before 1945, the US cultural and informational diplomacy programs that were adopted during this time nevertheless turned out to be highly successful in communicating abroad the political, cultural and global values that America claimed to stand for. From a contemporary vantage point it is obvious that despite the apparent reluctance with which international persuasion practices were regarded, even by the officials that implemented them, the cultural and informational diplomacy programs undertaken by Washington in 1936-53 had a significant constitutive influence over America's changing global role during this phase.[3] To a great many of the world's people during the twentieth century, especially in the context of the Cold War, the United States came to symbolise the purest practical realisation of the political values of freedom, democracy, justice and prosperity that the world has seen. What I have sought to show in this study is that there are threads that connect the posture of reluctance initially articulated in relation to cultural and informational diplomacy to the global cultural and political hegemony that Washington has subsequently exercised. Once cultural and informational diplomacy gained initial acceptance as tools of foreign policy, US policy officials utilised policy discourse in such a way as to unlock deep reserves of American energy and idealism that could be brought to bear in US foreign policy at a broader level. Most importantly, this was because cultural and informational diplomats fashioned their work around a shared

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[1] William Benton, "Statement," *Expanded International Information and Education Program*, Hearing, 5 July, 1950; (Y4 1483 F76/2:In3/2); Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 5.
[2] Reverse of the Great Seal of the United States, translation: *a new order of the ages.*
[3] See, e.g. Joseph Joffe, "Who's Afraid of Mr. Big?" *The National Interest* 64, (Summer, 2001); Robert J. Lieber, and Ruth E. Weisberg, "Globalization, Culture, and Identities in Crisis," *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society* 16, (no. 2 2002).

vindicationist premise that by claiming a position of post-war global leadership, "America had the infinite privilege of fulfilling her destiny and saving the world."[4]

This study has sought to demonstrate that while it might seem that some vexatious, contradictory or even tangential ideas had been raised in policy-debates concerning US cultural and informational diplomacy in their founding phase, these debates provide a way to understand how Washington regarded the changing purposes and principles of American power at a broader level during the 1936-53 period. The historical material surveyed in the foregoing chapters shows, furthermore, that the articulation of two ideas was particularly important in unlocking Washington's capacity and enthusiasm to engage in cultural and informational diplomacy. These were political traditions situating America as a liberal political community and a historically exceptional nation. These two aspects of US political culture had strong rhetorical and symbolic currency as principles of American identity and foreign relations in the context of the cultural and informational programs themselves, and in relation to political and public audiences beyond them. These principles had important implications for the kinds of cultural and informational strategies that Washington adopted, as well as functioning to enable new conceptions of US grand strategy to be articulated and accepted at a broader level.

Because of their far-reaching and often contradictory nature, the policy debates that accompanied the formulation of American cultural and informational diplomacy during 1936-53 are an important source of insight onto the transformation of US foreign policy in this period. In debating what was the most desirable basis for Washington's international persuasion practices US policy-makers tended to situate cultural and informational diplomacy not simply as a co-optive tool of international influence to be pursued pragmatically, but also as a symbol of the American nation itself. Frequently there were contending interpretations of America and its national interests articulated in the course of cultural and informational policy debates, which attests to the overall significance of cultural and informational policy-making as a site at which US national interests were constituted and often contested in this phase of transition. US cultural and informational officials can also be observed rearticulating a shared conception of America and its rightful global role in response to the

[4] Woodrow Wilson cited in Anatol Lieven, *American Right or Wrong: An Anatomy of American Nationalism*, (London: Harper Perennial, 2004), p. 33.

momentous upheavals within the global order during 1936-53, particularly the rise of Soviet power during the late 1940s. Consequently, the foregoing chapters represent a survey of how US cultural and informational diplomats developed policy in response to their domestic political culture as well as the international context. I illustrate in the process that there was a prevalent tendency among US foreign policy-makers in 1936-53 to find the solution to international problems within the terms of America's own historical trajectory and domestic political culture.

The research questions that have guided this study were, firstly, how did officials articulate American cultural and informational diplomacy in the context of foreign policy-making during the 1936-53 period? Secondly, I asked to what extent these representations can be seen to have enabled the broader cultivation of international influence by Washington during 1936-53. In this concluding discussion I shall reflect on my findings in relation to these questions, and summarise the most significant features of the discourses that I have observed at work in shaping and constituting US cultural and informational practices.

I shall present these findings in relation to three key geographical regions, summarising below how the representation of US cultural and informational diplomacy shaped Washington's posture of engagement with the Third World (predominantly Latin America and Asia), the Soviet Union and Western Europe. In each section, the ways in which discursive narration, framing, predication and alterity functioned to structure and enable US cultural and informational diplomacy practices will be emphasised. I note, for example, that alterity is a particularly helpful concept for understanding how Washington came to regard the USSR as its moral and ideological antithesis after 1947-8, showing how the information programs and US involvement with Unesco were directed to ideological warfare on the strength of these representations. On the other hand, the narration of America and its relationship with other states took centre stage in enabling Washington to extend its influence to the Third World and affect the 'cultural modernisation' of less developed societies, particularly during the Second World War. The historical relationship between America and Europe was also a prevalent representation that was mobilised in the form of alterity, narratives and predicates in the post-war period as a justification for the extension of US power on that continent. I shall also show that US conceptions of Europe were multifaceted and played out in different ways at

different points within the 1936-53 period. After completing my summary of the discursive practices of US cultural and informational diplomacy in relation to the Third World, the USSR, and Europe, I shall turn to a summary of the ways in which US cultural and informational policy-makers represented America itself, in broad terms, according to the tenets of American liberalism and sensibility of exceptionalism.

In chapter one I indicated that this study has theoretical implications for constructivist approaches to IR, in that my analysis of discursive practices within the context of US cultural and informational diplomacy contributes to and extends the constructivist theorisation of the functions of language in foreign policy-making. I also emphasised that my analysis has implications for current debates on US 'soft power' and 'public diplomacy' within International Relations, and that the methodological approach I have used is intended to build a bridge between IR scholarship and existing debates within Diplomatic History on cultural practices and the nature of world order. In the second part of this conclusion I shall therefore reflect on the contributions that I have made to these three areas of academic debate, and on the possibilities for further research that have been opened by this study's approach and findings.

The Story of America: Narrating America's Cultural and Informational Influence

The genesis of US cultural diplomacy emerged from its relationships with the Latin American nations, and I have argued above that the 1936 provisions for US bilateral cultural exchanges within the Western Hemisphere became in key respects a template for the broader cultural diplomacy program that followed. Implicit within Washington's hopes that cultural diplomacy could foster prosperity and harmony in Latin America was a claim to American leadership and modernisation in relation to Latin America and the post-colonial world.[5] The rhetoric attached to the 1936 treaties fashioned a justification for cultural diplomacy from the underlying story of the self

[5] To reiterate a point that I emphasised in chapter two: I adopt the term 'modernisation' in relation to the discourses of US-Third World engagement in foreign policy-making deliberately, in order to draw parallels with the academic debates of the early Cold War within US political science. These discourses emphasised notions of social harmony, political stability and material development in the Third World. See, e.g.: Mark T. Berger, *Under Northern Eyes: Latin American Studies and US Hegemony in the Americas 1898-1990*, (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), pp. 13-4.

within American political culture. Hence, the 'New World' was scripted as the political template for less advanced societies, and within this logic it was possible for America's economic advancement and political liberalism to be benignly exported to nations still mired in the struggles of history and modernisation. This principle, often articulated as a justification of America's claim that Latin America was its legitimate sphere of influence, had long been in circulation within US foreign policy discourse. It informed the nineteenth-century Monroe Doctrine that sought to exclude European imperial influence from the Western Hemisphere, and was reframed as a principle of Hemisphere interdependence and interchange within the Good Neighbour Policy during the 1930s. By recalling that the US had been historically responsible for guaranteeing the independence and prosperity of the Western Hemisphere, and claiming that a special form of solidarity consequently existed between US and the other republics of the Hemisphere, the 1936 cultural agreements were conceptualised within the terms of an integrating, modernising narrative of the history of the Americas. Here, Washington's historical repudiation of imperialism and a liberal sentiment that power should not be overtly concentrated in US hands also informed how cultural and informational diplomacy was envisaged and articulated in relation to Latin America in these early years.

In policy documents American cultural diplomacy was articulated as being inherently attuned, as Cordell Hull put it in late 1939, to

> the fullest the contributions which each of us in the American family can make to the others...Never has there been greater realisation that each of us has much to contribute to the other; never has there been greater mutual respect or greater comprehension.[6]

Similarly, a report to the Congress of 1942 asserted that a community of interest and a shared 'New World' identity meant that US cultural diplomacy with Latin America would be inherently non-coercive and based on a posture of reciprocity. American cultural and educational activities in Latin America aimed for the:

> diffusion of understanding and mutual knowledge between the Americas through the establishment of personal relations

[6] Cordell Hull quoted in J. Manuel Espinosa, *Inter-American Beginnings of US Cultural Diplomacy 1936-1948*, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 140-1.

> between intellectual and scientific leaders of the New World. It seeks to assure that community of interests essential to the safety and well-being of the Western Hemisphere...It is hoped... that through a cumulative process of friendly contacts any barriers of cultural isolation between the Americas will be reduced and the main currents of thought and the outstanding contributions of the New World to sciences and letters be better understood.[7]

The framing of US cultural diplomacy within a community of interest, identity and solidarity within the New World permitted cultural diplomacy to be first countenanced as a possibility for US foreign policy, and helped to constitute Washington's broader posture of engagement with Latin American within the economic, political, military and cultural spheres in benign terms.

By situating their work as cultural diplomats according to the same progressive historical forces from which America's independent, liberal community had itself been born, US officials avoided the clear-eyed embrace of power politics that the pursuit of cultural influence within Latin America might otherwise have required. A liberal disinclination to exercise imperial dominance was frequently stated, in both public and confidential policy contexts, alongside this narrative of America's historical incumbency to exercise international influence. The US Secretary of State could thus confidently reassure the US people that Washington's cultural relations activities "would be non-political and non-patronising activities...[and] are truly the means of implementing a foreign policy of a democratic people whose national interest is the maintenance and orderly development of their democracy."[8] Reciprocity was a key framing principle for US cultural diplomacy in this period, in that it connected this broader narrative of America's liberal progressivism and exceptional history to practical policy initiatives.

As Tzvetan Todorov's work emphasises, narrative is a form of discursive practice encompassing descriptive, chronological and transformational elements that has important implications for how agents situate themselves and others in social contexts.[9] It is important to reflect on just how vivid this transformational vocabulary

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[7] Department of State, "The Program of the Department of State in Cultural Relations: A Report to the Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, Seventy-Seventh Congress, Second Session, January 1942," (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1942), p. 3.
[8] Edward R. Stettinius, "United States Programs for the Promotion of Mutual Understanding With Other Peoples of the World," *Department of State Bulletin* 2078, (March 4, 1944), p. 218.
[9] Tzvetan Todorov, "The 2 Principles of Narrative," *Diacritics* 1, (no. 1, Autumn 1971).

was during the early phases of the US cultural diplomacy program in relation to Latin America. As Stanley Hornbeck contended in 1942, global transformation and advancement was a key warranting argument for Washington's cultural and informational programs:

> It is not our American concept that there should be a static world or a frozen *status quo*. As a nation we have always had in mind the evolution of society, of political institutions, of economic instruments and devices accomplished through cooperation and conciliation, through the pacific settlement of controversies and through the general improvement of all conditions, national and international, by peaceful methods and processes.[10]

The New World/modernising narrative and reciprocity frame attached to US cultural diplomacy in the Latin American context informed the ways in which Washington constituted its role as the exemplar and agent of political and economic modernisation in other Third World contexts, notably China. In similar terms to the narration of political interdependence in the Western Hemisphere, the relationship between the US and China was plotted as part of a historical process of integration and identification. In this rendition American intervention in Chinese politics was enabled by virtue of America's qualities of modernity and democracy, and because it had a long-standing commitment to the repudiation of formal colonialism. This idea also informed wartime US cultural and informational programs in India, which gave obvious American support to the Indian independence movement even at the risk of sparking civil war and undermining the Allies' strategic position in the Pacific theatre.

US cultural and informational diplomacy to China presents a particularly interesting illustration of how policy-makers resolved the question of whether America's own firm commitment to democratic principles might be infringed by engaging in cultural diplomacy with authoritarian states was first debated. Here, cultural modernisation entered into the lexicon of US cultural diplomacy, in that it allowed democracy to be situated as the outcome rather than the proviso of US cultural engagement. As the material presented in the foregoing chapters has shown, by articulating America's modernising, democratising influence over China in this

[10] Stanley K. Hornbeck, "Why We are Fighting and For What," *Department of State Bulletin* 1745, (May 23, 1942), p. 462.

way Washington envisaged China becoming a regional power and partner to the US in post-war East Asia. The cultural programs were seen to be affecting, through the extension of technical assistance, information and cultural norms, "enlightened and far-sighted leadership" over China for the mutual benefit of the Chinese people, the US, and the broader East Asian region.[11] As Office of War Information guidelines contended, America's interest was in China's adoption of rational economic, educational and political beliefs akin to its own.

> To strengthen China internally, we must first of all try to convey to the Chinese a realisation of all the advantages to be derived from, and the techniques to be used for, the political organization of a country on a truly democratic basis. For this purpose we must present a picture of the workings of a genuine democracy elsewhere. We should also make plain the hope of the American people that China will develop toward real democracy in the political sense without interruption...[US policy should] convey a realisation of what the individual can gain from, and the techniques available for, the political organisation of a country on a truly democratic basis.[12]

The technocratic, modernising imperatives that were situated as the objective of US cultural and informational programs represent a manifestation of the vindicationist terms upon which Washington was beginning to constitute its interests in relation to the Third World. The vindicationist premise of US cultural diplomacy in this period also informed the ways in which the American delegation sought to direct Unesco toward 'realistic' or politically relevant projects in its post-war reconstruction and development activities, and scripted as an entitlement America's leadership position within the institution. As William Benton's statements most clearly illustrate, the reconstruction of war ravaged and Third World regions was to be undertaken

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[11] Joseph W. Ballantine, "Cultural Factors in the Far Eastern Situation," *Department of State Bulletin* 1740, (May 9, 1942), pp. 397, 402.

[12] Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, "Guidance for OWI Informational Work in Unoccupied China, October 24, 1944," pp. 1-2; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD. Strengthening the democratic consciousness, as well as appealing to the aspirations and emotions, of the Chinese people was also alluded to in an undated report by Gerald F. Winfield, "A Report on The Effect of OWI's Radio Program on Public Morale in Peiping During the Period of Japanese Occupation," (November 12, 1945), pp. 5-6; Records Relating to the China, Burma, India Theatre, 1942-5; Records of the Historian; Records of the Office of War Information, Record Group 208, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

according to the ideological template of the Western powers, specifically the US, that had won the war.[13]

As American fears about the advance of Communist influence in China intensified in the late 1940s, and in keeping with the broader script of ideological struggle that US policy-makers were articulating in response to the extension of Soviet power into Central Europe, America's effort to foster democratic progress in China was reconstituted as a geo-strategic necessity. As US political advisor John Fairbank had argued just a short time before the Communists seized power in China, Washington

> must offer Asia more explicitly some of the promise of American life which vitalizes our own faith and makes us inexorably opposed to totalitarianism. Where our main approach to post-war China has been economic, military, and political, we must now make it more vigorously ideological. Ideals are weapons which we have neglected. The ideal of a better life for the common people of Asia today is dynamite, whether or not Communists use it.[14]

The revolutionary conflict in China escalated rapidly between 1948 and 1949, culminating in the seizure of power by the Communist party led by Mao Zedong and the expulsion of the Nationalist regime to Taiwan. John Lewis Gaddis' recent work on US diplomatic history in this period has observed that many US officials countenanced and even accepted the prospect of a Communist regime in China before 1949.[15] However the revolution was a profound shock to the exponents of Chinese modernisation and democratisation within the US cultural programs, since they had constituted their work around the example of America's political development and presupposed that China was on a similarly unobstructed path to democratisation. US cultural diplomacy with China all but ceased as a consequence of these frustrated hopes, the information program was turned essentially to combative Cold War purposes, and the US sought to diplomatically isolate Communist China in Unesco and other multilateral frameworks. While American culture and informational

[13] William Benton, "Speech to the First General Conference of Unesco;" "General Conference 1st Session, Held at Unesco House, Paris, From 20 November to 10 December, 1946," http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0011/001145/14593e.pdf, p. 64; William Benton, "First General Conference of Unesco," *Department of State Bulletin* 2701, (December 1, 1946).

[14] John Fairbank, "Toward a Dynamic Far Eastern Policy," *Far Eastern Survey* 18, no. 18 (Special Issue: White Paper on China), p. 211. Article retained within the papers of Elmer Davis; Box 4; Papers of Elmer Davis; Library of Congress Manuscripts Division.

[15] John Lewis Gaddis, *We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), Ch. 3.

diplomats professed the liberal, reciprocal and open approach to engagement with the Third World, the China case illustrates that these had limits and a posture of leadership and entitlement to determine the ideological terrain of the post-war order was also emergent in the prevailing terms upon which US cultural and informational practices were constituted.

The Soviet Other: Logics of Alterity and the Cold War Protagonists

As was the case with the prevailing representations of Third World societies as objects of America's transformational, modernising imperatives, the representation of the Soviet adversary within the US cultural and informational programs drew the rhetorical device of narration. America's historical incumbency to use its cultural and ideological influence to foster stability and interdependence within the global order was prevalent in the articulation of US Cold War interests, although this was accompanied by a different set of presuppositions and categories of classification that constructed the USSR as the moral antithesis of America. In the construction of Cold War alterity, the USSR was situated in terms of equivalence with the United States in its capacity for global influence. Policy and legislative debates from late 1946 to early 1948 thus emphasised that America's failure to seize the ideological initiative in Europe had left the Soviet Union free to exercise its considerable capacity for cultural and intellectual expansionism. What distinguished the two superpowers was that the Soviet Union could be identified with the US in terms of its global influence and persuasive fervour, but was fundamentally estranged from the United States along a moral axis. As the propaganda scholar Ralf Block had suggested in 1950:

> the most important Soviet weapon, more important than its atomic weapon, is the vast illusion, fortified by an equally vast body of dogma, which Soviet imperial communism spreads through its world wide machinery. The latent idealism of peoples everywhere is the target of an ideological fabrication about the humanitarian objectives of Soviet communism unmatched by even the propaganda of Hitler or Goebbels.[16]

[16] Ralph Block, "Propaganda as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 3884, (June 19, 1950), p. 989.

Arguments such as Block's emphasising the sophistication and extensiveness of Soviet publicity techniques turned on prior self-representations of the US as a reluctant propagandist and the superior moral qualities that this reluctance implied. The shadowy, totalising nature of Soviet 'propaganda' was pitted as the antithesis of Washington's more modest, occasionally ineffective but truthful, democratic and unselfish approach to international 'information' and 'cultural exchange.'[17] As Robert Sherwood had asserted:

> Soviet propaganda today is both global and total. It is both voluntary and mercenary. It is centrally planned, but it is diversified in the channels through which it flows, and by the audiences it tries to reach. It is flexible though it operates within a definite set of premises. It pursues immediate- though often inconsistent- tasks, but has the unity of long-range aims. It is rational, though it appeals much more to the emotions, national sensitivities, and baser instincts.[18]

Washington, unlike the manipulative Soviet propagandists, mobilised information that appealed to the rational mind and to humanity's better nature. American ideals were classified not as a system of brainwashing but rather "as an ideology [only] in the sense of a set of beliefs in self-government and its corollaries." As such the key premise of US information was that "foreign peoples are to be influenced through their reason and their convictions against the false promises of Soviet communism."[19] As George Allen similarly assured the American public: "Our social, political, and moral patterns would not permit us to use the Soviet type of propaganda."[20] Yet despite these efforts in US policy discourse to construct the differences between *how* the USSR (with deceit) and the US (through freedom of information and truth) were seen to be propagating their ideas, it was frequently the very same principles of justice and freedom that were being claimed by the two superpowers.[21] The relation of alterity through which US policy-makers regarded the

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[17] See also Lewis Revey, "Holding the Political and Psychological Initiative," to Philips (first name unrecorded), (August 16, 1950), p. 2; Policy Papers and Meetings, 1949-50; Subject Files, 1947-50; Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, 1947-50; General Records of the United States, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park, MD.

[18] Robert E. Sherwood (1942) quoted in Alan M. Winker, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942-1945*, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1978), p. 18.

[19] Block "Propaganda as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," p. 989.

[20] George V. Allen "Progress of Human Liberty in Democratic Forms" *Department of State Bulletin* 3116, (April 11, 1948), p. 519.

[21] Nigel Gould Davies, "The Logic of Soviet Cultural Diplomacy," *Diplomatic History* 27, (no. 2, April, 2003).

Soviet Union thus also turned on the perversion of Western ideals within Soviet propaganda:

> Russia, through its clever propaganda in the past 30 years, has been selling the world a phony package. The Russians are the world's greatest plagiarists. They have stolen or bastardized the great ideas of the West- peace, democracy, justice, national independence- our phrases that exult and sing of our freedom, and corrupted them to the end of tyranny.[22]

Debates over the operational tone and approach that should be adopted within the US cultural and informational programs were thus far from marginal to the emergence of Washington's posture of Cold War antagonism. Distinguishing the US's approach in these *operational* terms enabled US informational and cultural officials to demarcate their political and ideological purposes from those of the USSR, and to articulate their claims to global public support on this basis.

The doctrine of freedom of information had strong resonance in this context, because it located the pursuit of American informational and cultural influence within the broader global democratising and emancipatory project that Washington had articulated during the post-war settlement. Archibald MacLeish had thus defined the free exchange of ideas as 'basic' to America's entire 'political doctrine,' while Joseph Grew had stated that one of America's urgent tasks in the post-war era was to see that information could be a 'force for good.'[23] In the case of Voice of America and Unesco policy, however, we have seen that nascent within the doctrine of freedom of information was the idea that the US should be *more free* to distribute its own information than exponents of Communism or Cold War neutrality. Speaking on the US's information policy, Secretary of State James Byrnes thus characterised Washington's international information policy in the following terms:

> While we adhere to the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs, we assert that knowledge of what other people are thinking and doing brings understanding; and understanding brings tolerance and

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[22] In this America would use both 'cold logic' and 'warm truth' against the Soviet propaganda onslaught. US Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, *Expanded International Information and Educational Program: Hearing, 5 July 1950*, p. 5; Y4 F76/2: In3/2; (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950).

[23] Archibald MacLeish, "Popular Relations and the Peace," *Department of State Bulletin* 2247, (January 14, 1945), p. 50; Joseph Grew, "Freedom of Information," *Department of State Bulletin* 2346 (June 17, 1945), p. 1098.

> willingness to cooperate in the adjustment of differences...[However] the policy of non-intervention in internal affairs does not mean the approval of local tyranny. Our policy is intended to protect the right of our neighbours to develop their own freedom in their own way. It is not intended to give them free reign to plot against the freedom of others.[24]

Once again, the seemingly innocuous exercise of articulating the information program's operating principles took on a broader constitutive significance in terms of America's global role. The orienting frames and premises of US information policy in relation to the Cold War continued to cast America as a liberal world power, even as Washington was taking more forthright practical steps to ensure that its own ideas reached international audiences.

The foregoing chapters have not supplied an account of the development of Washington's posture as a Cold War protagonist as a wholly straightforward or uncontested process, however. As a report on the cultural programs of 1947 noted, despite the pressures of global ideological conflict, forestalling Soviet propaganda did not necessarily have to detract from the 'positive project' of democracy-building and the fostering of international interdependence within the programs: "We do not need to abandon one objective in order to work toward the other."[25] There were many figures, such as Ben Cherrington and Archibald MacLeish, who were sceptical at the outset of the proposition that the US could engage in ideological warfare and remain true to its cherished political values. Proponents of the idea that the Voice's truthful and self-critical 'journalistic function' must be upheld, even under conditions of Cold War antagonism, thus cautioned that America's tone "should not be such as to create the belief that the US is conducting an ideological crusade...We should avoid entering into sterile ideological debates, blow for blow retaliation, or the use of propaganda patterns like those of the Soviet Union."[26] Interestingly, in the context of Unesco, where a post-colonial voting bloc emerged as an explicit challenge to America's efforts to make multilateral cultural cooperation a tool of ideological

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[24] James Byrnes, "Neighbouring Nations in *One World*," *Department of State Bulletin* 2419, (November 4, 1945), p. 709.

[25] W. R. Tyler, "Memorandum on an Overseas Information Service," Jan 7, 1946, p. 2; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park MD.

[26] "US Information Policy with Respect to Soviet Anti-American Propaganda Campaign," (no author), (November 13, 1949), pp. 2-3; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park MD.

conflict, there was less internal debate as to the appropriateness of America's Cold War posture. The overarching urgency of securing Unesco's compliance with US ideological objectives and an underlying sense of entitlement to lead the Organisation limited the scope for self-criticism and debate among the American Unesco staff.

As Frank Ninkovich has reflected, and as my survey of the history of US cultural and informational diplomacy in the late 1940s has also shown, liberalism remained the most intelligible script according to which the diplomacy of international persuasion was conceptualised in Washington during early Cold War. As my analysis of how the USSR was regarded in internal policy debates has shown, power politics and ideological rivalry could initially only be countenanced within the boundaries of this liberal discourse as Cold War antagonisms developed.[27] Longstanding representations of US liberalism and progressivism continued to license the pursuit of global cultural and informational influence, and in their own way actually deepened America's conviction that the Cold War struggle must be world-wide and totalising in scope. Framing US cultural and informational diplomacy according to the descriptors of liberalism, progress and freedom supplied a symbolic license, and often even symbolic inducement, for Washington to partake in the military interventionism, strategic containment and ideological warfare that comprised the Cold War more unreservedly than would otherwise have been the case.

In with the New (World): The Construction of Europe in US Cultural and Informational Diplomacy

The representations and propositions that accompanied US cultural and informational interactions with Europe were largely subsumed within a narrative of America as the New World in relation to its European progenitor during the 1936-53 period. A shared political and philosophical heritage as well as strong pre-existing religious and cultural ties played into US perceptions of its own privileged cultural and historical status in relation to Western Europe. Once again, the notion of America as the New World- a relational identity premised on the political failures of the European 'Old World'- predicated the approach that US cultural and informational policy-makers took in devising policies for Europe. Within US cultural

[27] Frank Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations, 1938-1950*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 'Epilogue.'

and informational discourse logics of alterity were at play in terms of how America's cultural and informational engagement with Europe was constituted. Equivalence was drawn between the US and Europe in terms of their complexity and philosophical heritage as international actors, but at the axiological ('value-judgement') level Europe remained in a stunted, unfulfilled and historically regressive ideological state. US public and intellectual debates about the political and moral implications of propaganda as a political practice, as I noted in chapter two, mobilised images of European imperial acquisitiveness and ethnic divisiveness to articulate a critique of propaganda within the terms of American political culture. After Washington had adopted practices of official political persuasion of its own and had been drawn into European politics by the war, the spiritual and political pathologies of Europe became a warranting argument in favour of American oversight of Europe's ideological reorientation.[28] The tragic spectacle of two world wars in the space of thirty years having been caused by European political and cultural antipathies was thus articulated as a basis to vindicate the position of economic, military and political influence the US occupied *vis-à-vis* Western Europe in 1945. In this context, implementing an American-authored vision of the post-war European economic and political order was entirely legitimate; American principles were

> capable of universal application as rules of national and international conduct. In their application by other nations and in willingness and preparedness on the part of all peacefully inclined nations to join together and make them effective lies the greatest hope of security, happiness, and progress for this country and all countries.[29]

As one British memorandum reflected in 1940, "[w]hat enabled [Washington] to put in the immense effort she did, was a wave of emotional enthusiasm, a desire to pass on to suffering Europe the blessings of freedom and democracy. Easy to sneer at, [but] not if the intensity of the effort is realised."[30]

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[28] Brands' characterisation of US international doctrines as veering from extreme reluctance to be involved internationally to extreme interventionism and embeddedness is illustrated here. H. W. Brands, "Exemplary America versus Interventionist America," in *At the End of the American Century: America's Role in the Post-Cold War World*, ed. Robert L. Hutchings, (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998).

[29] Cordell Hull, "Our Foreign Policy in the Framework of Our National Interests," *Department of State Bulletin* 1995, (September 18, 1943).

[30] B. Ward Perkins, "We Must Keep Our Regard for the Americans," (Februrary 8, 1940); CO/1745/9; UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.

The historian Max Lerner published a long treatise on US political culture during the 1950s that illustrates the historical frame through which US commentators and policy-makers had approached the post-war moment in relation to Europe. America had long regarded as its political culture as "the naked embodiment of the most dynamic elements of modern Western history," and as such it had always encompassed an "acceptance of the European ties and does not reject them."[31] As the State Department's Harley Notter had declaimed:

> It is in the 'New World' where a new dynamic culture has risen. The term means two things. It means the United States, where out of fusion of many transplanted cultures, plus the peculiarly influential culture of the original immigrants...an American culture has risen and has momentum.[32]

Notter went to assert that during the war the US had been forced to assume the mantle of defending and extending Western civilization against the Axis threat. This played into the emergence of America's posture of Cold War influence within Western Europe. A 1950 article on US information policy written by Ralf Block shows how the historical trajectory of US-Western European relations was reformulated in Cold War terms:

> By the trend of world events, rather than by design, the United States emerged from war in a position of power and authority. That position made unavoidable its assumption of responsibility in its own defence for survival of the concepts fundamental to Western civilization.[33]

Freedom was one of the most important underlying principles within the scripting of America's role as the fulfilment of the moral and political creeds of the West. In this context, freedom of information was articulated in the late 1940s in such a way as to

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[31] Max Lerner, *America as a Civilization: Life and Thought in the United States Today*, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1957), p. 65. See also Todorov's concept of alterity, which offers an interesting way to conceptualise this form of self-reflexivism. Tzvetan Todorov, *The Conquest of America: The Question of the Other*, trans. Richard Howard, (New York: Harper & Row,1982).

[32] Harley Notter, statement in: General Advisory Committee of the Division of Cultural Relations., "Planning for the Cultural Relations Program: Statement at General Advisory Committee of the Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State, Minutes of Meeting," (September 17-18, 1941), p. 62; Miscellaneous Subject Files 1939-1950; Records of Harley Notter; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park MD.

[33] Ralf Block, "Propaganda as an Instrument of Foreign Policy," *Department of State Bulletin* 3884, (June 19, 1950), p. 987.

mobilise the lexicon of Western values and simultaneously pave the way for the extension of American ideological influence in Europe in the context of the Cold War propaganda struggle. Economic freedom was similarly prevalent within the discursive construction of US cultural and informational influence in post-war Europe. By inculcating Allied occupied and war-devastated nations in the values of free markets and property ownership, US policy-makers saw the promotion of capitalism as having primacy in the post-war context as a foundation for European democracy and interdependence.

We have also seen in the foregoing chapters that American foreign policy-makers scripted their own practices as emblematically liberal by playing up the distinction between US cultural and informational diplomacy from the purposes of European colonial propaganda. This fundamental contrast between the exploitative European imperialism and Washington's emphasis on democracy, self-determination, and the repudiation of propaganda fed into the ways in which Washington articulated its post-war plans to the Third World, as well as into how Washington saw continental Europe's level of entitlement to exercise diplomatic influence in post-war institutions.[34] As the Cold War deepened the framing of Europe as acquisitive of diplomatic influence and exploitative of post-colonial states was applied to the policy positions taken by France, Italy and other social democracies in Unesco. French and Italian social democracy and Cold War neutralism were classified as 'bizarre,' irresponsible and deliberately obstructionist to an almost pathological degree in this context. Under the terms of American Cold War cultural and informational discourse, and the triangular alterity between the 'free world,' the Communist system and obstructive neutralism, the obstructions posed by continental European neutrality and social democracy were scripted as necessitating that Washington exercise greater global leadership. In this context, cultural and informational diplomacy was seen as a mechanism for Washington to point out to the European public that it was in the New World that the fulfilment of Western principles had actually taken place, and that it was America that could guarantee their freedom and prosperity for decades to come. Britain occupied a somewhat contradictory place in the context of this framework of US representations of cultural and informational diplomacy both to European publics, and in relation to the practices of European governments. On the one hand, British

[34] Niall Ferguson, *Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World*, (London: Penguin, 2004), pp. 351-2.

colonialism was depicted as an unjust system and informed how Washington's own plans for post-war decolonisation were presented to Third World publics. On the other hand, in relation to France's vision of Unesco as a bastion of 'high' culture and its subsequent expressions of Cold War neutrality, US diplomats frequently alluded to an 'Anglo-Saxon' solidarity between America and Britain in terms of their administrative and policy positions in relation to Unesco.

The transition in US cultural diplomacy from representing US culture as a 'democratic' alternative to Europe's rarefied, 'ethnic' and 'high' cultures to the promotion of America's own 'high' culture provides an interesting window onto Washington's changing view of its political and ideological interests in Europe. America's distinction from Europe was played up in the context of US cultural diplomacy during the early phase of the period studied here. The accessibility, lack of pretension and the inherent democracy embodied within American culture was initially cast as an advantage for Washington in seeking to appeal to the people of the Third World and to some sectors of the European public.[35] As one British memorandum from the mid 1940s had reflected, there was a palpably popular basis for US cultural diplomacy. There was a "very vigorous and 'American'" tone and an "extremely wide" definition of culture, with an emphasis on popular culture and 'practical' or 'technical' instruction rather than intellectual achievement.[36] However the idea that America could exercise intellectual and high cultural prestige in Europe that developed during the early Cold War was, in a significance sense, a claim to cultural *rapprochement* with the European nations as an equal. Just as Washington's broader diplomatic role was seen to have matured to the point where the US now guaranteed Europe's economic, political and strategic future, American cultural diplomacy discourse seemed, with this emphasis on high culture, to have turned

[35] In 1943 Waldo Leland thus defined the programs as concerned with "all intellectual, aesthetic, and educational interests" rather than those of elite cultural and intellectual practitioners. Waldo Leland, "International Cultural Relations: Historical Considerations and Present Problems," University of Denver Social Science Foundation Papers, 1943, p. 2; Box 2, File 28; Records of the Division of Cultural Relations (CU Papers); Special Collections & Manuscripts Library; University Arkansas at Fayetteville.

[36] Text of speech by Assistant Director of the US Division of Cultural Relations Willian Schurtz, and notes. Report of T M. Snow, report to Anthony Eden, (April 10, 1943); FO 371/34209, UK National Archives: Public Record Office, Kew.

toward a strident refutation of longstanding images of America as Europe's backward, coarse and superficial offshoot.[37]

As the foregoing discussion has suggested, cutting across all three geographical categories of American cultural and informational influence were discourses that affirmed America's repudiation of propaganda and its aspiration to exercise a moral, liberal progressive form of agency as a world power. In the face of the undemocratic connotations that had been attached to 'propaganda' during US public debates during the 1920s and 1930s, American foreign policy officials could only go about establishing programs of international persuasion in the 1940s by claiming that it was not the practice of persuasion as such that was problematic. Rather, it was their adoption by other acquisitive states in pursuit of 'power politics' or self aggrandisement and the tactics of deceit, manipulation and one-sidedness that they had developed. Contrastingly, American cultural and informational discourse was predicated by the fact that liberalism was taken as the foundational principle for US foreign relations. In the next section I shall thus reflect on the impact of the claims about the distinction between cultural and informational diplomacy and 'propaganda' that US policy-makers articulated. The practice of setting the US apart as an exceptional kind of agent in the realm of international persuasion was a symbolic move that actually enabled a much more far-reaching posture of hegemony to be contemplated in Washington than might otherwise have been if pragmatic propaganda was taken as the rationale for American cultural and informational diplomacy.

[37] A survey of these pejorative views of US culture in the decades before to the Cold War see: Richard Pells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans Have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture Since World War II*, (New York: Basic Books, 1987), p. 10-16. Of course, the projection of high culture was not without complexities and contestation in Washington. See, eg. Frank Ninkovich, "The Currents of Cultural Diplomacy: Art and the State Department 1938-1947," *Diplomatic History* 1, (no. 3, Summer 1977).

Exceptionalism and Liberalism: American Identity and the Practices of Cultural and Informational Diplomacy

The French sociologist Jacques Ellul remarked in 1965 that democratic governments were inherently 'ineffectual' at propaganda because "to the extent that the democratic propagandist has a bad conscience...he cannot do good work."[38] If we accept Ellul's terms, my study has shown how America's liberal 'conscience' was articulated, and thereby eased, by internal and public policy discourse. As William Hocking of Harvard University had argued during this period, to remain true to its values America would need to find an entirely 'new style' of international persuasion that reflected its liberal democratic principles.[39] Secretary of State George Marshall had similarly observed:

> I deplore the use of the world 'propaganda,' however technically correct that may be because it presumes, I think, and it certainly does for me, the feeling that you are engaged in cunning practise to put over your bill of goods...the most important principle in this matter...is that we confine ourselves to the truth, just the particular truth...it is most dangerous... [to use] any procedure which ha[s] the character of propaganda, as we sometimes think of it. I think any propaganda machine is an unfortunate thing for a government like ours to have set up.[40]

The discursive representation of US cultural and informational policy-making thus encompassed characterisations of propaganda as a 'threat to American virtue'[41] as a liberal power, with the US information and cultural programs to deliver their political message only 'indirectly.'[42] At the very least, the term propaganda required revision

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[38] Jacques Ellul, cited in Gary Rawnsley, *Radio Diplomacy and Propaganda: The BBC and VOA in International Politics, 1956-64*, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1996), p. 9.

[39] On Hocking's position see: J. Michael Sproule, *Propaganda and Democracy: The American Experience of Media and Mass Persuasion*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), pp. 178-81.

[40] George Marshall, "Statement," *Expanded International Information and Education Program*, Hearing, (July 5, 1950); (Y4 1483 F76/2:In3/2); Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 5.

[41] W. R. Tyler, W. R., to William T. Stone, "Notes on the OIC Program," (April 22, 1947), pp. 1-2; Records Relating to the International Information Activities, 1938-1953; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives, College Park MD.

[42] Overseas Operations Branch, Office of War Information, "Operational Guidance on OWI Documentary Films," (November 24, 1944), p. 1; Chronological File, 1944-45; Records of Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Cultural Relations, 1944-1945; General Records of the Department of State, Record Group 59; National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, MD.

or qualification when US policy-makers referred to their own work: hence, propaganda "coming from America, with unmistakable American sincerity, is by far the best form of propaganda."[43] This was because US policy-makers tended to see their work as "the natural expression of the democratic principles on which and for which we stand...to build the good life which flows across national boundary lines." American politics and culture were an example for "democratically minded people" across the world to interact under conditions of "cultural exchange- not cultural penetration."[44]

Taken together, the diplomatic histories of the bilateral cultural relations, international radio, and Unesco programs surveyed within my study tell a story about the ways in which Washington's liberal attributes as a cultural and informational agent provided crucial symbolic license in the pursuit of influence through cultural and informational diplomacy. It has been a key finding of this study to note how the process of easing America's 'bad conscience' over the illiberal implications of propaganda, actually generated a more expansive and transformational rendition of Washington's foreign policy interests that encouraged the adoption of a posture of global hegemony after 1945.[45] Articulating alternative categories for US foreign policy practices such as 'cultural diplomacy' and 'informational diplomacy' rested on shared assumptions about the singularity of American political culture, and thus about the privileged, internationalist character of US national interests themselves. Even during the Cold War, I have shown in the foregoing case studies that Washington's considerably more strident, instrumental, selective and even distorting approach to the diplomacy of information and culture could be valorised as politically unselfish, morally benign, and a source of historical renewal and progress. The emergence of Washington's posture of Cold War ideological struggle represents one of the most important themes within this study because it is during the Cold War that the symbolic license and inducement supplied by the discourses of liberalism and

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[43] Sherwood quoted in Alan Winkler, *The Politics of Propaganda: The Office of War Information 1942-1945*, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 1987), p. 76.

[44] Report of the Chair of the Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange cited in Henry J. Kellerman, Cultural Relations as an Instrument of US Foreign Policy: The Educational Exchange Program Between the United States and Germany 1945-1954, (Washington DC: US Government Printing Office, 1987), p. 7.

[45] See also, Ninkovich, *Diplomacy of Ideas*, pp. 168-9. As Alan Winkler has reflected, the policies and messages adopted within cultural and informational diplomacy programs in the 1938-45 period "revealed what the nation considered important as it strove to reconcile its basic values and the requirements of war." Winkler, *Politics of Propaganda*, p. 7.

exceptionalism seems most apparent. Reinhold Niebuhr's reflections that America's ideals constituted both its greatest asset and its gravest peril in acting upon the world stage provide a prescient way of summing up this finding, and thus bear quoting at length.

> Our moral perils are not those of conscious malice or the explicit lust for power. They are the perils which can only be understood if we realise the ironic tendency of virtues to turn into vices when too complacently relied upon; and of power to become vexatious if the wisdom which directs it is trusted too confidently. The ironic elements in American history can be overcome, in short, only if American idealism comes to terms with the limits of all human striving, the fragmentaries of all human wisdom, the precariousness of all historic configurations of power, and the mixture of good and evil in all human virtue... [Our] idealism is too oblivious of the ironic perils to which human virtue, wisdom and power are subject. It is too certain there is a straight path toward the goal of human happiness; too confident of the wisdom and idealism which prompt men and nations toward that goal; and too blind to the curious compounds of good and evil in which the actions of the best men and nations abound.[46]

In the next section I shall assess the implications of my argument and approach in relation to existing literature within International Relations and Diplomatic History, and suggest how this work has opened scope for further research into the significance of cultural and informational diplomacy as sites through which states constitute their identities.

Discourses of Attraction: Theoretical Implications of the Representation of America in Cultural and Informational Diplomacy and Implications for Further Research

This study has been situated within a strand of International Relations literature that seeks to demonstrate how language is productive of agency in international political life and social contexts in general. Discourse analysis draws attention to the meanings and understandings through which foreign policy objectives and approaches are formulated, and seeks to show how in the process of articulating

[46] Reinhold Niebuhr, *The Irony of American History*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1952), p. 133.

present conditions particular courses of action become possible while others are implicitly deemed unacceptable or rendered unthinkable. The most important general theoretical implication of this study is that while the discursive practices and constructivist literature had not hitherto been applied to the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy, significant and new analytical insights can be gained in doing so. In the process I also sought to bridge the divide between the cultural turn in Diplomatic History and constructivist International Relations scholarship by drawing extensively on the existing research and theoretical arguments within these historical debates.

Existing constructivist perspectives on the function of discourse in foreign policy have addressed a range of cases and processes, but most often these have been undertaken with the objective of assessing how state identity-formation represents a process of estrangement between the national 'self' and threatening, international 'others' by charting the articulation of 'threats,' 'crises' and 'insecurity' in foreign policy discourse.[47] This study has highlighted how progressive/pluralist logics representing the US as a locus for persuasion, attraction and renewal were developed as a response to the conditions of insecurity and disorder that the US confronted during the1936-53 period. I have thus shown that the articulation of the American 'self' did not always seek to estrange, distance or find threatening the international 'other.'[48] Similarly, while my focus has largely been on the constitutive functions of foreign policy discourse within Washington, my analysis in chapter five has sought to show that although it is often overlooked by scholars of international organisations, Unesco presented a forum in which perhaps the earliest instance of counterbalancing against US hegemony took place.

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[47] Roxanne Lynn Doty, *Imperial Encounters: The Politics of North-South Relations*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996); David Campbell, *Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity*, rev. ed. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1998); Iver Neumann, *Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study of Identity and International Relations*, (London: Routledge, 1996); Jacinta O'Hagan, "'The Power and the Passion': Civilizational Identity and Alterity in the Wake of September 11," in *Identity and Global Politics: Empirical and Theoretical Elaborations*, eds. Patricia M. Goff and Kevin C. Dunn, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004); Jutta Weldes, "The Cultural Production of Crises: US Identity and Missiles in Cuba," in eds. Jutta Weldes, et. al., *Cultures of Insecurity: States, Communities, and the Production of Danger*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).

[48] Christina Klein, *Cold War Orientalism: Asia in the Middlebrow Imagination, 1945-1961*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003); Lene Hansen, "The Clash of Cartoons? The Clash of Civilizations? Visual Securitization and the Danish 2006 Cartoon Crisis," Paper presented at the 48th Annual International Studies Association Convention, Chicago, USA, February 28- March 3 2007.

It is hoped that in bringing a constructivist theoretical framework to bear on the practices of cultural and informational diplomacy I have demonstrated that there is further scope for analysing the constitutive functions of discourse within cultural and informational diplomacy in relation to other historical periods and agents. Two avenues in particular for extending my constructivist approach to the study of cultural and informational diplomacy have, in my view, been illuminated in the preceding chapters. Firstly, in chapter two I noted how British official and public attitudes to 'propaganda' during the inter-war period reflected similar elements of liberal reluctance to those propounded across the Atlantic. Although Phillip M. Taylor and Nicholas Cull have both provided some particularly insightful historical research into the history of British propaganda, there is scope to assess how discourses of liberalism were used in the constitution of British cultural and informational foreign policy, and how this differed from the American case.[49] Further research might also usefully be undertaken within a constructivist conceptual framework on the competition that arose between British Imperial and American information agencies in Asia during the Second World War, as they sought to convey their contending visions for post-war order.

Having analysed how discourses of cultural and informational influence shaped the way in which Washington pursued a posture of hegemonic engagement at a broader level after 1945, the second implication of my study is the significance of vindicationism as a constitutive principle in US foreign policy and the light this finding sheds on Washington's contemporary foreign policy challenges. It is striking that similar grammars of American vindication to those identified in my study are echoed in the premises that Joseph Nye and others situate as the basis of America's global cultural and political attractiveness in the contemporary period. It seems clear that assertions of US cultural universalism continue to shape US foreign policy discourse, especially in relation to the concept of American soft power:

> when a country's culture includes universal values and its policies promote values and interests that others share, it increases the probability of obtaining its desired outcomes because of the

[49] Phillip M. Taylor, *British Propaganda in the Twentieth Century: Selling Democracy,* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1999); Nicholas Cull, *Selling War: The British Propaganda Campaign Against American 'Neutrality' in World War II,* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).

relationships of attraction and duty that it creates.[50]

These assumptions are not Nye's alone; the concept of soft power has resonance because it fits in with established patterns of characterising America and its claims to influence within the international system. Yet as my study has sought to show, the language in which foreign policy is characterised and debated is powerful. Language shapes how agents think and act, and in the case of Washington's cultural and informational diplomacy in the late 1940s expansive claims and universalist rhetoric became a substitute for self-criticism and compromise. As US policy-makers and the foreign policy commentary community grapple with the contemporary challenge of how America might once again build trust and legitimacy within foreign public opinion, they might do well to recall that the celebration of virtue, particularly one's own, can easily slip into the vice of hubris.

[50] Joseph Nye, *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics*, (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 11

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